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In Byzantium, usurpation was made possible by the conflict between hereditary-dynastic and 
meritocratic-republican theories of rulership. Legitimacy was founded upon subjective 
notions of idealized moral-behavioural norms drawn from the imperial virtues and Christian 
ideology. Authority could be challenged when it was perceived to deviate from these norms. 
Investitures transformed a usurper from a private individual to an emperor on the 
basis of ratification by popular consent. The historic ritual of reluctance allowed emperors 
to present themselves as ‘moral ideals’ at the moment of proclamation, ridding them of 
blame for a usurpation. 
Guilt and sin were inevitable byproducts of usurpation, but imperial repentance 
facilitated an expiation and legitimized imperial authority in relation to moral ideals. On 
occasion a usurper’s successors would perform repentance on his behalf, freeing the dynasty 
from the sins of its foundation. 
The treatment of defeated usurpers could take a variety of forms: reconciliations 
enabled a peaceful ‘healing’ of the community. Political mutilations transformed the 
victim’s appearance and rendered him ‘other’ in an attempt to demonstrate his immorality 
and illegitimacy. Degradation parades inverted recognised investiture rites in order to 
permanently alter a victim’s identity and reveal him to be a tyrant, acting against the interests 
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A Note on Transliteration 
As the present work must frequently refer to technical terms as well as the names of people, 
places, and institutions that were not originally written with the Latin alphabet in mind, a 
few words on transliteration are required. No single system of transliteration is universally 
acceptable for a work that covers more than a thousand years of ‘Byzantine’ Roman history. 
When transliterating Greek names and terms I have, in general, attempted to render them as 
literally as possible and without Latinisation (e.g. vestiarios and Komnenos rather than 
bestiarius and Comnenus). Some exceptions have been made in the interest of textual clarity 
or where the substitution of names and terms would become particularly awkward. An 
attempt has also been made to reflect the historical use of both Greek and Latin as 
administrative languages of the empire. To this end, names and terms will generally take 
their Latin form for the period before the accession of Herakleios, and the Greek form 
thereafter (e.g. Leo II, but Leon III). An exception to this rule is the name Constantine, that 
of the first Christian emperor, which held a certain prestige in Byzantine historical thought 
and evoked ideas of imperial renewal. For Arabic, Slavic, and other non-Greek and non-
Latin names and terms, transliteration follows that of the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 
wherever possible.  
Quotations in the main text are generally provided in translation. Extended 
quotations in Greek or Latin are restricted to footnotes. Some contradictions and 
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The glory of ruling makes all things permissible. 
If Andronikos, perhaps, swore an oath to his Alexios, 
Still he took the sceptre himself from his murdered nephew. 
As heir to the kingdom, he did not scruple to violate the honour of his oath, 
That old man who was a fugitive under Manuel.1 
 
Pietro da Eboli employed these lines as a moral denigration of the Sicilian usurper Tancred 
de Lecce (r.1189-1194), an illegitimate grandson of Roger II. They were well-chosen since 
the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos I (1183-1185) was then notorious as an 
exercise in oppression, terminated by his popular overthrow.2 Pietro’s choice of Tancred’s 
prototype suggests a derisive view of Byzantine political culture: Andronikos had broken 
oaths and murdered his nephew to seize the throne, but was still permitted to rule. In 
Byzantium, Pietro implies, wrongdoers like Tancred-Andronikos exploited an immoral and 
autocratic political system which lacked clear rules of succession. The attainment of real 
power, ‘the glory of ruling,’ justified and permitted any wrongdoing. Rather than accepting 
the inferred orderly successional procedures of the west, Tancred embraced Byzantine 
practice, to his family’s ruination.3 An eighth-century Chinese visitor to Byzantium had 
similarly criticised the political system,4 and even the relatively modern association of 
‘Byzantine’ with ‘political intrigue’ perpetuates the appraisal.5 
                                                 
1 Gloria regnandi cuncta licere facit. / Andronicus si forte suo iuravit Alexi, / Ipse cruentato sceptra nepote 
tulit. / Heredem regni fidei maculare pudorem / Non puduit profugum sub Manuele senem. Pietro da Eboli, 
Liber ad honorem Augusti, 104-105. 
2 For the image and reception of Andronikos’ reign in western medieval historiography, see Neocleous 2012; 
Pontani 2003. 
3 For a summation of the events surrounding Tancred’s usurpation, and the political situation in Sicily in this 
period, see Houben 2002: 172-175. 
4 ‘Their emperors are not men who last. They choose the most capable and put him on the throne; but if a 
misfortune or something out of the ordinary happens… they all at once depose the emperor and put another in 
his place.’ Xin T’ang shu quoted in Hirth 1985: 55. 
5 The historiography of Byzantine studies, and the reception of Byzantium during and after the enlightenment, 
have proven popular subjects in recent decades. Disavowals and refutations of Edward Gibbon’s reductive 
view that Byzantine history was a ‘tedious and uniform tale of weakness and misery’, Hegel’s summation that 





The present work seeks to examine some of the perceived moral and legitimising 
implications associated with usurpation and imperial authority. Did ‘the glory of ruling’ 
make all things permissible? Why was usurpation accepted in Byzantium? And how was 
imperial authority communicated, challenged, or reinforced by reigning emperors and 
usurpers in the context of its contestation? Through close reading of the literary-rhetorical 
and ritual evidence of the Byzantine narrative histories it will explore the normative 
behaviours and ideologies of rulership that influenced these contests. 
The study is divided into seven chapters relating to discrete stages in the process of 
usurpation. It considers events from the instigation of a conspiracy to the moment of 
coronation from several perspectives. The mechanisms and ideologies that permitted 
usurpation, and the rhetorical justifications that were employed to legitimise a usurper’s 
actions via appeals to dominant socio-political and ideals of moral rulership are discussed. 
It then explores the significance of ritual and symbolic investitures and their perceived 
‘transformative’ value for a usurper as emphasised in the narrative histories. The ideological 
model of the ‘reluctant emperor’ is adduced as evidence of how ritual investitures and 
imperial ideals were combined to render a usurper a paragon of ‘moral rulership’. Ultimately, 
this allows us to explore Byzantine conceptions of imperial authority in the context of civil 
wars, from the perspective of contemporary propaganda, ritual, and the narrative tradition. 
The meritocratic notions of popular consensus and election, stemming from the empire’s 
republican past, it will be argued, remained essential to the imperial office, allowing 
usurpation to be justified in spite of autocratic and hereditary-dynastic propensities. The 
study then addresses Byzantine reactions to usurpation in terms of the perceived moral 
consequences. It examines the sources of guilt and the methods adopted by successful 
                                                 
views, represent something of a topos in the prooimia of modern scholarly works. On the reception of 
Byzantium, see Haarer 2010, including a discussion of the views of Gibbon and his contemporaries. See also, 





usurpers to communicate their repentance for the misdeeds committed in coming to power. 
It argues that socio-ideological developments in the ninth and tenth centuries rendered 
imperial atonement a normative feature of admittedly violent usurpations, and a necessary 
political consideration for subsequent ‘new dynasties’, including a usurper’s successors. 
Finally, this study considers the treatment of defeated opponents in terms of the range of 
punitive methods recorded in the histories. It shows that these were adapted to contemporary 
circumstances and sensibilities but consistently communicated to observers the legitimacy 
of the reigning emperor and the moral inferiority of the victim. The role of consensus politics 
in rituals of degradation is also discussed. 
 
Initial considerations 
An immediate concern for any study regarding ‘usurpation’ is the term itself. Since 
Byzantium lacked a codified constitution, the fundamental question ‘What constitutes an 
Emperor?’ is fraught with uncertainty.6 After the implementation of Constantinopolitan-
based inauguration rituals can we include any person proclaimed in the field? Or only those 
who received a coronation? Do we consider emperors temporarily dispossessed of the capital 
by a rival who was recognised by the senate to remain emperors, or be reclassified as 
usurpers? In the aftermath of the loss of Constantinople in 1204 who among the numerous 
claimants should be considered the ‘legitimate’ emperor? Furthermore, can we be certain 
that what we consider today as usurpation had the same semantic value in then contemporary 
thought?7 
Modern definitions of usurpation are inherently pejorative since they imply that an 
                                                 
6 Lilie 2008: esp. 212, considers some of the difficulties of answering this question. 





individual had no right to do or be something.8 Byzantine vocabulary lacked a direct 
equivalent but possessed approximations. For the Ancient Greeks, the term ‘τύραννος’ 
delineated a leader who acted in a politically or socially immoral fashion, but it held no 
connotations of a lack of legitimation. By Late Antiquity it was employed to describe 
challengers of imperial authority who failed to overthrow a reigning emperor; thus 
connecting it with legitimacy via success/failure. Both uses were retained throughout the 
Byzantine period.9 Other expressions existed: ἀνταπαιτητής, a ‘counter-claimant’; 
ἀποστάτης, a ‘rebel’ against the legal authority; σφετεριστής, an ‘appropriator’; νεώτερος, 
‘innovators’ or ‘revolutionaries’; and αὐθέντης, independent rulers or ‘separatists’.10 The 
Byzantine terminology of usurpation thus held legitimist connotations, and even accounts 
favourable to a usurper might employ these terms until real power had been assumed.11 
Furthermore, this terminology was not restricted to internal political disputes: proto-national, 
separatist, and ethnic rebellions were described in the same terms. Essentially every 
conceivable uprising was covered. 
The present study limits itself to internal political conflicts and seeks to avoid 
excessive prejudicial and legitimist biases.12 Consequently, a usurper is hereafter to be 
understood as a person who had not been authorised to claim the imperial title with the 
express permission of the preceding emperor; or, when an emperor had already died, claimed 
the title without the authorisation of the empress or senatorial election. It does not suggest 
that a particular person had ‘no right’ to claim basileia, merely that their claim had not been 
recognised by the preceding administration. An emperor is one whose authority was 
                                                 
8 Thus, ‘the term “usurper” describes the potentate who has come to power by violating existing concepts of 
legitimacy.’ Schwedler 2010: 360. See also, Schwedler and Tounta 2010: 351-352. 
9 Schwedler 2010: 365; Szidat 2010: 47. 
10 On these terms, see Schwedler and Tounta 2010: 351-352; Penna and Morrisson 2013: 21-22. 
11 Anna Komnene twice calls her father an ‘apostates’ in the course of her narrative of his rebellion against 
Nikephoros III: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 62, 69 (trans. Frankopan 56, 62). On the 
legitimist connotations of the terms, see Cheynet 1990: 178. 





accepted by the bureaucratic institutions of state, via appointment at Constantinople (after 
the fourth century) or due to promotion by a predecessor.13 These definitions allow us to 
view the phenomenon of usurpation from the perspective of the imperial office itself, but 
they present some apparent peculiarities. For example, the Macedonian Empress Theodora 
is now considered a usurper of Michael V’s throne, and Alexios III, from whom Theodoros 
I claimed authority, is subsequently deemed an attempted usurper of Theodoros’ throne.14  
As we are investigating imperial representation, the diffusion of imperial ideology 
within the empire, the term ‘propaganda’ will be used repeatedly. Its modern associations 
with totalitarian regimes are to be abandoned; instead it should be understood as ‘the 
systematic propagation of information or ideas by an interested party, esp. in a tendentious 
way in order to encourage or instil a particular attitude or response.’15 Propaganda opened a 
dialogue with a target audience in an attempt to promote a particular understanding of an 
ideology. Since ideology is a dynamic concept, this dialogue was ongoing and varied 
between socio-political groups.16 To an extent, ideology was constructed through this 
dialogue: this does not mean that all persons were ‘consulted’, but that emperors were 
attuned (not least for reasons of self-preservation) to the varied expectations of their 
subjects.17 This will inform our discussion throughout. 
This study explores political thought and ritual behaviours primarily through the lens 
                                                 
13 Thus, before Constantinople became a factor for rulership, rival emperors who received a proclamation are 
considered usurpers in this study until they successfully deposed the existing regime. Consequently, the 
promotion of Julian, in the fourth century, is considered a usurpation until his accession was recognised by 
Constantius II, an appointed successor of Constantine I (Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 20.5-8; 
Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 50-52); and after 1204, we deem Theodoros I to be the ‘legitimate’ 
emperor from the perspective of the imperial office itself, since his authority was derived from his appointment 
as despotes (then essentially heir-apparent) by his father-in-law, Alexios III – who did not cease to claim the 
imperial title until his capture and blinding in 1211, but who had been captured by the Latins in 1205 (see, 
below, page 116, footnote 570). This categorisation is not wholly satisfactory given the subjective nature of 
usurpation but provides structure for our analysis of the imperial office. 
14 We also deem Constantine VII to be a usurper against the Lekapenoi under this formulation. 
15 Manders 2007: 279, also commenting on the relative applicability of the term to ancient and medieval 
contexts, with references to recent discussions in the secondary literature. 
16 Manders 2007: 277-278. 





of the narrative histories. It allows these narratives to determine those elements that were 
considered more, or less, important at each stage of usurpation. The justificatory, ritual, and 
ideological elements their authors deem most important, and choose to elucidate, form the 
basis of our discussion. Instead of looking to rhetorical works addressed to emperors in order 
to understand how the imperial position, ideology, and usurpation were intended to be 
understood, and therefore simply repeating political ideas espoused by the regime itself, we 
try to move as far from the regime as possible by examining sources that were not (in most 
cases) directly addressed to emperors, and which were relatively free to provide critical 
assessments of, and ideological reactions to, historic events whilst still providing a record of 
an emperor’s propagandist efforts. In this way we can seek to assess the relative 
pervasiveness and persuasiveness of imperial ideology and propaganda upon certain sections 
of society or particular authors (representatives of certain sections of society). The personal, 
political, and cultural biases and concerns of these authors, and the textual traditions of their 
narratives must also be taken into account. But these demonstrate the potential plurality of 
political thought. Naturally, material culture, legal codes, chrysobulls and prostagma, 
rhetorical sources, and other literary works, will be used to support or challenge the 
arguments arising from the narrative histories.  
Due to the disparate survival of source materials, and the details preserved within, 
certain periods receive greater coverage than others. The tenth to thirteenth centuries are 
especially well-documented, coincide with an increase in the incidence of political 
conspiracies, and therefore receive particular attention in this study. Developments in 
ideology and normative behaviours are a recurrent theme of this work, and the Roman past 
will also be adduced, but given this historical scope there is a danger of minimising subtle 
changes over time or seemingly perpetuating notions of wholly unchanging practices and 





II. USURPATION: MECHANISMS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
Although coup-d’états were not uncommon in the late antique or medieval worlds, 
Byzantium was unique in terms of the number of emperors deposed and the frequency with 
which power was challenged. In the period 306-1453 approximately one third of senior 
emperors acceded through force or intrigue, one third through influential socio-political 
supporters, and one third through dynastic succession or election.18 In the eastern empire, 
forty-four usurpations were successful in promoting an emperor whose authority was 
recognised by the institutions of state.19 Only fifteen established a succession upon death, by 
no means ensuring ‘dynastic’ longevity.20  
A precise count of conspiracies targeting emperors is necessarily provisional; 
frustrated by insufficient source coverage and ambiguities concerning the particular 
objectives of an intrigue.21 However, we may include hundreds of nascent conspiracies and 
attempted usurpations.22 Although each was unique, these attempts may be categorised in 
three ways: ‘military interventions’, comprising the intrusion of an armed force from outside 
the capital; ‘uprisings’ on the streets of Constantinople, involving some section(s) of the 
                                                 
18 Lilie 2008: 212-213, provides the first quantitative discussion of Byzantine successional practices. The 
present study qualifies usurpation in slightly different terms to Lilie but is roughly in agreement about the 
statistical evidence. 
19 These were: Constantine I (306), Julian (361), Basiliscus (475), Phocas (602), Herakleios (610), Konstans II 
(641), Leontios (695), Tiberios III (698), Justinian II (705), Philippikos-Bardanes (711), Artemios-Anastasios 
II (713), Theodosios III (716), Leon III (717), Artabasdos (741), Eirene Sarantapechaina (797), Nikephoros I 
(802), Michael I (811), Leon V (813), Michael II (820), Basileios I (867), Romanos I (919), Constantine VII 
(944/945), Nikephoros II (963), Ioannes I (969), Michael IV (1034), Theodora and Zoe (1042), Theodora 
(1055), Isaakios I (1057), Constantine X (1059), Michael VII (1071), Nikephoros III (1078), Alexios I (1081), 
Andronikos I (1183), Isaakios II (1185), Alexios III (1195), Alexios IV and Isaakios II (1203), Alexios V 
(1204), Theodoros I (1205), Michael VIII (1259/1261), Andronikos III (1328), Ioannes VI (1347), Andronikos 
IV (1376), Ioannes V and Manuel II (1379), Ioannes VII (1390); and see Table 1. 
20 These were: Constantine I, Herakleios, Konstans II, Leon III, Nikephoros I, Michael II, Basileios I, Michael 
IV, Zoe and Theodora, Constantine X, Alexios I, Theodoros I, Michael VIII, Andronikos III, and Ioannes V 
and Manuel II. On the practical difficulties and statistical unlikelihood of establishing and maintaining a 
dynasty, see Lilie 2008; Dagron 2003: 13-35.  
21 On these problems, see Wright 2017: esp. 287. 





population; and ‘palace coups’, originating within, and usually confined to, court circles. 
The viability of these typologies and the particular mechanisms employed for each were 
adapted to contemporary political circumstances, meaning that different patterns of 
usurpation emerge in different periods. 
From the third century, military interventions were the most common method of 
assuming power.23 Constantine I, who had come to power through civil war, provided a 
ready precedent as the emperor par excellence in Byzantine thought, and numerous emperors 
claimed to be restoring political order in the guise of a ‘New Constantine’.24 Twenty-three 
usurpers were successfully installed by the military between 306 and 1453.25 However, 
between Constantine’s death and the violent usurpation of the soldier-emperor Phocas (602), 
only Julian and Basiliscus were able to oust a senior emperor; both were imperial family 
members.26 After Phocas, military involvement in successful usurpations predominated for 
the next hundred-and-forty years: nine of the sixteen emperors in this period were installed 
by military intervention.27 Thereafter, due to changing social and administrative structures, 
                                                 
23 For a comprehensive list of Byzantine civil wars (followed by the current author), see Treadgold 2006: 230-
233. 
24 Magdalino 1994. 
25 These were: Constantine I (306-337), Julian (361-363), Phocas (602-610), Herakleios (610-641), Konstans 
II (641-668), Tiberios-Apsimaros (698-705), Justinian II (705-711) [second reign], Philippikos (711-713), 
Theodosios III (716-717), Leon III (717-741), Artabasdos (741/2-743), Leon V (813-820), Romanos I (920-
944), Nikephoros II (963-969), Isaakios I (1057-1059), Nikephoros III (1078-1081), Alexios I (1081-1118), 
Andronikos I (1183-1185), Andronikos III (1328-1341), Ioannes VI (1347-1354), Andronikos IV (1376-1379), 
Ioannes V and Manuel II (1379-1390, and 1390-1425), and Ioannes VII (1390).  
26 Constantius II had promoted Julian to replace Gallus as Caesar in November 355. Helena, Constantius’ 
sister, married Julian to solidify the promotion. In February 360 he was proclaimed Augustus by the troops in 
Gaul and went to war with Constantius: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 20.5-8; Zonaras, Epitome, 
ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 50-52. Basiliscus was the brother of the empress-dowager Verina. He successfully 
assumed the throne in Constantinople (475-476) after winning the support of the Ostrogoth troops under 
Theodoric Strabo, and the Isaurians under Illus. Basiliscus and Verina, with the support of the magister 
officiorum Patricius, and the magister militum per Thracias, convinced Zeno that he would be assassinated if 
he did not flee Constantinople. Zeno’s supporters in Constantinople were then slaughtered by Basiliscus’ allies. 
Basiliscus was crowned emperor, and Strabo and Illus were sent after Zeno. Zeno soon realised the treachery 
and rallied his Isaurian loyalists in effort to retake the throne. Basiliscus’ overthrow was achieved when Strabo 
and Illus realised they had more to gain from Zeno than Basiliscus and switched allegiances. Evagrius 
Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 100-108 (trans. Whitby 132-142); Malalas, 
Chronographia, ed. Thurn 301-303 (trans. Jeffreys 209-210). On the circumstances of the usurpation, see 
Heather 1991: 272-273. 
27 Between 610 and 743 military intervention resulted in the accessions to sole rule of Herakleios, Konstans II, 
Tiberios-Apsimaros, Justinian II [second reign], Philippikos, Theodosios III, Leon III, Artabasdos, and 





most usurpers were members of the aristocracy. They were normally high-ranking military 
officers able to exploit loyalties amongst the soldiery to instigate rebellion.28 Civil war led 
to the accession of soldier-emperors in each of the remaining centuries of the empire’s 
existence, except the fifteenth when territorial, economic, and military constraints rendered 
that eventuality futile.29 Of particular note in relation to many of these accessions were the 
periods of military reverses that preceded them: often making them a response to territorial 
losses.30 From the thirteenth century, the involvement of foreign troops in internal disputes 
became a characteristic of civil wars, where previously it was an occasional occurrence.31 
The mood of the Constantinopolitan populace helped to determine the outcome of a 
siege, and conspiracies were more common in Constantinople when regimes faced an 
approaching army.32 The need to secure the populace’s support was essential, since 
Constantinople’s defences were only breached on one occasion by Byzantine troops without 
inside help.33 Propagandist efforts were made by both sides during campaigns and sieges 
and included the circulation of ‘prophecies’, promises of lenience, and appeals to political 
rhetoric. In 1047, Leon Tornikios’ troops outlined to Constantinople’s citizen defenders 
Constantine IX’s misdeeds, the reasons for their revolt, and impressed upon them Tornikios’ 
                                                 
Constantinople (Leontios). On the prominent role of the military in promoting emperors in this period, see 
Kaegi 1981: esp. 306. 
28 Cheynet 1990: 303-313; Tounta 2010: 454. 
29 Wright 2017: 282. 
30 For example: Leon III usurped the throne in the context of the Umayyad threat, and immediately faced a 
siege at Constantinople; Leon V forced Michael I’s abdication after the defeat of the Byzantine forces at the 
battle of Versinikia; Romanos I came to power after a series of Byzantine defeats to Symeon of Bulgaria; 
Isaakios I exploited disapprobation over the military situation on the eastern frontier to raise a rebellion; 
Nikephoros III did likewise; and Andronikos III exploited Turkish advances in Thrace and Asia Minor to win 
support away from his grandfather. Treadgold 2006: esp.223, shows that rebellions were in fact most likely to 
occur after significant military defeats at a time when the empire’s defences could least sustain them. On 
military unrest in reaction to territorial losses in the early period, see Kaegi 1981. On the situation in the late-
tenth to early-thirteenth centuries, see Cheynet 1990. On the role of territorial losses provoking usurpations 
under the Palaiologan emperors, see Wright 2017: esp. 272-273. 
31 Wright 2017.  
32 On conspiracies being more common when the city faced the prospect of a siege, see Wright 2017: 273, 
noting that the threat of a besieging force prompted conspiracies within the capital that led to the accessions of 
Phocas, Konstans II, Nikephoros I, Isaakios I, Nikephoros III, and Andronikos I.  
33 Wright 2017: 274. Only Constantine V was able to traverse the land walls of the city without aid from within 
the city. Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos ed. Mango 136-137; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 419 





‘philanthropeia’ and ability to bring future successes against the ‘barbarians’ threatening the 
empire.34 Outside the capital it was common practice for emperors to dispatch chrysobulls 
to rebellious cities to attempt to restore loyalty.35 And Andronikos I reportedly affixed 
messages to arrows encouraging rebellious populations to surrender, promising amnesty, and 
defaming the usurpers they supported.36  
These efforts to encourage ‘political activism’ by the populace belie the statement of 
Cheynet that passivity towards the rulers was the permanent attitude of the public.37 In fact, 
uprisings on the streets always remained an intermittent possibility but required substantial 
popular support if they were to prove successful.38 Kaldellis has sought to refocus attention 
to the ‘republican’ dynamic of rebellion and Byzantine politics more generally. He considers 
numerous examples up to 1204 of the Constantinopolitans lending their support decisively 
to emperors and usurpers, finding ‘popularity’ to be a determinative factor in the outcome 
of a coup.39 In fact, Justinian I’s suppression of the Nika rioters was the only case of an 
emperor overcoming a ‘determined’ populace.40 Nevertheless, only three usurpers 
successfully assumed the throne through popular action alone. In 695, Leontios incited the 
crowds to join him and depose Justinian II. The crowd coerced Patriarch Kallinikos to 
                                                 
34 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 44-61; ed. Renauld II, 19-26 (trans. Sewter 210-215); Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 440 (trans. Wortley 414-415); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-
Wobst III, 628. 
35 ‘[Assuming that the emperor would be] sending imperial missives to all of the cities. For this reason I 
remained unperturbed, as I also trusted in the loyalty of the citizens of Rhaidestos, that the town would remain 
firm in its loyalty to the rulers out of gratitude.’ Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martín 244 (trans. Kaldellis 
and Krallis 446-447). 
36 During the sieges of Nikaia and Prousa. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 287 (trans. Magoulias 159). 
37 Cheynet 1990: 190. 
38 On the role of the Constantinopolitan (and other metropolitan) populaces in the political sphere, see Garland 
1992; Charanis 1978; Kaldellis 2013; Kaldellis 2015. 
39 Kaldellis 2015: 125-150; Kaldellis 2013. 
40 Kaldellis 2015: 90-91. See also, Wright 2017: 174, n.15, confirming Justinian as the only emperor to suppress 
a determined populace, but adding that emperors often suppressed minor revolts on the streets of the capital. 
Unfortunately, neither proposes a rationale for distinguishing between uprisings that may be considered 
‘significant/determined’ and those that may be considered ‘minor’, nor considers the possible source problems 





support the movement, and Justinian was overthrown.41 When Michael V ousted Zoe in 
1042, the populace were roused to action against him. Psellos writes that ‘Zoe was 
universally popular’, ‘heir to the throne’, and ‘had won everyone’s heart through her 
generous gifts.’ Michael had courted the ‘elite, commoners, and craftsmen’, by granting 
freedoms and mistakenly believed that the people would support him.42 Instead they elevated 
Theodora, Zoe’s sister, and were not pacified by Michael’s explanation of his actions (Zoe 
had conspired against him) or Zoe’s return to the palace.43 Patriarch Alexios was convinced 
to support the uprising, and Michael was deposed.44 Finally, in 1185 Isaakios II roused the 
crowds and coerced Patriarch Kamateros to support his revolt against Andronikos I.45 
Although large-scale uprisings in the capital are then unknown after 1204, the citizenry’s 
political activism did not cease under the Palaiologoi. Outbreaks of unrest are documented 
in relation to usurpations in this period and Constantinopolitan quiescence appears 
incompatible with metropolitan strife seen elsewhere.46 In fact, Palaiologan emperors appear 
to have resorted to inclusive ‘consultative’ measures involving influential mercantile groups 
in an attempt to avert unrest.47 The citizenry may not have independently promoted an 
emperor, but they still leant support to their favoured candidates. 
                                                 
41 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 94-99; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 368-369 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 514-515). 
42 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 200-203; ed. Renauld I, 95 (trans. Sewter 130-131); Kaldellis 
2013: 50-51. 
43 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 142-145; ed. Renauld I, 67 (trans. Sewter 100). On Psellos 
account of the episode, see Kaldellis 2013: 50. See also, Cheynet 2008: esp. 65-66, discussing the significance 
of Michael’s oath to Zoe and the accusations that he levelled against her. 
44 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 14 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 20-21); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 418 (trans. Wortley 393-394). On Alexios’ loyalties and involvement in events, see 
Cheynet 2013a: 2-6. 
45 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 349-353 (trans. Magoulias 192-194). 
46 Wright 2017: esp. 285-286, noting that the anti-Kantakouzenoi uprisings in the towns of Thrace and 
Macedonia, and the emergence of the Zealot regime at Thessalonike in the 1340’s are hardly evidence for the 
populace becoming passive observers of political events. On the Zealot regime/revolt, see Barker 2003: 16-21, 
29-33. 
47 On emperors’ recourse to consultative decision making, see Kiousopoulou 2011: 111-127; Wright 2017: 
286; Kyritses 2013: esp. 63-69; Frankopan 2007; Charanis 1978: 74-78. Magdalino 2011: 131-144, proposes 
a different view. He argues that Palaiologan emperors substantially disengaged from communicative politics 
involving the Constantinopolitan populace and restricted themselves to the Blachernai Palace and its environs; 
Macrides 2011, challenges the historical reality and significance of this ‘disengagement’, arguing that the idea 





Emperors could only contest uprisings if they had the backing of a significant section 
of the populace, or a military force within Constantinople.48 Consequently, the loyalties of 
Constantinopolitan-based guard units were important considerations. Between 574 and 610, 
three successions involved promotion of the comes excubitorum, rendering the commander 
de facto heir-apparent.49 In 913 the Hetaireiai quashed the revolt of Constantine Doukas,50 
and were personally commanded by Romanos I when he assumed real power in 919.51 In the 
next century, the Varangians aided Theodora’s succession (1055), and they refused to 
acclaim Romanos IV until Michael VII had given his consent.52 In the decades before 1204 
the Varangians’ political activism became increasingly apparent: Andronikos I handed the 
deposed protosebastos Alexios into Varangian custody (1182); they were conspicuously 
absent during Andronikos’ overthrow (1185); quashed Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos’) 
revolt (1200); were responsible for Isaakios II’s restoration (1203); and were instrumental 
in promoting Alexios V, and Constantine Laskaris (1204).53 If the interests of the palace 
guard were better served by a rival candidate, they would support him. They represented yet 
another faction that emperors had to monitor and secure, and their periods of political 
                                                 
48 See, for example, the failed usurpation of Ioannes Komnenos-Axouchos in 1200: Choniates, Historia, ed. 
van Dieten 527-528 (trans. Magoulias 289); Mesarites, Die Palastrevolution des Johannes Komnenos, ed. 
Heisenberg. 
49 Tiberius II, Maurice, and Priscus (Maurice’s son-in-law, and probable heir), each held the post. This was a 
practice particular to the Justinianic dynasty, reflecting Justin I’s election to basileia from the post of comes 
excubitorum. Priscus’ conspiracy on behalf of Herakleios, which enabled the latter’s troops to gain access to 
Constantinople when the unit deserted, ended this sequence of successions: Treadgold 1997: 241. 
50 The Life of Saint Basil the Younger, ed. Sullivan, Talbot, and McGrath 98-99. 
51 Christophoros Lekapenos subsequently replaced Romanos, ensuring that the fledgling Lekapenoi regime 
could monitor the unit. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 394; Symeon Logothetes, Chronicon, ed. 
Wahlgren 310; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 209 (trans. Wortley 202). 
52 For Theodora’s accession: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 152-153; ed. Renauld II, 71 (trans. 
Sewter 260). For the refusal of Romanos IV: Skylitzes Continuatus, ed. Tsolakis 123-124. The Varangians were 
also instrumental in securing the throne for Michael VII in the aftermath of Manzikert: Bryennios, Histoire, 
ed. Gautier 122-123. 
53 For the treatment of the protosebastos: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 249 (trans. Magoulias 147-148). 
For Andronikos’ overthrow: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 343-346 (trans. Magoulias 189-191). For 
Isaakios’ restoration: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 536-541 (trans. Magoulias 294-297); Akropolites, 
Historia, ed. Heisenberg 6 (trans. Macrides 109-110). For Ioannes Komnenos-Axouchos: see above page 12, 
footnote 48. For the promotions of Alexios V, and Constantine Laskaris, see Choniates, Historia, ed. van 
Dieten 563, 572 (trans. Magoulias 308, 314). On the political influence of the Varangians in this period, see 





influence highlight the absence of effective imperial authority in Constantinople at that 
moment. 
Palace coups involved a member of the imperial family or a prominent official, and 
were responsible for twenty accessions. The prospect of military intervention was an 
additional factor in six cases.54 Seven coups involved palace assassinations.55 Five others 
imposed blinding in order to disqualify an emperor.56 And the remaining eight minimised or 
removed opponents by other means.57 Notably, the successive Amorian and Macedonian 
dynasties were established by assassination, an indication of the preponderance of court 
intrigues in that period.58 Empresses and minority-emperors were also particularly at risk, 
since the empire was deemed to need ‘strong’ and ‘active’ male leadership instead of a 
‘feminized’ (ἐκθηλυνθήναι) authority.59 The changed distribution of power and privileges 
meant that after 1261 palace coups became much less common, were never successful, and 
                                                 
54 These were: Basiliscus, who had aid from Ostrogoth and Isaurian troops, alongside the empress-dowager 
Verina; Romanos I, who was supported by his naval forces, and who claimed to have support from Constantine 
VII’s tutor inside the palace; Andronikos I, who marched on Constantinople with Byzantine and Turkish troops, 
but had been entreated to help the kaisarissa Maria protect Alexios II; Alexios III, who was proclaimed by the 
military as part of his coup, and was a member of the imperial family; Alexios V, who was supported by the 
Varangians and had affinal ties to the Angeloi emperors; and Michael VIII, who was commander of the Latin 
mercenaries responsible for the assassination of Georgios Mouzalon, and was a member of the extended 
imperial family. 
55 These were: Michael II, who assassinated Leon V (820), Basileios I, who assassinated Michael III (867), 
Ioannes I, who assassinated Nikephoros II (969), Michael IV, who was proclaimed after the assassination of 
Romanos III (1034), Andronikos I, who assassinated Alexios II (1183), and Alexios V, who deposed and then 
assassinated Alexios IV and Isaakios II (1204). In addition, Konstans II was assassinated in the palace in Sicily 
by the usurper Mizizios, but the latter’s authority was never commonly accepted: Theophanes, Chronographia, 
ed. de Boor 351 (trans. Mango and Scott 490-491). 
56 These were: Artemios-Anastasios, who blinded Philippikos (713), Eirene Sarantapechaina, who blinded her 
son, Constantine VI (797), Michael VII, who tonsured his mother, and subsequently blinded Romanos IV 
(1071); Alexios III, who blinded his brother, Isaakios II (1195), and Michael VIII, who blinded Ioannes IV 
(1261). 
57 These were: Zeno, who exiled Basiliscus – who later died of exposure (475); Constantine VI, who removed 
Eirene (790); Nikephoros I, who tonsured Eirene (802); Michael I, who succeeded the seriously injured 
Staurakios (811); Romanos I, who permitted Constantine VII to remain co-emperor but gradually removed him 
from precedence (919/920); Constantine VII, Constantine Lekapenos, and Stephanos Lekapenos, who tonsured 
Romanos I (944); Constantine VII, who tonsured Constantine and Stephanos Lekapenos (945); and Constantine 
X, who permitted Isaakios I to undergo the tonsure (1059).  
58 See Table 1. 
59 On the increased risk to regencies and imperial women, see Lilie 2008; Cheynet 1990: 187. On the need for 
stereotypically male leadership, see Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 254-257; ed. Renauld I, 121-





civil wars between members of the dynasty predominated.60 
Success in claiming basileia was determined by the dynamic balance of power: the 
relative consensus between any combination of the groups involved (the military, senate, 
and people) and their preferred candidate(s) at any given time.61 Beck, followed by Kaldellis, 
explained the recurrent instability of the imperial office by outlining normative ‘republican’ 
theories of rulership drawn from the political behaviour of the empire, its ceremonies, and 
literature.62 He concluded that elevations through force or intrigue, integral to Roman 
history, remained an acceptable mode of accession.63 Lemerle’s analysis of the emperor-
usurper relationship outlined its inherent parallelism on the basis of contrasting notions of 
power, and concluded that usurpation was less an illegal act than the first stage in the process 
of legitimation for a new ruler. When a usurper failed to take power, hereditary-dynastic 
principles prevailed and were strengthened; when he succeeded he might integrate himself 
into the dynasty or choose to found a new dynasty and acquire legitimacy independently.64 
This system was described by Mommsen as ‘an autocracy tempered by the legal right of 
revolution’, and by Kaldellis as something ‘closer to a monarchical republic than a monarchy 
by divine right… [in which] the people were sovereign and the emperors exercised authority 
that was delegated from below.’65 Turning against an emperor signified his loss of legitimacy 
and demonstrated that authority was predicated upon consent.66 
                                                 
60 Wright 2017: 286-288. 
61 Flaig 1997: esp. 16-18. 
62 Beck 1966; Beck 1970; Beck 1978; Kaldellis 2013; Kaldellis 2015. 
63 For these methods of usurpation in Late Antiquity and earlier Roman history, see Wardman 1984: 220-237. 
64 ‘L’usurpation... a un sens et presque une fonction politique. Elle est moins un acte illégal que le premier acte 
d’un processus de légitimation, dont le schéma théorique est constant. Entre le basileus et l’usurpateur, il y a 
parallélisme plutôt qu’opposition. D’où l’existence de deux notions différentes de la légitimité, l’une 
‘dynastique’, l’autre qu’on pourrait dire (au sens romain) ‘républicaine’, qui ne sont pas vraiment en conflit, 
mais plutôt se renforcent l’une l’autre: la seconde, quand l’usurpateur échoue, renforce de ce fait la première, 
et quand il réussit, la recrée, soit que l’usurpateur se rattache à la dynastie, soit qu’il fonde une dynastie.’ 
Lemerle quoted in Karlin-Hayter 1991: 85. 
65 Mommsen quoted in Bury 1910: 9; Kaldellis 2013: 54; and see now Kaldellis 2015. 
66 Beck 1966: 41-47; Kaldellis 2013: esp. 53; Kaldellis 2015. See also, Cheynet 2008b: 69-70, considering the 
role of consent in the decision of the Constantinopolitans to abandon Alexios IV and Isaakios II and proclaim 





The existence of multiple routes of succession was well understood: Isaakios I’s 
supporters, for example, objected to being told that his military-proclamation was invalid 
(because he should have been adopted by Michael VI), by claiming that this criticism was 
itself invalid since it referred to a particular kind of promotion.67 However, after the ninth 
century, successful usurpers increasingly espoused ‘dynastic’ links to the previous regime. 
Eventually, the ‘usurper-regent’ (or ‘co-emperor’) typology came to predominate accessions 
by those outside the dynasty-proper.68 Of the twenty-four successful usurpations after 920, 
eight involved a usurper-regent, twelve involved imperial family members, two were 
members of the extended family, and two remained ‘outsiders’.69 Usurper-regents assumed 
power alongside minority emperors and created familial connections.70 For example: 
Nikephoros II was crowned emperor alongside the basileis (of whom it was rumoured that 
he was godfather) and then solidified his connection to the dynasty by marriage to the 
empress-regent Theophano.71 Nikephoros’ early nomismata depict him as emperor alongside 
                                                 
67 (Psellos:) …καὶ τῶν βασιλευσάντων οί πλείους τε καὶ καλλίους ἐκ τῆς τοῦ καίσαρος τάξεως εἰς τὴν 
βασιλείαν ἀνήχθησαν… (Isaakios’ partisans’ response:) ‘Ως δέ μοι ἔνιοι πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀπέντησαν, ώς 
ἰδιωτικὴ ἡ ἀνάβασις αὕτη, οὗτος δὲ ἤδη βασιλεύειν εἰλήχει... Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 212-
213; ed. Renauld II, 99-100 (trans. Sewter 291-292). 
68 See Zuckerman 2010: esp. 884-890, on the office of basileus, and on the modern idiomatic use of the term 
“co-emperor” (“Mitkaiser”), a title which had no direct equivalent in Byzantine imperial protocol. 
69 The eight usurper-regents were: Romanos I (920), Nikephoros II (963), Ioannes I (969), Nikephoros III 
(1078), Alexios I (1081), Andronikos I (1181/1183), Michael VIII (1259), and Ioannes VI (1347). The twelve 
usurpations by imperial family members were, Stephanos and Constantine Lekapenos with Constantine VII 
(944), Constantine VII (945), Michael IV (1034), Zoe and Theodora [against Michael V] (1042), Michael VII 
(1071), Alexios III (1195), Isaakios II and Alexios IV (1203), Theodoros I (1205/1208), Andronikos III (1328), 
Andronikos IV (1376), Manuel II and Ioannes V (1379), and Ioannes VII (1390). The two extended family 
members were: Isaakios II (1185) - who could claim, and promoted, descent from the Komnenoi but was not 
considered part of ruling Komnenian family itself (as evidenced, for example, by the persistence of his name 
‘Angelos’, and his brother’s decision to adopt the name ‘Komnenos’); and Alexios V (1204) – who 
subsequently married Alexios III’s daughter, Eudokia, who had been left behind in Constantinople when her 
father fled in 1203. On Isaakios II’s exploitation of his Komnenian familial connections, see Simpson 2015: 
esp. 185-186. The two ‘outsiders’ were: Isaakios I (1057), and Constantine X (1059). It should be noted that 
Constantine X claimed that his accession had been authorised by Isaakios I, although this was almost certainly 
not the case; see below, page 110. 
70 Romanos I, Nikephoros II, Andronikos I, Michael VIII, and Ioannes VI exploited regencies. Ioannes I, and 
Alexios I exploited rumoured changes to the succession. Nikephoros III simply married into the dynasty and 
claimed that he would respect Constantine’s rights as heir.  
71 For the marriage and Nikephoros’ rumoured status as godfather to Basileios and Constantine, see Leon 
Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 50 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 100); Morris 1994: 203. Nikephoros’ supposed 
status as godfather raised questions about the validity of his marriage to Theophano. Patriarch Polyeuktos’ 
objections were reportedly overcome when it was suggested that Nikephoros’ father, Bardas, had been their 





Basileios II who holds the sceptre with him. When Basileios was subsequently removed from 
Nikephoros’ coinage, Ioannes I exploited this as a sign that the basileis were threatened.72 
Nikephoros was assassinated, Ioannes proclaimed himself emperor with the basileis, and 
married Theodora (their paternal aunt) when a marriage to Theophano proved politically 
impossible.73 The wedding coincided with Bardas Phokas’ revolt (970), providing much-
needed support when the Phokades were challenging Ioannes’ authority.74  
In each case of a usurper-regent assuming power, the minority emperor remained a 
prominent figurehead until political control had been secured. Romanos I arranged the 
marriage of his daughter to Constantine VII and then gradually removed Constantine from 
precedence by promoting each of his sons, associating basileia overwhelmingly with the 
Lekapenoi.75 Ioannes VI arranged Ioannes V’s marriage to his daughter, and later promoted 
Matthew Kantakouzenos.76 Notably, patriarchal protections of a minority emperor’s 
successional rights were never upheld.77 Despite their role as figureheads for populist 
                                                 
72 On these types, see Morrisson 2013: 75. The circumstances of Ioannes I’s coup are discussed in greater detail 
below,  page 184. 
73 Ioannes would have been open to potential accusations of trigamy had he wed Theophano (her third 
marriage): Morris 1994: 208-209; Laiou 1992. 
74 Sinclair 2009: 51-52. Leon Diakonos records that the marriage had been engineered to create a positive 
public reaction: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 127 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 174). 
75 The promotion of Christophoros Lekapenos occurred on 20 May 921, Pentecost: Theophanes Continuatus, 
ed. Bekker 398; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 213 (trans. Wortley 206). Stephanos and 
Constantine Lekapenos were promoted on 25 December 924: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 409-410; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 221 (trans. Wortley 213). Christophoros replaced Constantine VII 
in precedence in the ritual acclamations from the time of Maria Lekapena’s marriage to Peter of Bulgaria in 
927: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 414; Shepard 1995: 132-133. Constantine’s exclusion was reversed 
after the death of Romanos’ intended successor, his son Christophoros in August 931: Theophanes 
Continuatus, ed. Bekker 420. Romanos then appears to have had a change of heart and concerned himself with 
the salvation of his soul: see below, page 179. 
76 The marriage of Ioannes V to Helena Kantakouzene was the very first act undertaken by Ioannes VI after 
concluding a power sharing arrangement with the regency. The marriage vows were taken the same day (8 
February 1347), but the marriage was solemnised on 12 February, at the Church of the Virgin’s Spring, outside 
Constantinople: Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen III, 8-12; Nicol 1968: 64. Matthew Kantakouzenos 
was not made co-emperor until April 1353: Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen III, 269-270; Nicol 
1968: 113.  
77 Constantine VII was under the protection of Patriarch Nikolaos, who had been appointed to the regency by 
Alexandros: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 196, 207 (trans. Wortley 190, 201). Basileios II and 
Constantine VIII had received an oath from Patriarch Polyeuktos, sworn before Romanos II, to protect their 
dynastic rights: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 31 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 83). Alexios II’s rights had 
been confirmed in an oath sworn by Patriarch Theodosios who, according to Eustathios of Thessalonike, The 
Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 38-39, was termed basileiopator. Ioannes IV was subject to an 





rebellions, patriarchs were only as politically effective in regard to successions as an 
emperor/usurper allowed them to be, and were generally replaced with loyalists of the new 
regime.78 If the typology intended to mask usurpation by suggesting dynastic continuity it 
had limited success, since, except in the cases of Alexios I and Michael VIII (who were 
opposed by loyalists of the preceding emperors), every usurper-regent was overthrown.79  
In other cases, when direct blood-relations were not available other forms of 
integration were used. The Justinianic dynasty had relied upon adoption exclusively, and the 
eleventh century witnessed a minor revival of succession by adoption or marriage.80 Between 
1028 and 1081 four of twelve reigning emperors were promoted by marriage, and three 
others (usurpers) claimed ties to imperial women.81 Furthermore, the proposed adoptions 
and promotions to the rank of kaisar (heir-apparent) of the usurpers Isaakios I and 
Nikephoros Bryennios would have ended their respective revolts, forestalled the overthrow 
of reigning emperors, and provided heirs to those emperors.82 In the next centuries, 
Andronikos I married Alexios II’s wife Anna/Agnes of France after killing the boy, and 
                                                 
Arsenios: see below, page 232. And Patriarch Kalekas openly declared himself regent for Ioannes V: Gregoras, 
Historia, ed. Schopen II, 605-612. 
78 On the balance of power within the emperor-patriarch relationship, see von Falkenhausen 1997: esp. 191; 
Dagron 2003. On the replacement of patriarchs with loyal figures, see Cheynet 2013a. Of course, patriarchs 
were occasionally involved in political disputes: notably, the involvement of Patriarch Keroularios in the 
usurpation of Isaakios I, brought a swift cessation to hostilities with Michael VI, and swung the senate and 
Constantinopolitan elites to Isaakios’ side. But this was a unique instance of a patriarch voluntarily intervening 
in a dispute that lacked any overtly ecclesiastical concerns. On Keroularios’ intervention: Dagron 2003: 235-
240; Cheynet 2013a: esp. 6-9; Angold 2008b: 603. 
79 Alexios I and Michael VIII (and their successors) were able to promote the ideas of continuity and integration 
of their new regime with the preceding dynasty. For Alexios’ propaganda, see below, page 112. For Michael’s 
propaganda, see below, page 232. 
80 The Justinianic succession: Justin I adopted Justinian I (his nephew); Justinian I adopted Justin II (his 
nephew); Justin II adopted Tiberius II (the comes excubitorum); Tiberius II adopted Maurice (his son-in-law, 
the comes excubitorum); and Phocas appears to have intended his son-in-law, Priscus (the comes excubitorum) 
to succeed him, and may have adopted Priscus if Herakleios had not acceded. 
81 The four promotions by marriage were, Romanos III, Michael IV, Constantine IX, and Romanos IV. The 
usurpers claiming associations with imperial women were, Michael V (adoption), Nikephoros III (marriage), 
and Alexios I (adoption, and a proposed marriage). On marriage as an accepted method of accession, see Laiou 
1992: esp. 148; Angelova 2004: esp. 7; Herrin 2013: 174-177; Maes 2004. 
82 Macrides 1990: 117, noting that the late Roman procedure of appointing a Caesar who would then accede 





Alexios V and Theodoros I claimed affinal ties to Alexios III.83 
The dynastic principle had been understood since Roman times as a method of 
ensuring political stability through the promotion of a worthy successor whose virtue was 
(theoretically) ‘guaranteed’ by appointment by his predecessor.84 Emperors who failed to 
make adequate preparations for the succession were routinely criticised.85 The increased 
propensity for dynastic integration demonstrates the eventual necessity of client connections 
and lineage (εὐγένεια) in order to succeed. Eventually only connected persons were able to 
mount an effective opposition.86 It might be tempting to see this as evidence that hereditary-
dynastic theories of rulership became fully established,87 but that does not seem to have been 
the case. As Dagron elaborated, hereditary succession was only ever weakly accepted in 
Byzantium. Primogeniture was never ‘legally’ established and could be challenged by 
younger siblings.88 Recourse to ideologies of sacral kingship sought to protect the imperial 
family, and the notions of ‘divine unction’ and ‘birth in the purple’ were introduced 
alongside other measures to help strengthen ideologically the dynastic principle. Ceremonies 
creating symbolic kinship ties between heirs and prominent figures in society were employed 
in childhood and adolescence to foster networks of support for the dynasty and to help ensure 
the succession of its heirs.89 In fact, attempts at integration suggest that the illusion of 
dynastic continuity was exploited in order to preserve existing power structures. The gradual 
                                                 
83 For Andronikos’ marriage to Anna/Agnes: Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. 
Melville Jones 52-53. For Alexios V and Theodoros I: see below, page 115, footnote 567. 
84 Börm 2016: 6. 
85 Psellos critiqued Basileios II, and Empress Theodora, for failing to make provisions for the transfer of power, 
and Choniates rebuked Manuel I for the same reason. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 60-63; II, 
168-171; ed. Renauld I, 27-28; II, 79 (trans. Sewter 55-56, 268-269); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 220 
(trans. Magoulias 124). 
86 In his statistical analysis of dynasties, Lilie 2008: esp. 230-231, confirms that those emperors without kin 
relations or links to the preceding regime were most at risk of being swiftly overthrown. Cheynet 1990: 157-
158, considers that ‘good-stock’ was the essential qualification required by a usurper. 
87 As Guilland 1943: 234, appears to suggest. 
88 Just as Anna Komnene and her husband Nikephoros Bryennios (the Younger) challenged Ioannes II’s 
accession in 1118, and Manuel I challenged the succession of his oldest surviving brother Isaakios in 1143: 
Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 26-30 (trans. Brand 29-32); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 5-7, 41-48, 
219 (trans. Magoulias 5-6, 24-29, 124).  





takeover of power was intended to lessen the risk of a reactionary backlash and permit access 
to the dynasty’s networks.90 Since administrative and social changes meant that power 
became increasingly restricted to the ruling family and a growing number of ‘client families’ 
(especially under the Komnenoi and Palaiologoi), it was natural for rivals to emerge from 
‘within’ and for support to be canvassed/required from these networks.91 The resulting 
hazard would make sense of Basileios I’s choice to promote three sons to co-imperial status, 
make the fourth Patriarch, but keep his daughters unmarried,92 and Basileios II’s refusal to 
allow Zoe or Theodora to marry while he was alive. Both emperors knew first-hand the risks 
associated with male ‘in-laws’. 
 
Justifying revolution 
But what were the rhetorical legitimations that permitted a usurper to challenge a reigning 
emperor or seek integration into a dynasty? According to modern theories, legitimacy exists 
where there is a belief in a government’s right to govern.93 When contested, it is not usually 
the system of governance itself (i.e. monarchy) that is brought into question, but the way in 
which that system exercises authority.94 Support for or resistance to a government’s 
‘legitimacy’ is expressed in terms of the ‘character’ of that government.95  Illegitimacy arises 
when the state attempts ‘to do things or act in a manner which individuals or groups… regard 
as wrong, absurd, or oppressive.’96 These conceptions are subjective because the state uses 
                                                 
90 For examples of dynastic continuity being espoused in order to preserve power networks, see below, page 
112, and VICARIOUS REDEMPTION. 
91 See below, pages 256 and 267. 
92 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 134 (trans. Wortley 132-133); Macrides 1992: 272; Dagron 2003: 
33. 
93 In modern conceptions political legitimacy ‘defines one’s right to wield authority, giving one the legal right 
to use force. Acceptance denotes the approval that certain people or social groups grant to someone so that he 
may rule in future, when he acquires the necessary legitimacy. Both notions rely on the idea of consent.’ Tounta 
2010: 448; Barker 1990: 27. 
94 Barker 1990: 196. 
95 Barker 1990: 28-29. 





different methods of governance for different persons, and these relationships thus engender 
different interpretations and intensities of legitimacy.97  
This theoretical framework is applicable to Byzantium where basileia implied the 
duality of legitimate or tyrannical rule. The ‘exercise of authority’ was legitimised through 
the imperial idea which stated that the emperor, being subject only to God, was ‘living law’. 
The artifice of the Kaiseridee, promulgated through imperial ceremonial, encomia, and 
solemn preambles, projected this persistent image rooted in sacral rulership and divine 
virtues.98 Since no man or law could compel him, the emperor was advised to voluntarily 
submit himself to the law and imitate God.99 As Dagron revealed, this formulation provided 
an ideological pathway for unrestrained ‘real power’ to be legitimised through respect for 
vaguely defined ‘legal’ norms. A moral conversion from the use of force (tyranny) to the 
rule of law (basileia) was implied.100 In the words of Gregoras: 
For the demagogue, who is led and guided by the advice of his 
presumptuous judgment, and who rules under delusion, does not notice 
that he is himself the first victim of the tyranny of the archetypes of evil. 
However, the Emperor who justly submits the reins of government to the 
prevailing laws… becomes a clear symbol of rulership.101 
A tyrant exercised authority in a violent, oppressive, or harmful manner. Therefore, when an 
emperor exhibited behaviours deemed ‘illegal’ or ‘immoral’, or a rebel broke into revolt, it 
could be said that he had slipped into tyranny and lawful order had been suspended.102 This 
state of suspension could only be ended by the restoration of lawful order, either through the 
emperor’s moral conversion, the usurper’s defeat, or the emperor’s deposition by a more 
                                                 
97 Barker 1990: 113-117, 124-125, 196. 
98 On the core of the Kaiseridee, the rhetorical ideology of imperial rulership, the fundamental studies are those 
of Treitinger 1938 and Hunger 1964.  
99 Agapetos Diakonos, ed. Riedinger §27, §36-37 (trans. Bell 109, 111-112); Michel Italikos: Lettres et 
discours, ed. Gautier  294; Blemmydes, Basilikos Andrias, ed. Hunger and Ševčenko 46-48, 122-123. On the 
concept of ‘living law’, see Simon 1984; Beck 1970: 31-33; Dmitriev 2015: 11-13, 16; Dagron 2003: 19-21, 
229-235; Dagron 1994; Hunger 1964: 117-122. 
100 Dagron 1994: 27-52; Dagron 2003: 19-35. See also, Dmitriev 2015. 
101 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 575. For comparable recitations of this idea over the centuries, see 
Dmitriev 2015: 14-15, with references.  





worthy candidate. It was in the absence of a moral conversion that ‘legitimate authority’ 
could be contested. 
Kekaumenos’ eleventh-century Strategikon,103 addressing the emperor, advised him 
that: 
Whenever people say that the emperor is not subject to the law, but is law, 
I too say the same. [But] only, as long as whatever he does and legislates, 
he does well, we obey it… Know from this that the emperor, being a man, 
is subject to the laws of piety… so let your deeds and actions be full of 
understanding and truth, and justice be in your heart.104  
Numerous authors expressed comparable ideas,105 and we see that the formulation amounts 
to a theory of consensual, limited monarchy, qualifying absolutist rhetoric: the people obey 
only as long as the emperor rules in accordance with legal norms and moral ideals. 
Consequently, the possibility of opposing an emperor when he ceased to act lawfully 
remained an option:106 Nikolaos Mystikos, in a letter to the pope, stated that ‘If the emperor, 
inspired by the Devil, gives an order contrary to divine law… we shall not obey these 
infamous edicts, but rather choose to lose our life.’107  
As Cheynet outlined, imperial power was established on the virtues of philanthropy, 
clemency, justice, and care for the common good, and an emperor’s conversion to legitimate 
                                                 
103 Kekaumenos’ Strategikon forms a unique collection of moral advice, military maxims, and cautionary tales 
in the vein of so-called ‘wisdom literature’. Presumably composed in the mid-late 1070’s, by a former military 
commander, it offers unambiguous warnings on the dangers of court, acquaintances, and unrestrained ambition. 
The author’s ideals have been described as lying outside those of the urban intelligentsia, although it is apparent 
that Kekaumenos was also familiar with the fundamentals of rhetoric. The audience for his work was certainly 
larger than the author’s declared ‘sons’ and their ‘brothers’ (perhaps a metaphorical reference to his intellectual 
family – his readers). For useful introductions, with bibliographies, see Roueché 2003: 23-37; Bernard 2014: 
159-160. 
104 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.93 (trans. Roueché).  
105 For example: the sixth-century Dialogue on Political Science acknowledges ‘differing opinions’ on the 
imperial position, and advocates legal, ethical, and behavioural limitations to imperial power. It asserts that 
imperial authority is predicated upon divine favour, which is expressed in the offering of basileia to the emperor 
by the people. Legitimacy, it infers, is predicated upon respect for, and adherence to, the law. Emperors are 
held responsible to God and to the people in enacting the law, and the possibility of their deposition was 
implicit: Dialogue on Political Science, ed. Mazzuchi 5.7, 5.13, 5.17, 5.21, 5.46, 5.47 (trans. Bell 146-150, 
155).  
106 Cheynet 1990: 179. 





rule was assessed and accepted on the basis of his behaviour.108 If the usurper could prove 
that the emperor had acted unlawfully or immorally (in contravention of ‘divine law’) then 
rebellion might be deemed legitimate. Thus Leon Tornikios’ supporters supposedly ‘lacked 
a sufficient pretext (προφάσεως) to rise, but continued to hold the desire for rebellion in their 
souls.’109 And when faced with the conspiracy of Nikephoros Diogenes, Alexios I urged his 
advisors to ‘Leave him [Diogenes] alone’, because ‘We must not afford him a pretext against 
me. He alone must be responsible, before God and man, for the evil he plans.’110 The 
perception of imperial wrongdoing signified immorality and justified rebellion. 
Four cases, those of Romanos I, Isaakios I, Alexios I, and Andronikos I, will allow 
us to examine some of the justifications that were espoused by usurpers who successfully 
deposed one regime in favour of their own and sought to legitimise their actions. 
 
Romanos I 
The accession of Romanos I (919-920) was achieved through a combination of military force 
and palace intrigue that exploited the historic instability of Constantine VII 
Porphyrogennetos’ regency council. Porphyrogennetos’ care had been entrusted to Leon 
VI’s brother Alexandros after the emperor’s death. Yet Alexandros reigned for only thirteen 
months. He was alleged to have considered castrating the boy, but upon his death (June 913) 
he appointed a regency of seven figures, headed by Patriarch Nikolaos.111 Pointedly, 
                                                 
108 Cheynet 1990: 177-184; Cheynet 2008b. See also, Tounta 2010: 455; Schwedler and Tounta 2010: 352. For 
a detailed catalogue of these virtues in relation to the Kaiseridee, see Hunger 1964. On the central importance 
of philanthropia to the imperial image, see Hunger 1963; Gregory 1975. 
109 νῦν δὲ μὴ εὐποροῦντες εἰς ἀποστασίαν ἀρκούσης προφάσεως, ὑποβρύχιον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὴν γνώμην τῆς 
τυραννίδος ἐφύλαττον. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 36-37; ed. Renauld II, 14 (trans. Sewter 
205). Author’s translation. 
110 «ἔα», φησίν, «οὐ χρὴ πρόφασιν τοῦτον ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐσχηκέναι… ἔστω τῆς καθ’ ἡμῶν μελέτης αὐτὸς ὁ αἲτιος 
πρός τε Θεὸν καὶ ἀνθρώπους.» Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 268 (trans. Frankopan 
246). 
111 Alongside Nikolaos were: the magistroi Stephanos and Ioannes Eladas, the raiktor Ioannes, and Alexandros’ 
favourites Gabrilopoulos and Basilitzes. Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 286; Theophanes 





Empress Zoe, the controversial fourth wife of Leon, was excluded and ousted to a convent 
where she was tonsured at Nikolaos’ behest.112 The regency was tested almost immediately 
by the revolt of the domestikos ton scholon Constantine Doukas, who it was later rumoured 
had been entreated to act by Nikolaos. Doukas attempted to gain access to the Great Palace 
with an armed force, but was felled in combat with the guardsmen.113 Then, in August, 
Symeon of Bulgaria marched on Constantinople with an army. A siege was only prevented 
when the regency negotiated a future marriage between Symeon’s daughter and 
Porphyrogennetos, and recognised Symeon’s status as ‘Emperor of the Bulgarians’.114 This 
humiliating settlement proved Nikolaos’ undoing and in February 914 Zoe was returned to 
the palace in a coup supported by the regent Ioannes Eladas and the influential 
parakoimomenos, Constantine. The marriage alliance was called off and Symeon’s imperial 
title repudiated. Alexandros’ favourites, the regents Basilitzes and Gabrilopoulos were 
removed from the council, and Nikolaos was excluded from political influence.115 Therefore, 
from the start, Porphyrogennetos’ minority was beset by conspiracy, and policy reversals. 
By 917 the regency was once again in trouble. After some successes c.914-916, 
including the recovery of Adrianople and a peace treaty with the Arabs, the council’s military 
campaign against Symeon faced a severe reverse.116 The Byzantine forces led by the megas 
domestikos Leon Phokas were routed at Anchialos (August 917). Romanos Lekapenos, the 
droungarios whose fleet was supposed to support the land units, reportedly deserted after a 
dispute with another of the expedition’s commanders, precipitating the disaster. He returned 
                                                 
112 Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.131-133. On the ‘Tetragamy’ of Leon VI, see below, 
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113 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 383; Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.131-133; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 197-199 (trans. Wortley 191-194). 
114 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 292; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 385; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 200 (trans. Wortley 194). 
115 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 292; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 386; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 201 (trans. Wortley 195). Zoe attempted to restore Euthymios to the 
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to Constantinople in contravention of his orders.117 A second defeat soon followed when 
Symeon surprised the troops rallied by Phokas to defend Constantinople.118 The Letters of 
Patriarch Nikolaos detail the sense of panic in the capital at that time, and reveal that 
denunciations were directed against the regency, ‘those who were badly administering his 
[Porphyrogennetos’] affairs’.119 
It is in this context that Romanos acted. To begin, the defeats represented a major 
embarrassment to the regency and an inquest was held into Romanos’ actions. We read that 
he was tried, found ‘guilty’ of desertion, and condemned to be blinded. The penalty was 
dismissed through the intervention of one of the original regency members, the magistros 
Stephanos, but it would have established Romanos in opposition to Zoe.120 Next, we are 
informed that Phokas was openly claiming to have pretensions for the throne. He was a 
relative by marriage of the parakoimomenos Constantine and apparently expected to accede 
with his help.121 Skylitzes writes that ‘[Phokas] thought that by putting a great deal of 
confidence in him [the parakoimomenos] it would be easy to seize the throne’, and imagined 
himself to be a ‘lawful successor’.122 As Runciman surmises, it is possible that Zoe had 
considered marriage to Phokas once her regency was politically endangered by the military 
reverses.123 Since blame for the defeats had been directed against the regency’s poor 
administration, and against Romanos through his trial, Phokas could have brought her much 
needed support from the eastern military aristocracy who continued to back him.124 
                                                 
117 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 387-389; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 201-203 (trans. 
Wortley 196-197). 
118 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 295-296; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 389-391; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 203-204 (trans. Wortley 197-198). 
119 Nikolaos Mystikos, Letters, ed. Jenkins and Westerink 98-99. 
120 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 390; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 204 (trans. Wortley 
199). 
121 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 296; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 390.  
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Alternatively, Phokas’ claims could have been a later invention of Romanos’, 
justifying his subsequent intervention in political affairs. Certainly, this reading would make 
sense of developments inside the palace where another coup was underway (early 919). 
Porphyrogennetos’ tutor, Theodoros, supposedly convinced him to send a message to 
Romanos, ‘written in his own hand’, entreating him to do all that he could ‘to put an end to 
the designs of Constantine the parakoimomenos and his relatives’.125 The parakoimomenos, 
as the chief political figure and Zoe’s principal ally, had taken substantial criticism for the 
regency’s failings. The histories assert that he was attempting to gather the government into 
his own hands, and even Porphyrogennetos’ De Administrando is hostile to his policies and 
promotions.126 Consequently, when Romanos followed Porphyrogennetos’ orders by sailing 
into Constantinople and taking the parakoimomenos prisoner, the regency’s attempts to 
negotiate his release were rebuffed by people throwing stones at their representatives.127 The 
histories record that Porphyrogennetos ordered Zoe’s removal from authority, and the 
restoration of Patriarch Nikolaos and the magistros Stephanos (who had spared Romanos’ 
sight). Phokas was dismissed as domestikos ton scholon.128 Theodoros allegedly explained 
the coup to Zoe by saying that ‘Leon Phokas has destroyed the army, while Constantine the 
parakoimomenos has destroyed the palace’.129 The conspirators’ justificatory propaganda 
                                                 
the Phokades’ position within the eastern military aristocracy, see Cheynet 1986: esp. 480-483, 495 (on Leon 
Phokas); Whittow 1996: 341.  
125 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 297; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 206 (trans. 
Wortley 200): γραμμάτιον οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς Κωνσταντῖνος διαχαράξας γραφῇ καὶ ὑπογραφῇ διασφαλισάμενος 
ἀπέστειλεν αὐτῷ, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ χεῖρας λαβὼν ὑπέσχετο τὴν κατὰ τοῦ παρακοιμωμένου Κωνσταντίνου καὶ 
τῶν συγγενῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπίθεσιν, ὡς δέοι ποιήσασθαι. 
126 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 296; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 390-391; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 201 (trans. Wortley 195); De Administrando Imperio, ed. 
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βάλλοντες. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 207 (trans. Wortley 201), ascribes this to certain of 
Romanos’ ‘undisciplined sailors’: ὁ τῶν πλωῖμων διαναστὰς ἀκόλαστος ὄχλος λίθοις αὐτοὺς ἐξήλασαν. 
128 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 298; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 290-292; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 207-208 (trans. Wortley 201). 
129 διὰ τὸ ἀπολέσαι Λέοντα τὸν Φωκᾶν τοὺς ‘Ρωμαίους καὶ Κωνσταντῖνον παρακοιμώμενον τὸ παλάτιον ταῦτα 
γεγόνασιν: Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 298; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 
207 (trans. Wortley 201): διὰ τὸ ἀπολέσαι, ὦ δέσποινα, Λέοντα μὲν τὸν Φωκᾶν τὰ στρατόπεδα, Κωνσταντῖνον 





thus exploited the dire military situation and disaffection with the government in order to 
replace the regency once again. They were presented as acting to protect the state, with the 
support of the people, and in accordance with Porphyrogennetos’ wishes. Moreover, in 
suggesting that the parakoimomenos had held ambitions for power, they revealed themselves 
as defenders of Porphyrogennetos’ rights. Romanos had merely followed instructions. 
The histories provide a distorted version of events immediately following this, 
however, it appears that Phokas protested his dismissal by Nikolaos and a compromise was 
reached that promoted his relatives.130 Nikolaos swore an oath not to discharge them, and 
then broke it. In turn, Phokas appealed to Romanos for assistance in toppling Nikolaos’ 
regency. Romanos’ troops were still in the capital and he had been used as a pawn by 
Nikolaos and Theodoros. The pair arranged a marriage alliance to seal their agreement, but 
Romanos betrayed Phokas. He informed Nikolaos of the plot and requested that his troops 
be allowed to secure the palace.131 When this request was refused he sailed into the 
Boukoleon harbour (24 March 919) and removed Nikolaos and Stephanos from office: 
avowing that Theodoros, and therefore Porphyrogennetos, had called on him to act.132 The 
story of Theodoros’ second request was evidently a later invention since, before he was 
allowed into the palace, Romanos was made to swear an oath (over the True Cross) not to 
harm the emperor.  
The pretext that Romanos was acting in defence of Porphyrogennetos’ rights was 
then communicated through ritual. He appeared with Porphyrogennetos at the Church of the 
Pharos, a historic site of Macedonian patronage,133 where he performed proskynesis, 
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131 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 393; Symeon Magister, ed. Wahlgren 310; Leon Grammatikos, 
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received assurances, and was promoted megas hetaireiarches.134 The sequence 
simultaneously ensured his hold over the government, suggested deference to the dynasty, 
and implied that he was acting with imperial authorisation. Proskynesis and an exchange of 
assurances at a Macedonian foundation were evidently the strongest initial gestures of 
deference that Romanos could make to the dynasty in light of his obvious military coup. 
This pattern of deference allowed Romanos’ integration and characterised the final 
stages of his ascent through gradual promotions prompted by concern for Porphyrogennetos 
and the empire. In April 919 Helena, Romanos’ daughter, was married to the emperor and 
Romanos was appointed as basileiopator (‘father of the emperor’).135 In response, with the 
support of Zoe’s loyalists Phokas entered into revolt, claiming to be defending 
Porphyrogennetos.136 Alongside missives offering promotions and financial rewards for 
commanders who abandoned Phokas, a chrysobull was issued explaining that Romanos had 
been appointed as ‘protector’ and that Phokas was a ‘tyrant’ and ‘apostate’ who was intent 
on claiming the throne for himself. Phokas’ troops deserted and he was captured, blinded, 
and paraded.137 Theodoros and Zoe were then independently accused of intrigues and 
removed from the palace, and Romanos was crowned co-emperor in December.138 We read 
that his ascent to imperial precedence was justified on the basis of preventing conspiracies: 
that of the sakellarios Anastasios had been uncovered shortly beforehand.139 Political 
                                                 
134 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 394; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 300; Skylitzes, 
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infighting and military reverses had allowed Romanos to present himself as a concerned 
military figure intervening to protect Constantine’s throne. It was believed that his seniority, 
and integration into the dynasty, would allow him to act effectively on the boy’s behalf, and 
bring an end to the paralysis in the capital. 
 
Isaakios I   
Isaakios I’s military revolt and usurpation (1057) owed much to the unanimously poor 
reputation of Michael VI. The histories of Psellos, Skylitzes, and Attaleiates are in agreement 
about the essential details and justifications. We learn that, on the occasion of the roga 
ceremony (at Easter), the eastern commanders Isaakios Komnenos and Katakalon 
Kekaumenos approached the emperor and requested their promotion to the rank of proedros. 
Michael refused them and, according to Psellos, levelled charges against them.140 Isaakios 
was accused of nearly losing Antioch, corrupting the army, lacking leadership, and 
misappropriating public funds to serve his own ‘greed’.141 When Isaakios’ comrades, 
Michael Bourtzes, Constantine and Ioannes Doukas, attempted to intercede on his behalf 
they were reportedly instructed to be silent and then all were dismissed. We learn that the 
commanders then approached the protosynkellos Leon Paraspondylos (Strabospondylos) to 
repeat their request and ask him to intercede on their behalf. However, Paraspondylos 
dismissed them a second time, even going so far as to insult them for having asked.142 It was 
at this point that a conspiracy was formed: Isaakios and his comrades met at Hagia Sophia 
                                                 
140 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 180-181; ed. Renauld II, 84 (trans. Sewter 276-277); Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 53 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 94-97). Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 
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Kekaumenos source, see Shepard 1992. 
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ὲσχηκότα οὐκ εὐκλείας, ἀλλ’ ἀπληστίας ὑπόθεσιν... Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 180-181; ed. 
Renauld II, 84 (trans. Sewter 276-277). 
142 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 182-183; ed. Renauld II, 84-85 (trans. Sewter 277); Skylitzes, 





to swear an oath sealing their cause, and then returned to their estates to prepare.143 They 
gathered to proclaim Isaakios in June, and then marched against Constantinople.144 Michael 
was deposed after the imperial troops were defeated at Nikaia and a conspiracy involving 
Patriarch Keroularios had proclaimed Isaakios in Constantinople.145 
Consequently, the conspiracy involved elements of the military who were disaffected 
and had suffered under the recent governments. Cheynet notes that each of Isaakios’ co-
conspirators had suffered confiscations, demotion, or dismissal, due to reformist policies 
introduced by Empress Theodora and Paraspondylos.146 The disaffection caused by these 
policies, and Michael’s refusal to reverse them, was central to Isaakios’ justifications. 
Psellos, in discussing the events of his embassy to Isaakios (on behalf of Michael), indicates 
that the commanders’ demotions were espoused as the rebellion’s casus belli. He relates that 
the rebels held Michael responsible for their misfortunes, and he attempted to redirect blame 
from the emperor. Addressing Isaakios, he claimed: ‘…you have not even suffered indignity, 
except that you have not obtained that which you had previously desired. As for the terrible 
sufferings you speak of, those were caused by other men, not by the current emperor.’147 
Later, in a private conversation after Michael had offered Isaakios the dignity of kaisar in 
an attempt to save his rule, Isaakios reportedly told Psellos that he would accept as long as 
his men would not be deprived of the privileges that he had granted to them, and that he 
would be given control of the honours system.148 Once Michael had agreed to these terms 
                                                 
143 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 487 (trans. Wortley 454). See also, Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri II, 182-183; ed. Renauld II, 85 (trans. Sewter 277). 
144 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 456 (trans. Wortley 456). 
145 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 54-59 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 98-107); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 495-500 (trans. Wortley 461-465). 
146 Kekaumenos had lost command of Antioch, and Michael Bourtzes, Romanos Skleros, Nikephoros 
Botaneiates, and the Argyroi, no longer commanded units and were thus free to join the rebellion. Bryennios, 
who was brought into the rebellion at a later date, had suffered confiscations under Constantine IX and 
Theodora that Michael had not repaid. Cheynet 1990: 354-356. 
147 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 212-215; ed. Renauld II, 99-100 (trans. Sewter 292-293). 
Translation adapted.  
148 …ὠς οὔτε ἑτέρῳ παραχωρήσει τοῦ κράτους ἐντεῦθεν ἀπιών, οὔτ’ ἀφελεῖταί τινα τῶν σθστρατευσαμένων 





Isaakios’ supporters expressed their willingness to end the revolt.149  
The usurpation thus appears to have been little more than an expression of military 
discontent during a period of relative demobilisation. However, Isaakios’ propaganda 
presented it as a reaction to serious maladministration and injustice perpetrated by Michael’s 
government. In all three of the principal accounts Michael’s denial of the commanders’ 
request sharply contrasts with his generosity to others. Psellos introduces the reign by saying 
that although imperial authority rested on the people, senate, and army, only the first two 
were benefitting under Michael. He claimed that the emperor ‘distributed honours more 
widely than was usual’ and promoted people two or even three ranks higher than expected, 
concluding that this had resulted in a state of ‘confusion/chaos’ (σύγχυσις).150 Attaleiates 
claimed that only Michael’s favourites benefitted.151 And Skylitzes reports that the 
commanders had initially approached Michael after hearing of his generosity,152 and had 
then explained to Paraspondylos that it was ‘unjust for citizens who have never manned the 
battlements nor contended in battle to attain imperial honours… [while they] should be 
passed over and be deprived of imperial largesse.’153 We infer that Michael’s government 
was prone to maltreating those outside his faction. The commanders had not been 
unfavourably dismissed the first time as a result of accident or misfortune, since Michael’s 
representative had been given an opportunity to correct the initial error and had not. The 
story of the second request proved that the commanders were not acting precipitously or 
without cause. Instead, it revealed that order had been inverted: the unfair distribution of 
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Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 216-219; ed. Renauld II, 102 (trans. Sewter 294). 
149 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 220-223; ed. Renauld II, 104-105 (trans. Sewter 296). 
150 ‘... ἢ προσῆκε τὰς τῶν ἀζιωμάτων διανεμήσεις πεποίτο.’ Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 178-
179; ed. Renauld II, 83 (trans. Sewter 275). Translation adapted. 
151 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 53 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 94-97): stating that only those ‘who 
were close in some way to the emperor were benefitting from this situation, regardless of whether they had 
done something good, something bad, or nothing at all, and no attention was paid to anyone else.’ 
152 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 483 (trans. Wortley 451). 





honours not accidental, Michael simply did not care to be impartial. Isaakios’ rebellion 
would restore order, by promoting those who were deserving and had served the interests of 
the empire rather than merely the emperor. 
Isaakios’ propagandists also enhanced Michael’s negative image by depicting him as 
an emperor singularly incapable of exercising authority. In a panegyric of Psellos we read 
that Michael ‘had placed power into the hands of others and in fact lived as a private person 
(ιδιώτης)’.154 In the histories, Psellos and Skylitzes were both critical of his lethargic 
response to Isaakios’ rebellion: he had no intention of sending an embassy to the rebels until 
this was suggested to him and even had to be convinced to raise the armies in response, 
believing that the rebellion would fragment on its own.155 He was presented as an ineffective 
administrator: Skylitzes comments that Michael was at ‘the age at which it is better to retire’, 
and records how Isaakios’ men endeavoured to win support by calling him ‘an ancient thing, 
ruled by eunuchs’. Elsewhere, he asserts that, ‘being an extremely aged man who could recall 
many antiquated things, he [Michael] undertook to revive several ancient customs which had 
fallen into disuse: not that these would profit the state or the people in any way.’156 And 
Attaleiates introduced the reign by saying that Michael was ‘worn down by old age and 
therefore would have to share basileia.’157 These critiques suggested that Michael should 
never have been on the throne to begin with. He was too old to do anything of use, his 
reintroduction of outdated policies (not even ‘innovative’) proved fruitless, and he depended 
upon others to govern for him. Michael emerges from these accounts as an emperor in name 
only whose advisors were exercising real authority. The image of his reign is that of a 
                                                 
154 Mesaionike Bibliotheke IV, ed. Sathas 360. 
155 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 178-179; ed. Renauld II, 83 (trans. Sewter 275); Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 492 (trans. Wortley 458). 
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government without an emperor. 
In connection with this image, Paraspondylos became a scapegoat. Alongside the 
story of him rudely dismissing the commanders, Isaakios’ demanded his removal from office 
during Psellos’ embassy, and was later pleased to hear that ‘the man who looked after the 
imperial affairs’ had been forced to resign.158 He was similarly described by Skylitzes as the 
man who ‘managed the affairs of the empire’, thus supplanting Michael entirely.159 His 
derisive sobriquets were derived from his relation to the Spondyles family and the verbs 
παρασπονδέω (‘to break faith with’) and στρεφώ (‘to twist around/invert’), which may imply 
that he was reputed to have promised the commanders promotions and then reneged on those 
promises. Therefore, his dismissal was presented in such a way that Isaakios’ could be seen 
intervening to help Michael restore control over a government corrupted and dominated by 
Paraspondylos’ mismanagement. 
Finally, it appears that Isaakios exploited the Seljuk threat as yet another justification 
for his promotion. Kekaumenos was reportedly able to win troops to Isaakios’ cause after 
producing a forged imperial missive saying that he had been ordered to march against the 
Seljuk Emir Samouch.160 During his reign, Isaakios’ coinage provoked controversy for its 
militaristic representation of an emperor with his sword drawn, and his seals bore a similar 
image of him with his sword resting upon his shoulder. The iconography resembled that of 
military saints, and may have referenced the eastern saint Michael of Chonai, of whom 
Isaakios is conjectured to have been a devotee.161 Moreover, Skylitzes records that 
throughout the rebellion Isaakios’ troops endeavoured to influence his opponents by praising 
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his past victories and tactical genius.162 By contrast to his predecessors’ demobilisations, the 
suggestion of renewed victories in the east would have won Isaakios substantial support 
amongst his colleagues and revealed him to be active in defence of the empire.  
 
Alexios I 
The Alexias of Anna Komnene provides invaluable insight into how the ruling family tried 
to present Alexios I’s conquest of Constantinople and overthrow of Nikephoros III (1081).163 
Anna’s narrative exploits multiple explanations in order to present Alexios’ usurpation as 
necessary and beneficial. To begin, we learn that an atmosphere of factionalism and distrust 
had taken hold at Nikephoros’ court. On one side stood the protoproedros Borilos and his 
colleague Germanos, favourites of Nikephoros. The pair were reportedly ‘consumed by 
envy’ (phthonos) at the thought of the favour being shown to the brothers Komnenoi, Alexios 
and Isaakios. This enmity only worsened after Nikephoros named Alexios proedros and 
domestikos ton scholon in the west, when Borilos and Germanos began publicly slandering 
the brothers, incited others to do likewise, and endeavoured to turn the emperor against 
them.164  
A second faction formed in opposition. Anna claims that the Komnenoi sought to 
align themselves with Empress Maria in order to seek protection from the insults and 
intrigues ranged against them. To that end, Isaakios, who was a relative by marriage of the 
empress, was reported to have persuaded the attendants of the palace’s women’s quarters to 
convince Maria to adopt Alexios.165 The circumstances suggest the existence of a pro-
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Komnenoi element within the wider palace administration, and the adoption subsequently 
allowed the Komnenoi easy access to the palace and empress. However, the adoption failed 
in preventing accusations from being levelled against the brothers. In fact, Anna claims that 
‘envy flared up against them even more fiercely.’166 They were (correctly) accused of 
planning a military revolt,167 and Borilos and Germanos then began scheming to have the 
brothers blinded. Anna claims that this plot against the Komnenoi was revealed through one 
of Maria’s loyal countrymen, an Alanian within Nikephoros’ circle: insinuating that 
Nikephoros had foreknowledge but had not intervened.168 She writes that it was this scheme 
which finally convinced Alexios and Isaakios to plan rebellion in order ‘to ensure their own 
safety’.169 This first defence amounts to an accusation of injustice perpetrated by the 
emperor’s coterie. From the exposition it is clear that Alexios was not at fault, since powerful 
enemies at court had compelled him to act in order to save his life. An abbreviated version 
of the story can also be found in the history of Nikephoros Bryennios, Anna’s husband, and 
the contemporary Epitome of Ioannes Zonaras, which indicates the pervasiveness of 
Komnenian apologetic and the stifling of dissenting voices.170  
The charges against Nikephoros’ favourites were then extended to indict the emperor 
himself. Bryennios’ narrative states that ‘Truth and Justice’ were on Alexios’ side and that 
Botaneiates was searching for any pretext ‘to send the innocent to his ruin.’171 The Alexias 
equally accused Nikephoros of wrongdoing. After Alexios and Isaakios had fled 
Constantinople to raise an army, Anna Dalassena, Alexios’ mother who had remained behind 
with the Komnenian wives, is purported to have publicly rebuked Nikephoros. She claimed 
                                                 
166 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 57 (trans. Frankopan 52). 
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169 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 60-61; Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 57, 61-63 (trans. 
Frankopan 52, 56-57). Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 726, confirms that the Komnenoi 
were said to fear for their safety. 
170 Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 723-726. 





that her sons were ‘faithful servants’ who had always been among the first to go into danger 
and fight bravely on behalf of the empire, but Nikephoros’ kindness had exposed them to 
the ‘envy’ of their enemies. Dalassena asserted that these enemies planned to harm them, so 
Alexios and Isaakios had fled in order to buy time to convince Nikephoros of their continued 
fidelity. Dalassena’s rebuke ends by saying that Nikephoros should have intervened to 
protect the Komnenoi, but he did not.172 The story, real or fictional, presented Nikephoros 
as a failing emperor because he was either unwilling or unable to defend his subjects from 
falsehoods and injustices committed by his own circle, or because he actively wished them 
harm. We infer that Nikephoros’ failings had forced the Komnenoi to act against him. 
The histories also indicate that Komnenian propaganda exploited this theme 
extensively. All three accounts refer to the antagonists Borilos and Germanos as ‘slaves’, 
implying that this designation was also used in official rhetoric.173 Anna’s recourse to the 
label is particularly suggestive. She invites a subtle comparison between Alexios and these 
rivals. Her account consistently refers to Borilos and Germanos as ‘the emperor’s slaves’ or 
simply ‘τῶν δούλων’ so that it quickly becomes a shorthand. By contrast, when we read that 
Alexios feared for his life on account of their plotting, he is reported to have decried that ‘it 
is not right to suffer like slaves’.174 The comparison aligns an accusation of slavery and 
injustice with Botaneiates, Borilos, and Germanos, and suggests that Alexios was acting in 
order to preserve his freedom. Elsewhere, Anna describes Borilos and Germanos as 
‘Slavonic barbarians’.175 Consequently, the association of ‘the slaves’ with barbarism may 
indicate that Alexios’ propaganda portrayed him preventing an inversion of order that would 
have reduced him to the status of a slave and a barbarian. When we then read that Borilos 
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and Germanos were aspiring to basileia it emerges that they represented a threat to the 
empire as a whole.176 Nikephoros’ rulership had provoked ataxia, and if Alexios had not 
acted slaves would have become the masters, Romans the slaves, and injustice would have 
taken hold of the imperial office. 
Alexios’ supposedly superior character served as another justification for his rule. 
Anna claims that her father had also been acting in defence of the successional rights of 
Constantine Doukas, Empress Maria’s son. We are told that there were rumours 
(ὑποψιθυριζομένων) that Nikephoros intended to renege on his agreement to retain 
Constantine as his successor, and instead envisioned promoting his relative Synadenos. Anna 
says that had Nikephoros not planned this change, ‘he would have ensured his own safety to 
the end.’177 However, the Komnenoi approached Maria and offered to help ensure her son’s 
succession; they swore an oath to that effect and asked for her help in avoiding conspiracies 
against them.178 Thus, when Alexios restored Constantine’s privileges at the start of his own 
reign he was revealed to be the true defender of the boy’s rights.179 He even considered a 
marriage to Maria, and later arranged the engagement of Constantine to his daughter Anna, 
solidifying his connection to the dynasty and suggesting his good intentions.180 A contrast 
was invited between Alexios, who kept his oath and recognised Constantine as emperor, and 
Botaneiates, who did neither: one was trustworthy and loyal, the other was not.181 
Superior military leadership and philanthropeia also constituted an element of 
Komnenian apologetic. Anna observes that the military commanders Gregoras Pakourianos 
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and Constantine Houmpertopoulos quickly sided with Alexios on account of his ‘exceptional 
courage and intelligence’, and because of his ‘hands unusually fond of dispensing gifts.’182 
By contrast, Bryennios comments that Nikephoros was illiberal and had not rewarded 
Alexios for suppressing the revolts of Bryennios the Elder or Basilakes.183 He suggests that 
the military had become disheartened and despised Nikephoros, thus choosing to align with 
Alexios’ leadership instead. Bryennios also comments repeatedly that Alexios was the ‘hope 
of the Romans’, the ‘Saviour of the Romans’, and that he brought to an end the ills of the 
empire, a reference to the ongoing civil wars and threats from the empire’s neighbours.184 In 
line with this rhetoric, Anna describes how, despite disillusionment at court after the fall of 
Kyzikos, the Komnenoi were able to ‘comfort the emperor’s soul, troubled as it was by the 
ravaging of his towns, they raised his fallen spirits… assuring him that Kyzikos would soon 
be retaken.’185 As Cheynet notes, at the end of the eleventh century there was substantial 
desire among the military aristocracy for more active campaigning.186 The espousal of 
Alexios’ military pedigree in suppressing internal rebellions, and the favour with which he 
was viewed by his comrades, evidently exploited this. Alexios’ comments about Kyzikos 
revealed him to be an active figure taking steps to restore the empire, whereas Nikephoros 
had fallen into a self-pitying lethargy. Therefore, hopes of restoration lay with Alexios’ 
leadership rather than Nikephoros’. 
Finally, it appears that this lethargic image of Nikephoros was widely exploited in 
official rhetoric. According to Bryennios, Nikephoros was ‘decrepit and worn with age… he 
had lost his energy and was not up to [the task of exercising] supreme power,’ he ruled 
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‘despite being on the threshold of old age’.187 Anna equally opined that ‘Botaneiates’ spirit 
had been chilled by old age; however brave he had been in his youth, he only breathed freely 
now as long as the walls protected him...’. And when she recalls his offer to share power 
with Alexios, in the final hours of his rule, we are reminded that he was ‘a lonely old man’.188 
In depicting Nikephoros as fearful and inactive his military credentials were further 
undermined and the empire was revealed to be endangered. Furthermore, the unchallenged 
scheming of Borilos and Germanos could now be explained: the pair had abused and 
dominated an old man who was unable to control his court. Consequently, the rebellion of 
the Komnenoi was in the best interest of the empire, since they were the only ones willing 




The only Byzantine accounts of Andronikos I’s rise to the throne (1181-1183) are those of 
contemporaries Eustathios of Thessaloniki and Niketas Choniates. Both were writing under 
the influence of later Angeloi propaganda, and Choniates utilised Eustathios’ material for 
his own account.189 Andronikos had been involved in a number of intrigues previously which 
another contemporary author, the epitomator Kinnamos, suggested were inspired by his 
being overlooked for promotion to the ranks of the protosebastoi.190 Thereafter, Andronikos’ 
perpetual desire for power is a characteristic of every narrative in which he features, and 
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underpins the accounts of his ascent.191 However, there are also traces of Andronikos’ own 
justificatory and propagandist efforts preserved within these narratives and it is to these that 
we will now turn our attention. 
When Manuel died in 1180, his son Alexios II had been proclaimed as co-emperor 
but was too young to rule alone.192 We read that Alexios had given himself over to hunting 
and racing, and that he had been taught to neglect his imperial duties.193 Instead, Empress 
Maria served as his regent alongside (nominally) Patriarch Theodosios. Eustathios and 
Choniates emphasise that Maria was courted by many amongst the nobility, but that Alexios 
the protosebastos, a nephew of Manuel, won her affections.194 Eustathios asserts that the 
protosebastos ‘intended to enlarge his power’ and thus provoked the ‘envy’ of others.195 
Choniates confirms this impression, claiming that the other members of the imperial family 
feared that a ‘tyranny’ was taking root and that the protosebastos, although having no 
murderous intentions towards Alexios, intended to remove them from power.196 In reaction, 
a conspiracy was formed to depose or assassinate him, and centred on the kaisarissa Maria 
(Manuel’s daughter from his first marriage), the kaisar Renier, Andronikos’ sons, and a 
select group of officials.197 In February 1181, the conspiracy was uncovered. Eustathios 
draws attention to the ‘improper’ way in which Empress Maria was permitted to preside over 
a summary trial of the kaisarissa’s co-conspirators, and particularly criticises the judge 
Theodoros Pantechnes. We learn that guilty sentences were read out, the criminals subjected 
to ‘excessive indignities’, and imprisoned. Furthermore, the judges ‘were planning without 
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concealment’ to arrest the kaisarissa as well.198 Eustathios’ version of events indicates that 
the kaisarissa’s partisans were claiming that justice had been perverted by the regency and 
that judges no longer served the law, but conspired against the people. According to 
Choniates, the kaisarissa openly accused the regency of acting unlawfully and bringing 
Alexios’ reign into disrepute.199 In being perceived to have overstepped lawful authority 
Maria and the protosebastos demonstrated their illegitimacy, meanwhile Constantinople and 
the empire suffered. 
The summary trials resulted in the kaisarissa claiming asylum at Hagia Sophia for 
two months, during which she recruited Latin mercenaries and claimed to be defending 
Alexios’ rights. She called for the removal of the protosebastos, and received support from 
the Constantinopolitan crowds.200 In the course of this impasse, three priests entered the 
Forum and acclaimed Alexios whilst declaring anathema upon the Empress and 
protosebastos.201 Then, in May, a one-day battle ensued between the kaisarissa and the 
regency before apatheia was granted and the kaisarissa was permitted to return to the 
palace.202 
Andronikos exploited this chaos in the capital to return from retirement at Oinaion 
with an army. The kaisarissa had sent a message to him requesting his support, and we read 
that, in light of the political infighting, Andronikos appeared the most capable of restoring 
order by protecting Alexios and removing the protosebastos.203 Consequently, his concern 
for Alexios’ rights featured heavily in his rhetoric. In late 1181 he had corresponded with 
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199 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 232-233 (trans. Magoulias 131). 
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Historia, ed. van Dieten 232 (trans. Magoulias 131). 
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202 Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 22-23; Choniates, Historia, ed. 
van Dieten 236-240 (trans. Magoulias 133-135). 





Alexios, Theodosios, and his supporters in Constantinople, urging them that the 
protosebastos should be removed from office for Alexios’ safety, and because of the 
rumours involving empress Maria.204 During his march on Constantinople (early 1182), he 
announced en-route that he was acting in defence of the emperor, and received oaths to 
himself and Alexios from cities along the way.205 He is even reported to have claimed that, 
under the terms of his oath to the emperors sworn in 1180, Manuel had appointed him to 
Alexios’ regency, and that he was returning in order to fulfil his sworn duties.206 The pretext 
for Andronikos’ rebellion was thus clearly established as the defence of Alexios through the 
removal of a regency that had provoked infighting and scandal. Andronikos was not 
rebelling in order to claim the throne himself but was attempting to restore political stability 
and dynastic unity. He appears to have enjoyed some success in promoting that message 
since Eustathios asserts that people were calling him a ‘saviour, and a bulwark for the 
empire’,207 and Choniates claims that Andronikos appeared ‘more affectionate than a father’ 
when he was appointed to protect the boy.208  
When Andronikos finally arrived at Constantinople in March/April 1182 the regency 
surrendered and he made recourse to rituals in order to communicate his professed aim of 
dynastic unity. Andronikos first prostrated himself before Patriarch Theodosios, who had 
been instrumental in negotiating the settlement of the dispute between the regency and the 
kaisarissa, and who had been popularly restored to office after the protosebastos had 
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attempted to remove him.209 He next met with Alexios and made obeisance to the emperor 
including performing the ritual proskynesis. This was coupled with a display of antipathy 
towards the unpopular Empress Maria, who was removed from authority.210 By showing 
signs of respect to Alexios and Theodosios, Andronikos was able to conciliate allies in the 
church and senate and legitimise his intervention in political affairs.211 He also visited 
Manuel’s tomb in order to pay his respects, a sign that old hostilities towards his cousin had 
been put aside in favour of dynastic loyalty.212 Finally, he was named Alexios’ 
guardian/regent, and had the protosebastos ejected from the palace, blinded, and publicly 
paraded.213 As Beihammer notes, the sequence was a strong ritual confirmation of 
Andronikos’ good intentions, but it also firmly established his position as regent through the 
hostility shown towards his allegedly incompetent and immoral predecessors.214 
Andronikos’ early propaganda also appears to have exploited disaffection over the 
perceived financial mismanagement of the regency. Choniates states that it was believed that 
only Empress Maria and the protosebastos were benefiting from state revenues, while even 
the impoverished were stripped of their wealth.215 The massacre and looting of the Latin 
population of Constantinople, which coincided with Andronikos’ entrance to the city, was 
partly an expression of this discontent, since it was believed that Maria had favoured the 
Latin merchants.216 By contrast to the regency, Choniates claims that Andronikos provided 
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often flows into the belly of the whore.’ Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 230 (trans. Magoulias 130). 





for the ‘impoverished’, and Eustathios writes that he sought to introduce ‘new practices’ 
(μελετῶν καινά) that were opposed by the nobility (especially the Angeloi) and supported 
by ‘the mob’.217 Jurewicz and Angold argue that Andronikos sought to portray himself as a 
champion of the ‘common people’ and actively targeted socioeconomic policies to win their 
support.218 Although we cannot be certain that these policies were actually beneficial to the 
masses, his encomiasts spoke of successes in this area.219 He was also purported to have 
complained at length when these policies were opposed, even expressing a desire to return 
to Paphlagonia which he claimed was filled with his riches.220 It seems that, in part, 
Andronikos’ rhetoric made use of supposed financial successes elsewhere to present him as 
a suitable candidate to head the regency, and implied that his governance would be beneficial 
for the wider empire. His efforts to present himself restoring political and economic stability 
distinguished him from predecessors who were believed to have undermined this. 
The next stage of Andronikos’ ascent was justified on the basis of threats to the 
empire. Over the next year he faced opposition to his authority. The Angeloi had broken into 
revolt at Nikaia during his march on Constantinople,221 and at Philadelphia Ioannes Vatatzes 
claimed that Andronikos was supplanting Alexios and establishing a ‘tyranny’.222 In 
Constantinople the kaisarissa and her husband had died under unusual circumstances,223 and 
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in September 1183 Empress Maria was accused of conspiring with her sister’s husband, Bela 
III, to attack the territory around Belgrade and Braničevo. Her death warrant was approved 
by the judges, and signed by Alexios at Andronikos’ behest.224 Andronikos’ rhetoric 
particularly condemned Maria: he is reported to have termed her a ‘concubine/harlot’, he left 
her corpse on display on the beach outside the city walls (a traditional fate for traitors and 
rebels),225 and throughout the city he instigated a damnatio by modifying her imperial 
portraits in order to depict her as ‘a wrinkled old woman’.226 Here the critique of old age was 
directed against a figure accused of sexual immorality, who was believed to have created 
political paralysis, and had been executed for treason.  
When Maria’s death triggered the rebellions of Theodoros Angelos and Theodoros 
Kantakouzenos, these prompted calls for Andronikos’ proclamation as co-emperor.227 
According to Eustathios this was championed by the ‘vulgar people’ before the court elite 
joined them. In the acclamations following his coronation Andronikos was granted seniority 
over Alexios on account of his greater experience, gained from his ‘distant wanderings’.228 
These ‘wanderings’ referred to Andronikos’ ventures with the Turks, when he campaigned 
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by contrast, states that Maria had been held at St Diomedes monastery, was strangled, and then thrown into the 
sea. 
226 In fact, she was in her mid-thirties (34/35) at the time of her death. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 332-
333 (trans. Magoulias 183). 
227 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 270 (trans. Magoulias 149-150). 
228 Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 42-45; Choniates, 





alongside them, and thus invoked his military experience.229 Choniates confirms this, saying 
that it was decided that promotion was the only way that Andronikos would be able to 
combat rebellions and rule ‘more forcefully and authoritatively than Alexios’.230 Certainly, 
once he was in power, Andronikos was active in prosecuting campaigns against rivals at 
Nikaia and Prousa.231 His encomiasts are also reported to have spoken of wars of reconquest 
and the ‘good governance of cities’, which implies that his military credentials represented 
a significant element of his propaganda.232 It also appears that Andronikos continually 
presented himself as a figure restoring order and justice since, elsewhere, Choniates reveals 
that his recourses to capital punishments were always lawfully sanctioned233 and his 
panegyrists connected this with the ‘Sword of Justice’.234 
Finally, although during his coronation Andronikos swore that he had only agreed to 
reign in order to aid Alexios, it was soon decided that the boy should be made a ‘private 
citizen’, and then that he should be murdered.235 As Beihammer concludes, it would be 
wrong to view the course of Andronikos’ ascent as pre-calculated. His return was a reaction 
to paralysis in Constantinople and he was believed capable of restoring order through 
effective administrative, economic, and military leadership.236 Notably, whereas his name 
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was expunged from the Synodikon in Constantinople it continued to appear in those of the 
provinces: proof of his continued status amongst some sections of society.237 He was 
supported at each stage by members of the senate and the populace, and his justifications 
were evidently convincing.  
 
Discussion 
The case studies are instructive of the kinds of justifications that were espoused by usurpers 
at any period in the empire’s history. In seeking to explain the source of a conflict, or 
manipulating justifications to serve invective, authors provide us with glimpses into the 
world of revolutionary discourse. The factual content of justifications (or the narratives’ 
records of them) was to some extent irrelevant; more important was the belief that they 
would be understood as appropriate pretexts in the political sphere. We see that multiple 
explanations were advocated in each case, and that these fit into four general categories: the 
defence of successional rights, economic maladministration, injustice, and military 
concerns. These charges could incriminate an emperor directly, or indirectly through his 
subordinates. However, in every case, they were adduced as evidence of a regime’s 
illegitimacy and proved sufficient to warrant the reigning emperor’s deposition. 
The defence of successional rights was used intermittently as a pretext, usually in 
association with regency governments where a powerful figure at court was said to be 
threatening a minority emperor. The first prominent example was Valentinos’ rebellion on 
behalf of Konstans II, which resulted in the overthrow of Heraklonas and Martina.238 As we 
saw, Romanos, Alexios, and Andronikos, also made recourse to this kind of justification as 
a way of securing support for their rebellions. Later, Georgios Akropolites’ justified Michael 
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VIII’s murder of the regent Georgios Mouzalon by stating that Theodoros II ‘had made a 
will, supposedly for the son, but in truth for his protovestiarios Georgios,’ and implied divine 
inspiration for the act.239 And Gregoras records Ioannes VI’s accusations that the regency of 
Empress Anna, Patriarch Kalekas, and Alexios Apokaukos, was appropriating wealth and 
power for itself; neglecting Ioannes V.240  
Other forms of nominally loyalist revolt might seek to restore a deposed emperor or 
proclaim a pseudo-emperor. These needed minimal incentive since candidates had access to 
client-networks whose interests might best be served by their restoration: as with the 
rebellion which sought to restore Artemios-Anastasios, the conspiracies surrounding the 
sons of Constantine V, and the attempted restorations of the Lekapenoi.241 However, these 
emperors were never guaranteed the support of their countrymen: in his appeal to the Turks 
in 1211 Alexios III allegedly called Theodoros I ‘unjust in seizing another’s realm,’ yet 
Alexios’ former subjects refused to recognise his authority and blinded him.242  
Heredity alone was never sufficient justification for rebellion. Whenever a usurper 
claimed to be defending an emperor’s rights, this was always accompanied by other 
justifications: the regency or senior emperor was incompetent, greedy, or unjust. When 
Andronikos III was disinherited in 1320-1321, his partisans presented his grandfather’s 
actions as being the result of unfounded and excessive hatred but accompanied this with 
allegations of senility designed to query the grandfather’s competence.243 The wellbeing of 
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the empire was being threatened alongside the wellbeing of an emperor. The hereditary 
rights ‘being defended’ were then typically subverted by the usurper, which was justified on 
the basis of his superior abilities.  
In every case, the security and prosperity of the state mattered foremost, not the 
preservation of a dynastic claim. Classical models of political thought, known in Byzantium, 
established that public affairs were to be conducted as a meritocratic bureaucracy, not a 
family business.244 Thus Skylitzes historically rebuked Leon Phokas for thinking of basileia 
‘as an inheritance’, and Choniates ridiculed Alexios the pinkernes’ belief that he would be 
welcomed as Manuel I’s heir.245 Even after 1204, when usurpers were almost exclusively 
family members, Michael VIII’s propagandists claimed that his authority was owed to his 
superior virtues, and an oration of Nikolaos Kabasilas addressed to Matthew Kantakouzenos 
claimed that imperial lineage was insufficient qualification for basileia since it included 
‘disgraceful persons’ (read Ioannes V).246 The persistence of this principle even seems to 
have prevented the emergence of ‘dynastic history’ writing in Byzantium, when it flourished 
elsewhere.247 Meritocratic claims thus proved necessary alternatives to dynastic claims, a 
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way of justifying disputed successions.248  
Economic concerns represented an opportunity to demonstrate an emperor’s lack of 
merit. Military pay disputes were an especially prominent cause of civil wars in the sixth to 
mid-ninth centuries.249 The mutiny and eventual usurpation of Phocas in 602 was prompted 
by the troops being ordered to winter across the Danube frontier (an old punishment duty), 
in preparation for a campaign against the Avars. Maurice attempted to cut expenditure by 
having them support themselves in enemy territory and did not offer compensations.250 
According to Theophylaktos, ‘[they] were troubled by the emperor’s order, both because of 
the lack of booty and the exhaustion of the horses, and in addition because of the many 
barbarians who surged around the country across the Danube.’251 Discontent was created by 
the danger, lack of financial recompense, and risk to mounts that had been purchased 
independently and would need to be replaced. The troops believed themselves spurned by 
Maurice and turned to rebellion by proclaiming Phocas.252 Naturally, financial unrest also 
affected the civil population. Economic concerns swayed Leontios to consign Justinian II’s 
finance ministers Theodotos and Stephanos to flames. Unpopular tax policies had been 
introduced in order to raise finances and there was particular resentment over the activities 
of the kommerkiarioi.253 Leontios appears to have harnessed discontent amongst the public 
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and aristocracy to instigate his usurpation.254 In 1077 Nikephoros Bryennios rebelled against 
Michael VII and exploited disapprobation with the tax reforms of the logothetes tou dromou, 
Nikephoritzes to promise economic rewards for his supporters in Thrace.255 And we saw that 
Andronikos I innovated economic policies to win support; despite opposition from the elites. 
The emperor believed to best serve the needs of the community would win support. 
In questioning an individual’s competence to administer economic affairs an 
established category of imperial evaluation was employed. Advice literature established that 
ideal emperors ensured the financial security of the state and populace, and concerns about 
fiscal stability and ‘oppressive’ taxation had long influenced Kaiserkritik.256 Magdalino 
highlights twelfth-century authors’ concerns that emperors should manage the ‘public 
finances/common property’ for the common good, not just their own faction’s enrichment.257 
Zonaras had accused Alexios I of thinking ‘of the palace as his own house’, and calling it 
that; and of misappropriating the pronoiai system for his own (and his supporters’) personal 
wellbeing, depleting public finances. He argued that an emperor should be oikonomos, not 
despotes, and that Alexios had failed to understand this.258 We saw similar charges levelled 
against Michael VI, and the regency of Alexios II. In the late-Byzantine period the proper 
role of the emperor’s economic policies and discretionary rights over the empire’s landed 
                                                 
254 For the consignment to flames of Theodotos and Stephanos at the Forum Bovis: Nikephoros, Historia 
Syntomos, ed. Mango 96-99; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 369 (trans. Mango and Scott 515). For 
Justinian’s unpopular policies, see Stratos 1980: esp. 73-74; Head 1972: esp. 59-98; Oikonomides 2002: 980-
981, 985. 
255 Nikephoritzes’ attempted tax reforms and the establishment of the phoundax, a centralised warehouse for 
the grain supply of Constantinople, had created a state monopoly leading to grain shortages and inflation. The 
allegedly willing population pulled down the phoundax located outside the city and acclaimed Bryennios.  
Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 244, 248-249 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 446-447, 452-453); 
Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 216-217. On Nikephoritzes, see Kazhdan 1991: 1475. On Nikephoritzes’ 
reforms and the phoundax, see Métivier 2007: 143-145; Angold 1997: 121-124; Stephenson 2000: 98-100. On 
the promise to the population of Thrace, and Rhaidestos in particular, see Kaldellis 2015: 155-156. 
256 On these aspects of advice literature and Kaiserkritik, see Dmitriev 2015: 21-22; Angelov 2003: esp. 55, 
57; Stone 2011: esp. 187; Magdalino 1983; Tinnefeld 1971; Brubaker 2004: 83, 86, 101. 
257 Magdalino 1983: esp. 327-330. 
258 Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 732-733; III, 766-767. By contrast, Ioannes III received 
praise for his care over separating public wealth from private, and even reproved his son for wearing the 
imperial insignia while hunting because these represented the blood of their subjects and should only be worn 





wealth was increasingly debated. Confiscations in the name of the ‘public benefit’ were 
challenged by the belief that property rights were inviolable, and the discussion was framed 
in the language of ‘tyranny’ versus ‘good rulership’: the elites’ financial independence was 
considered a form of liberty not to be infringed.259 During the civil wars of the 1320’s 
Andronikos III decreed that Thrace was to be liberated of tax duties, and that the soldiery 
would receive higher pay.260 Andronikos II condemned his grandson for ‘dividing the public 
finances’, leaving the treasury depleted,261 and claimed the grandson had no idea how to 
govern since he had only lived a life of pleasure-seeking indolence.262 Those emperors who 
could be presented as unfair or incompetent financial administrators were seen to be abusing 
the common funds and could legitimately be challenged. 
‘Justice’ represented yet another category of evaluation. Emperors’ ideological 
duties as defenders of truth and justice were frequently alluded to in literature and art.263 If 
an emperor was believed to have wrongly persecuted someone, or failed to defend him 
against a false accusation, then he had acted unlawfully and emulated a tyrant in that 
instance. Consequently, alleged miscarriages of justice remained common pretexts for 
rebellion. In 355, the magister militum Silvanus had claimed to be the victim of slander at 
court. Out of fear that Constantius would simply order his execution Silvanus had himself 
proclaimed and was assassinated after twenty-eight days.264 In the case of Alexios I, false 
accusations and conspiracies directed against him by Nikephoros’ favourites were at the 
heart of his propagandists’ apologetics. This wrongdoing went unchallenged by the emperor 
                                                 
259 Angelov 2011: esp. 324-327. See also, Smrylis 2013; Smrylis 2009. 
260 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 392-393; Nicol 1993: 155. 
261 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 403-405. 
262 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 394. 
263 For example: Nikephoros Blemmydes, Basilikos Andrias, ed. Hunger and Ševčenko §110-122, 155-171, 
209-216; a portrait of the emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates (Paris, BnF, Coislin 79, fol. 2r.) depicts the 
enthroned emperor flanked by allegorical representations of the imperial virtues of truth and justice; similarly, 
the description of a work depicting the emperor Manuel I, that once adorned a dome of the kouboukleion at the 
Blachernai, mentions that he was accompanied by figures representing Justice, Fortitude, Prudence and 
Temperance: Magdalino and Nelson 1982: 142-146. 





which indicated that injustice had taken hold at court and invalidated Nikephoros’ moral 
qualifications. Given that Nikephoros had exploited injustices committed by Michael VII as 
part of his own propaganda, Alexios appears to have tapped into a prevailing mood of 
hostility towards governmental power.265 In the thirteenth century, Michael VIII did 
likewise. Theodoros II had attempted to curtail the power and influence of the ‘over-mighty’ 
through his own legislative activities, thus creating resentment that Michael exploited.266 
Michael excused his exile as a result of the ‘arrows of jealousy’ emanating from 
Theodoros,267 and his propagandists explained how Mouzalon had been killed by those 
Theodoros had penalised unfairly.268 Given that Michael promised to reform the justice 
system soon after his proclamation, that Manuel Holobolos refers to such reforms in an 
oration of 1265, and that Michael’s novel ‘On maladministration’ has been dated to the early 
years of his reign, the eradication of widespread ‘injustice’ perpetuated by Theodoros was 
clearly a significant cause for his promotion by the aristocracy.269  
In exploiting these worries usurpers tapped into the uncertainties of their peers who 
might also fall prey to falsehoods. ‘Envy’ emerged as a recurring accusation in the case 
studies, and represented the most frequently adduced cause of conspiracies in all periods 
since it was understood to induce sykophantia (false testimony).270 Advice literature warned 
emperors to avoid envy and to rule in a benevolent fashion. Kekaumenos explained that 
slander and injustice were occupational hazards, and counselled emperors to ignore 
                                                 
265 For Nikephoros’ propaganda in this regard see below, page 301. See also, Kekaumenos’ statements about 
slander and injustice: below (main text). 
266 Angold 1975a: esp. 75-81. 
267 Imperatoris Michaeli Palaeologi de vita sua, ed. Grégoire 453 (trans. Dennis 1243). 
268 The murder occurred on 24 August 1258. Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 134-135 (trans. Macrides 
312-313). 
269 For Michael’s promise to reform the system of justice, see Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler 
and Laurent I, 132-133. For Manuel Holobolos’ oration, see Manuelis Holoboli Orationes ed. Treu p. 36. For 
Michael’s novel ‘On Maladministration’, see Burgmann and Magdalino 1984: esp. 386. 
270 On the relationship between envy and sykophantia, see Maguire 1994: 219-221. The possibility was 
recognised in law: Ekloga 17.51, states that those found guilty of false testimony were to suffer the same 





accusations unless there was clear evidence of wrongdoing.271 The use of these topoi was 
not merely rhetorical, for they reinforced an implied axiom of Byzantine political culture: it 
was ruthlessly competitive at all levels.  
In a society where positions were hotly contested and service to the state was 
valorised, the unfair distribution of titles and honours, or failure to adequately reward 
service, were other forms of injustice which led to disapprobation and open war. As we saw 
from Isaakios I’s defences, neglect or unfair dismissal could be successfully exploited by 
military commanders. The usurpation of Ioannes I similarly involved demobilised and 
disaffected commanders who accused Nikephoros of dismissing them to ‘idle on their estates 
like peasants without rights’.272 And Bardas Skleros entered into revolt on account of his 
‘demotion’ from stratelates to doux.273 Skylitzes, who made use of a pro-Skleros source for 
that period,274 writes that, ‘this all grieved Skleros severely, so much so that he was not able 
to keep to himself his grief magnanimously, but protested out loud… Was demotion the kind 
of reward he was to receive for all the courageous deeds and victories he had brought about?’ 
When Skleros appealed, he was ignored. A colleague, Michael Bourtzes, was similarly 
suspected, dispatched to Antioch, and joined Skleros’ revolt along with ‘many people in 
whom Skleros had confidence’.275 We read in this how usurpers were able to mobilise 
supporters who equally felt maltreated, had interests best served by their accession, or else 
were loyal to them. The charisma and power-networks of prominent figures naturally 
engendered support, and emperors could be accused of fostering factionalism or dismissing 
                                                 
271 Even then emperors were advised to be mild in persecuting these cases: Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. 
Vasilevskij p.3. 
272 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 88 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 139). For details, see below, page 184. 
273 The demotion was ordered by Basileios the parakoimomenos, acting on behalf of Basileios II. Bardas had 
been suspected of treason and Basileios the parakoimomenos sought to limit the troops at Skleros’ disposal 
should the suspicion prove accurate. Holmes 2005: 324-327, questions whether this could really have been 
considered a demotion, since Skleros remained in command of the forces arrayed against Hamdanides of 
Mosul, a crucial command. 
274 On the evidence for this source, see Holmes 2005: 255-298, and esp. 268-278, 324.  





more competent figures, bringing into question their concern for the empire’s wellbeing. 
Wrongdoing by an emperor’s subordinates was used as evidence of his own 
ineptitude and immorality. He appointed them to help administer the affairs of state on his 
behalf, and it was crucial that they were competent individuals able to fulfil their duties. As 
we saw, the supposed ineptitude of Leon Phokas and the parakoimomenos Constantine 
allowed Patriarch Nikolaos to return as Constantine VII’s regent. The mismanagement of 
Michael VI’s government was partly blamed on the policies of Paraspondylos who had 
maltreated and dismissed commanders responsible for the defence of the empire, and 
Michael was additionally condemned for promoting people above their ability: including his 
decision to advance secretaries to act as tax collectors.276 The regency of Empress Maria and 
Alexios the protosebastos, was undermined by their injustices and the complicity of the 
judge Theodoros Pantechnes. These kinds of maladministration provoked injustice and 
ataxia and provided a pretext for a usurper to intervene in order to restore order to the 
government since the emperor was evidently incapable of doing so. 
The most extreme forms of injustice were those associated with the stereotypical 
‘tyrant-emperor’ model: use of force and arbitrary punishment.277 Herakleios created this 
image for Phocas in order to legitimise his rebellion. We read of numerous executions and 
purges attending the years of Phocas’ reign, yet their historicity is questionable since Phokas 
enjoyed broad support from the military, demes, and an aristocratic faction headed by the 
patricius Germanus, and his governmental appointments showed relative continuity with 
those of his predecessor.278 Instead Herakleian propaganda invented executions which 
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rebellion. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 483 (trans. Wortley 450); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri II, 188-189; ed. Renauld II, 88 (trans. Sewter 279). 
277 On the literary presentation of tyranny, with a special focus on the Historia of Choniates, see Simpson 
2013a: esp. 163-164; Simpson 2013b. On a comparable examination of ‘tyranny’ in relation to Justinian II, see 
Head 1972. 





continually projected Phocas as a ‘destroyer of order’, and simply called him ‘tyrannos’.279 
This imagery was also used by Philippikos against Justinian II, to whom vast purges and 
mass murders are attributed. Yet, as Head notes, nowhere is it mentioned that Theodosios, 
the son and co-emperor of Tiberios-Apsimaros, was killed: a rather extraordinary omission 
if we are to believe that Justinian indiscriminately purged all opposition.280 And in 1185 
Isaakios II depicted Andronikos I as an unjust emperor willing to kill and penalise arbitrarily, 
despite Andronikos’ consistent recourse to legal sanction. In all three cases it was suggested 
that these emperors had no respect for the law, and they were condemned as ‘tyrants’. 
Usurpation was warranted since they apparently could not rule in accordance with accepted 
legal and moral standards and the people were suffering as a result. 
Rebels had to prove that injustice affected more than just their own personal 
ambitions or else appear to be acting for immoral reasons of personal profit rather than out 
of concern for the state. Thus Attaleiates condemned a plot by ‘certain people’ who were 
‘hoping for new profits’ when they accused Constantine X of ‘slacking in his imperial 
munificence’.281 Self-serving actions and motives were signs of illegitimacy and it was 
expected that readers would recognise these justifications to be unsound. 
Our case studies show the ease with which a regime could be challenged when 
deemed incapable of handling internal or external threats. Naturally, significant defeats, or 
periods of territorial contraction, provided evidence of an emperor’s deficiencies. When the 
strategos ton Anatolikon Leon III rebelled in 717 it was only nominally a response to 
Theodosios III’s overthrow of Artemios-Anastasios.282 Instead, Leon successfully presented 
                                                 
279 Meier 2014: 154, 161, 165-166, demonstrating that there was a concerted effort by Herakleios’ 
propagandists to associate Phocas with the term ‘tyrannos’. Theophylaktos Simokattes, for example, refers to 
Phocas by the term ‘tyrannos’ twelve times in just two books.  
280 Head 1972: 117-118.  
281 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 72 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 130-131). 
282 Although neither Leon nor his colleague Artabasdos, the strategos ton Armeniakon, swore fidelity to 





himself as capable of handling the Umayyad threat by organising the defence of the local 
populations and winning their loyalties away from Theodosios, who had made no response 
to the raiding. When the public realised that Theodosios could not protect them, Leon was 
their best hope.283 The pragmatic decision of the populace highlights how local opinion and 
political realities shaped loyalties. Likewise, Psellos asserts that Leon Tornikios believed he 
would be welcomed into Constantinople since ‘the people hated Monomachos as a ruler and 
wanted to see a soldier-emperor, a man capable of fighting for them who would put an end 
to the barbarian incursions.’284 Tornikios’ supporters amongst the families of Adrianople 
were those most affected by the settlement in the west of the Pechnegs who had crossed the 
Danube in 1046/1047. Their disaffection was compounded by Monomachos’ continued 
campaigning in the east, prompting them to promote Tornikios as their champion.285  
Discontent over failed promises of military success could also be exploited. As we 
saw, Alexios I’s propagandists depicted him as a more capable campaigner than Nikephoros, 
but when his reign was challenged by territorial losses in the east in the early 1090s, the 
eastern military commanders united around Nikephoros Diogenes and Constantine Doukas 
to attempt a coup in 1094.286 The deteriorating situation in Asia Minor caused resentment of 
Alexios’ campaigns in the west amongst the eastern aristocracy.287 Isaakios II comparably 
exploited Andronikos I’s propaganda of military restoration, the ongoing civil wars, and 
Latin encroachment in the west, to present himself as ‘the liberator Moses and Zorobabel 
                                                 
283 Against Leon’s wishes, Amorion, capital of the Anatolikon theme, declared itself for Theodosios within 
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Chronographia, ed. de Boor 389-390 (trans. Mango and Scott 539-540); Brubaker and Haldon 2011: 73-75; 
Kaegi 1981: 193-194. 
284 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 44-45; ed. Renauld II, 18 (trans. Sewter 209-210). 
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leading back the captives of Zion’.288 Emperors unable to maintain state security and live up 
to their own rhetoric became easy targets for figures who could present themselves as 
superior alternatives. The common good was, they argued, better served by their leadership 
than by an emperor who allowed enemies to commit injustices against Roman citizens. 
Revolutionary propaganda often accused emperors of cowardice or a lack of energy 
in pursuing political and military interests. We saw this deployed against Michael VI and 
Nikephoros III in connection with their ‘old age’. It was implied that they had lived to 
become a danger to the state because the burden of governance was too much for them.289 
Romanos I and Andronikos I used rhetoric to highlight a minority emperor’s youth and the 
incompetence of the regency in order to propose their own promotion on account of their 
superior abilities. This aligns with another common topos of leadership in the narratives, 
namely that those who exercised authority were described as ‘dynamic’ or ‘active’ 
(έργατικόν) individuals, capable of getting things done.290 The renewal of the empire’s 
fortunes was thus to be accompanied by a rhetorical rejuvenation of the imperial office by 
men in their prime who would be more active in safeguarding the empire than their 
predecessors. 
Finally, the most serious indictment that could be levelled against a reigning emperor 
was that of collusion against the empire. When Alexios IV appealed to the crusaders (1203) 
                                                 
288 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 356 (trans. Magoulias 197). Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of 
Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 2-3, even refers to the Thessalonikans’ belief that Isaakios was a ‘liberator’ 
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289 Kaldellis has argued that Psellos used the same charge against Romanos III in order to justify Michael IV’s 
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to establish him on the throne, he set in motion his own downfall.291 In July, Alexios was 
restored alongside his father Isaakios II and the pair imposed confiscations in order to pay 
the crusaders.292 Anti-Latin sentiment provoked violence, which intensified when the 
crusaders started fires in response. The emperors were not seen to challenge this behaviour, 
continued to associate with crusader leaders, and imposed additional confiscations. On 25 
January 1204 representatives of the senate, church, and citizenry gathered at Hagia Sophia 
to find a rival emperor. They promoted Nikolaos Kannavos on 27 January, but were 
frustrated when Alexios V Doukas (a prominent anti-crusader figure) proclaimed himself 
and deposed the Angeloi.293 The absence of any form of resistance to their removal attests 
to the comprehensive rejection of their authority. It marked the only occasion of a regime 
being overthrown for appearing to conspire against the populace with foreign enemies, 
although a related charge was levelled against Manuel II during the Ottoman siege of 
Constantinople (1394-1399).294 In theory, diplomacy had to benefit the whole empire, not 
just an individual emperor. When he forgot this he could be accused of treason and deposed. 
 
Chapter Summary 
Real power, determined by the relative support given to a candidate by the representative 
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groups of state and other political actors, determined the success or failure of a rebellion. 
The interests of these disparate socio-political groups had to be considered by any emperor 
who wanted to remain in power. Although dynastic integration became increasingly 
important as authority was restricted to members of the imperial family and its clients, 
hereditary rights were only ever weakly established in Byzantium. They coexisted and 
conflicted with meritocratic-republican ideals of rulership. Therefore, usurpations could be 
justified on the basis of the ‘election’ of a usurper who looked capable of bringing about an 
improvement in the condition of the state, and hereditary rights were not strictly necessary 
in order to claim the throne. 
The conflict between these theories of rulership was borne out in justificatory 
materials that revealed a reigning emperor’s failures to administer or defend the empire. This 
propaganda sought to exploit established systems of imperial evaluation in order to 
undermine an opponent’s legitimacy. Although authority did not depend upon how an 
emperor came to occupy the throne, how a usurper managed to attain power could provide 
an indication of whether he possessed necessary characteristics. A comparison between an 
emperor ruling in accordance with idealised legal and moral norms associated with the 
virtues of Christian rulership, and a tyrant exercising authority by force was implied. The 
reigning emperor could occupy either role depending on one’s perspective.  
Injustices and maladministration were signs of an emperor’s descent into tyrannical 
behaviours that threatened his subjects, and were prominent motives for rebellion. When an 
emperor introduced policies detrimental to some section of society, that section might argue 
that his government was acting unjustly against them and lend their support to his rivals. 
When he was believed to have displayed ingratitude, or promoted ineffective, incompetent, 
or hostile individuals to act on his behalf, the government could be said to have become a 





to restore order. External threats to the empire represented another failure of rulership since 
the populace suffered under an inept commander. Usurpers frequently exploited reverses and 
presented themselves as superior generals in order to assume power with the promise of 







III. AUTHORISING INVESTITURES  
 
Rituals existed at all levels and in all places in Byzantium. They were of singular importance 
in shaping emperors’ public images and projecting the realities of power, wealth, and rank, 
through symbolic gestures and behaviours.295 Ceremony served to ‘create stability in crises 
of power… through orderly interaction between various social groups, controlled by precise 
regulations on behaviour.’296 Sociologists recognise that these communicative patterns 
possess a demonstrative and constructive character which help to create a sense of identity; 
if one wanted to propagate a certain idea or identity this could be more easily achieved by 
embracing the ritual patterns associated with it.297 Consequently, ritual theory asserts that 
inauguration ceremonies contributed to the perceived transformation of a usurper into a 
‘legitimate’ claimant.298 Moreover, any significant deviation from normative ritual 
behaviours might be understood to indicate a change in the structure or ideology of that 
culture.299 This means that usurpers had to adopt ritual behaviours compliant with existing 
norms or else appear out of the ordinary and attain ritual legitimation in new ways. 
The present chapter examines the development and format of four stages of 
‘investiture’ that are emphasised in the narratives of usurpation: proclamation, assumption 
of imperial attire, entry into Constantinople, and coronation. It employs ritual theory and the 
narrative evidence to explore how these stages were believed to contribute to an emperor’s 
legitimization, and surveys the ideologies of rulership that were projected. Some trends in 
the use and adaption of these investitures by usurpers will be adduced. Ultimately, this 
allows us to draw some conclusions about the socio-political and cultural contexts that 
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influenced a usurper’s inauguration ceremonies, and the conceptions of power that were 
communicated by these investitures. 
 
Proclamations and acclamations 
The tenth-century Book of Ceremonies identified four stages in the inauguration of emperors: 
ἐκλογή, the choice of candidate; ἀναγόρευσις, the proclamation of the chosen candidate 
through acclamations; στέψις, the coronation; and εὐφημία, the acclamation acknowledging 
a newly crowned emperor.300 These fundamental elements had evolved in response to the 
succession crises of the first and second centuries, and were commonplace by the third 
century, usually performed in accreted form by field armies proclaiming commanders.301 
Those proclamations comprised an acclamation of the candidate by the troops, an investiture, 
and an acclamation of acknowledgement. Emperors subsequently addressed the troops, 
distributed donatives, and received oaths of fidelity.302 By the accession of Valentinian, 
investiture with a diadem and military torques/maniakion had become traditional, and 
emperors were raised on a shield.303 
At Constantinople, proclamations became more inclusive, reducing their military 
character. They were enacted within the military grounds of Hebdomon until the fifth 
century when it was substituted by the Hippodrome.304 The change corresponded with a 
strengthening of the capital’s significance in Byzantine ceremonial and the growing need for 
ritual communication between emperors and citizens following the withdrawal of emperors 
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from active campaigning.305 The martial setting, which symbolically linked the procedure 
with historic military advancements, was thus replaced by a civilian locale representative of 
the newly strengthened role of the populace in ‘authorising’ imperial elevations. Yet the 
military continued to participate in the proclamation’s attendant acclamations and 
procedures. Troops joined the demes and senate in acknowledging that emperors were 
‘worthy’ of office. Eventually, the proclamation was transplanted from the Hippodrome to 
Hagia Sophia, but representatives of military, populace, and senate were always 
participants.306  
The military character of the fourth-century shield-raising also became more 
‘representative’ in later Constantinopolitan and Nikaian performances. The proclamation of 
Julian at Paris (360), as a rival to Constantius II, represents the first attested performance.307 
The procedure was quickly adopted and, despite a punctuated silence in the histories, shield-
raising probably remained a recurrent feature of inauguration rituals until the fall of the 
empire.308 By the sixth-century shield-raisings were performed in the kathisma of the 
Hippodrome: technically a section of the palace which bridged the symbolic divide between 
‘public’ and ‘imperial’ domains.309 This imbued the procedure with a civil characteristic 
                                                 
305 Emperors withdrew from active campaigning during the late-fourth and fifth centuries. That withdrawal 
afforded relative stability to the imperial office in this period. Ward-Perkins 2012: 54; Arena 2007: 328; Lee 
2007: 54.  
306 On the transition to Hagia Sophia, see Trampedach 2005: esp. 233. 
307 Brightman 1901: 366; Teitler 2002: 505-507. 
308 Phocas’ proclamation in 602 is the last attestation of its performance until the Book of Ceremonies gives an 
ambiguous reference to Nikephoros II’s ‘elevation’ during his proclamation. Psellos’ description of the 
Bulgarian uprising of 1040, and Leon Tornikios’ proclamation in 1047, are rather more definitive about its use. 
Another lacuna then exists until we hear that Theodoros II was raised on a shield in 1254, supposedly in 
accordance with ‘custom.’ For Phocas: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 287 (trans. Mango and Scott 
412). For Tornikios: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 42-43; ed. Renauld II, 18 (trans. Sewter 209); 
discussed in Kazhdan 1984: 51. For Nikephoros: Constantine Porphyrogennetos, Book of Ceremonies, ed. 
Reiske I, 434 (trans. Moffatt and Tall I, 434), ἐκ τῆς τέντας ύψώσαντες ὰνηγόρευσαν αὺτὸν βασιλέα. For 
Theodoros: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 105 (trans. Macrides 277-278). On the evidence for shield-
raising in the medieval period, see Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov esp. 419 (Studies). 
To be clear, the possibility of shield-raising being a recurrent feature does not mean that every emperor or 
usurper who was proclaimed was actually elevated on a shield, only that this was always a possible element of 
the ceremony and could be embraced.  





alongside the military. Under the Palaiologoi shield-raising was typically performed within 
the patriarchal palace, moving it into an ecclesiastical locale.310 Pseudo-Kodinos lists it 
among the procedures of coronation rather than proclamation, and a thirteenth-century 
innovation saw emperors sitting on the shield and raised in elevated locale.311 High-ranking 
churchmen were now recorded as participants, and their involvement has been interpreted 
as an acknowledgement of their increased status as representatives of the polity, approving 
the election of the emperor akin to the soldiery and populace.312 Palaiologan modifications 
to the procedure need not indicate, as some scholars have suggested,313 that it was 
reintroduced after centuries of absence, since authorial omission of ceremonial details is a 
well-known phenomenon. Other forms of elevation may also have been in use.314 
Importantly, the soldiery remained present in the shield-raising, represented by their 
commanders alongside proxies from each consensus group.  
The weakening of proclamation’s association with the military and the expansion of 
the ritual procedures to incorporate other groups rendered it a ceremony of popular 
‘ratification’ or ‘election’. Byzantine proclamation rituals revived the consensus seeking 
rites initially developed in first-century Rome to establish the symbolic approval of multiple 
                                                 
310 However, Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen III, 188-189, mentions that Matthew Kantakouzenos was raised 
on a shield at his proclamation in the imperial palace at least a year before his coronation. The use of the ritual 
was thus not, as Pseudo-Kodinos implies, exclusively associated with coronations, and could potentially be 
performed outside the patriarchal palace. 
311 Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 216-217 (Text), and 418-421 (Studies). 
312 For this interpretation, see Angelov 2005: 309. For the involvement of churchmen in the elevation of 
Michael VIII, see Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 137; III, 221. It is important to 
note that the involvement of churchmen in shield-raising is inconsistently recorded by the sources. Churchmen 
may be listed as present for one instance and yet absent for the next. This does not necessarily mean that they 
really were absent, but may simply indicate that an author had omitted to mention them because readers familiar 
with the ritual would automatically infer their presence. Consequently, the fact that churchmen start making an 
appearance in accounts of this ritual from the thirteenth century onward does not imply that this was a 
thirteenth-century ‘innovation’. Their involvement in earlier iterations of the ritual should not be discounted. 
313 Kazhdan 1984: 114. 
314 For example, in the eleventh century, Theodora was proclaimed by the crowds, invested with a mantle, and 
then elevated to sit atop a horse. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 228-229; ed. Renauld I, 108-109 





‘consensus groups’ (military, senate, and populace) for a new emperor.315 Narratives’ 
confirm this by frequently describing proclamations in association with words and phrases 
like ‘elected’, ‘by common vote’, or ‘by lot’, regardless of the circumstances.316 Even 
proclamations ‘in the field’, which persisted because ritual performance in Constantinople 
was never a prerequisite of claiming power, held elective overtones. Furthermore, a ritual 
adventus was performed upon arrival at each new town/city that a rebel won to his cause, 
symbolically allowing the citizenry to offer loyalty and ratify the usurper’s election, via 
acclamation.317 The supporting acclamations were shouted rank by rank, and street by 
street.318 Failure to project consensus allowed authority to be questioned: Lactantius, for 
example, inveighed that Maximinus’ proclamation by Diocletian occurred in full accordance 
with protocol except that it was against Diocletian’s better judgement and lacked the support 
of the troops (who allegedly favoured Constantine I instead). The circumstances served to 
                                                 
315 On the Roman prototypes, see Flaig 1997: esp. 16-18. On the emulation in Byzantine rituals, see Dagron 
2003: esp. 13-48, 78-79; Brightman 1901: esp. 359. Arena 2007, notes the correspondence between the 
ceremonial locations used for the proclamation of emperors in first- and second-century Rome, and those of 
Late Antique Constantinople. The symbolism of popular election expressed through the choice of inauguration 
sites, that was a feature of accessions in Rome, is also found in the Late Antique Constantinopolitan ceremonial.  
316 For example: the proclamation of Phocas: καὶ χύριος τῶν σκήπτρων ὁ τύραννος προχειρίξεται... 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 289 (trans. Mango and Scott 413). The proclamation of Tiberios-
Apsimaros: ψηφίζονται δὲ ᾿Αψίμαρον ὄνομα… Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 98-99. The 
proclamation of Leon III: εἶτα εἰς ψῆφον ἐληλυθότων τοῦ βασιλεύσοντος ᾑρέθη Λέων ὁ πατρίκιος... 
Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 120-121. The proclamation of Nikephoros III: καὶ κοινῇ ψήφῳ 
πάντες οἱ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸν Βοτανειάτην αὐτοκράτορα ‘Ρωμαίων καὶ δεσπότην ἀναγορεύουσι μετὰ πολλῆς καὶ 
ἀκατασχέτου τῆς συνδρομῆς καὶ περιηχῆς… Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 269-270 (trans. Kaldellis 
and Krallis 490-491). The proclamation of Constantine Laskaris: ᾿Εκ δὲ κλήρου τὸ πρωτεῖον εἰληφὼς ὁ 
Λάσκαρις τὰ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας οὐ προσίεται σύμβολα... Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 571-572 (trans. 
Magoulias 314). On the use of this kind of phraseology in connection with proclamations, see 
Christophilopoulou 1956: esp. 76. 
317 For example: Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder’s acclamation at Rhaidestos, and Alexios I’s acclamations in 
towns and cities while en-route to Constantinople. Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 247-249 (trans. 
Kaldellis and Krallis 450-455); Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 71 (trans. Frankopan 66). 
On the history of the adventus, see Shepard 2013. 
318 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 93-94 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 143), notes how the acclamations 
announcing the proclamation of Ioannes I were performed throughout the neighbourhoods of Constantinople 
by hand-picked supporters. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 204-205; ed. Renauld II, 96 (trans. 
Sewter 288), describes the military acclamation of Isaakios I (for which Psellos was an eyewitness), noting 
how it was performed rank by rank. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 75, 82-83 (trans. 
Frankopan 68, 75) describes acclamations attending the proclamations of Alexios I in the field and in 
Constantinople. The initial acclamation in the field was performed by each group of her father’s supporters, 
one rank at a time, led by the Doukai; when Alexios’ troops subsequently gained entry to Constantinople they 





invalidate rhetorically Maximinus’ authority and validate Constantine’s later overthrow of 
the tetrarchic system since Constantine was then shown to have acted with ‘consent’: an idea 
Constantine also promoted elsewhere.319 
The proclamation of an emperor/usurper remained the most important ritual of 
investiture throughout the empire’s history. Every serious rival to a reigning emperor was 
proclaimed by representatives of one or more of the constituent groups. Even during 
Constantinopolitan uprisings proclamation was among the very first acts undertaken. The 
citizens and senators who instigated the rebellion against Michael V, for example, found 
Theodora and rushed to proclaim her in Hagia Sophia.320 Although they typically continue 
to use ‘tyrannos/apostates’ to refer to a usurper, the accounts confirm that proclamation 
represented a transformative moment in which his supporters believed him to have been 
granted basileia,321 by detailing how he now fulfilled duties usually restricted to the emperor. 
Bardas Phokas distributed donatives to supporters and began assigning dignities and 
functions.322 Leon Tornikios was unable to distribute largess, but granted a remission of 
taxes, assigned rights to booty, and allocated supporters and senators to his inner council and 
military commands.323 Nikephoros Bryennios contacted notables in Constantinople to offer 
titulature, and promoted his own brother, Ioannes, kouropalates and domestikos.324 And 
                                                 
319 Icks 2012: 465-467. See also, Drake 1995, on how Constantine I’s own justificatory writings emphasised 
that his actions were undertaken in order to form consensus, or were in response to consensus; with particular 
reference to Constantine’s ‘conversion’. For a comparable later example, see Choniates’ criticism of Alexios 
V who acted without popular consensus to depose Isaakios II and Alexios IV: Choniates, Historia, ed. van 
Dieten 561-564 (trans. Magoulias 307-309). 
320 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 228-229; ed. Renaud I, 109 (trans. Sewter 144), draws attention 
to the organised and speedy manner with which the rebellion was conducted. Constantine Kabasilas was 
appointed its head, led the populace to Theodora, extricated her from the sanctuary of her church, promptly 
invested her, and processed to Hagia Sophia to proclaim her. 
321 As Nicol 1993: 190 observes, ‘the act of proclamation… was sufficient in itself to make a man an emperor, 
at least in the eyes of the representatives… who proclaimed him.’ According to Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. 
Reinsch and Kambylis 83 (trans. Frankopan 75), Georgios Palaiologos, a member of Alexios’ conspiracy, 
already believed Alexios to be emperor when Alexios entered Constantinople. Alexios had already been 
proclaimed, but Nikephoros III had not yet abdicated and Alexios had not received a coronation. 
322 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 113 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 163). 
323 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 42-43; ed. Renauld II, 18 (trans. Sewter 209). 
324 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 230-233; Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 249-50 (trans. Kaldellis 





Alexios I, and Ioannes Komnenos Doukas, began issuing chrysobulls signed in the imperial 
red/purple ink.325 
Whenever possible, newly proclaimed usurpers undertook to mint coinage: common 
practice in Late Antiquity and the Early Byzantine period when the size and wealth of the 
empire afforded easier access to the necessary materials and personnel. Herakleios issued 
coins before he even claimed the imperial title.326 In the seventh and eighth centuries only 
usurpers in Sicily and Italy, which retained independent mints, were able to produce rival 
issue.327 Afterwards, with the centralisation of mints in Constantinople and (periodically) 
Thessalonike, opportunities became fewer and those usurpers who did issue coinage either 
captured Thessalonike or founded their own mint.328 Cheynet establishes that only six out of 
more than two-hundred rebels and usurpers produced coins between 963 and 1204. Those 
minted by Theodoros Mangaphas were even considered noteworthy by Choniates.329 
Coinage was a viable propagandist media because of the necessity for pay, and the cases 
emphasise the effort put into producing rival coin in order to assert one’s claims to authority. 
Their subversive and legitimist potential was also well understood: when the fourth-century 
                                                 
325 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 77 (trans. Frankopan 70); Akropolites, Historia, ed. 
Heisenberg 33 (trans. Macrides 162): ‘[Theodoros Komnenos-Doukas] did not wish to be called emperor, 
because of the condition of his eyes, but named his son Ioannes emperor, shod his feet in the red shoes and 
prescribed that he sign with letters of the same colour, while he was to manage public affairs and administer 
his son’s business.’ …βασιλεὺς δὲ ὀνομάζεσθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησε διὰ τὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν πάθος, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν αὐτοῦ 
᾽Ιωάννην βασιλέα ὠνόμασε καὶ τοιούτοις γράμμασιν ὑπογράφειν διώρισεν, αὐτόν τε διέπειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ 
διεξάγειν τὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ.  On the ideological importance and symbolism of imperial documents and the red/purple 
ink, see Dölger 1939: 235-236. 
326 His revolt coinage names him as consul, but never Augustus. Since emperors in this period claimed the 
consular title upon their proclamation, Herakleios’ use of it may have been intended to minimise Phocas’ claims 
to authority without Herakleios being accused of similarly overreaching (a way of denying Phokas’ legitimacy 
without Herakleios actually claiming to be emperor himself). On emperor’s claiming the consular title, see 
Kaegi 2003: 40-42. 
327 (For example, the usurper Mizizios c.668-669). Grierson 1982: 152. 
328 Penna and Morrisson 2013: 41-42. On the mint of Thessalonike during the tenth-twelfth centuries, see 
Hendy 1969: 79; Grierson 1982: 224.  
329 Cheynet 1990: 20-145. Particularly noteworthy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries were issues of 
Basilakes, whose revolt lasted only six months (1078-1079); the Gabrades, who established a mint at Trebizond 
(c.1092-1098) during Alexios I’s reign; Isaakios Komnenos of Cyprus (1184-1191), who employed outsiders 
to mint issue bearing his image; and Theodoros Mangaphas, who established an amateur mint in Philadelphia 
(1188). On Basilakes: Hendy 1969: 79. On the Gabrades: Hendy 1985: 438; Bendall 1977: esp. 130, 134-136. 
On Komnenos: Bellinger and Grierson 1994: IV, 354-364. On Mangaphas: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 





usurper Procopius attempted to win support by distributing gold issue, his agents were 
quickly neutralised and the coinage seized,330 and Justinian II may have attempted a 
systematic withdrawal of Leontios and Tiberios-Apsimaros’ issues from circulation.331  
In another indication of basileia, after a proclamation in the field, a usurper’s 
command tent assumed the guise of the imperial tent. Mullett outlines how imperial tents 
functioned as mobile courts acting as a microcosm for ceremonial, receptions, and palace 
life in absentia. Psellos confirms that Isaakios I’s courtiers would arrange themselves 
hierarchically inside his tent for receptions during his rebellion.332 Alexios III’s conveyance 
to the ‘actual’ imperial tent after his proclamation, has been described as a rite de passage 
denoting his transition to imperial status, and imbuing the tent with a ceremonial importance 
akin to the palace.333 Proclaimed usurpers thus imitated the court and administration even 
outside Constantinople. 
Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that usurpers sought to exploit symbolic 
dates for their proclamation in order to enhance their imperial charisma. To cite three 
examples: Isaakios I was proclaimed near Kastamon on 8 June 1057, the anniversary of the 
Translation of the military saint Theodoros Stratelates.334 The military symbolism of the date 
would have integrated neatly with the justificatory material espoused by Isaakios.335 
Nikephoros III’s rebellion was given a false chronology by Michael Attaleiates. He writes 
that Nikephoros was proclaimed on 2 July 1078, which was both the date of the summer 
                                                 
330 Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 26.7.11. 
331 Grierson 1968: II.2, 644. 
332 Mullett 2013: esp. 504; Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 204-207; ed. Renauld II, 96 (trans. 
Sewter 288). Hendy 1985: 273, documents how the wealth and splendour of the imperial tent could even rival 
that of a palace, and the image of splendour was certainly promoted by Psellos in relation to Isaakios. See also, 
Grünbart 2008, on Psellos’ description of the golden ornamentations adorning the imperial tent of Basileios II. 
333 Tounta 2010: 464. 
334 The date is found only in Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 489 (trans. Wortley 456). Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 54 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 96-97), gives the more general ‘Spring Equinox’ as 
the date for the start of the rebellion (although not necessarily the proclamation); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri II, 184-185; ed. Renauld II, 86 (trans. Sewter 278) gives no useful information with which to 
determine the date of proclamation. 





equinox and, although Attaleiates does not mention this, the commemoration of the 
Translation of the Robe of the Theotokos to the Blachernai.336 Fictive dates for significant 
events are not unknown337 and, given that Nikephoros’ revolt actually commenced in late 
1077, it seems clear that his propagandists sought to exploit the invented date. Attaleiates’ 
accompanying allusions to ‘sunlight’ may indicate a connection to rhetorical ‘sun-king’ 
imagery associated with emperors.338 Or the date may have implied the favour of 
Constantinople’s saintly protector, especially since Nikephoros captured the city without 
bloodshed. Finally, Ioannes VI’s proclamation at Didymoteichon on 26 October 1341, 
coincided with the feast of St Demetrios, the military saint, presumably to signify Demetrios’ 
favour for Ioannes’ nascent campaign.339 Demetrios was an imperial patron since the 
Komnenoi, and was closely aligned with the Palaiologan family in official propaganda as 
defender and legitimist.340 Given Ioannes’ efforts to espouse familial relations with the 
Palaiologoi as a means of self-legitimisation, the adoption of the family’s protector 
undoubtedly served this effort.341 Despite these examples, it should be noted that the dates 
of proclamations are exceedingly rarely recorded, generally provide only the month/season, 
and were most likely to have coincided with tactically opportune moments or have been 
dictated by changing political circumstances.342 
                                                 
336 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 215 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 392-393), claiming that the 
proclamation took place in ‘the first year of the indiction’ (i.e. 1078). Skylitzes Continuatus, ed. Tsolakis 172, 
establishes that Nikephoros was proclaimed emperor by the magnates of the East in October 1077.  
337 Angelov 2009: 100, points to the unlikely correspondence (‘happy coincidence’) of imperial birthdays with 
major feasts in twelfth- and thirteenth-century orations and suggests that the closest major feast day to an actual 
imperial birthday was often deliberately conflated. 
338 On the use of sun-king imagery in imperial panegyric, see Dennis 1997: 134; Hunger 1965: 97-102. The 
birth of the emperor Constantine was even said to have caused the sun to stand still: Vita Constantini, ed. Guidi 
308. 
339 Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen II, 167. Discussed in Nicol 1996: 55-56; Dölger 1938: 20-24. 
340 On the importance of St Demetrios to Palaiologan propaganda (Andronikos II even named a son Demetrios), 
see Nelson 2004: esp. 31, 36. On Demetrios’ elevation from local saint to dynastic patron under Alexios I and 
the Komnenoi, see Grotowski 2010: 115-117. 
341 On Ioannes VI’s attempts to position himself as a family member, see Dölger 1938: esp. 26-29, showing 
that Ioannes’ efforts in that regard were not particularly unusual: links to past emperors provided a form of 
‘dynastic pedigree’ (lineage) that a candidate could espouse in order to win support for their accession. 
342 Leon Tornikios fled confinement in Constantinople on 14 September 1047, the day of the Elevation of the 






Just as proclamation invested usurpers with authority to behave imperially, it permitted them 
to adopt insignia connoting their newfound status. The functional symbolism of costume in 
Byzantine political culture cannot be underestimated, and ‘the impression given in the texts 
is that titles and the robes that accompanied them were used to denote power… [and] express 
hierarchical relationships to the imperial throne.’343 The Kletorologion of Philotheos, 
compiled c.899, and the fourteenth-century Pseudo-Kodinos emphasise the close association 
of particular attire with particular titles.344 Liudprand of Cremona’s account of the roga 
ceremony of 949 indicates how hierarchy was represented via differing pay and robes of 
office.345 Fundamentally, one’s clothing was emblematic of one’s identity, therefore 
investitures and divestitures were frequently recorded in the narrative histories in order to 
underscore changes in identity.346 Since the language of power thus anticipated a visual 
component,347 a usurper’s adoption of imperial insignia represented an easily understandable 
transformation that intended to convey and confirm his new identity/status.  
In most cases, the specific items conferred at a proclamation are omitted or 
inconsistently recorded. Generalised expressions like ‘imperial insignia’ or ‘imperial attire’ 
abound, and we must suspect representational usages elsewhere. Unfortunately, coinage and 
art cannot help since they rarely survive for unsuccessful usurpers, rarely depict 
                                                 
escape, since he was proclaimed emperor several days later, at Adrianople. Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez 
Martin 22-23 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 38-39). 
343 Eastmond and Jones 2001: 166. The deliberate association of attire and authority was long-understood, and 
emperors of late antiquity were forced to legislate against provincial officials who ‘claimed their ceremonial 
due even when they were not wearing their insignia.’ McCormick 1989: 163. 
344 Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 319-358. 
345 On the procedure and Liudprand’s account, see Oikonomides 1997: 200-202. 
346 McCormick 1989: esp. 163, citing the example of Clovis of Tours, who embraced this ‘identity’ principle 
when adopting Byzantine costume and ritual behaviour upon receipt of the rank of consul, in order to present 
himself as a member of the same civilisation.  
347 Choniates expresses the wide-spread understanding of this link (scathingly) when recounting how, during 
the successional crisis of January-February 1204, the popular assembly sought to promote anyone who 





proclamations, and served primarily to propagate an idealised image of basileia.348 Three 
principal ensigns emerge. The purple chlamys and the diadem are the most frequently 
recorded items used between the fourth and eighth centuries. Thereafter the chlamys was 
supplanted by the red boots as most frequently attending a proclamation, but does not 
disappear entirely. Investiture could occur before or after the acclamation. 
The symbolic connotations of imperial insignia, pertaining to the imperial mission 
and sacral charisma, can only have increased the belief that usurpers needed appropriate 
attire.349 The ‘imperial purple’ chlamys and loros costumes were the ceremonial garments 
most often associated with emperors.350 Dyed silk was interwoven with fine strands of gold, 
and decorated with jewels. The chlamys remained in use until at least the early-thirteenth 
century, when it fell out of favour at Nikaia. The loros had gradually replaced it in preference 
during the middle-Byzantine period and remained in use until 1453.351 Purple was most 
singularly associated with basileia, and fulfilled a practical purpose since ‘spectators could 
immediately pick out the key person in a group.’352 
The diadem, after its introduction in the fourth century, became the most prominent 
ensign. For the first three centuries CE it conflicted with Roman republican rhetoric 
surrounding the imperial office.353 When Constantine transformed his imperial self-
                                                 
348 Parani 2003: 11-34. As Eastmond 2003: 74-78, explains, rather than a personalised representation, imperial 
art provided an idealised model of the emperor with which to understand the essence of the imperial office, 
and thus ‘see’ and understand the nature of the emperor himself. These were not strictly accurate physical 
representations of the emperors they purported to depict. 
349 Regarding the symbolism of the imperial insignia, Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and 
Laurent I, 61-63, for example, details how Ioannes III Doukas Vatatzes rebuked his son for wearing the imperial 
insignia while hunting, since it represented the blood of the people and thus should only be worn to impress 
ambassadors with the people’s wealth. 
350 These were the imperial vestments most often recorded in the Book of Ceremonies, Pseudo-Kodinos, and 
imperial art. Grabar 1936; Parani 2003: esp. 11-34. 
351 Parani 2003: 11-13: tentatively traces the latest established reference to the chlamys-costume as a part of 
imperial attire to the reign of Manuel I in Choniates’ narrative. Parani 2007: esp. 117-118: argues that the 
chlamys had fallen out of favour by the early thirteenth century as a result of changes in court ceremonials, the 
reduced bureaucratic contingent of the Empire of Nikaia, and the adoption of ‘oriental’ styles of dress by 
courtiers in this period. 
352 McCormick 1985: 19. 





representation by adopting a diadem in 325 it signified an ideological innovation. 
Constantine was now sole ruler, reigning charismatically in accordance with imperial and 
divine ideals.354 The diadem personified his God-given power, embodying the close 
relationship of ‘God-crowned’ (θεόστεπτοι) emperors with the divine. This found expression 
in numerous images depicting the Manus Dei crowning emperors.355 Initially a simple band 
that replaced the wreath, diadems became increasingly elaborate and incorporated pearls, 
rosettes, and various gemstones. The design continued to change and under Alexios I 
assumed a hemispherical shape.356 In the fourteenth century, economic constraints forced 
Anna of Savoy to sell the crown (‘stephanos’) with which her son Ioannes V had been 
invested. Consequently, Ioannes VI used an improvised crown of gilded leather and coloured 
glass.357 
The red footwear was to be worn by emperors at all times and was considered 
inseparable from the imperial person (often being the last element of attire surrendered by 
an imperial claimant).358 Roman tradition associated it with Julius Caesar, who wore red 
buskins as evidence of his descent from the Alban kings, and to differentiate his authority 
from all predecessors.359 Like other elements of the imperial costume, footwear became 
increasingly elaborate. Diocletian was reportedly the first emperor to adorn his shoes with 
precious stones.360 Manuel I’s red shoes (tzangia) were decorated with white pearls forming 
eagles, a motif symbolising the purity and lofty-status of the emperor.361 Later, eagle motifs 
                                                 
354 Wienand 2015: 448-449. 
355 On the sacral symbolism of the coronation, see Woodrow 2001: 127-130. 
356 Parani 2003: 27-30. 
357  ‘…also their diadems and vestments in that ceremony, for the most part, had some appearance of gold and 
precious gems; but the former were made of leather, of the kind sometimes gilded according to the custom of 
the leatherworkers; the latter of glass, gleaming with every kind of colour.’ Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 
787-788. Author’s translation. This was the stephanos used for Ioannes VI’s second coronation, he had 
previously received a coronation while in revolt, outside Constantinople (see below). 
358 Heher 2015b: 82-93, provides a useful overview of the history of the imperial footwear and its symbolisms. 
359 On the red shoes of the emperor, see Gioles 2002: 68. 
360 For the sources and for discussion of this ‘innovation’, see Philostorgius, trans. Amidon 242-243 
(Appendix), esp. n.12; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst II, 617 (trans. Banchich and Lane 66). 
361 A twelfth-century description of the jousts of Manuel I records that, ‘His footwear was red and truly 





adorned the shoes of the despotes and sebastokrator, strengthening ‘dynastic’ implications 
of the imagery.362 
Given the expense and intricacy of these items, and the fact that they resided with 
the emperor, we may question with what exactly usurpers were invested. Unfortunately, 
provenance and descriptions are rarely given. From the little evidence available, a division 
appears between proclamations in the capital and the provinces. In Constantinople, ensigns 
could be taken through deceit or networking.363 During the Nika riots, the patricius Hypatius 
was proclaimed at the Column of Constantine with a golden torques, and diadem, taken from 
‘a palace’.364 And in 1200 Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos) entered Hagia Sophia to take ‘one 
of the small crowns which hung suspended around the altar’.365 Outside the capital the 
availability of ‘official’ insignia diminished. In the fourth century, Silvanus improvised a 
chlamys using an imperial banner standard, and Procopius made do with the gold tunic of a 
courtier, but wore red shoes, and a small purple cloth (since no mantle could be found).366 
Later, the usurpers Leontius, Herakleios, and Thomas the Slav, were invested with diadems 
taken from local churches by clergymen.367 We might suspect, given his adoption by 
Empress Maria, that the red shoes provided for Alexios I were genuine.368 There is also some 
                                                 
high flying of the birds the total elevation of the emperor might be depicted. For the emperor is spotless like a 
pearl and high-flying like the eagles.’ Translated in Jones and Maguire 2002: 108. 
362 Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 78-79. The eagle became a symbol particularly 
associated with the Palaiologan dynasty: Kazhdan et al 1991: I, 669; Grotowski 2010: 249-250. The appearance 
of an eagle was a commonplace omen indicating future rule: among the copious bibliography, see Brackertz 
1993: 228-229; Moravcsik 1961: 83-88; Solovjev 1935: 122-125, 129-135; Angelov 2007: 85; Coote 1997: 
esp. 23; Koch 2010: esp. 520-524; Scott 2010: 115-132. 
363 We may add that Empress Theodora was provided with ‘radiant robes’ (λαμπροτέρων στολῶν) by her 
supporters, who included members of the senate with access to palaces: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri I, 228-229; ed. Renauld I, 108 (trans. Sewter 144). 
364 Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 397-398 (trans. Jeffreys 278). 
365 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 526 (trans. Magoulias 289-290). See also, Mesarites, Die 
Palastrevolution des Johannes Komnenos, ed. Heisenberg 22. 
366 For Silvanus: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum 15.5.15. For Procopius: Ammianus Marcellinus, 
Rerum Gestarum 26.6.15-16. 
367 For Leontius: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 312-313 (trans. Jeffreys 216); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 128-129 (trans. Mango and Scott 197). For Herakleios: Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 299 (trans. Mango and Scott 428). For Thomas: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner 
and Thurn 24 (trans. Kaldellis 29). 





limited evidence that usurpers produced their own attire: Bardas Phokas allegedly walked 
among the troops before noticing that his shoes were a dark colour rather than red. The 
response of his retainers, that they actually were red, suggests that a wide colour range was 
acceptable and/or that the boots had been dyed by his supporters.369 Nikephoros Bryennios 
reportedly contrived purple shoes with pearls and precious stones.370 And, in the fourteenth 
century, Ioannes VI commissioned goldsmiths to make a crown.371 
These disparate approaches to securing insignia indicate that there were no ‘unique’ 
items that a usurper had to acquire in order to claim basileia.372 Instead, a range of items 
were utilised in approximation of what might be expected. This contrasts with practices in 
many parts of the medieval West where the possession of one or more unique ensigns was 
literally identified with holding office.373 The relative ease with which Byzantine usurpers 
could claim to possess insignia may even help to explain the discrepancy between incidences 
of usurpation in Byzantium and the West: ritually, it was easier to claim authority in 
Byzantium. However, this does not imply that ritual investiture was ‘diluted’, since the 
refusal of Byzantine usurpers to delay assuming insignia until they could take possession of 
‘genuine’ items at the coronation emphasises the legitimist value of appearance.374 
                                                 
369 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 121 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 169). The possibility that the story was 
merely an apocryphal propagandist invention must also be taken into account. 
370 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 280-281. 
371 Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen and Niebuhr II, 564. This was used for his first coronation, 
outside Constantinople. 
372 Of course, the previous emperors’ imperial attire became available to those usurpers who successfully 
overthrew the regime. 
373 The Holy Roman Emperor Henry II, for example, secured his position against Hermann II of Swabia because 
neither possessed the crown. All Hermann could do to prevent Henry’s accession (1002) was prevent him from 
arriving at Mainz to be crowned; he could not attempt to be crowned himself. On the circumstances, see Bagge 
2002: 167, also citing how Gerard of Elsass’ enemies captured the banner conferred on him by the king as a 
sign of the fief he had received, forcing him to leave the fiefdom in spite of promising to reclaim the banner. 
Note also how, upon the recapture of Constantinople in 1261, the Latin Emperor Baldwin II left behind his 
insignia of office; presumably because he could no longer claim authority: see below, page 235, footnote 1163. 
374 The Madrid Skylitzes seemingly confirms this conclusion (although perhaps only incidentally) and the 
discrepancy between the respective importance of insignia in Western and Byzantine thought. Ioannes I is 
depicted by its Western miniaturist(s) in imperial attire immediately after the murder of Nikephoros II despite 
the text itself never referring to Ioannes as basileus or autokrator until after his proclamation in the 





The charismatic significance of ‘correct’ attire was also exploited to undermine 
rhetorically a usurper’s authority. In an oration of Valens’ court c.366/367 the usurper 
Procopius was ridiculed for being garbed as an emperor without really being one.375 
Ammianus and Zosimus’ accounts of the proclamation employed similar ridicule. 
Ammianus asserted that Procopius resembled how ‘on the stage… a splendidly decorated 
figure was suddenly made to appear… or through some mimic deception. [He was] raised in 
a laughable manner to this dishonour of all honours.’376 Zosimus recalled how everyone 
looked upon Procopius ‘as on a king made in a theatre.’377 Later, Psellos asserted that Leon 
Tornikios ‘forgot that he was merely an actor playing a part on the stage or adopting a 
pose.’378 In both cases, although supporters considered the usurper to be emperor, the 
criticisms implied that proclamation, investiture, and behaving in an imperial fashion were 
insufficient to claim authority. Choniates enhanced this criticism to illustrate Andronikos I’s 
‘barbarian’ nature when Andronikos fled the Great Palace: he threw aside imperial insignia 
and adopted ‘barbarian’ attire. The wilful abandonment of his former identity was paralleled 
by Isaakios II’s proclamation and investiture by the crowd. Andronikos, who we infer had 
merely mimicked the appearance of an emperor, was thus replaced by a true emperor; one 
supported by the people.379 These invectives reveal the subjective nature of ritual 
investitures: approximating the appearance of an emperor was sufficient for those who 
believed that one deserved to be emperor. But popular acceptance of the particular individual 
                                                 
375 Icks 2012: 473. 
376 Ammianus, Rerum Gestarum 26.6.15-16. 
377 Zosimus 4.6.2; Icks 2012: 473. 
378 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 42-43; ed. Renauld II, 18 (trans. Sewter 209). Translation 
adapted. 
379 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 347 (trans. Magoulias 191). Andronikos reportedly placed a ‘barbarian’ 
pyramidal-hat upon his head, as he sought his escape. Since the question of Andronikos’ true identity and 
nature were recurrent considerations in narratives of his reign, we may suspect that the scene is also a comment 
on Andronikos’ ‘Protean’ nature as alluded to in propaganda recorded by Choniates and his contemporaries. 
Andronikos’ irregular, and ‘barbarian’ dress sense, has been noted in the scholarship, see Kazhdan and Franklin 
1984: 257-261; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 78; Grünbart 2011: 83. For other references to Andronikos’ unusual 





was of more importance because vestments and prerogatives merely provided an outward 
confirmation of authority/identity and could not bestow it.380  
 
Constantinople: political capital 
In the histories, control of Constantinople represented another transitional moment in 
claiming basileia. The city was deeply symbolic of empire and ‘Roman’ identity, and during 
the ‘period of exile’ attempts were made by Epirot and Nikaian emperors to recreate its 
ideological and functional significance at new capitals.381 It housed the political and 
administrative apparatus and as Constantinople-based investiture protocols developed its 
possession was necessary in order to complete an emperor’s inauguration.382 The strength of 
the ideological connection between possession of basileia and possession of Constantinople 
allowed Basiliscus (475-476) and Artabasdos (741/2-743), who were subsequently ousted 
by emperors they had dispossessed of the capital yet failed to defeat, to receive coronations 
and administer affairs. And Alexios III’s flight from the city in 1203 permitted his 
replacement.  
The city’s singular importance was alluded to by Kekaumenos who advised readers 
to ‘keep faith toward the emperor in Constantinople,’ and speciously claimed that ‘the 
                                                 
380 Blemmydes, Basilikos Andrias, ed. Hunger and Ševčenko 60-63, 127, agrees with this summation: ‘I praise 
the Roman Emperors of earlier days because, instead of writing “My Imperial Highness”, they put “Our 
Serenity” in all of their ordinances thus showing that serenity and gentleness were the special sacred obligations 
of the Emperor, to be set above the purple cloak itself or the diadem, for even tyrants appropriate these latter: 
but serenity is an inviolate and inalienable possession of the imperial dignity alone.’ 
381 On the singular importance of Constantinople in Byzantine ideology and identity, see Olster 1996. See also 
Magdalino 2000a: esp. 150-151, who comments that ‘the constitutional and ideological role of Constantinople 
within Byzantium far exceeded that of any capital city or metropolis in almost any other territorial state. It was 
the status of Constantinople as the New Rome which made it legitimate for Byzantines to call themselves 
Rhomaioi and their state Romania. For both these identities, Constantinople was the fixed point on the map’. 
On the numerous and varied Epirot efforts to ideologically model their capital, Arta, on Constantinople 
(perhaps more so than any of the other so-called ‘successor states’), see Fundić 2014. On Nikaia as an imitation 
of Constantinople, see Leszka 2012. 
382 Curiously, Tounta 2010: 465, has argued that the need to capture Constantinople was not a ritual necessity 
for a usurper, but rather a practical necessity since it was the administrative heart of the empire. Such a reading 
misses the singular importance of Constantinople in Byzantine thought concerning the imperial office. 
Although usurpers could ‘legitimately’ be considered emperors by their partisans before capturing 
Constantinople, it was always expected that they would make an attempt to gain the city. The number of 





emperor who sits in Constantinople always wins.’383 After entreating contemporary 
emperors to resume active campaigning, Kekaumenos advised them to ignore claims that if 
they left the city ‘another will become emperor in your place.’384 In fact, the prospect of the 
latter threat had prompted surprise when Nikephoros III’s supporters were able to maintain 
calm and security in the capital for three days before Nikephoros arrived.385 The competition 
for the capital imbued its possession with additional significance as a symbol of authority.  
Within the city, control of the Great Palace, Blachernai, and Hagia Sophia, was of 
the utmost importance. The palaces represented imperial spaces and served as sites of 
memory-politics and government. They contained the state archives and were places of work 
for many members of the state bureaucracy.386 The Great Palace housed the imperial mint 
and, together with Hagia Sophia, acted as a locus for ceremonial, including coronation.387 
Despite administrative and ceremonial bi-location between the two palaces from the middle-
period,388 even under the Palaiologoi (when emperors resided at Blachernai) the Great Palace 
and Hagia Sophia remained the sites chosen for coronations.389 The existence of two palaces 
also afforded a measure of security, as two defensible regions at opposite ends of the city 
needed to be secured in order to prevent a possible imperial reorganisation and counter-
offensive.390 Upon his restoration Justinian II arrayed his forces at Blachernai until it was 
established that Tiberios-Apsimaros had fled the city and the Great Palace could be 
                                                 
383 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij 64, 74 (trans. Roueché). 
384 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij 103 (trans. Roueché). 
385 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 272 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 494-495). 
386 Dagron 2003: 96-97; Grünbart 2015. 
387 For the role of the palace in imperial ceremonial of the early- and middle-Byzantine periods, see Magdalino 
1978: 111; Featherstone 2006, with bibliography. For the role of the palaces in late Byzantine imperial 
ceremonial, see Macrides 2011. 
388 On the use of both the Great Palace and Blachernai as seats of government from (at least) the late-eleventh 
century onward, see Macrides 2013a: esp. 289-291; Macrides 2011: 226. 
389 Ioannes VI was the only Palaiologan exception, and held the ceremony at the Blachernai instead because 
Hagia Sophia had been damaged in an earthquake in 1347: Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 787-788. On 
the coronation proceedings of this period, and with reference to Ioannes VI, see Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, 
Munitiz, and Angelov esp. 414-415 (Studies). 
390 Wright 2017: 181, notes the importance of the Blachernai Palace as a defensible place for besieged regimes 





secured.391 Nikephoros III dispatched troops to each location upon entering 
Constantinople.392 
Numerous usurpations centred on capturing the Great Palace, a feat that could prompt 
acclamations from supporters.393 Eleven figures successfully assumed power after deposing 
an emperor, or frustrating a succession, having already had access.394 Justinian II, Michael 
V, and Andronikos I, were dislodged in Constantinopolitan uprisings, and many other failed 
uprisings also targeted the building: the usurper Marcian (479), briefly seized it from Zeno, 
who narrowly evaded capture;395 Hypatius attempted entry via the kathisma, almost 
prompting Justinian to flee; Constantine Doukas, and Theodosios Monomachos, 
independently failed to force entrance;396 and Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos) temporarily 
captured the triklinos of Justinian.397 Other attempts were deterred in the early stages: Leon 
and Nikephoros Phokas escaped imprisonment in 971 and were discovered plotting to 
capture the Great Palace from an absent Tzimiskes; and c.1106 Michael Anemas’ conspiracy 
planned to murder Alexios I in the imperial bedchamber.398 Although most attempts against 
the palace ended in failure, they demonstrate an understanding of its symbolic importance. 
                                                 
391 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 100-105. It is important to note that Justinian II was using the 
Blachernai region as a staging area for his troops’ advance into the rest of the city. It is not known that there 
was already a palace in the region, although that section of the city was of ceremonial importance due to the 
presence of the Church of the Theotokos (which was believed to defend the walls nearby). Despite the absence 
of a palace, the area was evidently considered a useful tactical position from which to stage Justinian’s advance. 
392 For Nikephoros, see Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 249-250.  
393 Isaakios II was acclaimed autokrator when Andronikos I abandoned the palace, and Andronikos III was 
acclaimed after capturing the Blachernai from his grandfather. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 347 (trans. 
Magoulias 191); Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 422. 
394 These were, Artemios-Anastasios, Nikephoros I, Michael II, Basileios I, Ioannes I, Michael IV, Theodora, 
Constantine X, Andronikos I, Alexios V, and Michael VIII. For citations, see Table 1. 
395 Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Bidez and Parmentier 122-123 (trans. Whitby 161); 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 126-127 (trans. Mango and Scott 195). 
396 For Constantine: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 383; Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-
Hayter p.131-133; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 197-199 (trans. Wortley 191-194). For 
Theodosios, see Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 481-482 (trans. Wortley 449-450). 
397 Alexios III’s loyalists subsequently rallied from the Blachernai and regained control of the Great Palace, 
killing Komnenos(-Axouchos) in the process: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 527-528 (trans. Magoulias 
289). 
398 For Leon and Nikephoros Phokas: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 145-146 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 
189-190). For Michael Anemas: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 372-375 (trans. 





The historic association of the palace with basileia meant that whoever controlled it gained 
legitimacy merely by association, distinguishing them from persons who had merely been 
proclaimed elsewhere.  
The speed with which the Great Palace was secured at moments of successional 
insecurity further underscores its close association with the transition and projection of 
authority. In the twelfth century alone,399 Ioannes II missed his father’s funeral because he 
was ‘clinging’ to the Great Palace; Manuel I’s brother (and prospective rival) was prevented 
from accessing it until after Manuel’s coronation; Andronikos I rushed to defend it from 
Isaakios II’s supporters;400 and Empress Euphrosyne secured it for Alexios III.401 In each 
case, possession of the palace subsequently allowed Constantinopolitan inauguration rituals 
to be performed. 
Hagia Sophia represented another historic site of imperial ceremonial and 
(increasingly) of popular politics. The populace often descended upon the church when 
supporting a rival candidate, protecting persons claiming asylum, or seeking patriarchal 
support against imperial policy. Nikephoros III and Alexios III each bribed sacristans to 
proclaim them before they had entered the city, providing the semblance of ecclesiastical 
support and mimicking customary practice.402 After the deposition of Michael V, the church 
became a vital staging post for Constantinopolitan uprisings. Ten candidates were 
proclaimed inside Hagia Sophia in the period to 1204 and this pattern became especially 
                                                 
399 In the eleventh century, Isaakios I returned to the Great Palace to secure the succession when believed to be 
dying. See below, page 110. And in 1341, Ioannes VI ensured the successional security of Ioannes V in the 
immediate aftermath of Andronikos III’s death, by escorting Ioannes and the empress-regent to the palace. 
Ioannes VI had ‘feared that something might happen to the young emperor, as is often the case in these 
circumstances.’ Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 576-577. 
400 On Ioannes absence from Alexios’ funeral, see below, page 225, footnote 1110. On Manuel I’s side-lining 
of his brother: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 46-49 (trans. Magoulias 26-29); Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. 
Meineke 29-31 (trans. Brand 32-33). On Andronikos I’s defence of the Great Palace, see below, page 134, 
footnote 668. 
401 Euphrosyne’s retinue also had to crush the Constantinopolitan insurrection of Alexios Kontostephanos 
which also aimed to capture the palace. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 455-456 (trans. Magoulias 250). 
402 For Nikephoros: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 256, 269-270 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 466-467, 
490-491); Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 242-243. For Alexios: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 456 





popular after Isaakios II’s accession,403 eventually prompting Alexios III to station 
Varangians at the church.404 The trend implies an increasing influence of ecclesiastical 
authorities in imperial successions.405 Hagia Sophia was a relatively defensible position, and 
the taboo against bloodshed within a Church was hoped to dissuade direct assaults. 
 
Coronation  
Control of Constantinople’s ceremonial topography enabled a usurper to enact the final 
investiture ritual, the coronation. The two generalised forms of coronation outlined in the 
Book of Ceremonies and Pseudo-Kodinos corresponded to the principal modes of 
succession: the coronation of a senior emperor by the patriarch, when no other emperor 
occupied the throne, and the coronation of a co-emperor by a senior colleague.406 Regardless 
of which ceremony was performed, emperors received acclamations and other signs of 
honour. The coronation of a usurper-emperor was usually preceded by a triumphal adventus, 
which presented him as a conquering general visiting sites of religious or political 
significance along a route that was never strictly defined. Martial connotations were 
                                                 
403 These were: Empress Theodora, Isaakios I, Nikephoros III, Isaakios II, Alexios Branas, Isaakios Komnenos 
(the nephew of Andronikos I), an unnamed son of the governor of Thessalonike (Andronikos Komnenos), the 
unnamed candidate of a Constantinopolitan revolt in 1200, Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos), and Nikolaos 
Kannavos. To my knowledge, before the eleventh century, only the conspiracy of the sons of Constantine V in 
797 had focused on securing Hagia Sophia as a place of proclamation from the outset, and before challenging 
the palaces. It must also be noted that this ‘conspiracy’ may actually have been little more than a desperate 
attempt for the sons of Constantine to ensure their survival in the tempestuous circumstances of Eirene and 
Constantine’s accession. In other words, they may simply have been seeking asylum in the church rather than 
proclamation. For citations, see Table 1. 
404 Alexios’ actions mimicked those of Empress Euphrosyne, who had secured Hagia Sophia against the 
rebellion of Kontostephanos while Alexios was being proclaimed on campaign. Choniates, Historia, ed. van 
Dieten 525 (trans. Magoulias 288). Discussed in Angold 2015: 121-122. See also, Choniates’ statement 
regarding the failed coup of the son of Andronikos, governor of Thessalonike, which recognises the importance 
of Hagia Sophia to revolts in the last decades of the twelfth century: ‘Although another should have been the 
last to be punished for seeking the throne by going into the temple, he was the seal and the last of the rebels; 
henceforward, no one was to follow the same course.’ Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 428 (trans. 
Magoulias 235-236). 
405 A development in this period that is suggested by Christophilopoulou 1956: 158-159, and followed by 
Angold 1997: 183, on the basis of Zonaras’ account of the acclamations for Ioannes II (1118) being led by the 
‘clergy’. The Church’s public support, Christophilopoulou and Angold believe, allowed Ioannes to survive the 
intrigue of Anna Komnene and Nikephoros Bryennios. Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 763-764. 
406 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, Book of Ceremonies, ed. Reiske I, 191-196 (trans. Moffatt and Tall I, 191-






Although the specific procedures were continually changing and no two coronations 
were identical, after the relocation of the procedure from the Hippodrome, coronations in 
Constantinople usually took place within Hagia Sophia.408 According to the Book of 
Ceremonies:409 the emperor would enter the church and process with the patriarch to the 
sanctuary where a prayer would be intoned. They would then mount the ambo. After the 
litany, the patriarch would intone prayers over the insignia, emphasising through these the 
emperor’s obligations to ensure security, protection, and justice, to defend orthodoxy, and 
to govern benevolently on behalf of the community.410 A triple acclamation (‘Worthy!’) led 
by the patriarch, would be shouted after the emperor’s investiture, and he would retire to the 
metatorion to receive officials. Ideally, the ceremony communicated divine favour and the 
tenets of the imperial mission.411  
Dagron notes that, after iconoclasm, coronations were usually scheduled to coincide 
with one of the major feasts in order to imbue the ceremony with a religious character.412 
That development was undoubtedly linked to the increased need for emperors to assert their 
orthodoxy and sacral charisma after both had been questioned during iconoclasm. Usurpers 
exploited symbolic dates when possible but were often constrained by political 
                                                 
407 On the relative adaptability of Byzantine coronation protocols and triumphal entries, see Dagron 2003: 59-
78; Hunger 1990. 
408 An accounting of all the myriad variations and developments in coronation proceedings is beyond the scope 
of this study. This brief synthesis therefore relates only the ‘essential’ details of coronations, providing a 
simplified model upon which to build. Some of the developments and other elements are discussed below. 
Among the vast literature on Byzantine coronation procedures, see Treitinger 1938; Majeska 1997; Dagron 
2003; Trampedach 2005; Woodrow 2001: 116-145; Brightman 1901; Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, 
and Angelov, all with extensive bibliography. 
409 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, Book of Ceremonies, ed. Reiske I, 191-196 (trans. Moffatt and Tall I, 191-
196). A useful summation of the procedure, complete with a summation of what the congregation would 
actually have been able to see, is offered by Majeska 1997: 2-4.  
410 For the eighth century prayers, see Euchologion, ed. Goar 726-727. On the significance of the prayers in 
the coronation ceremonies of the Book of Ceremonies, see Woodrow 2001: 135-138, and esp. 137. For the 
performance of these prayers during coronations in the late Byzantine period, see Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. 
Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 220-223 (Text), 425 (Studies).  
411 On the ceremonial emphasis on the relationship between the emperor and God, see Treitinger 1938: esp. 
109-110. 





circumstance.413 McCormick postulates that Nikephoros II deliberately delayed coronation 
until the anniversary of the Virgin’s victory over the Arab besiegers of Constantinople in 
718,414 which also coincided with the entrance of the Mandylion in 944, because both 
suggested his divine favour.415 By contrast, Ioannes VI’s supporters derided Ioannes V’s 
coronation on 19 November 1341 because the date held no symbolic value.416  
The ‘constitutional’ function of coronation and the patriarch’s role have been subject 
to debate. The view of the ‘Charanis School’ holds that the introduction of the patriarch in 
the fifth-century represented a ‘constitutional innovation… [and] the church became an 
essential element in the constitutional system of the empire.’417 The patriarch, as an 
authorised representative of the church, sanctioned the emperor’s accession and conferred 
the imperial title upon him.418 Thus Charanis argues, Theodoros I was forced to content 
himself with the title of despotes until his coronation by Patriarch Autoreianos (1208).419 
However, present consensus views Charanis’ interpretation as a significant miscalculation 
of coronation’s value and the patriarch’s function.420 Basileia was not conferred by 
coronation, nor did patriarchs fulfil a constitutional role on behalf of the church. Authority 
had already been conferred by the proclamation; hence Leon Diakonos asserted that, ‘it was 
customary for those who have newly embarked upon the Roman rule to ascend the ambo of 
the church to be blessed by the patriarch and have the imperial crown placed on their 
                                                 
413 See the comments of Kalavrezou 1997: 75, and fn. 91, regarding the explicit choices of liturgical dates for 
the coronations of Macedonian emperors, and of usurpers of that dynasty. Kalavrezou notes, in particular, that 
Romanos I’s choice of 17 December must have been a product of political opportunism at that exact moment 
or he would have waited a few days for a more significant date (25 December). 
414 McCormick 1986: 169. 
415 Talbot & Sullivan 2005: 98 n.68. 
416 The date was supposedly chosen by Patriarch Kalekas, who rushed to arrange the event. Gregoras, Historia, 
ed. Schopen II, 616; II, 697-699. 
417 Charanis 1937: 194. 
418 Charanis 1940/41: esp. 60, 64-65; Charanis 1937; Charanis 1938; Grabar 1936: 176; Hussey 1937: 149; 
Svoronos 1951: 125-128. 
419 Charanis 1940/41: 61-62; Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 11-12 (trans. Macrides 119). 
420 Following studies by Sickel 1898; Treitinger 1939; Dolger 1950. See also, Christophilopoulou 1956: esp. 





heads.’421 Furthermore, the profession of faith written by the new emperor and deposited at 
Hagia Sophia before the coronation took place, in the fourteenth century (and probably 
earlier), already named him ‘basileus kai autokrator Rhomaion’.422  
Coronation confirmed real power and ritually transferred the imperial office’s 
characteristic of divine protection to the new emperor. He was already de facto emperor,423 
but the unity of ecclesiastical and imperial power (establishing his divine election and 
mandate to govern) were symbolically ratified by the representative groups present at the 
ceremony: providing the appearance of a de jure legitimation.424 Since the patriarch’s 
leading of the triple intonation, ‘Worthy’, mirrored historic recitations by the populace 
during past coronation proceedings, it seems that patriarchs acted as ‘first citizens’ handing 
over insignia which new emperors were permitted to wear, but which had been blessed in 
the patriarch’s ecclesiastical guise.425 The patriarchal prayers then served to express the 
hopes of the whole, civil, community.426 The ceremony thus held no ‘constitutive’ function 
in the attainment of political power, but rather its projection.427 To refute Charanis, Laskaris’ 
delay in claiming basileia was not evidence of a legal need for patriarchal sanction, but a 
result of the dynastic origins of his claim and desire to emulate tradition by having a patriarch 
                                                 
421 εἴθισται γὰρ τοὺς νέον τῆς ‘Ρωμαϊκῆς ἡγεμονίας προσεπιβαίνοντας ἐπί τε τὸν ἄμβωνα τοῦ νεὼ ἀνιέναι, καὶ 
πρὸς τοῦ κατὰ καιροὺς ἱεράρχου εὐλογεῖσθαί τε, καὶ τῷ βασιλείῳ στέφει ταινιοῦσθαι τὴν κεφαλήν. Leon 
Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 98 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 147). Emphasis added. 
422 (... βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτορ ‘Ρωμαίων... Οὕτω μὲν ό στεφόμενος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ προτάσσων ὁμολογίας 
γράφει...) As noticed by Dölger 1950: 146-147; Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 210-
213 (Text), and the discussion at 415-418, 421-429 (Studies). The profession is attested from as early as 
Anastasios I’s reign, but the earlier formula, and the profession’s continuous history cannot be established with 
absolute certainty. The formula was undoubtedly similar to that found in Pseudo-Kodinos, and the profession’s 
use was most likely continuous.  
423 See the remarks of Yannopoulos 1991: 73-89, ‘…ne conférait pas un pouvoir ou une fonction, mais il 
reconnaissait un pouvoir et l’exercise d’une fonction en leur conférant la couverture de la protection divine, 
qui a Byzance constituait la forme suprême de la légitimité.’  
424 Brightman 1901: 359; Woodrow 2001: 120; Dagron 2003: 78-79. 
425 Thus the patriarch inhabits ‘secular/civil’ and ‘ecclesiastical’ guises at different points in the ceremony. For 
a Roman precedent for this dualism, see below, page 127. On the presentation of insignia by the patriarch, see 
Dagron 2003: 67-68. Majeska 1997: esp. 3-4, proposes that the triple intonation and ritual procedures mimicked 
those for clerical ordination, which implies a new emperor’s sacral charisma and initiation to (an ill-defined, 
quasi-)clerical status. 
426 Woodrow 2001: 134-135, 139. 





crown him.428 Furthermore, patriarchs who refused to perform a coronation might simply be 
replaced like Patriarch Kallistos, who refused Matthew Kantakouzenos.429 
This does not mean that coronation was understood in the same way by all observers 
at all times. Psellos betrays his own beliefs and concerns in stating that Isaakios I’s 
coronation marked his transition to legitimate rule.430 Fifteenth-century ecclesiastical 
authors parsed the ‘emperor’s promise’ in the profession of faith as evidence of his supposed 
subservience to the church, the church’s constitutional position as the guarantor of imperial 
justice, and the patriarchs’ de jure role.431 Although not a legal prerequisite of basileia,432 
the introduction of unction, in (or by) the thirteenth century, further expanded the 
ecclesiastical functions of the patriarch in the ceremony, simultaneously binding it to the 
                                                 
428 Theodoros’ claims to basileia stemmed from his marriage to Alexios III’s daughter. He only began to seek 
the imperial title after Alexios’ capture by the Latins in 1205: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 11-12 
(trans. Macrides 119-120). In any case, it should be remembered that, in 1227/8, the Epirot Theodoros 
Komnenos-Doukas had himself crowned by Archbishop Demetrios Chomatenos in Thessalonike, and 
Chomatenos believed he had ecclesiastical authority to anoint a new emperor: Akropolites, Historia, ed. 
Heisenberg 33-34 (trans. Macrides 162-163); Prinzing 2013. And coronation by a religious figure other than 
the patriarch of Constantinople was certainly not unheard of: see below. 
429 Kallistos refused in 1353 and was dismissed. Ioannes VI authorised the synod to elect a new patriarch, 
Philotheos, who was confirmed in office in November. Matthew‘s coronation finally went ahead in February 
1354. Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen III, 270-276, and esp. 272-274; Nicol 1968: 113-114. 
430 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 254-255; Renauld II, 120 (trans. Sewter 312), ‘…after taking 
the weight of the empire on his shoulders from the day on which he was crowned, the usurper took the title of 
legitimate ruler…’. Translation adapted. 
431 The clauses in question read: ‘Likewise I promise to remain and constantly be a faithful and genuine son 
and servant of the holy church and, in addition, to be its defender (dephensor) and vindicator, to be well-
disposed and philanthropic toward the subjects in accordance with the principles of reason and propriety, to 
abstain as much as possible from murder, mutilation, and similar acts, and to incline always toward truth and 
justice.’ Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 212-215. On the hierocratic interpretations of 
the profession of faith by ecclesiastical authors, see Angelov 2007: 412-414. 
432 Manuel II did not receive physical unction until his second coronation, but still reigned as basileus and 
autokrator (see below). The date of the introduction of imperial unction to Byzantine coronation rituals has 
been subject to substantial debate. For the fundamental study, see Ostrogorsky 1955, who argues for its 
adoption in imitation of Latin practices, after 1204 (probably for the coronation of Theodoros I), and suggests 
that earlier references to unction are metaphorical in nature. This is the interpretation followed by Dagron 2003: 
267-276, esp. 275. For different views, see Nicol 1976, who argues that physical anointing was in use before 
1204 and distinguishes the earlier unction with oil (possibly modelled on western practice) from late Byzantine 
unction with myron. Christophilopoulou 1961-1962: 382-385, follows Brightman 1901: 383, in suggesting that 
physical unction was performed as early as the coronation of Manuel I. Note also, Macrides’ suggestion that a 
material unction may have been in use as early as the protocol of the Book of Ceremonies: ‘… the “hagios” 
acclamations at the moment of anointing can be found in both Pseudo-Kodinos’ protocol and in the coronation 
ritual in the Book of Ceremonies. What was the source of the emperor’s holiness in earlier centuries if not 
unction?’ For this suggestion, see Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 424-425 (Studies). In 
light of the various source problems I am not inclined to favour any particular interpretation. In summation, 
therefore, Theodoros I and his successors were physically anointed as part of their coronation and this may, or 





church and enacting the emperor’s attainment of ‘holiness’. However, it is instructive that 
narratives generally pass over coronations as mere formalities (unless irregular), but devote 
substantial prose to proclamations: the latter were seemingly of greater ideological and 
political importance. 
Despite the narratives’ favour for proclamations, usurpers often endeavoured to 
exploit coronation ceremonies as a means of communicating legitimising propaganda, or to 
present them as a ‘legal’ mark of authority. The first successful usurper from outside a 
dynasty, Phocas, embraced traditional inauguration rites, but extended them over the course 
of a week.433 The army, despite promoting Phocas in a military coup, played little role in the 
coronation ceremonies beyond the shield-raising and proclamation.434 The adventus, 
crowning, and distribution of donatives were spaced over several days, and preceded the 
coronation of Leontia as Augusta, allowing multiple opportunities for public 
acclamations.435 Phocas evidently sought to use ceremonials to project the existence of a 
consensus and rationalise his usurpation as a function of this. He was also the first emperor 
to be crowned within a church, seemingly exploiting imperial sacral charisma (and implied 
piety) to project moral-legitimacy.436  
Usurper-regents were particularly active in exploiting coronations to communicate 
ideology. In all eight cases a member of the dynasty is reported to have given ‘consent’ for 
the investiture, thus implying the association of a junior emperor (the usurper) by a senior 
colleague, akin to the traditional coronation of a successor. However, in practice these 
coronations took on a variety of forms: Romanos I was physically invested as co-emperor 
                                                 
433 The best study of Phocas’ inaugural procedures is that of Olster 1993. 
434 Performed at the Hebdomon. John of Antioch, Chronographia, ed. Müller 37. 
435 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 288-289 (trans. Mango and Scott 412-413); Olster 1993: 178-
179. 





by Constantine VII and Patriarch Nikolaos, and only later claimed precedence.437 
Nikephoros II staged an adventus typical of a ‘new man’.438 Andronikos I received the crown 
from Alexios II and Patriarch Kamateros, but changed the order of precedence in the 
acclamations performed after the investiture; thereby suggesting that Alexios had made him 
senior emperor (justifying the break with tradition).439 And Ioannes VI was crowned for a 
second time, with Ioannes V and Empress Anna observing from a gallery; suggesting their 
consent and signalling his ambition for dynastic unity.440 After the coronation of a usurper-
regent the minority emperors were notably minimised in official ceremonials and 
propaganda.441 Ceremony was adapted to suit the circumstances and to project the political 
hierarchies that best served a usurper’s aims. 
The communicative-legitimist potential of coronation was particularly exploited in 
five known cases of emperors receiving a second coronation. Each was usurpation-inspired, 
and three principal reasons for re-coronation emerge: to remedy a perceived inadequacy in 
                                                 
437 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 395-396, writes that Constantine was present for the coronation and 
that Romanos received the crown from Patriarch Nikolaos and Constantine: …τῷ τῆς βασιλείας στέφεται 
διαδήματι παρὰ Κωνσταντίνου βασιλέως καὶ Νικολάου πατριάρχου. See also, Symeon Magister, Chronicon, 
ed. Wahlgren 313-314: …τῷ τῆς βασιλείας στέφεται διαδήματι παρὰ Κωνσταντίνου βασιλέως καὶ Νικολάου 
πατριάρχου. 
438 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 47-48 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 98); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, 
ed. Thurn 259 (trans. Wortley 249). 
439 Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 50-51; Choniates, Historia, ed. 
van Dieten 272 (trans. Magoulias 151). Neither states who crowned Andronikos, however, given their hostility 
and the specificity with which his manipulations of coronation ‘protocols’ are recorded by the authors, we 
would expect to read that Alexios played no role in his physical investiture if that had actually been the case. 
See also, Beihammer 2013: 186-187, noting the importance of the inversion of the acclamations, but missing 
the authorising symbolism of Alexios’ role. Among the many similarities between the two emperors, Michael 
VIII’s first coronation similarly changed the order of precedence beforehand (but although he was in attendance 
Ioannes IV was not crowned but, rather, invested with a ‘close-fitting cap’). 
440 See below. 
441 For example: after his coronation, Nikephoros II seemingly ensured that his throne was visibly differentiated 
from those of the basileis. In the account of his second embassy to Constantinople, Liudprand of Cremona, 
Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana, ed. Chisea §3 (trans. Squatriti 240-241), reports how ‘There sat on 
the left [of Nikephoros], not aligned with him but far behind, two small emperors, once his rulers, now subject 
to him.’ After his own coronation, Ioannes I removed the basileis from precedence on his coinage: see below, 
page 186, and footnote 906. Nikephoros III never permitted Constantine Doukas to wear the imperial insignia 
that were due him, only permitting him silken shoes with a few strands of purple woven in: Anna Komnene, 
Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 97 (trans. Frankopan 88). And Alexios I, although restoring Constantine’s 
right to wear the insignia of a co-emperor, appointed the former kaisar Ioannes Doukas as Constantine’s 
basileiopator, effectively minimising Constantine’s authority by drawing attention to his youth, while 






the original; to assert an independent basis for authority after dynastic claims had been 
shattered; and to counteract a rival claimant. 
In the first category: Herakleios was proclaimed emperor in the field and crowned 
first by the metropolitan of Kyzikos (August-September 610).442 After deposing Phocas (5 
October), Herakleios received a second coronation by Patriarch Sergios at the chapel of St. 
Stephen. Immediately after, Sergios officiated over the marriage of Herakleios and Eudokia, 
and Eudokia was crowned Augusta.443 The sources offer no explanation for this second 
coronation, but Herakleios appears to have been reasserting procedural continuity to the 
takeover of power, which had been so viscerally undermined by rebellion and the executions 
of Maurice and Phocas.  
In the fourteenth century, Ioannes VI was contented with his proclamation as 
basileus, alongside Ioannes V in absentia (1341). However, after gaining a decisive 
advantage in the civil war,444 he was induced to arrange an investiture. In response to Stephen 
Dušan’s coronation (1346),445 Lazaros of Jerusalem crowned Ioannes on 21 May, the Feast 
of SS. Constantine and Helena. Eirene, Ioannes’ wife, was crowned immediately afterwards, 
but Matthew Kantakouzenos, their son, was not associated emperor at this point. Ioannes’ 
memoirs stress that ‘everything was performed according to custom as much as was 
                                                 
442 This proclamation and coronation occurred at Herakleia. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 299 
(trans. Mango and Scott 428). 
443 John of Nikiu, trans. Charles 177-178; Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 36-37; Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 299 (trans. Mango and Scott 428). Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf 701, claims 
that the coronation took place in Hagia Sophia. The chapel of St. Stephen is the more probable location given 
that it held the relic of St. Stephen (the protomartyr, who held symbolic associations with emperors), was 
particularly favoured by members of the Herakleian dynasty, and was the standard location for the coronation 
of an empress in this period (Herakleios’ new wife, Fabia/Eudokia, was crowned immediately after). For the 
argument in favour of the chapel of St. Stephen, see Kaegi 2003: 51. On the relics and ceremonial functions of 
the chapel of St. Stephen, and its favour under the Herakleian dynasty, see Kalavrezou 1997: esp. 59-67. 
444 By June 1345, after Apokaukos’ death. 
445 Stephen Dušan had begun to call himself ‘Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks’ by the end of 1345 and was 
crowned on Easter Sunday (16 April 1346) by the Archbishop of the Serbian Church, whom he had promoted 





possible.’446 Like Herakleios, after Ioannes had captured Constantinople447 he was crowned 
again (21 May 1347), exactly a year after the first; by the newly-appointed Patriarch 
Isidore.448 Ioannes again emphasised that ‘everything was performed in accordance with 
established custom,’ asserted that the second coronation prevented disputes about his 
authority on the basis of the first taking place outside Constantinople, and claimed that 
Lazaros’ unction would have sufficed for supporters.449 Gaul concludes that, in order to 
mitigate claims of illegitimacy regarding his usurpation, Kantakouzenos adopted a rhetorical 
strategy wherein his coronations were performed in accordance with the ethos of Palaiologan 
ceremonial.450 For both emperors ‘customary’ investitures performed in Constantinople 
would have remedied deficiencies arising from the original having taken place outside the 
city. In other words, both emperors asserted memory-history and the ‘continuity’ of imperial 
ceremony itself as a de jure legitimation. Kantakouzenos’ insistence on ‘custom’ would 
suggest that his efforts were not accepted by all observers. 
The second category presents a radically different picture: Basileios I was made co-
emperor on 26 May 866 (Pentecost), having already been adopted by Michael III. After 
Michael’s murder (September 867) Basileios appears to have arranged a second coronation 
at the Church of the Asomatoi.451 This re-coronation is problematic, not least because of the 
source materials.452 Christophilopoulou rejects its historicity since there was no need to mark 
                                                 
446 Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen II, 564. See also, Gaul 2007: 83-84. 
447 And a power-sharing treaty with Palaiologos establishing Kantakouzenos’ seniority. For a discussion of the 
terms of this settlement (which granted Ioannes VI seniority for a period of ten years), see Nicol 1968: 62-63. 
448 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 787-788. Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen III, 29: gives the 
date as 13 May which would be particularly unusual given its proximity to the anniversary of the first, and 
cannot be accurate. 
449 ‘…he had been crowned before in Adrianople by Lazaros, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and that anointing 
with holy oil would have sufficed for those who were well intentioned. So as not to give any pretext to the 
unruly because he had not been crowned in Constantinople according to the ancient custom of emperors, also 
the second rite was performed.’ Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen III, 29; translation adapted from 
Gaul 2007: 84. 
450 Gaul 2007: esp. 70, 82-84. 
451 The Church of the ‘bodiless’ Michael and Gabriel. 
452 As has long been recognised, all of the accounts rely on materials produced at the court of Basileios and his 





the transition from emperor to co-emperor,453 but Genesios clearly affirms it.454 Symbolic 
investitures with a ‘crown of victory’ featured in Basileios’ triumphs of 873 and 879, 
indicating his desire to ritually renew his authority. Therefore his re-coronation has been 
deemed a legitimising effort necessitated by Michael’s murder. It integrated neatly with 
Basileios’ approval-seeking pattern and fulfilled his need for popular-legitimation after the 
assassination. According to McCormick, ‘the only explicit ecclesiastical sanction of his 
[Basileios’] authority had come in the original ceremony of his elevation to the purple by his 
benefactor and victim.’455 The second coronation, at a church associated with Basileios’ 
patron saints, changed this. Dagron recognised that the ideological foundation of Basileios’ 
authority was no longer reliant upon Michael, but God, through the ‘archangels’ Michael 
and Elijah who interceded to promote Basileios and expiate his wrongdoing.456 Michael VIII 
adopted a comparable strategy. He had been crowned with Ioannes IV at Nikaia soon after 
1 January 1259,457 but received a second coronation before 25 December 1261, after the 
recapture of Constantinople.458 Ioannes IV had already been minimised, and was blinded 
soon after. The coronation represented a break with the original Laskarid source of Michael’s 
authority, and commemorated Constantinople’s recapture which was ascribed to the Mother 
                                                 
453 Christophilopoulou 1956: 92. 
454 ‘Basileios… believed that, contrary to his previous elevation, God himself had now given him the right to 
rule… he inaugurated the church of the archangels… and Basileios received the imperial crown from the hands 
of the patriarch, thus establishing his own dynasty on the throne, which he had gained with the support of the 
archangels.’ Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 80 (trans. Kaldellis 100). Translation adapted. It 
should be noted that this second coronation is wholly omitted in the Vita Basilii. Although the two works are 
interrelated, the omission is hardly surprising: the Vita is more consistently laudatory of the Macedonian 
emperors, and as probable direct-product of Constantine VII’s court may have considered a second (irregular 
and unnecessary) coronation to draw excessive attention to the disreputable circumstances of Basileios’ 
accession. Omission would have preserved rhetorically Basileios’ succession as a function of his elevation by 
Michael and the Amorian dynasty. 
455 McCormick 1986: 152-157. 
456  Dagron 2003: 74, 198-199, ‘…it was to God alone that he owed the empire’. See also, Woodrow 2001: 
145-146, on the symbolic importance of this coronation as a ‘fresh start’.  
457 After his proclamation on 1 January 1259 at Nymphaion or Magnesia (Akropolites and Pachymeres disagree 
on the location of this proclamation). Manuelis Holoboli orationes, ed. Treu 92; Akropolites, Historia, ed. 
Heisenberg 159-160 (trans. Macrides 346); Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 139-
141; I, 145-147, noting that Ioannes IV did not receive a crown but rather a cap decorated with gemstones. 
458 The date of Michael’s second coronation must have fallen between 15 August and 25 December 1261. 





of God.459 Both emperors had removed predecessors, and both used a second coronation to 
redefine the ideological origins of their authority. Instead of claiming that these coronations 
fulfilled a de jure function, they appealed to divine authorisation to provide an independent, 
superior, source for their legitimacy. 
In the final category: Manuel II’s re-coronation was seemingly prompted by dynastic 
infighting. Schreiner argues that the first (1373) lacked unction by the patriarch, because 
Manuel’s father had converted to Catholicism in 1369 and was excluded from Orthodox 
rites.460  Consequently, the second, on 11 February 1392, the feast of the Prodigal Son, 
corrected this deficiency.461 It held no de jure connotations since Manuel was already 
recognised as emperor, but it celebrated his accession as autokrator after his father’s death, 
presented an opportune moment to crown Helena, and must be viewed against Ioannes VII’s 
counter-claims.462 Ioannes’ authority originated from his father, Andronikos IV, Ioannes V’s 
heir-apparent, who had previously usurped authority as autokrator.463 The Palaiologan 
practice of primogeniture, crowning sons and grandsons as heirs in an emperor’s lifetime (a 
form of ‘succession planning’ that may naturally have developed in response to dynastic 
infighting),464 implied Ioannes VII’s accession. Therefore, Manuel’s legitimacy was 
contestable. The coronation provided a vehicle for his response:465 the readings that 
accompanied it were not those of the Prodigal Son, but Lazarus Saturday and the parable of 
the Good Shepherd. Reinert views them as tantamount to ‘instruments of imperial 
                                                 
459 Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 188-189 (trans. Macrides 387); Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, 
ed. Failler and Laurent I, 255-257. On his coins, Michael was now shown being crowned by the Mother of 
God: Iliescu 1965: 94-99. 
460 Schreiner 1967: 741, followed by Reinert 2001: 293. 
461 On the date of the coronation, see Russian Travellers, ed. Majeska 418-419, esp. n.12 (Coronation of Manuel 
II). 
462 Barker 1969: 103-104. 
463 On the source of Ioannes’ claims, and his potential coronation as co-emperor, see Geanakoplos 1959: 46, 
and n.67; Charanis 1942-1943: 295-301. 
464 On this distinctly Palaiologan successional practice, see Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and 
Angelov 429 (Studies).  





propaganda’ intended to style Manuel as the legitimate heir of Ioannes V and cast Ioannes 
VII as a pretender whose ambitions were patently illicit.466 The Lazarus reading established 
Manuel’s succession in spite of Ioannes’ own claims (‘we have been given possession of an 
unshakable kingdom’) and spoke of the virtues of forgiveness and marriage, whilst 
cautioning against greed.467 Manuel’s moral superiority and divine favour were inferred. The 
Good Shepherd then introduced the concepts of legitimate rule and loyalty, reinforcing 
through allegory the image of Ioannes as a usurper (false shepherd) and Manuel as the 
emperor (true shepherd).468 Manuel’s desire for Ioannes’ loyalty was implicit. Importantly, 
the coronation was witnessed not just by the Byzantine elites, but the Genoese and Venetian 
factions who had supported Ioannes VII and Manuel II during their respective usurpations. 
The choice of politically suggestive readings recited by a clerical proxy, and the patriarch’s 
performance of the coronation, revealed that the church would work with Manuel. The 
coronation established his superior authority by demonstrating his consolidation of power 
and outlining that the dynasty’s future lay in the marriage to Helena. Heirs would grant 
additional stability and prove yet another problem for Ioannes to overcome. 
All five of these emperors exploited re-coronation in an attempt to reinforce 
legitimacy in light of challenges to it. Consequently, it is noteworthy that no emperor whose 
reign was interrupted by a usurper who also received a coronation in Constantinople ever 
exploited the possibility of a second coronation. When Zeno ousted Basiliscus (476), he 
promoted the son of the magister militum Armatus to the rank of caesar (as agreed). The 
                                                 
466 Reinert 2001: 295-296. 
467 Hebrews 12:28-13:8: ‘We have been given possession of an unshakable kingdom. Let us therefore hold on 
to the grace that we have been given and use it to worship God in the way he finds acceptable, in reverence 
and fear. For our God is a consuming fire. Continue to love each other like brothers, and remember always to 
welcome strangers… Keep in mind those who are in prison… Marriage is to be honoured by all… Put greed 
out of your lives and be content with whatever you have… Remember your leaders, who preached the word of 
God to you, and as you reflect on the outcome of their lives, imitate their faith…’ 
468 John 10:1-8: ‘…he who does not enter the sheepfold by the door but climbs in by another way, that man is 
a thief and a robber, but he who enters by the door is the shepherd of the sheep… A stranger they will not 
follow, but they will flee from him, for they do not know the voice of strangers… “Truly, truly, I say to you. I 





opportunity for acclamation was thus taken, but Zeno refused to risk validating Basiliscus’ 
tenure through a re-coronation.469 Justinian II promoted as kaisar his principal supporter, 
Khan Tervel, and arranged the coronation of Empress Theodora and co-emperor Tiberios; 
exploiting acclamations and establishing the succession whilst culling opponents.470 But 
Justinian’s coinage dated his exile as part of his reign, denying the usurpers altogether.471 
Five other emperors acted similarly.472 We might explain this pattern of behaviour as a denial 
of the constitutive significance of coronation. The emperors in question never acknowledged 
the validity of an (‘illegitimate’) rival’s coronation, and instead appealed to the acclamations 
of the people as a source for their own authority upon their return. The consensus of those 
acclamations was then turned against usurpers during rituals of degradation. Real power and 
the suggestion of popular consent at that moment were deemed more significant than any 
perceived ‘constitutive’ authorisation arising from a prior investiture. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The histories detail four transitional moments at which a usurper legitimised his claims to 
authority. During proclamation in the field or in Constantinople his supporters believed him 
to have been invested with basileia. His new status as basileus allowed him to arrogate rights 
and privileges restricted to a reigning emperor. He made promotions and established a rival 
                                                 
469 Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 302-303 (trans. Jeffreys 210); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 
124-125 (trans. Mango and Scott 191-192). 
470 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 375 (trans. Mango and Scott 523). 
471 See below, page 333. 
472 Constantine V subjected Artabasdos to public degradation including acclamations for himself: see below, 
page 296). Constantine VII’s restoration prompted a purge and the coronation of his son Romanos II at Easter: 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 237 (trans. Wortley 228), states that Romanos was crowned in the 
year of the indiction but fails to specify which year of the indiction he means: 945 or 946 are possibilities, 
although 945 would be the obvious choice in order to solidify his position through the creation of an imperial 
college and commemorate his restoration via acclamations for his designated successor. Isaakios II’s 
restoration included the coronation of Alexios IV, who subsequently assumed power as de facto senior 
emperor: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 550 (trans. Magoulias 301). And Ioannes V promoted Manuel II 
to precedence in place of Andronikos IV in 1373, following Andronikos’ attempted usurpation: see above, 





administration outside of Constantinople. The proclamation also necessitated his adoption 
of attire that mimicked and conveyed the identity and charismatic authority of an emperor.473 
This visual transformation allowed him to be distinguished from those who had chosen him 
to rule, and fulfilled another of the essential characteristics of an emperor. No ‘unique’ items 
were required to affect this investiture. The usurper’s attire merely had to satisfy the 
expectations of his supporters, who already believed him qualified to fulfil the imperial 
duties. The possession of Constantinople, especially the palaces and Hagia Sophia, sites of 
memory-history, government, and ceremonial, was another transformative moment. It 
denoted that real power now lay with the possessor, closely associated him with the traditions 
and practices of imperial authority, and represented a significant obstacle for rivals to 
overcome. Finally, the coronation acted as a confirmation of authority that allowed the 
representative groups of state to symbolically ratify the accession of a new autokrator, and 
permit the sacral charisma of the imperial office to be ritually conferred. 
In all cases, the ritual formats allowed adaptations, and emperors exploited this to 
communicate ideology and political realities, to enhance their authority or redefine its 
source. However, since legitimacy included ‘factors beyond constituted legal mechanisms… 
[and rulership was] an integral exercise which needed more than only one distinct method 
of legitimation’,474 investiture rites could never instil permanent legitimacy. Ongoing 
compliance with idealised moral-behavioural norms was essential. 
                                                 
473 On the charismatic qualities of ritual attire, see Glassman 1975: esp. 619. 





IV. RELUCTANT EMPERORS 
 
In an extensive article on the rex renitens, ‘the king who, reluctantly and under protest, is 
forced to take up the sceptre and rule the realm’, Björn Weiler examined this topos prevalent 
in medieval European historiography. Despite his confession that ‘the figure of the reluctant 
ruler was probably even more common in Byzantium [than elsewhere]’, the broad spectrum 
of Weiler’s study meant that Byzantium was relegated to just a single paragraph.475 The 
present chapter addresses this topos in Byzantine historiography. It will show that the theme 
of reluctance was not simply literary dressing but, rather, a powerful instrument in a 
historian’s legitimising/delegitimising arsenal. An emperor who conformed to the topos 
could simultaneously be revealed as a morally pure and ideal ruler at the moment of his 
accession. The permutations it allowed will be surveyed, and examples of its manipulation 
to buttress or undermine an emperor’s legitimacy will be examined. We will see that its 
prevalence in medieval Europe and Byzantium was a result of ideologies of rulership that 
stemmed from the Republic and Principate, and that these easily coexisted with Christianised 
notions of moral rulership and divine favour. Finally, we will question whether the usage 
persisted as a purely politico-literary innovation or as a performative ritual attendant with 
the proclamation of new emperors. 
 
Permutations and functions 
Between the proclamation of Constantine I (306) and the death of Constantine XI (1453), 
twenty-two emperors and one empress are reported to have only reluctantly accepted 
                                                 





basileia.476 Seventeen additional instances of reluctance can be identified regarding the 
proclamation of would-be usurper-emperors and alternate candidates who never succeeded 
in securing the throne. Other occurrences surely exist. Our provisional examples are from 
the fourth to fourteenth centuries and their distribution is undoubtedly influenced by the 
increased narrative coverage of certain periods and the choices of authors in writing. The 
fact that many of these cases are attested in only one or two of multiple extant narratives on 
the same event suggests that overt politico-literary concerns were also involved. In every 
case the circumstances of the associated succession were problematic and the claim to 
basileia was either contested or contestable.  
 
In its most essential form, the topos of reluctance acted as an apologia, comprising a 
single word or phrase that indicated that an imperial candidate was unwilling to claim power. 
Thus we read in Theophanes’ Chronographia that in 588, in the course of a military pay 
dispute that escalated into a rebellion,477 ‘[the army] proclaimed Germanus as general against 
                                                 
476 This figure represents approximately one-fifth of the total number of emperors to reign during this period. 
For a provisional case list of reluctant emperors in the historical narratives of the period 306-1453, see Table 
2. Many of these cases are referenced in the following discussion. 
477 The revolt was sparked by the removal of Philippicus as Magister Militum per Orientem. In retribution, he 





















Emperors Failed Usurpers Alternate Candidates
Figure 1: Reported instances of reluctance among emperors, failed usurpers, and alternate 





his will, raising him aloft on a shield.’478 Admittedly the formulation communicates the 
essential idea of reluctance, but its brevity also makes it possible for an inattentive reader to 
miss. More typically, the topos is articulated at greater length and with additional emphasis 
on the reluctance being displayed. Hence Theophylaktos, writing about the same event, 
claims that after deposing their general Priscus, 
…the soldiers assembled and sanctioned the election of a general. It was 
for this reason that they summoned Germanus, introduced him into the 
council, and decided to entrust to him the reins of generalship. But when 
he rejected the camp’s demand, they insisted that he comply with the 
election, and added threats that the punishment for disobedience would 
even be death… the soldiers’ resolve prevailed, and Germanus was 
proclaimed…479  
The enhancement makes reluctance a feature of Germanus’ promotion rather than a mere 
incidental detail. Despite their differing emphasis, both narratives later agreed that Germanus 
was the only person capable of restraining the troops from looting, putting a positive gloss 
on his usurpation.480 The proclamation of the kaisar Ioannes Doukas (1074) by the rebel 
Roussel de Balliol, is similarly described.481 Bryennios’ Historia, a work favourable to 
Doukas because of his later involvement with the Komnenoi rebellion (Bryennios’ in-laws 
                                                 
troops. His replacement, Priscus, also reportedly failed to show the troops the necessary respect by dismounting 
his horse to greet them. The soldiery overthrew Priscus’ command on 20 April 588 (Easter). For chronology 
and details, see Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou 1970: 186-189; Kaegi 1981: 68-69; Higgins 1939: 31-33. On the 
sources, see Krivouchine 1993. There is some dispute as to the precise role to which Germanus was being 
promoted (general or emperor). Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Bidez and Parmentier 224-
225 (trans. Whitby 294-296), confirms the supposed arrogance of Priscus’ arrival, his overthrow, the forced 
election and elevation of Germanus, but adds that Germanus was proclaimed ‘emperor’. Germanus’ elevation 
on a shield, and association with the reluctance topos, suggest that Evagrius’ account is accurate and he really 
was being proclaimed emperor, not merely a general. 
478 ὁ δὲ στρατὺς... τὸν τε Γερμανὸν ἄκουντα στρατηγὸν ἀνηγόρευσαν ἐπὶ ἀσπίδος ὑψώσαντες... Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 260 (trans. Mango and Scott 382). 
479 …τὰ δἐ στρατεύματα συναθροίζεται, καὶ στρατηγὸν χειροτονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε. διἀ τοι τοῦτο μετάκλητον τὸν 
Γερμανὸν ποιησάμενοι, καὶ εἰσαγώγιμον εὶς τὸ βουλευτήριον ὲνεγκάμενοι, ἠξίουν ἐγχειρίζειν αὐτῷ τὰς 
στρατηγίδας ἡνίας. τοῦ δ’ ἀποπεμπομένου τὴν τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἀξίωσιν, τῶν δὲ καταναγκαζόντων αὐτὸν 
ἔσεσθαι περὶ τὴν χειροτονίαν πειθήνιον, καὶ προσαπειλούντων καὶ θάνατον τῆς παρακοῆς εἶναι τὸ διαζήμιον, 
νικῶσι τὰ τῶν στρατευμάτων βουλεύματα, καὶ στρατηγὸς Γερμανὸς ἀνακηρύττεται… Theophylaktos 
Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 115-116 (trans. Whitby 74).  
480 ‘…he had secured on oath matters of future expediency, that the Romans would refrain from pillaging the 
subjects, and that disorder would be banished…’ Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, de Boor (trans. Whitby 
74). ‘…they would have gone as far as looting had not Germanos prevented them by his many admonitions 
and exhortations.’ Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 260 (trans. Mango and Scott 382). 





and sponsors),482 records the particular circumstances of the unexpected promotion.483 We 
read that Roussel contrived the elevation in order to win the support of the local cities and 
‘influential people’ of the capital.484 Doukas, on account of his honesty and the high esteem 
in which he was held by all, previously could have laid claim to the throne had he so wished, 
but he had not. Instead, ‘the illustrious kaisar was troubled and irritated’ and sought to avoid 
the business.485 Only later did he become an active participant in claiming basileia. In a 
masterfully contrived explication, Bryennios presented Doukas’ hesitant promotion by 
Roussel as beneficial to the empire: it allowed Nikephoritzes time to secure Turkish 
reinforcements for Alexios Komnenos to defeat and capture Roussel.486 Doukas’ 
prevarications thus allowed Bryennios to revive his image by lessening the stigma of a failed 
rebellion that had been supported by a foreigner, and which had cost Roman lives. Doukas, 
although not a hero, was not wholly contemptible either.  
In both cases initial reluctance was coupled with a morally positive outcome related 
to the individual’s promotion. The conceit serves to divert attention from the illegality of 
rebellion since the advancements eventually prevented something worse from taking place. 
This amounts to a speculative and tendentious ethical defence of seditious activities. The 
reputation of the individual concerned was being partially rehabilitated, and we might 
therefore expect that a rebel who was favoured by an author is presented as reluctant to 
                                                 
482 Neville 2008, points to internal narrative conceits, register changes, and plot points, to suggest that 
Bryennios’ narrative may have drawn from an apologetic work linked with (or favourable to) Doukas. 
483 Doukas’ forces were defeated by Roussel in battle at the river crossing near Dorylaeum. The circumstances 
of the battle are described (hostilely) by Michael Attaleiates, who inserts praise for the future emperor 
Nikephoros III Botaneiates for his sound advice to the kaisar which the latter ignored to his cost. Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 185-187 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 336-339). See also, Zonaras, Epitome, ed. 
Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 709-712. 
484 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 177, 179. 
485 Ο δὲ κλεινός καῖσαρ πρώτον μεν εδυσφόρει και ήσχαλλε και πάντα καλῶν, ὅ φασιν, ἐκ ίνει ὥστε διαδρᾶναι 
το δρᾶμα. Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 177. 
486 For the presentation of Doukas’ reluctance as beneficial to the empire and Nikephoritzes’ efforts see 
Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 179, ’Αλλὰ κινῆσαν τοῦτο τὸν ἐκτομίαν Νικηφόρον σπουδαιότερον τῶν 
πραγμάτςν ἀντιλαβέσθαι τὰς ἐκείνων βουλὰς ἀπράκτους ἀποδέδειχεν… ‘But his action, because it allowed the 
Eunuch Nikephoritzes to deal more actively with the situation, undid their plan…’ For the capture of Doukas 
and Roussel, see Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 189-193 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 344-351); 





engage in rebellion. 
The implied association of the topos with the communication of moral and ethical 
concerns or misgivings is stated more explicitly in other episodes. In eight cases, the 
importance of respecting oaths is reported as an overt consideration in the initial refusal of 
office.487 Typifying these, Michael I initially declined his proclamation because of the oath 
that he had sworn to Staurakios, and had to be convinced that his accession would be 
beneficial to the empire.488 Leon V was entreated by the strategoi to help the ‘common 
cause’ and ‘protect the Christian state,’ but declined for some time on account of military 
concerns and his desire to ‘preserve his correct stance, untouched by treachery, toward the 
emperors.’489 And Michael VIII, whose reluctance was imperceptible for much of 
Pachymeres’ account of his rise,490 was far more reticent to accept in Akropolites’ pro-
Michael narrative.491 He refused to become guardian to Ioannes IV, or assume the regency, 
because of the oaths he had sworn. The clergy provided him with their ‘unwritten consent’ 
and then produced a signed document excusing any wrongdoing implied by these former 
promises. He was thus raised ‘…willingly or unwillingly, to imperial eminence, constrained 
greatly by the prominent men and those for whom public affairs were a concern.’492 We 
                                                 
487 The cases are Julian, Herakleios, Nikephoros I, Bardanes Tourkos, Michael I, Leon V, Andronikos I, and 
Michael VIII. For citations and details, see Table 2. 
488 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 492 (trans. Mango and Scott 674). See also, Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5 (trans. Wortley 4), who agrees that Michael declined the offer, but does not say that 
this was because of his oaths to the emperor. Skylitzes also has Leon V force Michael to accept the elevation. 
489 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 502 (trans. Mango and Scott 685). 
490 As each honour was granted to Michael VIII he was said to remain silent, neither affirming nor declining 
these decisions made on his behalf. The image is more of an individual silently scheming and seeing his 
ambitions come to fruition than that of the reluctant emperor. Only after his ascent to imperial power does 
Michael actively demonstrate humility: by offering to resign if either he or his son should prove themselves 
unworthy of ruling. An element of doubt had evidently crept into the emperor’s mind at this point, or, more 
likely, Pachymeres was signposting Michael’s impending misdeeds and poor governance, exploiting this 
semblance of humble reluctance to serve Kaiserkritik. Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and 
Laurent I, 96, 104, 130. 
491 Akropolites’ account is also in agreement with Michael VIII’s general statements in his Typikon for the 
Monastery of St. Demetrios. Here, after excessive use of paralipsis and proslepsis in detailing his outstanding 
qualities and character, Michael eloquently clarifies the proximate causes of his accession: “I did not persuade 
anyone, but was myself persuaded. I did not bring force to bear on anyone, but was myself forced.” Imperatoris 
Michaeli Palaeologi de vita sua, ed. Grégoire 453-455. See also below, page 109, footnote 541. 





deduce that, ideally, the depiction of a candidate’s hesitation to break fidelity prevented 
accusations of disloyalty to the previous regime from being levelled against him. Instead, he 
had been ‘persuaded’ to accept, and ‘correct’ procedures and authorisations were adduced 
in order to legitimise his promotion. Reluctance allowed a candidate’s respect for lawful 
authority to be demonstrated. Readers were to understand that these persons were not acting 
on personal desires or with undue haste. 
In the cases of Michael I, Leon V, and Michael VIII it undoubtedly helped that image 
that those particular accessions were successful and relatively uncontested,493 but even when 
a usurper failed to become autokrator or the succession was violently contested, these moral 
and ethical concerns recurred. After Julian’s palace was surrounded by his troops (February 
360), and the new emperor reluctantly acclaimed and invested, Ammianus records a speech 
to the army, and two letters sent to Constantius (who refused to recognise Julian’s new 
status). In the speech, Julian showed deference to the troops by thanking them for their 
support and assuring them that he would live up to their expectations. However, there was 
no doubt about his original reluctance or the awkwardness of his unauthorised elevation: 
‘Now that your deliberate choice has raised your Caesar to the height of supreme power, the 
difficulty of the situation…[demands] right and prudent steps…[be taken].’494 In the first 
letter, which was read publicly, Julian’s past successes and loyalty to Constantius were 
emphasised, but he also recounted how he had sought to conceal himself from the troops 
when he heard their acclamations, and then agreed to promotion so that he might ‘assuage 
the violence of their proceedings.’ He would remain loyal to Constantius, he claimed, as 
                                                 
493 Michael I succeeded Staurakios who was mortally ill, and deemed completely incapable of exercising 
authority. The promotion of Michael was approved by military and palace officials, and by the senate. Leon V 
was promoted by the military and marched on Constantinople. However, Michael I abdicated in favour of Leon 
and bloodshed was avoided (Michael’s children were subsequently mutilated to prevent opposition). Michael 
VIII, after removing Georgios Mouzalon was appointed emperor at the behest of the consensus groups, 
dissenters only really coalesced into a viable opposition movement after he had blinded Ioannes IV in 1261. 
494 Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 20.5. Translation adapted. See also, Zonaras, Epitome, ed. 





long as Constantius acted in the best interests of the state and the army. Julian’s troops were 
thus to remain in Gaul and not be sent to the east as Constantius intended, the rebellion’s 
casus belli.495 Julian’s reasoning is informative: he was clear that he had not sought 
promotion due to personal ambition, but had accepted it for the public good, to restrain the 
army and intercede on their behalf. The emphasis on continued loyalty revealed Julian’s 
desire to avoid charges of overt treachery.496 His advice to Constantius established his 
continued fidelity but also invoked a contrast between his concern for the common good and 
Constantius’ apparent lack thereof. The reader infers that if Constantius had been a 
competent administrator these things would not have been said, and there would have been 
no revolt. 
The same reasoning was employed by Kekaumenos to detail the events of the 
Larissaean revolt (1066/7) and the actions of his ‘relative by marriage’ Nikoulitzas 
Delphinas.497 We read that Delphinas approached Constantine X to warn him that a revolt 
was brewing in Hellas but was repeatedly dismissed and instructed to remain silent.498 
Delphinas returned to Larissa and the predicted rebellion soon began.499 He was approached 
in secret by its leaders and feigned his agreement with the cause.500 When the conspiracy 
became public, he was seized, threatened with violence, and reluctantly made its head.501 
                                                 
495 Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 20.8.2-17. 
496 Zonaras’ source for the period claims that Julian’s private letter to Constantius conveyed his willingness to 
content himself with the title of Caesar (which he had already possessed) if Constantius would pardon him and 
take no actions in revenge. Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 51-52. 
497 The protospatharios. Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.66-73. On Delphinas’ life and career, see 
PBW (consulted 3/6/15) Nikoulitzas 101. 
498 He reportedly spent thirty days in Constantinople trying to convince the emperor and his advisors that a 
rebellion was imminent. Georgios the protosynkellos is also specifically named as rebuffing Delphinas’ 
warnings. Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.66. 
499 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.67-68. The rebellion was a result of tax-increases imposed upon 
Hellas. At its conclusion, Constantine X Doukas receded these increases. Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. 
Vasilevskij p.70. See also, Cheynet 1990: 391-392. 
500 Kekaumenos names those responsible as Ioannes Gremianetes (the former protospatharios) and Gregoras 
Bambakes. Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.68. 
501 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.69-70 (trans. Roueché): ‘[the Larisseans] seized him, and 
said… “we choose you, in the present rebellion, to give us orders…” he fended them off once, and twice, and 
several times with the excuse that he was devoted to peace… some of his friends came, and, swearing to him 





After capturing Servia, Delphinas was proclaimed emperor although ‘[he did not] undertake 
the rebellion willingly, in order to struggle for his own acclamation, but because of the 
people, so they should not… destroy him like a criminal.’502 The narrative evidently lessened 
the stigma of Delphinas’ failed revolt by presenting him as a victim of circumstance and a 
devotee of peace who had been repeatedly forced to act against his own will. (This may even 
have been true.)503 Delphinas’ reluctance was contrasted with Constantine’s lack of care for 
the empire’s wellbeing. Consequently, Delphinas emerges as an ethical but pragmatic and 
unfortunate figure. He was to be pitied and forgiven for rebelling because blame lay with 
Constantine’s maladministration, which had forced him into colluding.  
These variations demonstrate how reluctance could serve the dual purpose of 
reinforcing the ethical integrity of the usurper when this was denied by a rival (Julian, and 
Delphinas, were forced into breaking fidelity by others), and of undermining the reigning 
emperor’s suitability to rule. In this way the topos was also associated with the justificatory 
apparatus of usurpation: it did not simply ‘rehabilitate’ a usurper but could suggest a 
rationale for his actions as well.  
It should now be clear that reluctance was frequently accompanied by threats and 
coercive gestures. On eleven occasions promotions were only realised via the threat of 
grievous harm to candidates.504 As we saw, Germanus’ elevation was said to have occurred 
after swords were drawn to force his acceptance,505 and Michael II reportedly threatened to 
                                                 
502 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.70-71. 
503 The author’s repeated (almost paranoid) commentary on the dangers of being swept up in populist outbursts 
or condemned for speaking imprudently would certainly reinforce such a reading. Kekaumenos, Strategikon, 
ed. Vasilevskij p.3-4, 41, 44, 57, 64, 66-72, 74, 94. Cheynet 1990: 168, suggests that Kekaumenos is not 
engaging in simple apologetic but Delphinas really was caught up in a rebellion, against his will. 
504 We may count Julian, Germanus, Theodosios III, Leon V, Theophobos, Nikephoros II, Romanos III, 
Theodora, Nikoulitzas Delphinas, Nikephoros Bryennios the elder, and Andronikos I. For citations and details, 
see Table 2. 
505 Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 115-116 (trans. Whitby 74); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 260 (trans. Mango and Scott 382); Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, 





kill Leon V if he refused the proclamation.506 But these were not the only coercive measures. 
Eight candidates unambiguously sought to avoid proclamation by attempting to escape and 
hide from supporters, only two succeeded.507 These escapes could take place in the field, 
Constantinople, or even in the palace,508 and the descriptions undoubtedly sought to 
communicate earnestness (although a comedic element is suggested in one example).509 
Another standard trope of reluctance, the refusal of insignia, could acquire a bullying 
overtone. During his revolt, Nikephoros Bryennios (the Elder) was presented by his 
grandson510 as disinclined to engage in civil war.511 When selected to lead the rebellion, 
Bryennios was reluctant to accept any insignia. His brother, Ioannes, therefore invited the 
troops to forcibly invest him with the imperial purple, and the red boots.512 In seven other 
cases of forced investiture some form of restraint or surprise was employed.513 On occasion, 
these installations are seemingly to be read as quasi-comedic/farcical events. Anna Komnene 
emphasises her father’s unwilling feet, flailing about so as to avoid the red sandals he was 
being offered. Isaakios Komnenos, Alexios’ brother,514 had to remind him of certain signs 
                                                 
506 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 4 (trans. Kaldellis 6). See also Theophanes Continuatus, ed. 
Bekker 16-17; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 28-29, confirming Leon’s reluctance and Michael’s threat, but 
adding that Leon may simply have been acting reluctant in order to later provide himself with an excuse for 
his actions. 
507 The eight cases are Constantine I, Julian, Areobindus, Theodosios III, Theodora, Isaakios I, Ioannes 
Komnenos, and Andronikos I. For citations and details, see Table 2. The successful escapees were Areobindus 
and Ioannes Komnenos, both cases are discussed in the main text, below. 
508 Those in the field: Constantine I, Theodosios III, and (rhetorically) Isaakios I. Those in Constantinople: 
Areobindus and Theodora. Those in the palace: Julian, Ioannes Komnenos, and Andronikos I. 
509 Uniquely, Theodosios III went so far as to flee to a mountain in effort to avoid (unsuccessfully) his 
proclamation by the troops of the Opsikion. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 385 (trans. Mango and 
Scott 536); Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos ed. Mango 118-119. 
510 Reinsch 1990 has convincingly resolved the question of the relationship between the two Bryennioi using 
information from Georgios Tornikes’ Funeral Oration for Anna Komnene. See also, Carile 1964. 
511 He reportedly sued for peace on several occasions. Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 231. 
512 ᾽Επιφερόμενος οὗν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ τῆς βασιλείας παράσημα, ἠνάγκαζε τὸν ἀδελφὸν ταῦτα περιβαλέσθαι· 
ἐκείνου δὲ ἀναδυομένου καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ τούτου ζητοῦντος, αὐτὸς ἀνέπειθε πάντας, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸν ἄνδρα 
βιάσασθαι. Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 227-231. 
513 These cases are Julian, Nikephoros I (implicit in his comments to Eirene and his choice of non-imperial – 
‘black’ - footwear after his proclamation and coronation), Theodora, Constantine X, Alexios I, Andronikos I, 
and Constantine Laskaris. For citations and details, see Table 2. 
514 Anna relates that Isaakios was also a competitor for the throne; supposedly he had been suggested to the 
army by Alexios as a potential candidate to lead the rebellion. Anna comments that Alexios knew when he 
proposed Isaakios as an alternative that the soldiers would not accept this. Zonaras notes that Alexios was 





foretelling Alexios’ reign and then adopt ‘a more energetic approach’ by restraining him and 
forcing the sandals upon him.515 The scene extracts a smirk from the modern reader, but it 
need not be read as an authorial comment on the facetious nature of those rejecting and 
accepting power.516 Nor does the inherent farce necessarily undermine the message of 
reluctance that is being promoted. Instead, expected symbolic gestures are deliberately 
exaggerated in order to demonstrate erudition through the hyperbolic use of the topos, and 
simply to entertain the reader. On an initial reading, these particular expressions of forced 
investiture may partially ameliorate wrongdoing or invite pity for figures who were 
apparently being made to act against their will, but their particular legitimising role is less 
obvious. A solution is suggested by the fact that the candidate was consequently presented 
as the ‘popular choice’. His support was so strong and earnest that he was literally forced to 
act as the representative of the ‘popular will’. If he succeeded in gaining the throne his 
rebellion could then be presented as having been instigated by popular consensus, and thus 
‘legitimate’. If he failed he would remain an unfortunate figurehead who had been forced 
into wrongdoing. 
The account of an outbreak of Constantinopolitan unrest in 512 appears to confirm 
this interpretation and features both eventualities. Malalas details how the former consul, 
                                                 
Doukai, led by the kaisar Ioannes Doukas). Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 74 (trans. 
Frankopan 67-68); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 726-727. 
515 ἀναστὰς δὲ ὁ ᾽Ισαάκιος καὶ λαβὼν τὸ φοινικοβαφὲς πέδιλον ὐποδιδύσκειν τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐπειρᾶτο. ὠς δὲ 
ἐκεῖνος πολλάκις ἀνένευεν, «ἔα», φησί, «διὰ σοῦ ὁ Θεὸς τὸ γένος ἡμῶν ἀνακαλέσασθαι βούλεται»... ἐπεὶ δὲ 
τὰ τοῦ γέροντος προμαντεύματα καὶ ἄπερ εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος ἐν λόγοις ὀ ᾽Ισαάκιος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐθεάσατο, 
ἐνίστατό τε ἀνδρικώτερον αὐτὸν βιαζόμενος καὶ τὸ ἐρυθροβαφὲς ἐνδιδύσκει ὑπόδημα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὁρῶν τοῦ 
ὁπλιτικοῦ παντὸς τὴν διάπυρον ἐπιθυμίαν πρὸς τὸν ᾽Αλέξιον. ‘Isaakios stood up and taking the purple-dyed 
sandal tried to put it on his brother’s foot. He objected repeatedly. “Come”, said Isaakios, “it is through you 
that God wishes to recall our family to power.”… Now when Isaakios saw the prophecy being fulfilled, with 
words being translated into action, he followed a more energetic approach and forcibly put on the purple sandal, 
especially when he recognised the burning zeal of the whole army for Alexios.’ Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. 
Reinsch and Kambylis 74-75 (trans. Frankopan 67-68). It should also be noted that Alexios was unsure that 
the prophecy predicting his reign was actually valid: he was disinclined to believe it, and reluctant to disclose 
its content to his brother when directly asked about it. By implication, his reluctance extended to the very 
thought of his potential accession, enhancing his overall image as a reluctant emperor in Anna’s narrative. 
516 However, Eustathios of Thessalonike’s farce-filled account of Andronikos I’s reluctant investiture is one 





Areobindus,517 was called upon by the rioting populace to assume basileia and replace 
Anastasius.518 But the rioters’ were frustrated: ‘[they] went to the home of Juliana, a patrician 
of most illustrious rank, and called for her husband, Areobindus, to be emperor of the Roman 
state. [But] Areobindus fled and hid in the Perama.’519 He was never invested and he 
disappears from the historical record soon after.520 Yet Areobindus’ purported escape 
essentially inverted Anastasius’ response to the crisis. Rather than running, the emperor was 
able to successfully negate his own overthrow by appearing before the people at the 
Hippodrome. In a sharp exhibition of political acumen, Anastasius turned this appearance 
into a ceremonial display of humility and deference to the public will. Having removed the 
diadem from atop his head, a mutatio vestis was enacted as he ascended the kathisma. This 
visual performance of divestiture accompanied a ‘sacred pronouncement’ that revealed his 
intent to abdicate the throne,521 and an entreaty to the populace calling for them to 
discontinue their lawless activities. According to Malalas,522 ‘[when they had witnessed this 
                                                 
517 Areobindus was a well-connected candidate thanks to his successful military career (Magister Militum per 
Orientem) and his marriage to Anicia Juliana, the daughter of western emperor Olybrius and Placidia (daughter 
of Valentinian III). Juliana was undoubtedly one of the richest of Constantinople’s aristocratic elite, and a 
prolific commissioner of building works and retained a positive image in later historiography. On Areobindus’ 
life and career, see Martindale and Morris 1980: 143-144; Kazhdan 1991: 162. On Juliana, see Martindale and 
Morris 1980: 635-636; Capizzi 1968: 191-226; Al. Cameron 1978: 259-276. 
518 We are informed that the riots were the result of Patriarch Timothy, and the Emperor Anastasius, seeking 
to modify the phrasing of the Trisagion to mirror eastern, Monophysite, tradition. On 6 November the residence 
of the ex-prefect Marinus was looted and burned, as he (we are told) was believed to be the one responsible for 
suggesting the change. Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 333-334 (trans. Jeffreys 228); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 159 (trans. Mango and Scott 240). 
519 …καὶ ἐλθόντες εἰς τὰ ̓ Ιουλιανῆς τῆς ἐπιφανεστάτης πατρικίας ἔκραζον διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς· ̔ ᾿Αρεόβινδον 
βασιλέα τῇ 'Ρωμανίᾳ· καὶ ἔφυγεν ᾿Αρεόβινδος ἐν Περάματι κρυβείς. Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 333-
334 (trans. Jeffreys 228). Author’s translation. These essential details are confirmed by John of Nikiu, 
Chronicle, trans. Charles 129. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 159 (trans. Mango and Scott 240): 
agrees that rioting took place and that the crowd called for another emperor to be selected, but states that 
Vitalian, the Magister Militum, was the one acclaimed. Possibly Theophanes confuses which magister was 
actually involved, but a more likely suggestion is that he assigns Areobindus’ proposed acclamation to Vitalian 
in order to reinforce the latter’s status as the ‘Guardian of Orthodoxy’ (for this argument, see Mango and Scott 
p.242, n.17). 
520 Martindale and Morris 1980: 143-144. 
521 This reading of the pronouncement (as a message that Anastasius suggested he would abdicate) makes sense 
of the crowd’s later calls for him to once again put on his crown – to return/remain as emperor. 
522 Malalas’ account reads:  καὶ ἀνελθὼν ὁ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς ᾿Aναστάσιος ἐν τῷ ἱπποδρομίῳ εἰς τὸ κάθισμα δίχα 
διαδήματος· καὶ τοῦτο γνοὺς ὁ δῆμος εἰσῆλθεν ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ· καὶ διὰ θείας προσφωνήσεως αὐτοῦ 
μετεχειρίσατο τὰ πλήθη τῆς πόλεως, παραγγείλας αὐτοῖς μὴ ὡς ἔτυχεν φονεύειν ἢ ἐπέρχεσθαί τισιν· καὶ 
ἡσύχασεν ἅπαν τὸ πλῆθος, αἱτήσαντες αὐτὸν φορέσαι τὸ στέμμα. ‘And the emperor Anastasius went up to the 





scene] the entire crowd became quiet and begged him to put on his crown.’ With taxis 
restored, arrests were made. Throughout the incident, Anastasios’ actions, although 
undoubtedly contrived, showed him as a humble individual who was reluctant to continue 
his reign when the people no longer considered him worthy and had found a more-preferable 
candidate (Areobindus). In appearing to abdicate, he not only engendered sentimental 
support, but exhibited his concern for the well-being of the people/state and thus renewed 
his worthiness in their eyes. The people acknowledged this by calling for his return. The 
description of Areobindus’ flight may be read in two ways. Either, he was unconcerned with 
the public good and escaped his responsibility to his supporters, or, more likely, he 
recognised Anastasius as the better candidate and fled the ataxia of the mob: a reading that 
preserves him from blame in accordance with the initial precept of the topos, and still 
presented him as an excellent figure.523 Reluctance, morality, and popularity emerge as 
interrelated concepts, with each suggesting legitimacy. 
The connection of the topos with the ideas of legitimate and popular authority may 
also help us to understand a curiosity of the Constantinopolitan inaugurations of Phocas and 
Herakleios. During his proclamation, Phocas, reportedly offered basileia to the patrikios 
Germanus, the father-in-law of the deposed Maurice’s son and heir, Theodosius. Germanus, 
who had already been offered the throne by the army if he were to replace Maurice, and 
before Phocas’ arrival in Constantinople had unsuccessfully attempted to gain power with 
an appeal to the ‘Greens’, publicly rejected the offer and the assembled demes acclaimed 
Phocas as emperor.524 This situation was then repeated under Herakleios who, Nikephoros 
                                                 
Hippodrome: and through his sacred pronouncement, he gained control of the populace of the city, exhorting 
them to cease murdering and attacking people wantonly. The entire crowd became quiet and begged him to put 
on his crown.’ Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 333-334 (trans. Jeffreys 228). Author’s translation. 
523 Given Areobindus’ marriage to the popular figure of Anicia Juliana, perhaps the preservation of his 
reputation is not surprising. See above, footnote 517. 
524 Theophylaktos’ clearly hostile account reads: ...ἔδοξεν ὁ μιξοβάρβαρος τύραννος κατειρωνευόμενος 
Γερμανὸν ἀναγορεύειν ἐθέλειν. τῶν τοίνυν δήμων καταυφημούντων τὸν τύραννον, καὶ πάντων τῆς μεταβολῆς 
γλιχομένων, ἀναγορεύεται τὸ κακόν, καὶ κύριος τῶν σκήπτρων ὁ τύραννος προχειρίζεται, καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς 





reports, offered power to Phocas’ son-in-law, Priskos, who refused the offer. The accounts 
give no explanation for Phocas’ offer to Maurice. Herakleios, on the other hand, claimed 
that he ‘had come not to take the empire but to punish Phocas for his unlawful [murder] of 
Maurice and his children…’525 This motive might make sense of Herakleios’ revolt coinage, 
on which he is called consul and only takes the title Augustus after his coronation by 
Patriarch Sergios,526 but Herakleios had already been crowned emperor at Abydos.527 
Although that coronation was a poor substitute for one in Constantinople, it shows that 
Herakleios did intend to claim the imperial title, and reveals that his offer was just as 
contrived as Phocas’. However, the historical circumstances of these usurpations suggest an 
explanation: they were the first in Constantinople to fracture the hereditary-dynastic 
principle of succession, or senatorial election. Consequently, by displaying reluctance and 
then having a member of the preceding dynasty publicly reject their own elevation, this 
rending of successional custom was disguised and outwardly provided ‘dynastic approval’ 
for the new emperor by the old order.528 The successions were presented as ‘elective’ since 
the emperors had been ‘convinced’ to accept power from another figure, and the acclamation 
of the crowds served to reinforce the choice of the newcomer over the old regime. 
After these accessions, the offering of power to an alternate candidate recurs as a 
potential feature of reluctance in the narratives, although in a substantially different form. 
                                                 
ἀτυχήματα. ‘…dissembling, the half-breed tyrant seemed to want to crown Germanus. Then when the demes 
were applauding the tyrant, and all wished for a revolution, the evil one was proclaimed, the tyrant became 
lord of the sceptres, misfortune overcame fortune, and the great, and so to speak, distinguished misfortunes of 
the Romans took their origins.’ Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 333-334 (trans. Whitby 225). 
Author’s Translation. Theophylaktos’ testimony is confirmed by Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 289 
(trans. Mango and Scott 413): ‘The usurper appeared to encourage Germanus to be emperor. But when 
Germanus pretended that he was unwilling and the factions acclaimed the usurper, the evil was proclaimed and 
the usurper was elected as lord of the sceptres, disaster overcame prosperity and the great misfortunes of the 
Romans began.’ On the role of Germanus’ refusal in Phocas’ inauguration ritual, see Olster 1993: 167-168. 
525 καὶ αὐτὸς Κρίσπον εἰς τὴν βαςίλειον ἀξίαν προύτρεπε· μηδὲ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας ἕνεκεν αὐτὸς ἐληλυθέναι 
ἔφασκε, τίσασθαι μᾶλλον Φωκᾶν τῆς εἰς Μαυρίκιον καὶ τὰ Μαυρικίου τέκνα παρανομίας. Nikephoros, 
Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 36-37. 
526 Braunlin and Nesbitt 1999: 188-191; Grierson 1950: 71-93. 
527 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 299 (trans. Mango and Scott 428). For comparison, see Chronicon 
Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 699-701. 





Since reluctant candidates rarely had a member of the ruling family at hand during their 
proclamations in the field, one of their own colleagues or family members was proposed as 
an alternate. Michael I did not believe himself ‘competent’ and offered basileia to Leon V 
who duly protested his own unworthiness and convinced Michael to accept.529 Nikephoros 
II attempted to promote Tzimiskes, but neither the army nor Tzimiskes would permit it and 
promptly proclaimed Nikephoros.530 Alexios I suggested his own brother.531 And Isaakios II 
suggested his uncle.532 As with Phokas and Herakleios, these were rigged elections. In each 
instance the alternate nominee was quickly dismissed by the true candidate’s supporters and 
by themselves so that the universality of the popular acclamation was emphasised. 
Ostensibly, there was no doubt in anybody’s mind about who was the superior candidate, 
and his subsequent actions were seen to have been ratified. 
A final confirmation of the relationship between reluctance, legitimacy, and 
consensus politics can be seen in two episodes involving Constantinopolitan revolts, which 
are juxtaposed with associated ‘unauthorised’ elevations. According to Psellos, in April 
1042, Empress Theodora had repeatedly refused the crowd’s calls for her to lead them 
against Michael V but was dragged from her monastic refuge and forcibly invested. By 
comparison, Michael had proclaimed himself sole ruler by exiling Zoe.533 Likewise, in 
January 1204, the Constantinopolitans were discontent with the stalled deliberations (by the 
senate, bishops, and clergymen) to proclaim a replacement for Isaakios II and Alexios IV, 
and took it upon themselves to do so.534 Choniates describes how ‘… on the third day… 
                                                 
529 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5 (trans. Wortley 4). 
530 Τοιαύτην ὁ Νικηφόρος προτεινόμενος κρόφασιν παρῃτεῖτο τήν ἀρχὴν, καὶ ᾽Ιωάννῃ τῷ Τζιμισκῇ παρεχώρει 
τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιβῆναι τιμῆς, καὶ τῶν σκήπτρων ἀνθέξεσθαι. οὐκ ἠνείχετο δἐ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων οὔτε τις τῶν 
τοῦ στρατοῦ, οὔτε μὴν αὐτὸς ὁ ᾽Ιωάννης· ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοθυμαδὸν αὐτὸν ἐπευφήμουν, σεβάσμιόν τε καὶ βασιλέα 
῾Ρωμαίων προσαγορεύοντες.  Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 41 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 92). 
531 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 74-75 (trans. Frankopan 67-68). 
532 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 345 (trans. Magoulias 190-191). 
533 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 226-229; ed. Renauld I, 108 (trans. Sewter 144). 
534 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 561-564 (trans. Magoulias 307-309). Cheynet 1990: 461-462; 





seizing a certain youth whose name was Nikolaos and surname Kannavos, they anointed him 
emperor against his will.’535 However, the people were frustrated when Alexios V 
proclaimed himself emperor with the backing of the Varangians, and crushed Kannavos’ 
supporters.536 The reluctant promotions of Theodora, and Nikolaos, at the hands of ‘the 
multitude’, were contrasted with the self-proclaimed accessions of Michael and Alexios. 
Psellos was extensively critical of Michael’s actions, and Choniates had favoured the 
promotion of the ‘gentle’ (μειλίχῳ) Kannavos, claiming that Alexios’ supporters were the 
worse faction.537 Consensus and moral superiority were aligned with the authors’ favoured 
(reluctant) candidates, whereas the self-proclaimed emperors demonstrated a lack of 
humility and virtue in acting against the common will and general wellbeing. We are to infer 
that the reluctant candidate was acting legitimately, and the self-proclaimed candidate 
illegitimately. 
Elsewhere, the topos introduces celestial sources of legitimising authority. In two 
examples of its use in court rhetoric we see that ‘divine will’ is adduced as the reason that 
                                                 
535 τὸ τοίνυν λαῶδες τῆς πόλεως... εἰς ἁποστασίαν οἰδαίνειν ἤγξατο... ἠναγκάζετο καὶ ἡ σύγκλητος ἤ τε τῶν 
ἀρχιερἑων ὁμήγυρις καὶ οἱ τοῦ βήματος λόγιμοι συνελθεῖν ἐκεῖσε καὶ συνδιασκέψασθαί σφισι περὶ τοῦ 
ἄρξοντος... ἑαυτοὺς ταλανίζοντες, καὶ πολλἀ τῶν παρειῶν κατελείβομεν δάκρυα... νεανίσκον τινἀ 
συλλαβὀντες Νικόλαον τὴν κλἢσιν, Κανναβὸν τὴν ἐπίκληίν, εἰς βασιλέα χρίουσιν ἄκοντα; Choniates, Historia, 
ed. van Dieten 562 (trans. Magoulias 308). Nikolaos’ proclamation by the people occurred on 27 January 1204. 
Alexios V’s removal of Isaakios II and Alexios IV was achieved on 28 January, his public proclamation was 
no later than the first week of February. 
536 With the support of relatives, the logothetes tou genikou, and the Varangians, Doukas imprisoned the 
Angeloi and Kannavos. For details, see C.M. Brand 1968: 250-251; Cheynet 1990: 462. 
537 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ χείρω ἐπικρατέστερα παρὰ τοῖς Κωνσταντινουπολίταις καὶ μάλιστα (φιλτέρα γὰρ ὑπὲρ τοὺς 
ὁμογενεῖς ἡ ἀλήθεια), ὁ μὲν Δούκας ἐκραταιοῦτο καὶ ηὔξανεν, ὁ δὲ Κανναβὸς ἀμαυρουμένην εἶχε τὴν αἴγλην 
κατὰ σελήνην λειψίφωτον. ‘Inasmuch as the worst elements prevail amongst the Constantinopolitans (for truth 
is dearer to me than my compatriots), Doukas grew stronger and increased in power, while Kannavos’ 
splendour grew dim like a waning moon.’ Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 564 (trans. Magoulias 308-309). 
Although Choniates was contemptuous of Kannavos’ elevation by ‘the multitude’ and disapproved of the 
circumstances that prompted the promotion, he believed Kannavos to be the better choice of emperor (even 
listing his virtues). The accession of Alexios V was much worse: a result of intrigue and personal betrayal by 
a trusted official that resulted in the deaths of Alexios IV and Isaakios II. Given that such acts of betrayal were 
a recurring theme of Choniates’ Kaiserkritik and, in his view, a contributing factor to the fall of Constantinople 
in 1204, Kannavos’ reluctance may be understood as a means of emphasising the scale of Alexios’ deceit and 
single-minded ambition. On Choniates’ views regarding the imperial office and the role of usurpation and 
ataxia in precipitating the fall of Constantinople in 1204, see Beihammer 2013; Catanzaro 2012; Harris 2000; 
Kaldellis 2009. See also, the comments of Macrides 1994: esp. 275, on the manner in which Choniates appears 
to both propagate the imperial image in panegyric and yet deconstruct this image in the narrative history. On 





reluctance was overcome. Panegyrici Latini VI, composed c.310 for Constantine I, marked 
a shift in Constantine’s strategy of legitimation. Where previously Constantine had utilised 
his promotion by Maximianus, the latter had betrayed and then been defeated by him. 
Constantine now sought hereditary and other sources of legitimacy to buttress his claims.538 
The panegyric served this purpose: it acknowledged Maximianus’ defeat but included 
reference to Constantine’s reluctant proclamation, something that is not mentioned in the 
histories.539 We learn that Constantine, mourning his father’s death, was unexpectedly 
clothed in the purple by the soldiery and attempted to spur his horse in order to escape. The 
anonymous composer then proffered an exegesis: Constantine was wrong to flee, because 
imperium was being offered to him by Jupiter and was thus unavoidable. His ‘modesty and 
piety’ were commended, but fortunately the needs of the state were said to have triumphed 
over them.540 Nine centuries later, Michael VIII expressed almost identical ideas about his 
own elevation. Unsought, it was achieved through the will of God and the people, and he 
was ‘persuaded’ and ‘forced’ to accept.541 Manifest within these works is the notion that, 
although achieved through human means, the elevation was divinely sanctioned and 
therefore inevitable. Furthermore, the displays of reluctance were explicitly adduced as 
                                                 
538 On Panegyrici Latini VI(7).8.3 (trans. Nixon and Rodgers 215-217). See also, Warmington 1974: esp. 374-
375. 
539 ‘The Triumph of Christianity’ narrative was evidently not conducive to this propaganda. The historic 
certainty of Constantine’s victory may have been diminished if he showed doubts. 
540 ‘…straight away the soldiers threw the purple over you despite your tears, taking more account of the public 
advantage than your feelings… You are even said, invincible emperor, to have to have tried to escape the 
ardour of this army which was demanding you by spurring on your horse. To tell the truth, this was to commit 
a youthful error. For what Cyllarus or Arion could snatch you away, you whom the Empire pursued? …that 
sovereignty I say which was offered you by Jupiter’s will… it was attached to you as easily as messages sent 
from heaven are swift to arrive on earth. And so your attempts to defer your rule showed your modesty and 
piety, but the good fortune of the state triumphed.' Panegyrici Latini VI(7).8.3-6 (trans. Nixon and Rodgers 
229-231). 
541 ‘I was raised up to be emperor of your people. The proof of this is clear and unambiguous. For it was not 
the many hands coming to assist me or their frightening weapons which elevated me above the heads of the 
Romans. It was not any highly persuasive speech delivered by me or by my supporters which fell upon the ears 
of the crowd, filled them with great hopes, and convinced them to entrust themselves to me. No, it was your 
right hand, Lord, which did this mighty deed. Your right hand raised me on high, and established me as lord 
of all. I did not persuade anyone, but was myself persuaded. I did not bring force to bear on anyone, but was 






symbols of excellent and humble character, and associated with God’s will. Here the topos 
served to propagate the imperial sacral charisma, which in turn strengthened the reluctant 
candidates’ claims to be acting legitimately. Although this direct association of the topos 
with divine authorisation is rarely replicated in the narrative histories it is possible that the 
association was meant to be inferred by the very use of the topos in a narrative; especially 
since most readers would have been familiar with its use in court rhetoric. 
In rare cases the topos appears to have been used to create a quasi-‘dynastic’ claim 
to basileia. The efforts of Bryennios’ Material for History to present the image of continuity 
between the Komnenoi and Doukai is one example. Bryennios suggests an atmosphere of 
historic cooperation between the families in their handling of state affairs. Consequently, the 
description of Isaakios I’s abdication and the accession of Constantine X encourages this 
image. Constantine came to the throne through a conspiracy involving prominent members 
of the senate and aristocracy,542 something concealed by Bryennios. Instead, Isaakios, fearful 
that he would soon die,543 reportedly offered the diadem to his brother Ioannes the 
kouropalates (father of Alexios I). Despite his wife’s cautions that the Komnenoi could all 
be killed if someone else took the throne, Ioannes was unwilling to accept and, further 
emphasising this disinclination, ignored the entreaties of his family by hiding within the 
                                                 
542 Psellos’ Chronographia offers a manipulated account of how Isaakios was encouraged to take the monastic 
tonsure by Psellos and his associates. It reveals the speed with which this was achieved and Constantine 
promoted: Empress Aikaterine is reported to have been extremely angry with Psellos for his actions in allowing 
the tonsure, and despite her attentiveness to the emperor’s sick-bed was somehow absent when this decision 
was made. The choice of Constantine X as Isaakios’ successor was also contrary to the empresses reported 
wishes for a member of the Komnenian line to assume the throne. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 
272-289; ed. Renauld II, 129-136 (trans. Sewter 322-329). Cheynet 1990: 345, and n.43, considers that the 
succession was delicate enough that the missives announcing Constantine’s proclamation claimed that he had 
the agreement of the army, and the senate, and his acclamation included cheers for Empress Aikaterine. 
Cheynet also questions if the Varangian conspiracy c.1060 was not an attempt to restore Isaakios I to the throne. 
Attaleiates’ Historia, and Skylitzes Continuatus, also note the irregularity of Constantine’s appointment in place 
of a family member but do not mention a palace coup, or give specific reasons for his selection. Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 69 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 124-125); Skylitzes Continuatus, ed. Tsolakes 108. 
See also, Kaldellis 1999: 100-101. 
543 Isaakios was injured during a hunt and it was believed that he would not survive. Psellos, Chronographia, 
ed. Impellizzeri II, 272-275; ed. Renauld II, 129-130 (trans. Sewter 322); Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 





palace.544 The proedros, Constantine, was appointed instead as the best candidate available 
under the circumstances, although evidently not the first choice.545 From Bryennios’ 
conception of the event, the reader knows that the throne ‘should’ have transferred along the 
Komnenian line, to Ioannes, and Alexios. The Doukai, although technically emperors, might 
properly be considered temporary stewards, or even interlopers.546  
By contrast, Psellos, who also used the topos in relation to this accession, and was 
read by Bryennios,547 chose to enhance Constantine’s claims to the detriment of Isaakios’. 
We are told that the people had urged Constantine to seize power under Michael VI, and that 
Isaakios had even offered it to him before his proclamation, but Constantine refused.548 
Psellos described Constantine’s eventual accession as a work of divine providence, further 
establishing the excellent qualities and suitability to rule that had initially prompted calls for 
his accession.549 Constantine’s earlier refusal revealed his humility and excused the 
circumstances of his later conspiracy because he should already have been emperor: earlier 
refusals suggested impeccable character and amended later ‘misdeeds’. Given Psellos’ 
involvement in the coup that brought Constantine to power, this formulation of events may 
be seen to offer a partial apologia for his own participation and a compliment to Constantine 
                                                 
544 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 81-83. In Psellos’ version of events it is Empress Aikaterine that speaks 
these warnings rather than Anna Dalassena. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 286-289; ed. Renauld 
II, 132-134 (trans. Sewter 325-326). On Bryennios’ use of Psellos in his reworking of this scene, see Neville 
2010: 78-79. 
545 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 83-85. 
546 Varzos 1984: 49-50 and n.5: has similarly noted that the narrative forms a conceit intended to provide the 
Komnenoi with legitimacy in the aftermath of Alexios’ accession. 
547 On Bryennios’ use of Psellos’ Chronographia as a source for his Material for History, see Carile 1969: 56-
87; Neville 2010: 78-79; Neville 2012: 46-47. 
548 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 286-289; ed. Renauld II, 136 (trans. Sewter 328-329). Skylitzes 
agrees that Constantine was amongst those who went to Michael VI in search of honours, but does not 
corroborate Psellos’ story that Constantine was enjoined to assume power. Instead, he claims that Katakalon 
Kekaumenos was chosen as the best candidate but refused and ‘immediately declared Isaakios to be emperor 
of the Romans.’ Skylitzes’ narrative was dependent upon a biographical work favourable to Kekaumenos, it is 
therefore unsurprising that the general is flattered and initially chosen in his version of events. Skylitzes, 
Synopsis, ed. Thurn 483, 487 (trans. Wortley 451, 454). On Skylitzes’ pro-Kekaumenos source, see Shepard 
1992: 171-182; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, trans. Wortley xxi-xxii (The Sources). 





(the candidate he backed).550 It also suggests that the two authors’ proposed differing 
conceptions of the nature of imperial power: Psellos invoked the ‘populist’ connotations of 
the topos and thus the elective principle; Bryennios revised Psellos in order to invoke 
Alexios’ ‘dynastic right’ and restricted the elective principle to the choice of a candidate by 
the imperial family. 
Returning to Bryennios’ narrative, the resignation of Michael VII and the accession 
of Botaneiates brings the legitimising effort on behalf of Alexios full circle. We are informed 
that Michael had long contemplated resigning and since circumstance now made this a 
reality he took the tonsure.551 Before he did, Alexios persuaded him to allow Konstantios 
Doukas, Michael’s brother, to accede, and had this confirmed in writing. Alexios 
accompanied Konstantios to the Great Palace in order to ensure the succession, but 
Konstantios refused it (believing in his implied youthful naiveté that he would be safe under 
Botaneiates).552 The pair subsequently met with Botaneiates and welcomed him as emperor 
by swearing fidelity.553  
Stanković has shown that Bryennios actively associated Alexios with Konstantios, 
whom Bryennios’ narrative presented as the only ‘legitimate’ heir to Michael, and portrayed 
them as the closest of friends in order to imbibe authority from this relationship.554 But 
Bryennios was actually doing much more. Botaneiates’ reign was presented as an aberration, 
he did not merit it555 and had overthrown the Doukai to get there. Alexios’ oath to him was 
a result of Konstantios’ actions with Alexios merely respecting his friend’s (Michael’s true 
heir’s) lead. Any charge that he broke fidelity with Botaneiates was negated by Botaneiates’ 
                                                 
550 On Psellos’ apologia for his involvement in the coup that brought Constantine to power, see Kaldellis 1999: 
100-101.  
551 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 247-249.  
552 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 249-251. 
553 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 251. 
554 Stanković 2007; Neville 2012: 168-169, goes further, arguing that Konstantios is actually presented as a 
child, with Alexios leading him around and acting as his protector and tutor.  





misrule and Alexios’ proven loyalty to the member of the Doukas family who should have 
been emperor. Further, Konstantios’ refusal recalled Ioannes’ refusal, and Alexios’ 
overthrow of the interloper Botaneiates with the aid of Empress Maria (in defence of 
Alexios’ adoptive family)556 revealed him succeeding from the Doukai, who had already 
refused power through tonsure (Michael) and naiveté (Konstantios), in much the same way 
that Constantine X succeeded Isaakios in place of Ioannes. It was not a usurpation, but a 
succession in accordance with the traditions of the wider (joint) Komnenos-Doukas dynasty. 
This reading also follows Alexios’ early efforts to present his rule as contiguous with the 
Doukai.557 
These examples of what may be termed ‘providential loops’, quasi-dynastic claims 
based upon past refusals, represent an innovation in the topos. In contrast to reluctance at 
the moment of proclamation, six cases detail a future emperor’s past reluctance to accept the 
throne.558 Four (Leon V, Ioannes I, Constantine X, and Ioannes VI) were usurper-emperors 
who reportedly refused power when previously asked to accept it by their immediate 
predecessor.559 One, Alexios, was closely associated with figures who rejected basileia. 
                                                 
556 Maria had adopted Alexios, who claimed that he would help ensure the succession of her son when 
Botaneiates appeared to have other intentions for the succession, before he instigated his coup. Anna Komnene, 
Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 57-58, 61 (trans. Frankopan 52, 56). On the adoption, see Smythe 1997: 
147; Cheynet 1990: 354-355; Macrides 1990: 117; Macrides 1992: 265, noting that it provided a conduit for 
information to be passed discreetly between the conspirators and the Empress. 
557 Anna Komnene’s Alexias emphasises the pivotal role played by the empress Maria in the overthrow of 
Botaneiates, and the respect that Alexios had for the rights of Maria’s son (the heir-apparent, Constantine). 
Alexios is portrayed as acting with the consent of the Doukai, in order to safeguard the ‘legitimate’ heirs. 
Stanković 2007: 170-171. Constantine Doukas was proclaimed co-emperor alongside Alexios, and was 
permitted to wear the purple sandals and a crown (a privilege Nikephoros III had denied him): Anna Komnene, 
Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 97 (trans. Frankopan 88-89). The influential former kaisar Ioannes Doukas 
(a paterfamilias-type figure for the Doukai) was appointed basileiopator for Constantine (1081-1088): 
Gkoutzioukostas 2014: 226-230. Alexios also promoted dynastic links with the Doukai through the 
iconographic selections of his seals. These notably mimicked the designs of Constantine X and Michael VII, 
and those of Nikephoros III, whose seals’ iconographic schema also borrowed from those of the Doukai. The 
obverse of a seal in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection (accession number: BZS.1958.106.518; Dumbarton Oaks 
Seals 6, no. 88.2) displays a motif of Christ enthroned that was first utilised by Constantine X, and then by 
Michael VII. The imperial regalia as depicted on Nikephoros III’s seals are retained by Alexios I’s seals. 
558 These are Leon V, Ioannes I, Ioannes Komnenos-Alexios I, Constantine X, Isaakios II, and Ioannes VI. For 
citations and details, see Table 2. 
559 Three (Leon V, Ioannes I, and Constantine X) were even proposed as alternate candidates for the throne by 





Another, Isaakios II, successfully rejected a popular call to usurp Andronikos’ throne in 
1184,560 and then did so in 1185. Tentatively, the typology appears to originate with 
Theophanes’ account of the ninth-century emperor Leon V.561 In all cases it uses the force 
of providence, and inference, to invalidate the dynastic-legitimacy of the preceding emperor: 
they should never really have been in power, but the superior candidate refused the throne. 
Divine will, delayed the first time, was realised the second. When this candidate 
subsequently claimed what should already have been his, who could oppose him? Ioannes 
VI’s legitimising efforts relied heavily on the strength of this argument, citing his intimate 
friendship with Andronikos III and multiple refused offers of co-emperorship.562  
Another effort to establish a retrospective dynastic claim may illuminate the 
description of Constantine Laskaris’ refusal to accept insignia after he received basileia ‘by 
lot’.563 Choniates describes how Laskaris had been chosen after the abandonment of 
Constantinople by Alexios V, and the entry of the crusader army. He allegedly declined the 
insignia offered to him by the patriarch and instead rushed away to fight the Latins.564 This 
                                                 
560 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 284 (trans. Magoulias 157). 
561 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 502 (trans. Mango and Scott 685). 
562 The narratives of Kantakouzenos and Gregoras are in accordance on these claims constituting a significant 
part of the emperor’s attempts to justify and legitimise his actions. Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen 
I, 365-370; Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 580, 585-586, 593-594, 604, 611-612. See also, Nicol 1968: 
41, 44.9. 
563 Constantine Laskaris was elected ‘by lot’ (κλήρου) in competition with Constantine Doukas. Choniates’ 
description of their competition for the throne is dismissive of their actions: he suggests that they believed the 
empire to be ‘Fortune’s prize’, and laments that there was nobody suitable remaining in the city to properly 
examine their claims. Laskaris was most likely selected because of his connection to Alexios III via his brother 
the (then) despotes, Theodoros I Laskaris. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 571-572 (trans. Magoulias 314). 
Beihammer notes the pathos inherent in the refusal and elsewhere in the account of Constantine’s election. He 
sees this as the terminus of Choniates’ deconstruction of imperial ceremonials and the degradation of the 
imperial office: they were gradually debased by usurpation and innovations in successional procedures until, 
in practical terms, they came to mean nothing. Beihammer 2013: esp. 201-202. However, despite Choniates’ 
disapproval and misgivings he does not question that Laskaris or his predecessors were ‘legitimately’ 
recognised as emperors, only that the circumstances of Laskaris’ selection were less than ideal. On Choniates’ 
acceptance of the popular selection of an emperor, see Kaldellis 2013: 45-46. 
564 …᾽Εκ δὲ κλήρου τὸ πρωτεῖον εἰληφὼς ὁ Λάσκαρις τὰ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας οὐ προσίεται σύμβολα, συυεξιὼν 
δὲ τῷ πατριάρχῃ κατὰ τὸ Μίλιον οὐκ ἀνίει παραινῶν τοῖς συνιοῦσι καί σφας ὐποθωπεύων εἰς ἀντιμάχησιν. 
‘Receiving the supreme office by lot, Laskaris refused the imperial insignia; escorted by the patriarch to the 
Milion, he continuously exhorted the assembled populace, cajoling them to put up a resistance.’ Choniates, 





refusal to accept, potentially a function of circumstance,565 may actually have been intended 
to provide legitimacy to Choniates’ future patron Theodoros I, Constantine’s brother.566 It 
offered a familial connection through which Theodoros could appear to have legitimately 
inherited the throne, from a brother who was reluctantly appointed emperor in the capital but 
refused a coronation due to his patriotic desire to defend the empire. Already, Theodoros 
had been named despotes under his father-in-law Alexios III and utilised that connection in 
order to establish his position in Asia Minor in 1203/1204.567 Only after Alexios’ capture in 
1205 did Theodoros cease claiming to be acting on his behalf, and actively seek his own 
coronation.568 In detailing Constantine’s refusal of insignia, the validity of this connection 
was preserved by Choniates: the brothers had not acted against Alexios, who they evidently 
acknowledged as emperor and from whom Theodoros claimed dynastic pedigree and 
titulature. Constantine had been reluctantly declared emperor, but this was under extenuating 
circumstances in order to lead the defence of Constantinople, concurrently reinforcing the 
integrity of Laskarid patriotism.569 In (not so) subtle contrast, Alexios had fled for his life 
when the crusaders first appeared; the Laskarids may have been loyal to him, but they were 
also superior. The reluctant Constantine, who could have claimed the imperial title for 
                                                 
565 Presumably there would not have been sufficient time to stage an investiture ceremonial of any note given 
the presence of the crusader army in the city and Constantine’s reported desire to lead the resistance against 
them.  
566 The best account of Choniates’ life and career, with bibliography, is that provided by Simpson 2013a: 11-
67. He revised and expanded the manuscript of the Historia during his life in Nikaia under Theodoros I. 
Simpson 2006; Simpson 2009: 13-34; Simpson 2013a: 11-67. 
567 Theodoros was the second husband of Alexios III’s daughter, Anna. He, along with Alexios Palaiologos 
(second husband of Alexios III’s daughter, Eirene) were married to Alexios’ respective daughters in 1199 in a 
joint marriage ceremony. Theodoros was either named despotes with Palaiologos following these marriages 
(i.e. in 1199), or after the Palaiologos’ death but before Alexios III’s flight from Constantinople in July 1203. 
On the chronology, see Macrides 2007: 82; Cheynet 1990: 469; Grierson 1999: vol. 4.2. p.447. For the 
marriages and promotions, see Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 508 (trans. Magoulias 280). 
568 Macrides has demonstrated Theodoros’ use of the marriage connection to Alexios III in his efforts to 
establish a base of operations in Asia Minor. Theodoros’ attempts to bring the cities of Bithynia into his domain 
was justified on the grounds that he was ‘to rule over them as emperor in the place of his father-in-law Alexios.’ 
This is confirmed by Geoffrey de Villehardouin’s statement that Theodoros ‘had as wife the daughter of the 
emperor whose land he claimed.’ Discussed in Macrides 2005: 148; Akropolites, Historia, trans. Macrides 82, 
and §5.5, 6 (Commentary). See also, Angold 2008a: 733-734. 
569 On ‘nationalism’ and anti-Latin patriotism in Nikaia and under the Laskarids, see Irmscher 1972; Angold 





himself and yet ceded authority to his brother and Alexios, afforded another means of 
promoting Theodoros’ dynastic claims when Alexios’ status as the ‘legitimate’ basileus after 
1204 was questioned and the latter challenged Laskaris (c.1210/11).570 Choniates’ 
description of events provided Theodoros with hereditary connections to two emperors who 
had been appointed in Constantinople, after 1204 which competitor could say the same?571 
The flexibility of the topos as a propaganda tool should now be discernible. Authors 
were able to rehabilitate wrongdoers, provide them with justifications for their actions, and 
make appeals to popular and divine elections and the dynastic principle in order to legitimise 
them. However, by raising the suspicion that reluctance was false, authors could also 
invalidate all of these functions and reveal a candidate to be illegitimate. Where Nikephoros 
II’s partisan sources572 describe a reluctant emperor who offered the insignia to Tzimiskes, 
and told the troops that he had never sought power but accepted it on pain of death and 
because of them, Skylitzes, dependent upon anti-Nikephorian sources for the period, swiftly 
deconstructs this image.573 He provides two potential explanations for Nikephoros’ 
proclamation. The first, followed pro-Nikephorian sources. The second, the version that 
Skylitzes says he believes, claimed ‘Phokas had long been labouring under the impression 
                                                 
570 Alexios III was a busy figure in the historiography: he fled Constantinople (17/18 July 1203) with his 
daughter Eirene, abandoning his other close relatives, and arrived in Thrace. He then attempted to establish 
himself at Adrianople and Mosynopolis, still claiming to be emperor. In April 1204 he was joined by Alexios 
V Doukas (who then became Angelos’ son-in-law through his marriage to Eudokia Angelina) and the rest of 
his abandoned family. However, Doukas was soon blinded and left for the advancing Latins. Alexios, soon 
after, surrendered to Boniface of Montferrat. In 1205 he attempted to join Michael I Komnenos Doukas, but 
was prevented by Boniface. c.1209 Alexios was ransomed by Michael I and went to Asia Minor where his son-
in-law, the former despotes and current basileus and autokrator, Theodoros I Laskaris had established himself. 
Alexios, with the aid of Sultan Kaykhusraw I, conspired against Theodoros and contested the imperial title 
once more – refusing to accept Theodoros’ authority. He was captured by Theodoros in 1211 at the Battle of 
Antioch on the Maeander, blinded, and confined to a monastery where he later died. Choniates, Historia, ed. 
van Dieten 546-547, 556, 608, 620 (trans. Magoulias 299, 301, 304, 333-334, 339); Akropolites, Historia, ed. 
Heisenberg 12-17 (trans. Macrides 123-124, 129-130, 131). See also, Macrides 2007: 79-81; Korobeinikov 
2014: 148, n.236. 
571 It should be noted that there is no hard evidence that Theodoros ever did utilise his connection to Constantine 
in this manner. The argument presented here is a speculative one based upon the construction of Choniates’ 
narrative and the historical uses of the reluctance topos in Byzantine historiography. 
572 For the favourable version, see Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 41-44 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 92-93); 
repeated by Psellos, Historia Syntomos, ed. Aerts 99. 





that he ought to be emperor… [and he] burned with desire for the empress Theophano.’574 
The pair supposedly contrived to have Nikephoros crowned, and soon after ‘[he dropped] all 
pretence and show by taking Theophano as his lawful wife.’575 Skylitzes’ staging of two 
possibilities creates a farce. The motif of forced investiture is undermined since who could 
believe that Nikephoros’ supporters would really kill him? Yet if the reader does accept this, 
Nikephoros was, like failed usurpers, a pitiable figure at the mercy of others, acting to save 
his own life and not for any honourable reason. This first story was not included to provide 
an objective view of the acclamation, but rather to undermine the pro-Nikephorian version. 
The reader ‘knows’ the true account was that favoured by Skylitzes; again, Nikephoros does 
not act for the benefit of the empire or another laudable reason but is motivated by lust and 
avarice, the desire for power, and for Theophano. The purity of his rebellion’s motive, his 
image as a reluctant individual, and his moral authority were shattered. 
In the case of Andronikos I reluctance itself became a weapon. Eustathios recounts 
that Andronikos was enjoined to accept the status of co-emperor and, despite seeing his 
deepest desire about to be fulfilled, feigned unwillingness to accept. He struck himself and 
sought a means of escape. In reality, we are told, this was only to allow him an opportunity 
to laugh with joy unobserved.576 After attempting to hide within the Blachernai Palace, 
guards were called to contain him and the Patriarch bound him with a metaphorical stock 
and chain.577 Andronikos openly lamented his fate and kicked his feet to prevent the buskins 
being placed upon them.578 Choniates, who utilised Eustathios’ material in writing the 
                                                 
574 ...ὁ καὶ δοκῶν ἀληθἐστερος, ὠς πολὺν ὤδινε χρόνον τὴν τῆς βασιλείας ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον αὐτόν ὁ 
ταὐτης ἔρως ἐξέφλεγεν, ὅσον ὁ τῆς βασιλίδος Θεοφανοῦς... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 256-
257 (trans. Wortley 247). 
575 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 260 (trans. Wortley 250). 
576 Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, Melville-Jones 48-51. 
577 Beihammer 2013: 185, considers this to be a reference to a threat of excommunication. 
578 ...καὶ περίθεσις παρασήμων τῇ βασιλείᾳ πεδίλων, ἐκείνου μὴ καθιστῶντος τοὺς πόδας... ‘…and they made 
him put on the sandals which are the distinguishing mark of imperial rank, although he would not keep his feet 
still…’ Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-Jones 50-51. Eustathios’ 
description of Andronikos’ kicking feet raises an important question about intertextuality in twelfth-century 





Historia,579 reports a similar scene although he greatly reduces Andronikos’ supposed 
reluctance: he was bade to accept co-emperorship, went to the Polytimos chamber of the 
Blachernai, was acclaimed, and his supporters restrained him by both arms to invest him 
with the insignia.580 Both works deconstructed Andronikos’ virtue by distorting what was 
initially an effective display of legitimising propaganda into a demonstration of hypocrisy.581 
Eustathios ridiculed Andronikos’ excessively dramatic display and revealed the emperor’s 
true thoughts and desires.582 Choniates condemned Andronikos’ self-interested desires 
(Andronikos’ recurring characteristic throughout the Historia),583 therefore reluctance was 
shown only at the moment of investiture, in a feigned struggle with his supporters. It was 
not real and it was barely perceptible. Consequently, Choniates assigned it only one line, in 
contrast to Eustathios’ paragraphs. In both accounts, hypocrisy allowed a moral judgement 
to be made. He had not acceded in a self-sacrificing way, or for the common good. He 
reigned because he had schemed, deceived the people with charades of hesitance and loyalty, 
                                                 
father’s proclamation, where Ioannes Komnenos similarly had to force the imperial footwear onto his brother’s 
unwilling feet. To my knowledge, these two references to actively unwilling investiture with the red buskins 
are unique within the Byzantine historiographical record. Psellos does claim to have taken an active role in 
investing Constantine X with the red buskins, but the Chronographia is unclear as to how resistant Constantine 
was – indeed, the inference is that he was an apprehensive, but largely passive participant (Psellos took the 
lead during the coup, the docile Constantine followed) and there is no reference to his resisting the physical 
investiture. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 74-75 (trans. Frankopan 67-68); Psellos, 
Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 274-303; ed. Renauld II, 129-136 (trans. Sewter 322-329). 
579 On Choniates’ use of Eustathios as a source for the Historia, see Simpson 2013: esp. 224-229. 
580 …τὸ δὲ τῆς ᾽Ανδρονίκου φατρίας θερμότερον καὶ ἀκκιζόμενον ᾽Ανδρόνικον καὶ τὴν συνεδρίαν 
εἰρωνευόμενον ἀμφοτέραις συσχόντες εἰς τὴν χρυσόπαστον κλίνην ἐφῆκαν, ἐφ᾽ ἧς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἲζανεν. ἄλλοι 
δὲ τὴν καπνηρὰν καὶ πυραμιδοειδῆ ἐρέαν τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀφελόμενοι πυρσὴν αὐτῷ περιέθεντο καὶ στολὴν 
βασιλικὴν ἐνέδυσαν ἔτεροι. ‘In apparent disregard of the assembly, Andronikos’ most devoted supporters, as 
though taking him by surprise, held him securely by both arms and set him down on the gold-covered couch 
on which the emperor sat. Removing his dark-grey pyramidal hat made of wool, one group put a red one on 
him, and another dressed him in an imperial robe.’ Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 270-271 (trans. 
Magoulias 150-151). Translation adapted. Emphasis added. 
581 Beihammer 2013: 185-186. 
582 Given that Andronikos is elsewhere described as akin to a Proteus figure, constantly changing his form and 
scheming to achieve power, we may view this scene as a continuation of that theme: .... καὶ μάλιστα ό 
'Ανδρόνικος, παντοδανὀς ἐκεῖνος ᾶνθρωπος καὶ παμποίκιλος, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ χαμαιλέοντος δίκην εῖτε 
πολύποδος, Πρωτέως δὲ μᾶλλον, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ ʹʹΕμπουσαν, ἣ φρικτὰ ἐφάνταζεν. ‘…a man of manifold 
and variegated qualities, though not in the manner of a chameleon or polyp, but rather of Proteus, and most of 
all of Empousa, who took on such awful forms.’ Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. 
Melville-Jones 13-17. 
583 For example, Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 101, 104-106, 107-108, 129-132, 137-142 (trans. 





and then murdered Alexios II. His authority was built on falsehoods and misdeeds. A bitter 
note on the scale of this treachery, and an encapsulation of the topos, is provided by 
Eustathios’ sardonic comment regarding Andronikos’ duped supporters: ‘It was, they said, 
better that he should suffer something that he did not want, namely being emperor, than that 
the world should be ruined.’584 
 
Origins and parallels 
Having explored the permutations of the topos, and the ability of Byzantine authors to 
manipulate its use in order to suit their ideological and political intentions, we should now 
seek to address its potential origins. As Weiler demonstrates, the reluctant ruler is a 
historically prevalent ruler, not unique to any one particular region of Medieval Europe.585 
This ubiquity raises questions as to why seemingly independent traditions appear to parallel 
one another so closely. What exactly was the ideological source and what else might this tell 
us about reluctance’s purpose? 
In order to function effectively as a means of propaganda, the topos must successfully 
have exploited a mutually accepted set of beliefs and theories concerning rulership. Weiler 
focuses on the shared moral and theological traditions of medieval European societies in 
order to explain this ‘origin’ question. Accordingly, he identifies similarities between the 
rex renitens and the nolle episcopari, the ‘reluctant bishop’, in the West.586 The theme was 
a longstanding one in the hagiographical tradition. In Sulpicius Severus’ fourth-fifth century 
Vita, St Martin was tricked into being elected as bishop by the citizenry of Tours who 
managed to lure him out of his monastery under the pretext of ministering to the sick. They 
                                                 
584 …καὶ κάλλιόν φασιν ὂν παθεῖν ὲκεῖνον ὃ μὴ βούλεται, τὀ βασιλεῦσαι δηλαδή, ἤπερ ἐξολέσθαι τὰ κοσμικά. 
Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-Jones 44-45. 
585 Weiler 2000: 7. 





swiftly hauled him into the local church and elected him by popular consent.587 Describing 
the events of Saint Anselm of Bec’s election as archbishop of Canterbury in 1093, the 
account of Eadmer, a monk of Canterbury Cathedral, written c.1093-1122, records how 
Anselm refused his own election. The assembled prelates forced the archiepiscopal staff into 
Anselm’s hand and dragged him to the altar to partake in the consecration.588 Elsewhere, 
c.1200 Richard de Devizes recorded the circumstances of the election of a new prior by the 
monks of Cluny at Montacute, whereby a not-so-pious brother successfully manipulated his 
own election but then feigned reluctance to assume the office.589  
The nolle episcopari can also be found in Byzantine histories, although less 
frequently than reluctant emperors.590 Theophanes’ anti-iconoclastic account of the election 
of Patriarch Paulos IV (780) remarks that Paulos tried very hard to decline the promotion 
‘on account of the prevailing heresy.’591 Paulos’ virtue and orthodoxy implicitly contrasted 
with Leon V’s supposed lack thereof. His resignation four years later,592 from a position that 
he then lamented having even accepted, was presented as a result of the overwhelming 
oppression of heretical teachings causing him to fear divine punishment.593 The topos served 
                                                 
587 Sulpicius Severus, Vie de Saint Martin 9.1, 270-271, 641-645; Weiler 2000: 19. Later tradition stated that 
the reluctant Martin even tried to hide in a barn where his presence was given away by the noise of the disturbed 
geese that had been sheltering inside. 
588 Eadmer, The Life of St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, ed. and trans. Southern 63-66; for discussion, 
and references to the secondary literature of this event, see Ruud 1998: 1-13. 
589 ‘…delaying a long time, so that he might appear to receive unwillingly what he had come to seize, he at last 
sat down in the seat and uttered a string of pious exclamations.’ The Chronicle of Richard de Devizes, ed. 
Appleby §19. This unnamed brother had produced forged letters from the Abbot of Cluny instructing the 
existing prior to resign and the others to accept him as prelate. On the compilation of Richard’s Chronicle, see 
Partner 1977: 143-181. 
590 At least, this is true of the narrative histories. A separate study of patriarchal and ecclesiastic reluctance is 
surely needed, and would undoubtedly benefit from close reading of the hagiographical corpus where the topos 
of the reluctant ecclesiast likely predominates. Another consideration, regarding the relative popularity of the 
reluctant emperor versus the reluctant patriarch (in historiographical sources), is the interest that individual 
histories paid to the circumstances of patriarchal successions in comparison with imperial successions; in many 
cases we have but one or two lines devoted to those of the patriarchs but whole paragraphs or pages for the 
successions of emperors. 
591 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 453 (trans. Mango and Scott 625). For details on Paulos’ election 
and his tenure of the patriarchate, see Efthymiadis 1998: 213; Treadgold 1988: 75. 
592 He retired to the Monastery of Saint Florus on 31 August 784. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 
457 (trans. Mango and Scott 631). 





to exculpate him from blame for heretical teachings and implied his ‘true’ preference for 
strictly Orthodox beliefs.594  
Theophanes’ account of the election of Tarasios (785), is more detailed. After 
Tarasios had unanimously been voted as Paulos’ successor,595 he attempted to recuse 
himself, offering this explanation:  
I have pronounced myself unworthy of this… inasmuch as I was unable to 
carry out or bear the yoke of the burden… I am seized by fear to consent 
to this election and stand in terror before the visage of God to hasten to it 
unready, and without careful consideration, lest I be liable to terrible 
condemnation… ‘lest in preaching to others I prove myself unfit,’596 how 
can I… rush to the magnitude of the priesthood without examination and 
due circumspection?597 
Tarasios’ public humility symbolically demonstrated his dispositional qualifications for 
office. He could not rush for fear of the consequences to himself and, more importantly, to 
the oikoumene. Although Tarasios had been chosen unanimously, he had to be certain that 
he possessed the necessary virtues to occupy such an important position. This was not an 
easy decision, pride and ambition had to be set aside and deep introspection adopted, or else 
                                                 
594 A similar ‘anti-heterodox’ or ‘rehabilitative’ function of the topos underscores Attaleiates’ later account of 
the election of Patriarch Xiphilinos (1064). Xiphilinos had enjoyed an ‘illustrious political career’ and served 
as the first nomophylax. Around 1050, a certain Ophrydas brought charges of heresy against him, prompting 
Xiphilinos’ adoption of the monastic lifestyle. However, Attaleiates conceals this charge, saying instead that 
‘Xiphilinos was so deeply concerned for virtue that while he was still occupied with palace affairs… he 
embraced the monastic lifestyle.’ Having eschewed personal power and looking instead to spiritual wellbeing, 
when Constantine Leichoudes died Xiphilinos was reportedly considered the only worthy successor. Attaleiates 
states that Xiphilinos was ‘not willing’ and had to be ‘compelled to accept and become a beacon of the Great 
Church and ecumenical patriarch.’ The insistence on Xiphilinos’ reluctance seemingly mitigated potential 
controversy over his ‘heretical’ past, and excused possibly contentious acts performed under his administration 
(namely an attempted union with the Armenian Church, and the revocation of Patriarch Keroularios’ decision 
to allow metropolitans in Constantinople from electing new bishops for vacant sees). Attaleiates, Historia, ed. 
Pérez-Martín 92-93 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 168-169). On these aspects of Xiphilinos’ career, see Angold 
1995: esp. 35-37; Kazhdan et al 1991: 1054; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 126-127; Oikonomides 1960: 55-78. 
On the office of the nomophylax and its prominent role in Byzantine law in the eleventh century, see Kazhdan 
et al 1991: 1491-1492; Oikonomides 1986: 190. On the heresy charges, against which Psellos provided 
Xiphilinos with a defence, see Michael Psellos, Orationes forenses, ed. Dennis orat.3; Dennis 1994: 193; 
Kaldellis 1999: 4-5; Kaldellis and Polemis 2015. On the uneasy relationship between intellectuals, philosophy, 
and Orthodoxy, in this period, see Browning 1975; Gouillard 1976; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 126-133. 
595 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 458 (trans. Mango and Scott 632). Tarasios was then the 
protoasekritis. Theophanes’ assertion that Tarasios held the position of asekretis is contested by the evidence 
of  La Vie de l’impératrice Sainte Irènes, ed. Halkin p.12, and the Vita Tarasii, ed. Heikel 397-398 (ed. and 
trans. Efthymiadis 12-13) which claim he was, in fact, protoasekritis. 
596 A quotation of Paul (I Corinthians 9:27). 





risk divine displeasure. Tarasios’ eventual acceptance of the patriarchate was accompanied 
by ‘a request’ for the reunion of the Eastern and Western Churches.598 In framing his 
acceptance in this manner, Tarasios’ impeccable character and true concern for his spiritual 
flock were enhanced, and his promotion benefitted the oikoumene.  
Theophanes’ iterations of patriarchal reluctance display many of the legitimising 
concerns that were present in the imperial cases, suggesting that analogous ideologies were 
in operation. This conclusion gains support from two other cases which indicate that the full 
range of political-rhetorical uses for the topos applied equally to ecclesiastical politics. The 
election of Patriarch Euthymios (907)599 was provoked by the political controversy over the 
Τetragamy of Leon VI.600 Patriarch Nikolaos, Euthymios’ predecessor, had been obdurately 
opposed to Leon’s fourth marriage, excommunicated the emperor, refused him access to 
Hagia Sophia, and by February 907 had incited his own demise. Nikolaos was unseated and 
exiled.601 The deposition contravened church canons and was considered especially 
scandalous given the political motivations responsible; it could even be argued that Leon 
and Euthymios had conspired to usurp the patriarchal throne.602 Thus a defence was needed 
and we learn from Skylitzes that Euthymios, a close ally of Leon, held a ‘high degree of 
godliness and virtue’ and was rumoured to have ‘at first refused the patriarchate… [but was] 
persuaded to accept it by divine revelation.’603  
Vita Euthymii, composed c.920-925, is even more expansive in its presentation of 
                                                 
598 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 459-460 (trans. Mango and Scott 633). 
599 The exact date of Euthymios assumption of the patriarchal throne is uncertain. Mid- to late- February 907 
is the most likely period. The main source for Euthymios’ career is Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-
Hayter. 
600 For an overview of events, see below, page 174. 
601 To the Galakrenai monastery - the very monastery he had founded - likely located on the Asiatic shore of 
the Bosporos. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, trans. Wortley: 180 fn.100 (Commentary). 
602 For this atmosphere of scandal, see Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.99. 
603 οὐ πολὺς παρῆλθε καιρός, καὶ χειροτωνεῖται πατριάρχης ὀ σύγκελλος Εὐθύμιος, ἀνὴρ θεοσεβὴς καὶ ἀρετῆς 
ἥκων εἰς τὸ ἀκρότατον. φασὶ δ᾽, ὅτι καὶ ἀπαναινόμενος τὴν ἱερωσύνην θείᾳ ἀποκαλύψει ἐπείσθη αὐτὴν 
καταδέξασθαι... Skylitzes, Synopsis, ed. Thurn 185 (trans. Wortley 180). Skylitzes was modifying the account 
of his primary source for the period, Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 371:  χειροτωνεῖται ὁ σύγκελλος 






Euthymios’ reluctance.604 Intended in part as an apologia for the election,605 the Vita claims 
that Euthymios was hesitant even to visit Constantinople. He had repeatedly declined or 
‘postponed’ a visit previously, but Empress Theophano personally intervened to convince 
him to ensure that victims of injustice, and the very soul of the emperor, were safe.606 He 
was soon granted the title of synkellos by its previous holder, Patriarch Stephanos.607 
Euthymios was asked to accept ‘without making any objection,’ and had the vocal support 
of Leon as well.608 Naturally, the promotion was presented as an unexpected honour thrust 
upon Euthymios. His sponsors even forestalled an expected refusal by asking him not to do 
so. Euthymios’ utter disregard for personal power was then made apparent to the reader. He 
remained at Hagia Sophia for just three days before departing Constantinople and returning 
to his life of avoiding the court. His persistent absence from the nexus of power was 
described in words accredited to the antagonistic figure of the basileiopator, Stylianos 
Zaoutzes,609 as ‘mocking the state with this prolonged retirement, showing your contempt 
for the rulers themselves.’610 Thus Euthymios had to return and exercise his duties or else 
have his humility and disregard for personal glory deliberately misconstrued by his 
opponents as contempt for the structures of the state itself. However, his reluctance was 
again in evidence when he finally assumed the position of Patriarch. The assembled 
metropolitans, having unwillingly accepted the resignation of Nikolaos (excusing Euthymios 
from wrongdoing), were instructed by Leon to find a suitable replacement, ‘but they all, as 
                                                 
604 On the date of composition of the Vita, see Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.9-10 (General 
introduction); de Boor 1888: 83-86. 
605 Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.9 (General introduction). 
606 ... τήν τε τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος ψυχικὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀδικουμένων προμήυειαν... Vita Euthymii 
Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.21.  
607 Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.21. 
608 Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.23. 
609 On Zaoutzes’ role as an antagonist to Euthymios, and as the prime source of the empire’s maladministration, 
in the Vita, see Tougher 1997: 94, 97. See also, Sophianos 1971: 289-296.  
610 μήτε τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ ἐπὶ πολὺ προσκαρτερῶν καταπαίζῃς τῆς βασιλείας καταφρονῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν 





if by agreement, called for the great Euthymios’.611 He would be a figure above reproach, 
would unify the church, and was ‘the one sought above all and by all.’612 Yet he rejected 
their calls, prompting Leon to intervene by ‘urging’, ‘begging’, and ‘inviting’ him to accept 
the position, and failing to persuade him.613 Eventually, letters arrived from the Pope along 
with the patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, enjoining Euthymios to accept 
the patriarchal throne, and acknowledged the emperor’s repentance for the Tetragamy 
(removing another potential excuse for refusal). Once Euthymios no longer had a pretext for 
rejecting the office, and ‘forced by the prayers of the emperor and the exhortations of the 
bishops…[the] representatives themselves…[and] yielding to the will of God and the 
unanimity of the Synod, he accepted the helm of the Church…[and] his virtues shone before 
all men.’614 Once again, the topos was utilised in connection with supposedly virtuous 
individuals involved in a circumspect promotion. We see that the perceived will of God, who 
directly intervened to ensure the promotion of his favoured candidate, was revealed. The 
choice made by the people/metropolitans to elect the best candidate was also satisfied, and 
Euthymios proved his moral disposition through his disregard for personal advancement.  
Finally, Akropolites’ thirteenth-century account of Patriarch Arsenios’ election 
(1254) invokes a reluctant alternative candidate to facilitate a political critique.615 According 
to Akropolites, ‘The opinion of many was in favour of Nikephoros Blemmydes…famous for 
his knowledge as well as his virtue even though the malice of some [prevented this from 
                                                 
611 …οἱ δἑ ὡς ἐκ συνθήματος άπαντες τὸν μέγαν ἐπεζήτουν Εὐθύμιον... Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. 
Karlin-Hayter p.93, 95. 
612 οὗτός έστιν ὁ ὑπὲρ πάντας και πάρα πάντων ζητούμενος… Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter 
p.95, 97. 
613 Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.97, 99. 
614 Τοίνυν ἐπικαμφθείς, μᾶλλον δὲ βιασθεὶς ταῖς τοῦ βασιλέως αἰτήσεσι καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀρχιερέων παραονέσεσι, 
ναὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν τοποτηρητῶν, ἐξαιρέτως τῶν ῾Ρώμης... ψήφῳ θεοῦ καὶ συνοδικῇ ὀμονοίᾳ τοὺς τῆς 
ἐκκλησίας ἀναδέχεται οἴακας. ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου τοίνυν ἀναχθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς λυχωίας τεθεὶς πᾶσι ταῖς ἀρεταὶς 
κατέφαινε καὶ τοσοῦτον ήδὺς τοῖς πᾶσι καὶ ἐπέραστος γέγονεν, ὠς οὐ παρὰ τῶν προσηκόντων μόνον...  Vita 
Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.101, 103. 
615 The date of Arsenios’ assumption of the patriarchate is not certain. A date in ‘late November’ is suggested 
by Laurent 1969: 140. Macrides 2007: 280 n.15, notes that such a date seems especially late given Theodoros’ 





becoming apparent]…Yet Blemmydes, observing the character of the emperor, was rather 
reluctant concerning the matter…the emperor himself made a feeble attempt [to persuade 
him, but was unsuccessful].’616 Instead, Arsenios, an ‘unlettered’ and ‘unordained’ monk, 
was made deacon, priest, and patriarch in a single day.617 Akropolites transformed the 
election into a function of political expediency rather than a deliberated choice. The haste of 
Arsenios’ promotion, necessitated by the absence of a patriarch to perform Theodoros II’s 
coronation,618 cast patriarch and emperor in a negative light. Unlike Blemmydes, who was 
wrongly judged unqualified, Arsenios patently was unqualified for the role and yet was too 
arrogant to see it, as evidenced by his acceptance and haste. In accordance with Akropolites’ 
Kaiserkritik, Theodoros was apparently unconcerned that this imposter should oversee the 
spiritual needs of the oikoumene.619 The association between reluctance and virtue, haste and 
incompetence, is retained. Akropolites’ use of the topos mimics the preference for an 
alternative candidate that we saw in some of the imperial cases. The reader infers that 
Blemmydes ‘should’ have been patriarch but was prevented. 
There are obvious parallels between the use of imperial and ecclesiastical topoi. 
Perhaps this is not surprising since ‘Kings and bishops shared a phenomenology of office; 
they were subject to similar moral principles, and their duties were described in similar 
                                                 
616 Blemmydes’ reluctance is seemingly corroborated by his own testimony, Blemmydes, Autobiographia cive 
curriculum vitae necnom epistula universalior 37-40. On Blemmydes’ life and activities, see Munitiz 1988: 
14-28; Kladova 2013. 
617 ‘When he [Theodoros] learned that there was a monk on Lake Apollonias who had little experience of letters 
(he had reached only the level of grammar education), who was unordained and named Arsenios, as quickly as 
he could he sent people to fetch him. And he came.’ Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 105-107 (trans. 
Macrides 277-278). 
618 Note also Blemmydes’ comments on the need to anoint the emperor. Autobiographia cive curriculum vitae 
necnom epistula universalior 37. On Theodoros II’s accession, see Hendy 1999: vol. 4.2, p. 514. 
619 Theodoros II and his father, Ioannes III, provided a contrast for Akropolites’ preferred Palaiologoi. In 
contrast to the evidence of Skoutariotes, Pachymeres, and Gregoras, both emperors were presented as ‘stingy’ 
and lacking the virtue of philanthropia; they were also poor administrators of the empire, and the people 
supposedly suffered under their rule. In describing an incident in which Theodoros II expressed serious 
concerns that he had been deceived by the Bulgarians over a recent treaty, Akropolites describes how he, 
Akropolites, was unjustly beaten at the behest of an irrational and highly irascible emperor. Theodoros’ 
instability was a sign of his unsuitability to exercise power, providing an excuse for the intrigues of Michael 






terms.’620 As in the west,621 Byzantine notions of imperial and patriarchal power employed 
the rhetoric of divine origin. The functional duties of the patriarch and the emperor often 
overlapped. Both were perceived to have responsibilities to the oikoumene: patriarchs as 
spiritual leaders, emperors as God’s administrative presence on earth.622 This overlap even 
brought the two into conflict, and was partly responsible for the production of works seeking 
to define the quasi-legal functions of each.623 Therefore, Weiler’s thesis explains how cross-
cultural ideas of Christian rulership allowed the reluctance topos to be employed for 
ecclesiastics and rulers, although not unthinkingly, and not as an exact transposition between 
clerical and imperial models.624 However, where Weiler considers the topos to originate 
from Christian ideology, that ideology was actually grafted onto and worked in conjunction 
with a heavily politicised Roman expression of humility and the elective principle. The latter 
we have already seen acknowledged in the unanimous selection of the reluctant candidate as 
the best possible choice by representative groups of the army, the people, the metropolitans, 
and (implicitly) God. This was inextricably linked with the very creation of the empire.  
As Wallace-Hadrill remarks, ‘The Principate was established by an act of denial… 
                                                 
620 Weiler 2000: 25, 22-26. 
621 On conceptions of the ‘divine origin’ of ecclesiastical and royal power in the West, see Weiler 2000: esp. 
24-39; Meens 1998; Schieffer 1998; Van Engen 1995. 
622 The emperor was responsible for ‘bodies’, the patriarch for ‘souls’. Dagron 2003: ch. 3, esp. 231. 
623 One understanding of the relationship between the patriarch and the emperor is described in the prooimion 
and titles of the Eisagoge, a ‘legal manual’, compiled c.879-886 that accompanied the more substantial legal 
codifications which formed the Basilika. The work, ascribed to Patriarch Photios, outlines the arrangement of 
the two powers before moving on to the more formal legal chapters. It defines the emperor as a ‘legitimate 
authority’, in contrast to the Hellenistic and Roman ideas of the emperor as ‘above the law’ or ‘living law’ - 
one who submitted to the authority of the law by choice. As Dagron notes, the Eisagoge was written at a time 
when Photios was most capable of making his ideas about the extent and purpose of imperial and patriarchal 
powers prevail. A council involving Constantinopolitan, papal, and other ecclesiastical representatives had just 
rehabilitated him as ‘supreme pastor’, and recognised his sphere of influence over the entire Christian 
community. Moreover, Basileios I, who had acceded to the throne through an act of murder, was embroiled in 
a dynastic dispute with his prospective heir, Leon VI. In contrast to the emperor’s problematic public image, 
the patriarch was popular. However, if we compare Eisagoge’s philosophy of the emperor-patriarch 
relationship with that expressed by Leon VI we find a very different picture. In Leon’s works, the ‘spiritual 
function of the emperor’ and the ‘dispensable state of the patriarch’ are prominent. The political struggle over 
the nature and political status of emperor and patriarch with regard to one another remained unresolved 
throughout the history of the empire. Schminck 1985: 214, 227-229; Antonopoulou 1997: esp. 76-77; Dagron 
2003:229-235. On the date of composition of the Eisagoge, see Schminck 1986: 1-15, who suggests the period 
885-886 as most likely.  





ritually perpetuated from reign to reign’.625 In January 44 BCE Julius Caesar had been hailed 
as Rex by members of the Roman populace. He quickly dismissed the title by playing upon 
the name of the Marcius Rex family, ‘I am not King, I am Caesar.’626 However, the ascription 
persisted and when a diadem was found upon a statue of Caesar it was quickly removed by 
two tribunes. When Caesar learned of this and complained that they had denied him the 
opportunity to properly reject kingship once again, he unlawfully dismissed them from 
office. In February, at the Lupercalia festival, he sat upon a gilded chair at the rostra of the 
Forum in Rome, wearing a purple toga and the red buskins of the Alban kings.627 Days earlier 
he had been named dictator for life,628 and he now staged another ceremonial rejection of 
kingship, a recusatio imperii. The consul Marcus Antonius, acting as a representative of the 
people by leading the priestly festivities, approached Caesar and placed upon his head a 
laurelled crown with a diadem threaded through it in Hellenistic fashion.629 The assembled 
crowd was initially torn between support for Caesar and apprehension about monarchy, but 
when Caesar threw the diadem aside, symbolically rejecting monarchy, they loudly 
approved. Antonius again tried to crown Caesar and was again refused. Caesar ended the 
struggle with the words ‘Jupiter Optimus Maximus alone is king of the Romans’, and ordered 
that the diadem be suspended in the Capitoline temple of Jupiter.630 The refusals have been 
viewed by recent scholarship as a concerted attempt by Caesar to publicly distance himself 
from anti-republican charges of tyranny and kingship. His power, already autocratic, was 
cautiously differentiated from a tyrant’s through a carefully orchestrated rejection that 
                                                 
625 Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 36. 
626 ‘… Caesarem se, non regem esse responderit…’ Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars I, ed. Rolfe I.79; ‘“οὐκ 
εἰμὶ Βασιλεύς, ἀλλὰ Καῖσαρ,”’ Appianus, Roman History III, The Civil Wars, ed. White II.16.108. 
627 Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars I, ed. Rolfe I.79; Appianus, Roman History III, The Civil Wars, ed. 
White II.16.109. On Caesar’s claimed descent from the Alban kings, see Sumi 2005: 69. 
628 Appianus, Roman History III, The Civil Wars, ed. White II.16.106. 
629 Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Caesar 61.1-5. On the Hellenistic diadem, see Bardill 2012: 16-17. 
630 For analysis of the event, see Billows 2009: 248-249; Canfora 2007: 282-283; Sumi 2005: 70-72; Fishwick 





framed it as the will of the people.631 However, the attempt proved unconvincing. Opponents 
read it as proof that Caesar desired kingship, had tested the waters, but had been frustrated 
by the crowd. His authority looked too much like tyranny and, when a prophecy circulated 
that only a king could conquer Parthia, his enemies struck, justifying his assassination as a 
preventative measure.632 
Yet, Caesar’s successors adopted his policy. Against the background of the civil 
wars, on 13 January 27 BCE Augustus appeared before the senate, renounced all of his 
powers, and declared his desire for a return to Republican governance.633 Again, the 
recusatio took the form of a well-choreographed ritual. Augustus appeared before a watching 
crowd, in a theatre, on his knees, tearing at his toga and begging to be excused.634 In response 
to his refusal, the senate desperately entreated him to change his mind and accept the powers 
they had granted. Their having forced (κατηνάγκασαν) him to do so,635 allowed the 
heretofore stigmatised assumption of power by a single man to be justified as ‘the 
enthusiastic, unanimous and voluntary bestowal of absolute power.’636 Although 
contemporary sources wavered between admiration for Augustus’ noble motives in rejecting 
power and criticism of a patently dishonest charade,637 the democratic overtones that the 
recusatio sought to provide were marked. The succession from Republic to Empire was 
achieved through a seemingly republican act, for the benefit of the rei publicae causa, 
against the will of Augustus. His unwillingness to allow the transition was witnessed 
                                                 
631 Sumi 2005: 70-73. 
632 Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars I, ed. Rolfe I.80. 
633 …ἀπολάβετε καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν, κομίσασθε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ τὰ ἕθνη τὰ ὑπήκοα, καὶ 
πολιτεύεσθε ὥσπερ εἰώθειτε. Dio 53.5, The best discussion of the event, with bibliography, is that provided by 
Huttner 2004: 81-106. See also, Gruen 2005; Cooley 2009: 127-128. 
634 ‘And when the people importuned him to accept the dictatorship, he bent down on one knee, with his toga 
thrown over his shoulders, and his breast exposed to view, begging to be excused.’ Suetonius, The Lives of the 
Caesars I, ed. Rolfe II.52. ‘As for the dictatorship, however, he did not accept the office, but went so far as to 
rend his garments when he found himself unable to restrain the people in any other way, either by argument or 
by entreaty; for, since he was superior to the dictators in the power and honour he already possessed, he 
properly guarded against the jealousy and hatred which the title would arouse.’ Dio 54.1. 
635 Dio 53.11. 
636 Jakobson and Cotton 1985: 501. 





publicly and permitted him to be dissociated with an act that was then accomplished by the 
senate. Reluctance became a republican expression. 
Eder has demonstrated that Augustus’ pseudo-foundational document, the Res 
Gestae,638 amounts to a list of ‘deeds not done.’639 Its catalogue of the offices and honours 
that were turned down by Augustus640 presents him as ‘the incorruptible guardian of tradition 
who took care, even against the will of the Senate and People, not to contradict the 
constitution of the fathers.’641 His rebuffs of honours and titles, together with his historical 
staging of refusals of power, communicated his altruism and deference to the legal traditions 
of the Republic. He was not an individual who had self-servingly overstepped the bounds of 
the law in order to accrue personal power (charges levelled against Caesar). The Res Gestae 
instead portrayed him in the role of the receiver, passively accepting things offered to him 
by others.642 Augustus’ refusals exposed due caution in leading the state, turning down those 
things deemed unlawful and harmful to the common good. This humility and reverence for 
the established order showed ‘him living up to his unprecedented name [and status].’643 
Augustus’ auctoritas was shown to have been earned through his deeds and virtue.644 He 
was an ideal ruler who had legitimised this status, in part, through his humble renunciations 
and deference to the law. 
The ritual and its ideology remained of central importance to the imperial office 
throughout the Principate. Delays before assuming power were a recurring feature at the 
                                                 
638 The compilation and political ideology of Res Gestae are considered in the Introduction and extensive 
commentaries that accompany the Cooley 2009 edition and translation (Res Gestae Divi Augusti). 
639 Eder 2005: 14. An early association with the concept of the emperor as the ‘living law’ might be suggested. 
640 Res Gestae Divi Augusti, §4-6. 
641 Eder 2005: 14. 
642 Freudenburg 2014: 107-108. 
643 Freudenburg 2014: 107. 
644 See in particular Dio’s description of Augustus’ rejection of power, and his possession already of abundant 
honour and virtue. Dio 54.1. On the links between Roman conceptions of moral leadership and auctoritas, see 





commencement of a new emperor’s reign.645 Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and 
Vespasian each staged refusals.646 In March 37CE, Caligula’s accession was forestalled by 
his deliberate staging of a renunciation of imperial power. It has been shown that he refused 
the senate’s acclamation, and the formal offer of imperium, made on 18 March, and, instead, 
waited for ten days before publicly being persuaded to accept by the senate and people in an 
expression of consensus.647 His popularity and suitability to rule were at that time agreed 
upon by all. The recusatii of Claudius and Vespasian then introduced an overtly military 
gloss to the existing ritual.  
The accession of Claudius (41CE) marked a turning point in imperial ceremonial. 
For the first time the praetorians used the acclamation not as a battlefield celebration of 
imperial victory but as a ritualised proclamation of a new Princeps.648 Caligula had just been 
assassinated in a conspiracy headed by the praetorians, and his nephew Claudius had 
conspicuously left the scene moments beforehand.649 Supposedly, Claudius was discovered 
hiding from the praetorians, forced out of the Palace, and taken by the praetorian ‘Gratus’ to 
the area Palatina to be proclaimed emperor. He was acclaimed and then proceeded to the 
                                                 
645 Huttner 2004: 151, goes as far as to say ‘One could hardly be called an emperor, where you can safely 
assume that his reign was not initiated by a recusatio...’ 
646 Jakobson and Cotton 1985: 498, 501 n.35. For Caligula, Claudius, and Vespasian, see below (main text). 
For Nero, see Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars II, ed. Rolfe VI.8. For Tiberius, see Tacitus, Annals 1.11-
15. 
647 Such a reading explains the inconsistencies in the sources regarding the dating of Caligula’s accession: the 
Acts of the Arval Brethren record the 18 March 37, whereas Suetonius and Dio say the 28 March 37. For this 
argument see Jakobson and Cotton 1985. The suggestions of Balsdon 1934, and Brunt 1977: 98, that the senate 
needed ten days in order to vote Caligula the imperial powers, after already acclaiming him, can hardly be 
accurate and would be without precedent. On the ideological importance of consensus, and its role as an 
expression of the popular will see Lobur 2008; Ando 2000: 145-147; Jakobson and Cotton 1985: 499. See also, 
Béranger 1948: 178; Béranger 1953, who notes that ‘consensus’ could (quite legitimately) imply the use of 
pressure to force a reluctant person to change their mind and accept the popular will. 
648 Arena 2007: 329-331. On the historical development of Roman accession ceremonies, and for the ideas 
underpinning imperial succession, with bibliography, see Ensslin 1939; Ando 2000; Flaig 1992; Parsi 1963; 
Pani 2003. 
649 The assassination of Caligula occurred on 24 January 41. The conspiracy was headed by the Praetorian 
commander Cassius Chaerea and had the support of numerous senators. It apparently intended to wipe out the 
rest of the imperial family: Caligula’s wife and daughter were murdered along with several other family 
members, and noble individuals. For a detailed discussion of the assassination and background, with 





castrum where he was acclaimed again.650 Claudius too, despite his probable involvement 
in the assassination of his predecessor,651 was depicted as coming to power without seeking 
it. His ascent was a result of selection by the army and, yet again, reluctance was employed 
to conceal misdeeds and personal ambition, which denoted tyranny. 
Vespasian’s accession occurred in the context of the civil wars of 69CE.652 Tacitus 
describes how Vespasian was proclaimed emperor by the troops in response to the elevation 
of Vitellius:  
As Vespasian stepped from his quarters, a few soldiers who stood near… 
suddenly saluted him as emperor. Then the rest came up, calling him 
Caesar and Augustus… Their minds passed from apprehension to 
confidence of success… The moment that he had dispelled the mist which 
his elevation… spread before his eyes, he spoke as befitted a soldier…653 
Vespasian was presented as an excellent and disbelieving candidate ambushed with new 
responsibilities. His character remained unchanged. Free of avarice, he had been chosen by 
fate and the soldiery, and it was feared that he might reject the elevation, hence his advocates’ 
transition to ‘confidence’. Josephus’ narrative then enhanced the refusal through the drawing 
of swords after Vespasian had outlined his objections.654 Like Claudius, Vespasian’s 
promotion was unsought, and justified as being for the wellbeing of Rome.655 Unlike 
Claudius (or his predecessors) the recusatio was wholly divorced from a civil locale. The 
entire sequence therefore held a uniquely martial aspect, providing a prototype for later 
performances ‘in the field’.  
                                                 
650 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae p.162, 216-217, 223-226; Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars II, ed. Rolfe 
V.10. 
651 Major 1992. 
652 The proclamation occurred on 1 July 69 and was supported by the troops of Roman Egypt and Judea. For a 
detailed examination of the elevation, with bibliography, see Levick 1999: esp. 49. See also, Wellesley 1975; 
Morgan 2006.  
653 Tacitus, Historiae 2.80. Translation adapted. Emphasis added. 
654 Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 4.592-608. Translation adapted. 
655 Hekster 2007: 99. At this time, emperors were increasing coming to be viewed as ‘the body politic’, hence 
fighting for them was seen as fighting for Rome itself. The presentation of personal interests as beneficial to 
the interests of the res publica was a consequence; and a means of ensuring one stayed in power. Ando 2000: 





Recusatii have been termed ‘a uniquely Roman phenomenon’ in the ancient world, 
lacking parallels in any of the ‘monarchies of the East including the Hellenistic 
Kingdoms.’656 Caesar and Augustus’ staged rejections of power were born from the 
transition from Republic to Empire, yet refusals of office were not part of republican political 
practice where honours were hotly contested.657 However, philosophical and theoretical 
precedents did exist. Humility, a principal virtue in later Christian political ideology, 
received praise in the political philosophy of this period also.658 Further, the concept of 
assent to rule only under compulsion, or the threat of something worse, finds roots in Plato’s 
Politeia, in the ‘philosopher-king’.659 These politico-philosophical ideas later came to 
influence Roman intellectual conceptions of the relationship between the emperors and the 
people.660 Therefore, while recusatii may have been necessitated by political expedience, 
they echoed (and influenced) the traditions of political philosophy. We may add Huttner’s 
cautious identification of examples of recusatii in relation to the Sicilian tyrants:661 it is quite 
possible that they attempted to legitimise and secure their positions of power by deference 
to the ‘public will’ and feigned reluctance.   
In examining the history of the topos we see that the portrayal of reluctance was a 
normative aspect of the imperial position in times of dynastic conflict, and can be traced 
back to the establishment of the empire by Augustus, and to Caesar’s rejection of kingship. 
                                                 
656 Jakobson and Cotton 1985: 503. See also, Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 37. 
657 Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 37 and n.41; Béranger 1953: 157-158. As Wallace-Hadrill has noted ‘Philosophy 
perhaps required that the electorate should invite the candidate, rather than letting him canvass them; but, as 
Cicero points out to Cato, this simply did not square with the facts of political life… Cato lost his consulship 
by this attitude according to Plutarch.’ Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Cato the Younger, 49.3-4: ‘…And besides this, 
he was not persuasive himself in canvassing for himself, but wished to preserve in his manners the dignity of 
his life, rather than to acquire that of the consulship by making the customary salutations; neither would he 
permit his friends to do the things by which the multitude is courted and captivated. He therefore failed to 
obtain the office.’ 
658 Xenophon’s praise of Spartan king Agesilaos II contrasts his active and modest style of rulership with that 
of the Persian king Cyrus. Agesilaos’ strict self-control, concern for friends, and affable nature, finds opposition 
in Persian self-indulgence and relaxed leadership. In short, Agesilaos’ was possessed of tapeinotês (humility).  
659 Nichols 1984. 
660 Rees 2012: esp. 198-200; Körner 2005. On the influence of these ideas of Kingship on Roman and Byzantine 
imperial ideology, see Goodenough 1928; Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 33-35; Hunger 1978: 139-170, esp. 156.  





The political role of reluctance in ancient Rome is similar to what we see in medieval Europe. 
Hesitancy to accept a position provided evidence of virtue, and thus morally legitimised an 
individual’s future tenure of that position. We also see that there were shared performative 
aspects associated with its usage, including the use of force and consensus to prompt 
compliance. This emphasis on promotion through the consent of influential social groups 
easily coexisted with pre-existing philosophies of ideal rulership and alongside later 
Christian notions of divine favour that replaced ‘fortune’ and ‘fate’.662 
 
Rhetoric and ritual? 
The sheer frequency with which the topos recurs in the histories, combined with an 
understanding of its origins and functions, raises two final questions. First, are we to interpret 
its usage in the later empire as solely a rhetorical device of politicising historiography? 
Second, if we are not, were there formalised historical procedures and rites concomitant with 
it? 
The first question poses numerous problems. To begin, we are reliant upon the 
narrative accounts for our evidence. These works are not simply a lens through which 
historical fact can be reconstructed. As repeatedly established, they incorporate the political 
concerns of their authors and are works of literature too. The apparent exaggeration of 
elements of the descriptions663 and the mimesis of other features,664 in order to entertain the 
reader or demonstrate erudition, means that we must question their factual reliability.665 
Furthermore, the politicised functions of the topos mean that its usage must always be 
                                                 
662 For example, Ammianus, Rerum Gestarum 4.8-14 notes the role played by ‘Fortune’ in assuring Julian’s 
promotion. 
663 Theodosios III’s absconsion to ‘a mountain’, or Andronikos I’s farcical refusal in Eustathios of 
Thessalonike’s narrative for example. See above, pages 102 and 117 respectively.  
664 Eustathios of Thessalonike’s apparent borrowing and enhancing of Anna Komnene’s description of her 
father’s investiture with the imperial footwear for example. See above, page 117 and footnote 578. 
665 On these literary problems with Byzantine historical narratives as sources for reconstructing ‘historical fact’, 





suspected. However, a reasonable circumstantial argument may be proposed on the basis of 
established tradition and historical prevalence.  
That Augustus staged a rejection of powers, and a reluctant acceptance of the 
imperial position, is not disputed. The exact circumstances may be distorted by the historical 
accounts, but the event itself occurred. Moreover, his successors under the Principate are 
reported to have done just the same at the outset of their reigns.666 The origin of the tradition 
therefore has its basis in historical practice, and numerous imperial aspirants over the course 
of fifteen centuries are reported to have mimicked it. An official panegyric for Constantine 
I and two official messages sent to Constantius by Julian attest to recusatio imperii-variants 
performed by these emperors. Anastasius’ appearance in the Hippodrome in 512, without a 
crown, is evidently an example of the recusatio in action once again, in a form related to that 
of Caesar and Augustus’. The offers to cede power to others made by Phocas and Herakleios 
during their proclamations, and those connected with Alexios I and Isaakios II, are additional 
instances of a recusatio-variant being practised. Theodora’s forced accession and 
assumption of imperial insignia is also potentially truthful since her overthrow of Michael 
was generally considered ‘legitimate’ (given her recognised ties to the throne) and reluctance 
was therefore unnecessary as a rhetorical justification for her involvement.667 The accounts 
of Andronikos I’s theatrical acceptance of power, are also largely in agreement about the 
conditions, something we might not expect given their different treatments of his 
disinclination. Andronikos may also have attempted to make an Anastasian-style recusatio 
in the hours before his overthrow.668 In addition we have three sources, including the 
                                                 
666 Huttner 2004: 151. 
667 Theodora’s broken monastic vows might suggest a reason for her presentation as unwilling to accept the 
popular acclamation in Psellos’ Chronographia. However, this use would be without precedent. 
668 Choniates’ clearly partisan account (imbued with later Angeloi propaganda and symbolism) of Andronikos’ 
downfall includes a description of the emperor’s attempts to mollify the riotous crowd supporting Isaakios II. 
We are told that, as the crowd surrounded the Great Palace and called for Isaakios’ promotion, Andronikos 
appeared to them from the walls of the Palace. After a brief attempt at resistance, he dispatched a messenger 
advising them that he was willing to cede the throne to his older son, Manuel. The offer is curious for several 





emperor himself, attesting to Michael VIII’s reluctance to claim the office, and his 
subsequent acceptance of what was ‘offered’. 
Additionally, we might tentatively adduce evidence from Genesios’ account of 
Basileios I’s coronation as co-emperor, which recalls elements of Andronikos’. Genesios 
alone records how Michael III contrived a ‘ridiculous’ plan. On the morning of Pentecost he 
asked two of his attendants to find Basileios and confine him in a room. Basileios was held 
by the arms and stripped. Michael then gave him ‘thirty lashes with a double-whip, and told 
him that this would serve as a reminder of his own benevolent disposition toward him.’669 
Basileios was crowned co-emperor in Hagia Sophia that very day. Obviously, the episode is 
loaded with homoerotic, cruel, and erratic overtones to further Genesios’ Kaiserkritik, but if 
we look beyond these, it can be read as a display of humble reluctance before the acceptance 
of power. The lashes serve as a physical reinforcement of Michael’s humbling statement, 
bear a resemblance to rituals of humility and penance known from the period,670 and 
integrate with other (threats of) violence against reluctant candidates. Just as Choniates 
                                                 
Ioannes had replaced Andronikos’ son-in-law, Alexios (an illegitimate son of Manuel I with his niece, and 
husband to Andronikos’ daughter Eirene) as the emperor’s successor early in his reign. Ioannes appears to have 
been his father’s favourite son, and to have gone along with (or have shared the blame for) Andronikos’ 
misdeeds since he was reportedly slandered by Constantine Tripsychos. Manuel, by contrast, appears to have 
been somewhat estranged from his father, and both Eustathios and Choniates attempt to shield him from blame 
for the worst of Andronikos’ crimes in their accounts – something they do not do for any other individual 
involved with Andronikos’ regime. They even comment that Manuel had been horrified by his father’s actions 
in killing Alexios II. Andronikos’ final, desperate, change in successional order may be explained either by 
Ioannes’ absence from Constantinople at the time, or by his brother’s apparently superior reputation (which, it 
must be noted, did not spare him from Isaakios’ purge). For the scene at the Great Palace, see Choniates, 
Historia, ed. van Dieten 346 (trans. Magoulias 191). For Andronikos’ plans for the succession, see Choniates, 
Historia, ed. van Dieten 254-257, 315, 425-426 (trans. Magoulias 142-143, 174, 234). On the reputations of 
Ioannes and Manuel, see Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 315, 356 (trans. Magoulias 174, 197-198); 
Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessalonike, ed. Melville-Jones 52-54. 
669 ‘…he contrived the following plan, even though it was ridiculous… he locked Basileios in a room and 
ordered his attendants with a nod to strip him naked and stretch out his arms. When his orders were carried out, 
Basileios was shocked and surprised, but, since he possessed a vigorous spirit, he recovered his self-composure 
and remained calm before the emperor. The latter gave him thirty lashes with a double-whip, and told him that 
this would serve as a reminder of his own benevolent disposition toward him...’ …ἐπεφύη τούτῳ σκοπὸς κἂν 
γελοῖος, ὃν τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐγνώπισεν... τινὶ κοιτώνων ἐγκλείσας Βασίλειον τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ 
προστάττει ἐν νεύματι ἀπογυμνοῦν τοῦτον τὼ χεῖρέ τε διατεῖναι. Τούτου δὲ γινομένου κατὰ τὸ προσταχθέν, ὁ 
Βασίλειος καταπλήττεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὄμως νεανικὸς ὢν τῆς ἐκπλήξεως ἀνακτᾶται, ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως 
καθίσταται, καὶ μαστίζεται παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ διπλοῖς ἐν φραγελλίοις λ´, μνήμην ἔχειν τοῦτον ἀνάγραπτον τῆς πρὸς 
αὐτὸν φιλοστόργου προθέσεως. Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 79 (trans. Kaldellis 98-99). 
Translation modified. 





reports Andronikos was forcibly taken by the arms and divested of his old attire, Basileios 
was taken in hand and similarly divested. In both cases resistance was feared. In both cases 
a co-emperor was being appointed. In both cases he was crowned within twenty-four hours. 
Might this be evidence of a comparable procedure for expressing humility before assuming 
co-imperial status? If a senior emperor should appear humble, surely his colleagues should 
too.671 
The ‘providential loop’ cases of Leon V, Nikephoros II, and Constantine X are 
problematic given their overt political-rhetorical form. However, the speech reportedly made 
by Nikephoros following his proclamation in the field does seem likely to have an element 
of truth to it, especially given the propagandist benefits.672 Skylitzes’ confirmation of the 
Nikephorian version of events is additionally suggestive. Testimonies of the nolle episcopari 
in Byzantium further reinforce the argument: a display of reluctant humility in the episcopal 
realm had obvious parallel benefits. Finally, we may cite Weiler’s evidence of comparable 
rituals performed by westerners. 
On the basis of this collective evidence, it appears that displays of reluctance at the 
moment of proclamation were sometimes more than just a literary-rhetorical expression of 
legitimacy. This does not mean that we should trust the sources unquestioningly, or that 
every record of reluctance was actually enacted, only that rituals communicating reluctance 
existed in practice. The topos likely emerged as a result of historic displays in the ancient 
                                                 
671 Kinnamos’ description of the accession of Manuel I Komnenos, although not an example of the reluctance 
topos per se, is possibly another instance of humility on display before the assumption of the throne. 
Accordingly, after Ioannes II’s speech citing his reasons for the elevation of his younger surviving son in place 
of the older (absent) Isaakios, Manuel knelt down and bathed the floor with tears. The nobles present were 
filled with joy and tears. After this display Manuel was invested with the general’s cloak, and the diadem. It is 
probable, given that the death of Ioannes, and Manuel’s grieving for him is dealt with after this scene (at the 
start of the second book), that this was a display of sincere humility prompted by his father’s decision to appoint 
him. This humility also would have been witnessed by those who Ioannes asked to confirm his decision (i.e. 
his electors), the nobles. Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 28-29 (trans. Brand 30-32). 
672 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 41-44 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 92-93); Michael Psellos, Historia 





world, became particularly associated with contested successions in late antiquity,673 and 
later developed into a versatile rhetorical tool of propaganda concerning imperial 
‘legitimacy’. Future studies might examine the particular ways in which authors employed 
the topos throughout their work(s), and its use within the specific literary and intellectual 
traditions in which these authors were writing. Its total absence from some works (i.e. 
Attaleiates),674 and relative abundance in others (Malalas and Theophanes in particular), 
must be a result of differences in textual traditions, and influence our understanding of 
intertextuality in Byzantium. 
Regarding the form that these rituals took, we are better informed. We have examined 
numerous examples of individual reluctance and, although the particulars of each case vary, 
shared features abound. The ritual of reluctance, distinct from examples of Augustan-
recusatii, can be broken down into discrete phases, with variations that could be exploited 
in order to suit the situation and enhance the communicative aspect. Naturally, these ritual 
elements were appended to the proclamation of a new emperor. 
First, the unwilling individual had been pre-selected by a symbolically representative 
assemblage and his election by this group was essentially guaranteed. Usually, they were to 
accede without the permission of the reigning emperor, or under unusual circumstances.675 
For a candidate in the field, it was at this point that the command position was surrounded 
by supporters who called for his elevation. A delegation of prominent figures would be 
dispatched to the proposed candidate in order to inform him of the decision that had been 
                                                 
673 When it stops being regularly reported at the outset of an emperor’s reign. 
674 Who cites no examples of reluctant emperors, but uses the topos of the nolle episcopari in relation to 
Xiphilinos’ reluctant tenure of the patriarchal throne. 
675 Basileios I, Andronikos I, Michael VIII, and Ioannes VI may be the sole exceptions to this rule in the period 
covered by this study (306-1453). Basileios I’s elevation to co-imperial status was at the behest of Michael III. 
Andronikos’ accession to the throne was surely verified, willingly or unwillingly, by the emperor Alexios II. 
Michael VIII’s accession was confirmed by Ioannes IV. Ioannes VI rejected the calls of Andronikos III to 





made on his behalf.676 In the case of Andronikos, a candidate already in possession of 
Constantinople and hosted at the Blachernai Palace, this process was performed in the 
relatively more intimate setting of the imperial court: in the Polytimos chamber, and, most 
unusually, at the urging of Alexios II.677 If Genesios’ description of Basileios’ promotion 
describes a comparable ritual, a similar process must have happened in the Great Palace.678  
After the candidate had been selected a perfunctory conference was performed. 
Ostensibly, this was in order to debate the decision and to persuade the candidate to accept. 
He was therefore exhorted to assume the throne by his peers. At this stage in the process, the 
nominee displayed reluctance and repeatedly refused the honour. Typically, an excuse for 
his aversion was provided to his supporters: the candidate could not accept the offer either 
because of the great difficulty associated with overthrowing the reigning emperor and the 
oaths sworn to him (legality),679 for fear of the drastic consequences of plunging the empire 
into civil war (morality),680 or because he was unsure that he was truly qualified to rule 
(humility).681  
The reluctant ruler might then proffer the name of a co-conspirator or some other, in 
                                                 
676 For example Michael I, Leon V, Nikephoros II, Isaakios I, Nikoulitzas Delphinas, Nikephoros Bryennios 
the Elder, and Alexios I. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5 (trans. Wortley 4); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 502 (trans. Mango and Scott 685); Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 40 (trans. 
Talbot and Sullivan 91); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 487 (trans. Wortley 454-455); 
Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.70; Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 227-231; Anna Komnene, 
Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 74-75 (trans. Sewter 67-68). 
677 Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 50-51, contradicts Choniates’ 
later testimony and claims that the display of reluctant investiture was performed at the Church of the Savior 
in the Chalke. 
678 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 79 (trans. Kaldellis 98-99). The Great Palace is not specifically 
named, but Genesios records that Michael III had left the Palace at St Mamas and returned to Constantinople 
in order to carry out his ‘ridiculous’ plan. Since Basileios I was crowned later that day we may infer that the 
Great Palace was the setting for Genesios’ story.  
679 See above, page 98.  
680 Julian, Germanus, Bardas Tourkos, Leon V, Nikephoros II, Delphinas (implicitly). Ammianus Marcellinus, 
Rerum Gestarum, 20.8.2-17; Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 115-116 (trans. Whitby 74); 
Evagrius Scholasticius, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Bidez and Parmentier 224-225 (trans. Whitby 294-296); 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 479, 502 (trans. Mango and Scott 657, 685); Leon Diakonos, 
Historia, ed. Hase 40-44 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 91-93); Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.70.  
681 Salutius, Valentinian I, Michael I, Leon V, Ioannes I, and Isaakios I. Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 3.36; 
Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum 26.2.1-6; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5, 7, 487, 489-





his opinion, worthier and better-qualified individual to be promoted instead. A potential, 
more theatrical, procedure might see him feign an attempt to hide from his backers. The 
candidate’s suggested successor and attempts to resist promotion were quickly and publicly 
dismissed by his supporters. This served as a means of demonstrating the broad support 
enjoyed by a candidate and united participants behind the common cause, one of the primary 
functions of the ritual. 
From this point, the opportunity to resist was denied. Either the individual was taken 
forcibly in hand and restrained, or else threatened with physical harm if he continued to 
resist.682 The frequent mention of the drawing of swords and threats of bodily harm, may not 
be simple rhetoric: performative enactments of coercion would certainly communicate the 
intended message of forced promotion, and could help to unify supporters by generating an 
esprit de corps among participants and observers. 
A final phase of the ritual occurred during the investiture with elements of the 
imperial insignia during the proclamation, never during the coronation. As a component of 
the insignia was offered683 the candidate would be seen to physically resist it being placed 
upon his person or handed over into his care. The reluctant emperor would shake his head 
and body, or kick his feet, in a symbolic display of resistance that would physically prevent 
the investiture from taking place and visually declare his unwillingness.684 As with Alexios 
I, the insignia were suitably forced upon him and his struggles henceforth ceased. 
                                                 
682 Germanus, Michael I, Leon V, Nikoulitzas Delphinas, Nikephoros II. Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, 
ed. de Boor 115-116 (trans. Whitby 74); Evagrius Scholasticius, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Bidez and 
Parmentier 224-225 (trans. Whitby 294-296); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5 (trans. Wortley 4); 
Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 4 (trans. Kaldellis 6); Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij 
p.70; Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 40 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 91). 
683 Other than Julius Caesar’s recusatio, I am not aware of any references to a crown/diadem being rejected. 
Usually, it was the red/purple sandals or buskins, or the purple and gold embroidered chlamys or loros costumes 
that were refused. The case of Anastasius’ appearance in the Hippodrome in 512 is assuredly not comparable. 
684 Ioannes Doukas, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder, Alexios I, and Andronikos I. Bryennios, Histoire, ed. 
Gautier 177, 227-231; Anna Komnene, Alexias, Reinsch and Kambylis 74-75 (trans. Sewter 67-68); Eustathios 
of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, Melville-Jones 48-51; Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 270-





With this forced investiture accomplished, ritual reluctance had served its purpose 
and the proclamation could continue. The new emperor had been selected, apparently against 
his humble protestations, as the best possible candidate for the role. His partisans had 
rejected all other potential contenders, including the reigning emperor in Constantinople. A 
symbolic affirmation of his ‘election’, and his suitability, was then immediately proffered 
through acclamations pronouncing him ‘Worthy!’685 
 
Chapter Summary 
The topos, and ritual, of the reluctant emperor clearly fulfilled numerous functions as a 
propagandist’s tool. Associated with contentious successions, authors employed it in order 
to provide a usurper, or one lacking direct claims of continuity with the previous regime, an 
alternative source of legitimacy with which to argue the ‘legality’ and ‘morality’ of their 
accession. These persons were humbly invited to express the elective will of the army, the 
people and, by extension, the divine will of God, and were thus acting for the common good 
of the empire. These justifications meant that they could not be considered individuals 
improperly aspiring to power, but could instead be presented as ‘rightful’ emperors all along. 
If successful, their conquest of the throne, and the deposition of the reigning emperor, merely 
marked the assumption of an imperial rule that was already morally theirs.686 In resisting 
them, opponents undermined their own suitability to rule. They simultaneously interfered 
with popular consensus, divine will, and the common good, and revealed themselves to be 
motivated by a desire to hold onto power when a better candidate was at hand. 
Unchecked desires and thoughtless deeds were visible expressions of the fickle 
                                                 
685 “ἄξιος.”. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, Book of Ceremonies, ed. Reiske I, 194 (trans. Moffatt and Tall I, 
194). 





character and moral deficiencies inherent within the ‘tyrant-emperor’ model.687 Reluctant 
emperors were the antithesis of this model. They were not motivated by a need to satiate 
personal pride or ambition. Nor had they acted in an arrogant fashion, thoughtlessly inciting 
civil war and spilling the blood of fellow Christians for no good reason. Instead, the topos 
presents them as having been forced into claiming basileia against their will. The decision 
was not rushed, but subject to the deepest of considerations. Personal misgivings had to be 
overcome and forced aside so that the reluctant individual may then truly act for the benefit 
of the empire. Their supporters did not question their qualification but, at the moment of 
proclamation and investiture, these individuals were filled with self-doubt. They repeatedly 
protested their unworthiness and were often dragged or otherwise compelled to accept the 
decision that had been made by their peers on their behalf. These expressions, not only 
endearing, further served to emphasise that the reluctant emperor was free from hubris, 
would listen to advice, and seriously contemplate his actions when in office. Moreover, he 
would not easily fall prey to temptation and succumb to the allure of power. He thus 
demonstrated himself to be genuinely humble and concerned with the well-being of his 
people. He would always want them to be governed by the best possible persons, and his 
reign, accordingly, was guaranteed to be a model of good rulership.  
The qualities of the reluctant emperor were almost a recitation of those of the ideal 
emperor, a virtuous individual who recognised that the imperial position was a functional 
duty and an administrative role not lightly to be assumed. Where a tyrant was blind to this, 
the moral emperor governed with the empire’s best interests at heart, and mimicked the 
imperial virtues that were consistently expressed in advice literature. The reluctant ruler, one 
who sought advice rather than sole counsel, and who recognised the needs of the empire 
                                                 
687 On the historic presentation of tyranny in Byzantine literature, with particular reference to the Historia of 
Niketas Choniates, see Simpson 2013a: 163-164; Simpson 2013b; see also, Head 1972, on the portrayal of the 





before his own, was the best suited to such a role. The undermining of the topos involved 






V. THE SOURCES OF GUILT 
 
The preceding chapters have explored the mechanisms of usurpation from the espousal of 
justifications to the moment of coronation. We have seen that ‘moral’ and ‘elective’ 
conceptions of rulership were embedded in those mechanisms which allowed a usurper to 
justify and legitimise his rebellion. However, conspiracy and usurpation often connoted 
‘guilty’ and ‘treasonous’ activities in the eyes of political opponents and even one’s 
supporters. The form and extent of one’s guilt was largely dependent upon the particular 
observer and circumstances, but three charges regularly recur in the histories: breaking oaths, 
spilling blood, and engaging in civil war. In order to better understand the perception of a 
usurper as a guilty figure, and to provide context for our study of imperial repentance, the 
present chapter examines the significance ascribed to these acts by contemporaries. 
At the outset, some comments on the legal definition of treason will prove instructive. 
Roman treason laws underwent relatively few major revisions. The Republican-era 
perduellio interpretation was martial, designating citizens who took up arms against the res 
publica as ‘traitors’ devoid of legal rights.688 The Twelve Tables prescribed trial for those 
accused of conspiring with foreign enemies against the res publica or any citizen, and 
advocated execution of the guilty.689 In 48 BCE the lex Iulia maiestatis repeated the 
perduellio interpretation, safeguarding the politeia through prescriptions intended to 
preserve public and military order. However, the law now restricted the influence of military 
governors by tying crimes of maiestas minuta populi Romani,690 crimes deliberately 
ambiguous in interpretation, to those who refused to leave a province within thirty-days of 
                                                 
688 Harries 2007: 72-77. 
689 The Twelve Tables 9.5. 
690 ‘The diminution of the majesty/greatness of the Roman people'. Cicero, De Inventione 2.53, translated in 





being replaced.691 By the composition of the Codex Theodosianus, crimes of maiestas 
included those against the emperor as a crime against the politeia itself, and held quasi-
sacrilegious connotations in concert with the strengthening of the imperial sacral 
charisma.692 Threats against an emperor, his councillors, and members of the senate or 
administration, were now deemed punishable by death, damnatio, and confiscations.693 
‘Abuse’ of the emperor was also criminalised (something resisted by Augustus and his 
successors during the Principate) and punished on a discretionary basis.694 The threat from 
within had prompted an expansion of the laws, in order to secure the imperial position.695 
However, treason was not now solely associated with crimes against an emperor, since 
treasonable activities against the res publica continued to be punished as a separate offense. 
In 469, the senate found Arvandus, the praefectus of Gaul, guilty of maiestas for conspiring 
with the Goths against the Roman people, and a contemporary pointedly asserted that 
Arvandus had ‘forgotten’ that treason was not restricted to misdeeds against the emperor 
alone.696  
These interpretations remained essentially unchanged in Byzantium. The Codex 
Iustinianus reaffirmed the ultimate punishment as death and confiscation of assets and, as in 
the later Ekloga and commentaries of Balsamon, imperial discretion was advised in 
sentencing.697 Those guilty due to carelessness or insanity were considered deserving of 
contempt and pity, those with genuine grievances (recognised to have suffered injustices) 
were to apologise. Conspiracies against ‘the emperor’ or ‘the oikoumene’ were grouped 
                                                 
691 Harries 2007: esp. 77. 
692 Harries 2007: esp. 77-81; Garnsey 1968: esp. 145. 
693 Codex Theodosianus 9.8.1-8. 
694 Garnsey 1968: 145-146. 
695 As Harries 2007: 83, notes: ‘While the security of the empire was not… at risk from outside enemies, the 
application of the perduellio interpretation of treason mattered less than the emperor’s… obsession with his… 
own security and status.’ See also, Garnsey 1968. 
696 Arvandus had negotiated a settlement in which he promised to cede territory to the Goths in exchange for 
their support. On this incident, see Harries 1994: 159-166; Harries 2007: 83. 





together, but distinguished, and had always necessitated death since in either case 
conspirators were said to be ‘aiming at the destruction of the entire community’.698 The 
Ekloga enumerated the penalty in its third statute, listing treason alongside violations of 
church sanctuaries (17.1), perjury on the bible (17.2), and assaults against priests (17.4). The 
hierarchy of penalties indicates that pseudo-sacrilegious connotations still applied, with 
treason considered second only to crimes against God. However, it is noteworthy that the 
laws were concerned less with the act of treason itself, than with its supposed effect on the 
wider community. The same emphasis underlies the narratives of guilt. 
 
Oaths and loyalties 
Oaths sworn to authority figures were a longstanding custom cementing fidelities in ancient 
Rome and Byzantium.699 Over centuries, their formulae expanded and new oaths were 
introduced to formally bind each socio-political group’s loyalties to the emperor. Roman 
military law had required that soldiers swear a sacred oath (Sacramentum) to their 
commanding general. Failure to swear the oath at levy, muster, or times of renewal, rendered 
one a deserter without legal protections.700 On the accession of a new emperor the army, 
officials, and civilians, swore allegiance to him. Augustus’ Res Gestae records the inaugural 
communal oath sworn before his campaign against Marcus Antonius in 32 BCE: ‘The whole 
of Italy voluntarily took an oath of allegiance to me and demanded me as its leader in the 
war which I afterwards won at Actium. The same oath was taken by the provinces of Gaul, 
                                                 
698 Ekloga 17.3: ‘Anyone who secretly plots or conspires against the emperor, or conspires with others against 
him, or [against] the oikoumene, shall from that hour be suitably put to death on the ground that he is aiming 
at the destruction of the entire community…’ On execution as the historic penalty for treason, see Garnsey 
1968: 146; Zachariä von Lingenthal 1892: 337. 
699 Svoronos 1951, remains the essential study of oaths of loyalty in Byzantium. For the period of late Antiquity, 
see Lee 2007: esp. 51-57. For the post-1204 period, see Angelov 2007: 324-347; Guran 2008; Rochette 2008. 
We await a comprehensive study of middle-Byzantine era oaths. 





Spain, Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia.’701 The oaths of Augustus’ immediate successors may 
have been modelled on this formula.702 In the fourth century, the military oath became 
Christianised. Soldiers now swore by God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the imperial majesty, 
to perform whatever tasks the emperor ordered, in service to the Roman state, without 
deserting.703 Similar oaths sworn by the soldierly, including the Varangians and other elite 
units, were ubiquitous throughout Byzantine history.704  
Beginning in the fifth century, when the proclamation of Leo I (457) was 
accompanied by a pledge from assembled archontes, ‘not to conspire against him or the 
politeia’,705 an oath became mandatory for all officials before their investiture.706 The 
‘appointment’ ceremonies that accompanied these oaths involved the new functionary 
receiving insignia corresponding to their rank. Oaths were renewed upon the accession of 
each new emperor and records were retained.707 Under the Palaiologoi, officials resigned en-
masse upon the death of an emperor and resumed their office by swearing fidelity to his 
successor.708 Thus ‘investiture oaths’ sought to link personal loyalty to the basileus with the 
administrative apparatus of state. Duty to the state implied faithful service to the emperor. 
In an attempt to further ensure hereditary-dynastic security, from the eighth century 
the formal oath was expanded to incorporate support for an emperor’s heir-designate.709 
According to Theophanes, Leon IV insisted upon a written oath that guaranteed his son 
Constantine’s succession in the event of his own death, before the boy’s coronation as co-
                                                 
701 ‘Iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua, et me belli quo vici ad Actium ducem depoposcit; iuravent in 
eadem verba provinciae Galliae, Hispaniae, Africa, Sicilia, Sardinia.’ Res Gestae Divi Augusti, §25.2. 
702 Southern 2007: 134; Pagán 2004: 14. As the exact wording of these oaths is nowhere extant, this must 
remain a (generally accepted) conjecture.  
703 Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris trans. Milner II.5. On the oaths of this period, see Southern 2007: 134; Lee 
2007: 52-53. 
704 On the Varangians’ oaths of loyalty, and their especially well-known reputation for upholding these 
promises, see Blöndal 1978: 95, 115, 120. 
705 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, Book of Ceremonies, ed. Reiske I, 91 (trans. Moffatt and Tall I, 91). 
706 Svoronos 1951: 108. 
707 Usually deposited in the Great Palace or Hagia Sophia. Svoronos 1951: 106-108; Guillou 1997: 203-204. 
708 Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen and Niebuhr I, 16 (trans. Fatouros and Krischer I, 21); Svoronos 
1951: 108. 





emperor. Written copies were deposited in Hagia Sophia on Holy Saturday, and their terms 
recited.710 Leon’s reign also marks the earliest attested occasion of all Byzantine citizens 
having to swear fidelity to the emperor, but it is unclear if this practice continued 
uninterrupted thereafter.711 Similar episodes between the eighth and eleventh centuries have 
been identified by Guilland, and Svoronos proposes Manuel I’s accession as the point at 
which this ‘universal oath’ became a regular, periodic, requirement.712 Oaths also constituted 
a fundamental component in all peace-settlements and reconciliations with rebels when 
individuals of questionable loyalty were encouraged to reaffirm fidelity, as Michael VIII was 
made to do after his treason trial (1253), and return from exile (1258).713  
Emperor-Patriarch relations became subject to comparable assurances. From 491 (at 
least), emperors were required to provide a written assurance/profession of Orthodoxy, 
representative of official teachings, before coronation by the patriarch.714 In practice this 
meant very little since, as with Leon III’s promulgation of Iconoclast policies, an emperor 
might later pursue an altogether different ideology that could still be considered 
‘Orthodox’.715 In the period of Iconoclasm, probably under Leon IV, was innovated an oath 
from clergy to emperor that persisted thereafter.716 Eventually, therefore, oaths existed to 
formally certify the loyalty of all potential internal sources of opposition, and clauses 
                                                 
710 The day before Constantine’s coronation on Easter Sunday, 24 April 775. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. 
de Boor 449-450 (trans. Mango and Scott 620-621); Brubaker and Haldon 2011: 248-249. 
711 Theophanes lists the themata, senators, Constantinopolitan tagmata, and the citizens and merchants of 
Constantinople amongst this group. 
712 Guilland 1947: 146; Svoronos 1951: 110, followed by Angelov 2007: 327 and n.61, 62, citing the comments 
of Niketas Choniates regarding Manuel I’s requests for such oaths in 1143 and 1171 being innovative. Histories 
written after 1204 repeatedly refer to it as a customary observance. 
713 Michael swore fidelity to Theodoros II and Ioannes IV. Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 92-100, 144 
(trans. Macrides 259-263, 326); Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 37-39, 45; 
Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 59; Angold 1975a: 66; Nicol 1993: 30.  
714 The first attested instance of this practice relates to Anastasios I’s coronation in 491. Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 136 (trans. Mango and Scott 208). See also, Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, 
Munitiz, and Angelov 210-213; Rapp 2016: 28; Dölger 1950: 146-147. 
715 On Leon III’s iconoclast politics, see Brubaker and Haldon 2011: esp. 69-155, with full bibliography. 





forbidding aid to rival imperial claimants were found in each.717 And since everyone had 
pledged loyalty, in theory, disloyalty was a concern for everyone. 
But how was oath-breaking understood and explained? Guillou follows Svoronos in 
concluding that the swearing of oaths by officials (but generally applicable) ‘was a religious 
act that strengthened imperial authority and served as a symbolic recognition by the 
functionaries of the divine nature of imperial power.’718 The sacral charisma of the imperial 
office necessitated loyalty and obedience, and the sacrality of the oath ensured its 
significance. The canons of Saint Basil, had prescribed a ten-year period of 
excommunication for one who broke fidelity, although through oikonomia this period might 
be reduced.719 Analogies to baptism were commonplace,720 and eleventh- and twelfth-
century monastic treatises often urged restraint in swearing oaths, even in trivial matters, for 
fear of the spiritual consequences of breaking them.721  
These spiritual concerns are apparent in episodes recounting conspiracies and 
usurpation, where broken oaths are especially prominent amongst the charges levelled 
against usurpers.722 When in 790 the Armeniakon themata disavowed Eirene’s authority in 
a loyalist revolt on behalf of her son Constantine VI oaths were a contributing factor. 
Theophanes records that the troops declined to swear never to accept Constantine’s authority 
while Eirene lived, and pointedly refused to acclaim her before Constantine. They had 
supposedly forgotten that, fifteen-years previous, they had sworn exactly that. Therefore, 
when they later acclaimed Constantine as emperor, they were believed to have committed 
                                                 
717 For example, the oath of Patriarch Autoreianos includes the clauses: ‘We will never foster ideas or plots 
which will go against you, your body, or your throne. We will not be partisans of any other, of an enemy of 
your majesty whoever it may be, Byzantine or barbarian, crowned or not, not even of the grandson of Kyr 
Andronikos’. Cinq ctes inédits du patriarche Michel Autôreianos, ed. Oikonomides 123.  
718 Guillou 1997: 203; Svoronos 1951: 107. 
719 Syntagma IV, ed. Rhalles and Potles 221; see also the fourteenth-century synopsis of the canons by Blastares, 
Syntagma VI, ed, Rhalles and Potles 290. 
720 And especially so amongst early Christian writers. Lee 2007: 52. 
721 The Anonymous Treatise on Asceticism, ed. Krausmüller 101-124; Rapp 2016: 28. 





perjury and thus ‘denied God’.723 In 802, when Eirene was deposed by Nikephoros I, 
Theophanes condemned patrikioi including Leon of Sinope, Niketas and Sisinnios 
Triphilios, for betraying her after swearing ‘terrible oaths’ and declaring her goodwill 
foremost amongst their concerns.724 Eirene reportedly rebuked Nikephoros for oath-
breaking, asserting that she had been too benevolent and could have executed him when 
rumours of his ambitions reached her, but that she had accepted God’s will.725 In Skylitzes’ 
Synopsis, the charge that Romanos I had perjured himself is recurrent. His promotion 
necessitated the breaking of oaths, and in demoting Constantine VII behind Christophoros 
Lekapenos ‘for ephemeral gains and a fleeting, corrupt reign, he distanced himself from God 
by perjury.’726 Later, Doukas even suggested that Michael VIII’s broken oaths led to the fall 
of the empire.727  
These accounts emphasise disloyalty and the perceived scale of wrongdoing. 
Breaking an oath was perceived as an act of perjury and sacrilege, aligning it with the legal 
association of treason as a (quasi-)sacrilegious act. Oath-breaking was therefore a serious 
charge, a long-lasting source of guilt and sin believed to distance one from God. The use of 
the adjectives ‘terrible’ or ‘dreadful’ (often as superlatives) to describe the oaths further 
attests to their perceived magnitude. Given oaths’ ubiquity in daily life, as markers of 
designated social obligations in a multitude of contexts,728 the rending of sworn agreements 
                                                 
723 Οἱ δὲ οὐ κατεδέξαντο ὀμόσαι, ὅτι ‘‘οὐ βασιλευόμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ σου ἐν τῇ ζωῇ σου, οὐδὲ προτάσσομεν 
τὸ ὄνομα Εἰρήνης πρὸ Κωνσταντίνου, ἀλλὰ Κωνσταντίνου καὶ Εἰρήνης, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς παρελάβομεν. ‘The latter 
[Armeniakon thema] did not consent to swear, “We shall not be ruled by your son as long as you are alive. We 
shall not even place the name of Eirene before that of Constantine, but shall keep Constantine and Eirene as 
we have accepted at the beginning.”’ Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 466 (trans. Mango and Scott 
640-641). 
724 ὅρκων φρικτῶν. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 477 (trans. Mango and Scott 655). 
725 ...αἷς εἰ συναπήχθην, ἀκωλύτως εἶχον τοῦ ἀνελεῖν σε. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοῖς σοῖς ὅρκοις πειθομένη, τὸ δὲ 
φειδομένη σου πολλοὺς εὐνοήτορας παρελογισάμην, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τηνικαῦτα τὰ κατ’ ἐμαυτὴν ἀποδοῦσα, δι’ οὗ 
βασιλεῖς βασιλεύουσι καὶ δυνάσται κρατοῦσι γῆς. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 478 (trans. Mango 
and Scott 656). 
726 ...διὰ πράγματα πρόσκαιρα καὶ βασιλείαν φθαρτὴν καὶ ἐπίκηρον, ἐπιορκίᾳ περιπεσὼν καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ 
γενόμενος μήκοθεν. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 214-215 (trans. Wortley 208). 
727 Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 48-49 (trans. Magoulias 67). 
728 Angelov 2007: 344, has pointed to Manuel Moschopoulos’ belief that the institution of the oath of loyalty 





(especially those to state institutions) undoubtedly connoted ataxia to some: a fundamental 
breakdown of social relations that harmed everyone by interrupting the idealised heavenly-
harmony of state.  Thus Leon Diakonos, who sympathised with Nikephoros II’s rebellion 
against the parakoimomenos and regent-ascendant Ioseph Bringas, condemned Nikephoros 
for placing ‘previous events second to his own safety, ascribing little importance to his 
oaths’.729 Since all were Roman and ‘regulated’ their lives ‘according to divine 
commands’,730 Patriarch Polyeuktos had mediated a sworn settlement ratified by the senate, 
that titled Nikephoros αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός so that he might campaign in Asia Minor. It 
bound him to accept the successional rights of Romanos II’s children, and forbade him to 
plan ‘anything undesirable against the state and senate’.731 His rebellion contravened this 
orderly settlement, provoked unrest, and was worthy of contempt. For most usurpers this 
was but an initial sin.  
The Guillou-Svoronos reading is thus perfectly cogent in its essential explanation of 
oaths’ religious significance, which is central to the condemnatory-dialogues of oath-
breaking as a source of wrongdoing. Yet this reading misses an equally important conceptual 
function of Byzantine-Roman oaths. The ideological façade of divine sanction served to 
bolster the security and prestige of the imperial position, but it was expressed in conjunction 
with republican ideas that provided authorisation for, and duty-bound limits to, imperial 
power. The Augustinian oath, as succinctly presented in Res Gestae, betrays republican 
concerns: soldiers and citizens were compelled to swear loyalty but the latter did so 
‘voluntarily’, rendering their oath extra-constitutional and beyond a strict obligation.732 The 
people ‘demanded’ Octavian-Augustus as leader and consensus was espoused to provide 
                                                 
729 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 41 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 92). 
730 ...δεῖ ‘Ρωμαίους ὄντας ἡμας, καὶ θείοις ῥυθμιζομέωνους προστάγμασι... Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 
33 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 86). Emphasis added. 
731 …τοῦ κράτους καὶ τῆς βουλῆς... Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 33-34 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 86). 





him authority to administer the civil war on their behalf. Military oaths of the Republic and 
early Empire had also distinguished between loyalty to leaders and to the politeia. In addition 
to their commanders, Roman soldiers swore allegiance to symbols of the state.733 Vegetius’ 
fourth-century summation of the Christianised military oath asserted that ‘[the soldiery will] 
do all that the Emperor may command, will never desert the service, nor refuse to die for the 
Roman state.’734 Again, loyalty to the emperor chosen by God, is differentiated from loyalty 
and duty to the state. They were not necessarily synonymous. In fact, Haldon, following 
Beck, notes that there was never an expectation for soldiers to die for emperors, rather than 
for Christian faith and the Roman state. Soldiers fought for faith and empire, not an 
individual emperor.735  
Later, the Justinianic oath of the praefectus praetorio per Illyricum included the 
clause, ‘I will willingly accept all pain and fatigue resulting from the office they [Justinian 
and Theodora] have conferred upon me in the interest of the empire and the 
politeia/republic.’736 The appointment was for the benefit of the state, not the emperor. 
Nikephoros II had sworn fidelity to the basileis and the ‘state and senate’. Additionally, in 
practice, the oaths sworn by the clergy distinguished between institutional and political 
loyalties: a Synodal praxis of 1026 requiring anathematisation of clergy associated with a 
rebel was condemned and invalidated, as were similar measures attempted by Manuel I 
                                                 
733 This usually meant the legionary standards. C.E. Brand 1968: 92. 
734 ‘…They swear by God, Christ and the Holy Spirit, and by the Majesty of the Emperor which second to God 
is to be loved and worshipped by the human race. For since the Emperor has received the name of the “August”, 
faithful devotion should be given, unceasing homage paid him as if to a present and corporeal deity. For it is 
God whom a private citizen or a soldier serves, when he faithfully loves him who reigns by God’s authority. 
The soldiers swear that they will strenuously do all that the Emperor may command, will never desert the 
service, nor refuse to die for the Roman state.’ Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris trans. Milner II.5. Emphasis 
added. 
735 Haldon 1995: 161; Beck 1970: 22-24; Kaldellis 2015: esp. 40-41. 
736 Καὶ πάντα πόνον καὶ κάματον μετ’ εὐνοἰας ἀδόλως καὶ δίχα τέχνης τινὸς ἀναδέξομαι ἐπὶ τῇ δοθείςῃ μοι 
παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀρχῇ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν βασιλείας καὶ πολιτείας. // …et omnem laborem ac sudorem cum favour sine 
dolo et sine arte quacumque suspicion in commissa mihi ab eis administratione de eorum imperio atque 
republica. Oath of Officials, ed. Uspenskii 336-339. Author’s translation. The oath is recorded in the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis, ed. Schöll and Kroll III, 89-91 (Novellae). It is also quoted in excerpted form in the tenth-century 





(1171) and Andronikos II (1295).737 
These distinctions appear to have been retained in late-Byzantine oaths as well. By 
the thirteenth century, imperial reciprocity was more pronounced, and benefits for the state 
more closely associated with the emperor.738 However, after affirming the fidelity of the 
judges, people, and army, of the ‘Roman state/territory’ to Theodoros I and his son and heir 
Nikolaos, the oath of Patriarch Michael IV and prelates asserted that this was to demonstrate 
support and ‘to encourage our powerful and holy autokrator in his many struggles against 
our arrogant enemies who now, more than ever before, invade our lands because of our 
sins.’739 Theodoros was thus expected to perform certain generic duties on behalf of those 
who empowered and swore loyalty to him and their common territory. In a treatise of his 
own composition, Theodoros II meditated on the mutual obligations of the emperor and his 
οἰκεῖος, finding that he owed subjects protection and munificence, and they owed him 
loyalty.740 Likewise, a fourteenth-century formulary required generic reciprocal duties from 
the emperor: ‘A true and faithful servant of the emperor, this I will be, if he reigns 
successfully according to the exact truth and in all honesty, just as Truth really asks of the 
servant to be true and honest with regard to his master.’741 And Manuel Moschopoulos’ 
treatise on ‘political oaths’ (to the emperor) claimed that these safeguarded basileia from 
conspiracies and expressed the will of the populace.742 He seemingly reaffirmed the 
                                                 
737 For the Synodal praxis of 1026, see Syntagma III, ed. Rhalles and Potles 97. For Manuel I’s attempted 
legislation, see Les regestes du patriarcat de Constantinople, ed. Grumel no. 830. For Andronikos II’s 
attempted legislation, see Pachymérès, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 222-223. On the 
differentiation between institutional and political loyalties, see Beck 1970: 400; Dagron 2003: 308-309, 
concluding likewise. 
738 Svoronos 1951: 138-140, and Angelov 2007: 324-347, link this with the influx of ‘feudal’ and ‘proto-feudal’ 
(respectively) ideas about oaths under the Komnenian and Nikaian emperors. 
739 …τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τὸν κράτιστον καὶ ἅγιον ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορα ἐπιπλέον προθυμοποιοῦντες καὶ διανιστῶντες 
πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπείρους καμάτους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ πολλοὺς ἀγῶνας κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων, τῶν νῦν εἴπέρ 
ποτε βαρέως καθ’ἡμῶν ἐπεισφρησάντων ἀλαζόνων ἐχθρῶν διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν. Cinq ctes inédits du 
patriarche Michel Autôreianos, ed. Oikonomides 121-124. 
740 Theodoros II, Opuscula, ed. Tartaglia 119-140. See also the comments in Akropolites, Historia, trans. 
Macrides 327-328 n.9 (Commentary). 
741 Sathas, MB, VI, 652-653; quoted in translation in Guillou 1997: 204. 





Augustinian position, although via contemporary quasi-feudal notions of contractual 
obligation rather than republican ideology.743 Nevertheless, the concepts of loyalty to the 
state as an entity independent of the emperor, and duties to the politeia by emperor and 
populace, are common threads from Republic to Palaiologoi. All persons eventually swore 
loyalty to the emperor, but all persons, including the emperor, also served the wellbeing of 
the state. Ideologically, those taking the oath were not king’s men, but served the politeia. 
Loyalty to the emperor was one means of service, as his personal interests were often 
conflated (or coincided) with those of the state. 
Implicit within this ideological framework is the possibility that one could break 
fidelity with an emperor and yet remain loyal to the state. As Kaldellis notes, the sixth-
century epitomator Jordanes claimed that the rebel Vitalianus was ‘hostile not to the 
Republic, but to the emperor.’744 The distinction allowed Vitalianus’ patriotism to be 
retained while questioning the emperor’s. Might this distinction have provided an ‘escape 
clause’ for usurpers and conspirators?  
Breaking oaths, in other contexts, was not always a bad thing, sometimes it served 
the greater good. Ioannes Moschos preserves a didactic tale of how a brother was persuaded 
by a spiritual father to break an oath, in order to reconcile with another. The father inveighed 
that it was occasionally morally prudent to break oaths that led to damnation, but later to 
overcome this through repentance.745 And Byzantine prayer-books offered prayers of pardon 
for oath breaking.746 Although sin was unavoidable, breaking an oath was not morally 
inconceivable. Eudokia Makrembolitissa, for example, was released from an oath to her 
                                                 
743 Moschopoulos asserts the belief that kingship lessened the risk of aristocratic infighting innate in other 
systems of governance. On Moschopoulos’ ideological conceptions, see Angelov 2007: 346-347; Beck 1970: 
392-394. 
744 ‘non rei publica sed regi infestus’: Jordanes, Romana et Getica (Romana), ed. Mommsen 357; Kaldellis 
2015: 40. 
745 Ioannes Moschos, Pratum Spirituale, ed. Migne 216 (trans. Wortley 192-193). 





deceased husband, Michael VII, in order to marry Romanos IV for the benefit of the empire, 
which was threatened by Turkish incursions.747  
Regarding treasonable activities, we have suggestions of similar exemptions and 
excuses. Theophylaktos of Ochrid writes of individuals taking oaths under duress, afraid to 
say that they reviled the emperor, and who then broke into revolt at the first opportunity.748 
The law recognised that wrongdoing could originate from genuine injustices, and on 
numerous occasions reconciliations were affected between emperors and conspirators: 
imperial assurance granted, a rebel’s fidelity renewed.749 These persons had often feared 
personal harm and their excuse was obviously acceptable since loyalty could be reaffirmed. 
Elsewhere, when an emperor broke the terms of an assurance, conspiracy might be perceived 
as a reasonable response.750 Furthermore, in 1182/3, notwithstanding his best efforts, 
Andronikos I was reportedly ‘bound not to distort the words [of his oath to Alexios II] by 
false interpretations’, suggesting that innovative re-readings were not uncommon. He used 
the oath’s terms to position himself as the young emperor’s protector, and when Alexios was 
finally assassinated Andronikos and his supporters were deemed in breach.751 Patriarch 
Kamateros and the synod intervened to publish decrees of amnesty (1183) releasing 
                                                 
747 The circumstances and events of Eudokia’s controversial release from the oath are considered by 
Oikonomides 1963: 124-127; followed by Cheynet 2008b: 67; Cheynet 1990: 345-346. 
748 Theophylaktos, Opera, ed. Gautier 202-203. 
749 According to Theophanes Continuatus the general Theophobos was forgiven and made to renew his oath to 
Theophilos after engaging in rebellion (838). Roussel swore an oath of loyalty to the emperor before being 
released from imprisonment in Constantinople and leading the attack against Bryennios the Elder’s besieging 
loyalists. Choniates records three occasions on which Andronikos I broke oaths of loyalty an emperor, twice 
having to renew them after reconciliations (1166 and 1180). And, as already mentioned, Michael VIII twice 
renewed his oath of loyalty after involvement in seditious acts. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 124, 135-
136; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 178-179, 194-195; Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 253 (trans. 
Kaldellis and Krallis 462-463); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 137-138, 226-227 (trans. Magoulias 78, 
128-129); Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 92-100, 144 (trans. Macrides 259-263, 326); Pachymeres, 
Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 37-39, 45. 
750 For example: according to Skylitzes, Leon Phokas considered himself perfectly justified when he undertook 
to move against Constantine VII’s regent, Patriarch Nikolaos, after the latter broke the terms of his oath to 
Leon (that Leon’s relatives would remain in command of the palace guard). Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, 
ed. Thurn 208 (trans. Wortley 201). 





Andronikos from sin.752 Given the content of Andronikos’ populist propaganda it is hard to 
believe that this amnesty would not have been accompanied by justifications that Alexios’ 
death served greater good of the empire, rendering the oath immoral and contrary to 
Andronikos’ sworn duty to the state, or suggesting that Alexios had already contravened it. 
The official story of the deposition of Alexios’ corpse at sea, a fate reserved for the most 
contemptible state enemies, may imply such a narrative.753  
The frequent recording of oaths between conspirators should also be considered 
suggestive.754 Beyond secrecy and mutual fidelity their formulae are not recorded, yet they 
were sworn at the outset of a conspiracy and by all those who bore witness to a usurper’s 
proclamation or joined his cause.755 The wording employed after a proclamation 
undoubtedly resembled official oaths. This imitated official practice, and (presumably) 
superseded pre-existing oaths to the emperor at Constantinople. Therefore, from their 
perspective, conspirators had not broken fidelity with the politeia, merely with an emperor 
who no longer fulfilled his duties. The reigning emperor became the guilty party in 
accordance with the underlying elective-administrative and reciprocal-duty principles 
expressed in the oaths: he had already broken them. Oath-breaking was contentious but 
relatively commonplace. It meant contravening an agreement sworn before God and 
accruing sin as a result, but could prove morally justified, beneficial to the state, and 
                                                 
752 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 276 (trans. Magoulias 153). 
753 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 275-276 (trans. Magoulias 152-153): who also claims that Andronikos 
requested to be released from his oath to ‘Manuel and his wretched son (ταλαιπώρῳ παιδί)’, Alexios. This 
request is suggestive of an anti-Alexios narrative being propounded at court: what exactly was the source of 
Alexios’ ‘wretched’ status in Andronikos’ rhetoric? Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 267 (trans. Magoulias 
148-149), uses the same term (ταλαίπωρον)  to describe Empress Maria during her trial for treason. A semantic 
link to accusations of treason may be suggested, although it is equally possible that Choniates is using the term 
to comment on the manner of their deaths. 
754 Cheynet 1990: 159-160, noting that the oaths sworn between conspirators could also include ‘assurances’ 
to foreign supporters, and individuals of differing religions: for example, those between Bardas Skleros and 
the Emirs of Amida and Martyropolis: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 316 (trans. Wortley 301). 
755 The histories are replete with examples: Leon Phokas with Romanos I, Isaakios I with his co-conspirators, 
Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder and his supporters at Traianoupolis; Theodoros Mangaphas and the populace 
of Philadelphia. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 208, 487 (trans. Wortley 201, 454); Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 247 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 450-451); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 399 





eventually be overcome. 
 
Bloodshed versus the ideology of peace 
After a rebel had broken fidelity circumstances might then necessitate the more serious 
charge of bloodguilt. Successfully contesting a succession typically necessitated violence 
against one’s opponents, either on a small-scale or through civil war where casualties rapidly 
accrued. Consequently, ideological stances towards bloodshed and conflict influence the 
narratives. 
To a great extent, bloodshed was antithetical to Byzantium’s Christian and military 
ideologies. Christians were entreated to avoid roles that might lead to the deaths of others.756 
Unlike later Western practice, Orthodox clergymen were never permitted to fight.757 The 
fourth-century Saint Basil classified ‘murders’ committed even in self-defence as sinful. To 
keep the church and state aware of their ideal ‘moral duties’ he re-emphasised that all wars 
and killings were sinful acts, and prescribed a three-year period of excommunication for 
soldiers who were not ‘clean-handed’.758 Saint Athanasius’ earlier contrary Epistle, 
permitting defensive killings as an unfortunate inevitability, did lead to a cleavage of 
thought. The twelfth-century canonists Zonaras and Balsamon, writing at times of 
encroaching Latin, Turkish, and Balkan foes, counselled against Basil; the fourteenth-
century Blastares advocated for.759 In terms of the legal penalties for killings, the 
                                                 
756 Cheynet 2013b:  63. 
757 Laurent 1946. The Latin custom of ‘warrior priests’ found its way into ‘Latin error books’ compiled by the 
Byzantines (i.e. Stilbes’ Against the Latins): Angold 2008a: 735-736. Patriarch Keroularios was chastised for 
supposedly arming clerics. Psellos, Scripta minora, ed. Kurtz and Drexel I, 285-288. Anna Komnene disdained 
the ‘barbarian Latin’ custom of ‘warrior priests’. Anna Komnene, Alexiad, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 306-307 
(trans. Frankopan 283). And in 1306, a certain monk, Hilarion stood trial for taking up arms in defence of the 
empire. Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent IV, 656-657; Nicol 1979: 69. Cheynet 
2013b: 64-65, however, has noted several instances where tonsured individuals turned away from their vows 
to resume military commands or fight in times of strife. 
758 Basil of Caesarea, Letters, ed. DeFerrari III, 42-45 (Letter 188, Canon 13). For analysis, see Simion 2015: 
199-200; Treadgold 2006: 210. 





codifications lead to a deceptively straightforward conclusion that these were measured 
according to criteria of intent and object or weapon used, and then prescribed a capital 
punishment.760 However, in practice the response to murder appears to have been softened 
by Christian ideology with canon-law contesting civil-law, and the church repeatedly 
offering sanctuary and rehabilitation to guilty individuals.761 It was generally believed that 
killing inevitably damaged the immortal soul, and should happen only as a last resort in 
defence of life. 
In regard to warfare, Haldon has argued that the Byzantines considered themselves 
to be ‘fighting for peace’ and war was universally seen as an evil.762 As Cheynet notes, this 
quasi-pacifist defensive-war ideology was actually well-suited to the conditions on the 
ground.763 From the seventh century the army saw a shortage of recruits and had to avoid 
wasting resources. In general practice, large-scale wars of reconquest and decisive battles 
were avoided.764 Instead, counter-insurgency and skirmishing tactics were employed as a 
last resort when tribute or diplomacy failed.765 When external wars of aggression were 
fought, as in the tenth and eleventh centuries against the Bulgars and Rus, they were 
vindicated as ‘defensive’ and ‘just’ in nature.766  And even as the imperial image acquired 
                                                 
760 A false impression noted by Troianos 1980: 6-10; Macrides 1988: 509. 
761 Macrides 1988. 
762 Haldon 1999: 13-33, 280. See also Stouraitis 2012; and the edited volume ‘Peace and War in Byzantium’, 
Miller and Nesbitt 1995. Treadgold 2006: 212 and n.8, has taken exception to the idea of ‘fighting for peace’ 
as Haldon applies it to the Byzantine context, on the basis of its use as a Stalinist slogan, the Byzantine tolerance 
of raiding, the many civil wars fought throughout the empire’s history, and occasions when wars were fought 
against enemies most likely to want peace. Treadgold nevertheless accepts that warfare was universally 
considered an evil. Although generally well-reasoned, Treadgold’s argument appears to negate or minimise 
the possibility of cognitive dissonance between what Byzantine ideology said about warfare, and how 
Byzantines actually executed warfare. It should also be noted that the use of the phrase ‘fighting for peace’ in 
Stalinist propaganda in no way constitutes an argument against its relative applicability to Byzantine thought 
as Haldon employs it. 
763 Cheynet 2013b: 66. 
764 Haldon 1999; Haldon 2003: esp. 42; Treadgold 2006. 
765 Haldon 1999: esp. 38, 60-62; Haldon 2003: 34-46; Treadgold 2006; Haldon 2007: 77, 260; Haldon 2013; 
Kyriakidis 2011: 37. 
766 Basileios II actually offered terms of peace to the Bulgars on several occasions if they would cede their 
conquests and become a client state. Treadgold 2006: 219; Treadgold 1997: 514-528. On Byzantine 
conceptions of ‘just wars’, see Laiou 1993, concluding that ‘self-defence’, ‘recovery of territory’, ‘breach of 





an unprecedented militarism in compositions under late eleventh-century military emperors 
and the Komnenoi (when the ideal of peace was not so prominently promoted and Roman 
triumphalism in ‘just wars’ became the dominant theme), peace was not neglected.767 
Ioannes II and Manuel I were commended for bloodless victories and having ‘persuaded the 
enemy to live in peace’.768  
Consequently, peaceful and humanitarian resolutions to any problem were deemed 
most praiseworthy. Respect for the sanctity of life defined imperial philanthropia and 
clemency, in emulation of Christ. Emperors who exemplified these qualities were widely 
praised, especially in connection with their handling of political adversaries. Constantine X 
was renowned for his mild treatment of opponents: ‘No one was ever put to death by him, 
even when the most terrible crimes had been committed. No one suffered mutilation at his 
command. He rarely uttered threats and even these were soon forgotten, for he was more 
inclined to tears than to resort to cruelty.’769 In the next century Ioannes II was lauded for, 
‘depriving no one of life nor inflicting bodily injury of any kind throughout his entire reign, 
he has been deemed praiseworthy by all… and one might well say that he equalled some of 
the best emperors of the past and surpassed the others.’770 Isaakios II ordered that nobody 
                                                 
767 Although they had always been judged on their military accomplishments, emperors’ personal abilities as 
soldiers and warriors then became increasingly prominent topics for these assessments. On this development 
in imperial rhetoric and the aristocratic ideal, see Kazhdan 1984: 43-57; Morris 1988: 86-87; Magdalino 1993: 
esp. 418-430; Munitiz 1995: 57-61; Dennis 1997: 135-137; Kaldellis 1999: 183, n.369; Stephenson 2003: 86-
90. 
768 Magdalino 1993: 419. Jeffreys and Jeffreys 2015: esp. p.89 and p.99, lines. 154-165, (an edited composition 
of Manganeios Prodromos, praising Manuel I as a new Solomon, a bringer of peace, who persuaded the 
empire’s enemies to live in peace, and who ascended the throne uncontested in a peaceful manner): ‘…it is 
right for you alone to be named Solomon, / for you proved another Solomon as emperor of peace / and you 
overwhelm the enemy, persuading them to live in peace; / having in a peaceful way become emperor of the 
Romans, / having put on the golden diadem, the symbol of power, / without incident, from your father’s right 
hand / (154-159) …you win most of your triumphs peacefully, / rarely using your sword too for victory / over 
those against whose obstinacy the sword is provoked…’ (161-164). 
769 ...καὶ οὔτε ψυχὴν ἀφείλετό τινος κἂν τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν κακῶν ἑπεπράχει, οὔτε τινὰ τῶν ἁκρωτηρίων 
ἑστέρησεν, ἁλλὰ τῇ ἁπειλῇ βραχύ τι χρησάμενος, μετ’ οὑ πολὺ καὶ ταύτην διέλυε, δάκρυα μᾶλλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν 
ἀφιεὶς ἢ ὡμότητι χρώμενος. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri ΙΙ, 296-297; ed. Renauld ΙΙ, 140 (trans. 
Sewter 333). Translation adapted. 
770 More fully: ...καὶ μηδένα διὰ ξυμπάσης αὐτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ ψυχῆς στερήσας ἢ ἐς τὸ σῶμα ὁσονοῦν 
λυμηνάμενος επαινετὸς ἐς δεῦρο παρὰ πᾶσι λελόγισται καὶ κορωνὶς ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ὅσοι ‘Ρωμαίων ἐκ τοῦ τῶν 
Κομνηνῶν γένους ὑπερεκάθισαν, ἵνα μὴ λέγοιμι ὡς καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνόπιν ἀρίστων τοῖς μὲν ἡμιλλήσατο, 





ever be mutilated, even for plotting against him, and then ignored the pronouncement.771 
And Choniates extolled Alexios III for having avoided killing or mutilating opponents 
during his reign at Constantinople:772 blatantly disregarding several such acts.773 Of course, 
rhetoric did not have to reflect reality but an emperor who successfully communicated this 
image embodied aspects of the imperial ideal and enhanced his legitimacy by morally 
differentiating himself from others.  
The moral ideals applied equally to the circumstances of successions, meaning that 
emperors and usurpers were also judged on how they had come to power. As Theophylaktos 
of Ochrid asserted, ‘[an emperor] does not acquire authority by force, or steep his robes in 
blood: his basis is the good will of the masses and the concurrence of the people, with his 
own moderation and mercy.’774 Imperial missives addressed to rebels during the early stages 
of a rebellion often exploited this belief by emphasising the emperor’s concern for peace, 
and reminding them of the temporal and eternal penalties awaiting them for oath-breaking 
and bloodshed, advising them to refrain from that course.775 Nikephoros III, for example, 
reproached Nikephoros Bryennios for ignoring ‘peace and happiness’ and choosing instead 
‘the slaughter of Christians’. He claimed that power had been given to him by God and the 
                                                 
771 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 366-367 (trans. Magoulias 203). Choniates’ narrative chronology (which 
is not necessarily trustworthy) indicates that the pronouncement was made after the execution and blindings of 
Andronikos I and his sons Ioannes and Manuel (September/October 1185), and the blinding of Alexios 
Komnenos ‘the pinkernes’ (November 1185). Yet, after these mutilations/executions, Isaakios II was 
responsible for the executions of two Pseudo-Alexios II’s, Alexios Branas’ beheading, the blindings of 
Basileios Chotzas, Constantine Tatikios, an unnamed Komnenos, Andronikos Komnenos (the grandson of 
Anna Komnene), Constantine Aspietes, a great-grandson of Anna Komnene, and his own cousin Constantine 
Angelos-Doukas. 
772 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 548 (trans. Magoulias 300). Most likely recording an official panegyric. 
773 Choniates’ statement ignores: Alexios’ blinding of Isaakios II, assassination of a Pseudo-Alexios II at 
Tzoungra, ordering the execution and beheading of the general Vatatzes, and the mutilation of the corpse of 
Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos). Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 452, 463, 486, 527-528 (trans. Magoulias 
248, 254, 266-267, 289-290). 
774 Theophylaktos, Opera, ed. Gautier 198-201 (Paideia basilike). The translation is that of Barker 1957: 146-
147. 
775 For example: Ioannes I, writing to Leon Phokas: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 115-116 (trans. Talbot 
and Sullivan 164-165). Michael VII, addressing Nikephoros III Botaneiates (outlined by Psellos): Psellos, 
Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 384-391; ed. Renauld II, 182-185 (trans. Sewter 377-380). Or Nikephoros 
III, directly addressing Nikephoros Bryennios: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 292 (trans. Kaldellis and 





acknowledgement of the people, that Bryennios had made himself an enemy of the God and 
the people and would be held to account.776 In return usurpers would emphasise their 
unwillingness to engage in violence against their co-religionists and countrymen. Thus we 
read that in 838, Theophobos, ‘being a pious man, in a God-fearing manner hesitated to 
piously initiate hostilities that would lead to the spilling of Christian blood.’ He instead 
surrendered Amastris to Theophilos after receiving an oath of amnesty.777 And Ioannes VI’s 
propagandists repeatedly asserted his preference not to ‘spill Christian blood’ in civil war.778 
The narratives of the accessions of Leon V and Isaakios I incorporate positive and 
negative judgements in order to contrast violence with moral rulership. In the Macedonian 
narrative tradition, Michael I was widely commended for ceding the throne to Leon. 
Although his advisors had encouraged him to resist the ‘tyrant’, Michael did not wish to 
‘spill Christian blood’ on his own account. He was ‘a man of peace… [and] ordered those 
who were saying such things not to incite him to engage in a murderous civil war.’ When 
Empress Prokopia reportedly objected to her husband meekly relinquishing power to Leon, 
the narratives emphasise Michael’s piety, for he assured her, ‘It is good for events to conform 
to the will of the Lord.’ Michael dispatched the imperial insignia to Leon, and ordered the 
senate to welcome the new emperor into Constantinople. Essentially, Michael arranged that 
Leon’s succession would be free of violence. By contrast, although in the common source 
of Genesios and Theophanes Continuatus Leon was moved to spare Michael and his family 
and ‘generously’ provide them with a stipend, the details of Leon’s ensuing mutilation of 
Michael’s children exposed his use of unnecessary force, implying his illegitimacy. 
Moreover, Skylitzes revised the tradition to remove any reference to Leon’s ‘generosity’, 
                                                 
776 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 292 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 532-533). 
777 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 43 (trans. Kaldellis 57); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
136; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 194-195. See the opposing views of Gregoire 1934: 192-198, and Treadgold 
1979: 189-190, on the role of later iconophile hagiographical traditions in shaping the accounts of Theophobos’ 
revolt and treatment by Theophilos. 





emphasising instead the violence of his takeover, which now also took place before Leon’s 
proclamation by the senate, allowing the designation ‘tyrannos’ to be retained. The revision, 
which is directly followed by a prophecy predicting the usurpation, served to draw attention 
to the immorality and illegitimacy of the usurpations of Leon and his immediate 
successors.779 
Later, Michael VI’s abdication to Isaakios I became the only point at which Michael 
received praise in the narrative of Attaleiates, and in a form following closely that of Michael 
I. His partisans and palace guard assured him that they would fight, but Michael ‘could not 
accept this course, saying it would be a selfish and even misanthropic thing to allow the 
Great City to be polluted with murder and the slaughter of others just for his own sake.’ 
Throwing aside his purple boots, ‘Michael said, “I will not forsake my religion for the sake 
of these.”’780 His pious resignation on behalf of the Constantinopolitans was then subtly 
contrasted with Keroularios’ implied impious desire for power.781 Michael’s final words in 
the Historia, bitterly directed to Keroularios upon receiving the Kiss of Peace post-tonsure, 
confirm the belief in the sinfulness of conspiracy and the potential consequences for the soul, 
‘“May God reward you in a fitting way for this embrace, archbishop.”’782 By contrast, 
Skylitzes engaged in Komnenian apologetic by querying Michael’s eternal salvation in not 
abdicating sooner, and thereby avoiding the bloodshed at Nikaia.783 Skylitzes’ inversion of 
responsibility for the violence points to the long-lasting criticism of Isaakios’ accession 
through civil war: its stain was felt and could not easily be overcome, so blame had to be 
                                                 
779 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 5 (trans. Kaldellis 7); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 18; 
ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 30-31. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 8-9 (trans. Wortley 8-9), 
repeating Prokopia’s objections but omitting Michael’s response. 
780 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 58-59 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 104-107). 
781 This implied desire for power relates to the fact that, in addition to aiding Michael’s overthrow, Keroularios 
infamously appropriated the imperial footwear under Isaakios I, prompting calls for his removal from the 
patriarchal office. On this event, see Dagron 2003: 235-240, with references. 
782 Θεός σε ἀξίως, ἀρχιερεῦ, ἀντασπάσαιτο. Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 59 (trans. Kaldellis and 
Krallis 106-107). 





reassigned. In both episodes the image of an emperor acting as a moral ideal drew attention 
to the usurper’s wrongdoing, establishing who the guilty party was. 
Elsewhere, those successions achieved by peaceful means were presented as being 
divinely sanctioned and provided an ethical defence of usurpation, even when the route to 
power was more tendentious in reality. Constantine X’s accession was celebrated in Psellos’ 
Chronographia for avoiding usurpation and instead allowing God’s will to peacefully 
unfold.784 Similarly, Attaleiates praised Nikephoros III’s elevation because, ‘everything was 
accomplished without bloodshed or destruction…. which is a definitive and fitting sign of 
his faith in God and of his appointment by him.’785 The palace coup that had raised 
Constantine, and skirmishes as Nikephoros marched on Constantinople, were concealed by 
the authors in order to preserve these emperors’ moral and divine authorisations. There is 
also some evidence that ‘guilt’ arising from accessional violence was considered to be 
transmissible. Psellos, expressed his surprise at the continued favour enjoyed by the 
Macedonian family which had been elevated through ‘murder and bloodshed’;786 Choniates 
expressed similar sentiments about the Komnenoi; and Doukas about the Palaiologoi.787 The 
possibility of transmissible guilt further emphasises the disrepute associated with 
successions achieved through violence. 
 
Civil War 
This brief survey of Byzantine reactions to bloodshed and peace highlights that there was an 
ideological aversion to violence. The development of ‘just war’ philosophies788 provided 
                                                 
784 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 288-289; ed. Renauld II, 136 (trans. Sewter 329). 
785 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 271 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 492-493). 
786 …φόνοις καὶ αἵμασιν. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 246-247; ed. Renauld I, 117 (trans. Sewter 
155). 
787 For Choniates: see below, page 198. For Doukas: Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 48-49 (trans. 
Magoulias 67). 





routes around this impediment to external conflicts. However, internal warfare was far more 
difficult to justify and always relied on a variant of ‘the greater good’. Wrongdoing was 
innate to the very premise and it was for this reason that so many claimants of basileia 
officially denounced and abhorred engaging in civil wars. In reality, practice bore little 
resemblance to theory and the Byzantines fought more wars against their fellows than 
external foes.789 But what were the perceived effects of civil war and usurpation on the 
politeia, and who was to blame? 
As Stouraitis has outlined, the Christian view of civil wars was extremely negative.790 
Pseudo-Damascene’s Letter to Emperor Theophilos, ranked them among the greatest of the 
calamities that might occur on account of divine anger.791 Theodoros Stoudites reiterated 
this belief in divine origin and ascribed them a didactic function.792 He determined that there 
was nothing worse, for they turned brother against brother, and father against son.793 
Theophanes believed them to be instigated by the Devil,794 and, in a Letter to Tsar Symeon, 
Nikolaos Mystikos espoused that they were worse than regular conflicts: ‘Bad are the wars 
against foreign enemies; but what can be said about those wars against father, brother, 
friends, and co-religionists, against those with the same God, Lord, Ruler, and Saviour?’795  
Identical reactions and statements are to be found in the histories. Theophanes 
Continuatus remarked of the revolt of Thomas the Slav:  
At this time a civil war broke out in the east and filled the world with all 
manner of evils, reducing from many, to few, the number of men: fathers 
                                                 
789 Treadgold 2006. 
790 Stouriatis 2010: esp. 152-153. 
791 Κατὰ μὲν δὴ τούτων πλείονα καὶ θρήνων ἄξια δι’ ἃ ἧλθεν ή ὀργὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν λαὸν τῆς ἀπειθείας ὡς 
ἀνωτέρω δεδήλωται, καὶ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν πρόδηλα υευόνασι· λιμοί, λοιμοί, σεισμοί, καταποντισμοί, θάνατοι 
ἐξαίσιοι, πόλεμοι ἐμφύλιοι, ἐθνῶν ἐπαναστάσεις, ἐμπρησμοὶ ἐκκλησιῶν, ἐρημώσεις χωρῶν καὶ πόλεων, 
αὶχμαλωσίαι λαῶν. The Letter of the Three Patriarchs to Emperor Theophilus and Related Texts, (Pseudo-
Damascene, Letter to Emperor Theophilos on the Holy and Venerated Icons), ed. Munitiz et al. p.191. 
792 Theodori Studitae Epistolae, ed. Fatouros II, 696. 
793 Theodoros Stoudites quoted, with German translation, in Stouraitis 2010: 153. 
794 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 418 (trans. Mango and Scott 578). 
795 Κακοὶ γὰρ καὶ οί πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἐχθροὺς πόλεμοι, ὅσοι δὲ πρὸς ἀδελφούς, πρὸς φίλους, πρὸς ὁμοπίστους, 
πρὸς τοὺς ἕνα θεὸν ἐπιγραφομένους, ἕνα κύριον καὶ δεσπότην καὶ σωτῆρα, τί ἄν τις εἴποι. Nikolaos Mystikos, 





took up arms against their sons, brothers against those born of the same 
womb, and finally friends against those who loved them the most.796 
Attaleiates797 and Gregoras798 used comparable expressions for contemporary conflicts. 
These formulations were not employed unthinkingly, nor was their use a mere rhetorical 
flourish. Instead, the phrasing represented a sincere lament identifying the breakdown of the 
most fundamental institution, the oikos, which characterised social and economic structures 
from the sixth century onward.799 Authors recognised that civil war engendered 
disintegration at the most basic level, something so terrible that even familial ties were 
rendered irrelevant, purest ataxia.800 As the laws on treason implied, to engage in civil war, 
no matter the pretext, was to undermine the politeia, society itself. From this ideological 
perspective victory always came at the expense of one’s compatriots and family.  
The cost to the wellbeing and governance of the state was also realised. Patriarch 
                                                 
796 Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀρχὴν λαβὼν ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος ἐξ ἀνατολῆς παντοίων ἐνέπλησε τὴν 
οἰκουμένην κακῶν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργάσατο, πατέρων δηλονότι τὰς δεξιὰς κατὰ τῶν 
υἱῶν ὁπλισάντων, καὶ ἀδελφῶν κατὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς φύντων γαστρός, καὶ φίλου τὸ τέλος κατὰ τοῦ φιλοῦντος 
τὰ μάλιστα. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 49-50; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 76-77. 
797 Attaleiates, narrating the rebellion of Isaakios I, remarked of the Battle of Petroe (also known as the Battle 
of Hades, or occasionally the Battle of Nikaia) the decisive battle between the troops of Isaakios I and the 
loyalists of Michael VI, fought on 20 August 1057: Τότε τοίνυν πατὴρ μὲν καὶ υἱός, τῆς φύσεως ὥσπερ 
ἐπιλαθόμενοι, πρὸς σφαγὴν ὀργᾶν ἀλλήλων οὐκ εὐλαβοῦντο καὶ δεξιὰν παῖς πατρικῷ χραίνει φόνῳ καὶ 
ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ καιρίαν ἐλαύνει καὶ συγγενείας ἢ συμφυΐας εἴτε τῶν ὁμοφύλων ἔλεος οὐδε διάκρισις ἦν, ἕως 
τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς βακχικῆς μανίας ληξάντων, τῆς συμφορᾶς ᾔσθοντο καὶ κωκυτὸν αἰθέριον ἤγειραν. ‘And 
then father and son, as if forgetting their natural bonds, showed no restraint in eagerly slaughtering each other. 
Hands of sons were stained with the blood of fathers; brother struck down brother; and there was no pity or 
distinction made for close relations or common blood. When this rage and evil frenzy subsided, they understood 
the extent of the tragedy and raised their laments to the heavens.’ Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 55 
(trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 98-101).  
798 Gregoras said of the civil wars between Andronikos II and Andronikos III, that: ...ἡ γὰρ τῶν δυοῖν βασιλέων 
διαφορὰ διαφόρους ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ τοὺς ὑπηκόους ποιήσασα κατ’ ἀλλήλων ἐξέμηνε· τέκνα κατὰ γονέων, 
φημὶ, καὶ γονέας κατὰ τέκνων, ἀδελφοὺς κατ’ ἀδελφῶν καὶ κατὰ γειτόνων γείτονας· τὸ δὲ μεῖζον, ἐπισκόπους 
καὶ πρεσβυτέρους κατ’ ἐπισκόπων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ μοναχοὺς κατὰ μοναχῶν. ‘…[in the course of] the 
dispute between the two emperors, the people argued and were incited against one another: I mean, children 
against parents, and parents against children, brothers against brothers and neighbours against neighbours. And, 
even worse, bishops and priests against bishops and priests, and monks against monks.’ Gregoras, Historia, 
ed. Schopen I, 426. Author’s translation. 
799 On the importance and functions of the oikos as an institution of Byzantine society, see Hunger 1967; 
Kazhdan 1982; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 100-101; Kazhdan and Constable 1982: 33-34; Macrides 1990; 
Smythe 2006: 128-129; Angelidi 2013: esp. 158-159; Brubaker and Tougher 2013. 
800 As Demetrios Kydones summarised the civil war between Ioannes V and Andronikos IV in 1385: ‘To the 
foreign wars there has now been added civil strife, which formerly spread destruction everywhere and which 
the fault of all of us has now pushed us to a point beyond repair. Nature is disregarded; family ties are merely 
a name; the one means of life is to betray one’s own race and fellow citizens.’ Kydones, ed. Loenertz II, §309, 





Nikephoros’ Historia Syntomos offers a typical reading: 
On account of the frequent assumptions of imperial power and the 
prevalence of tyranny, the affairs of the empire and of the city were being 
neglected and declined; furthermore, education was being destroyed and 
military organisation crumbled…the enemy were able to overrun the 
Roman politeia with impunity [causing] much slaughter, abduction, and 
the capture of cities.801 
It was not just that social relations had disintegrated, the political institutions of state also 
crumbled during these conflicts. Order was disrupted on all levels, and the damage to 
‘education’ symbolised a deeper loss, for it was always a source of cultural pride that 
separated ‘Roman’ from ‘barbarian’. In addition, the destruction of land and property in the 
course of a conflict represented a serious charge. Confiscations and loss were common 
accusations against emperors during peacetime as well, typically indicating alleged extra-
legal and ‘deplorable’ activities against citizens.802 Therefore, the descent of the state due to 
usurpation constitutes another leitmotif in the histories and another source of wrongdoing. 
In a sign of Byzantine ideological propensities for peace, those blamed by the 
histories for these problems were almost universally the aggressors, the rebels, and in 
particular their leaders. In the words of Leon Diakonos, ‘After the death of the emperor 
Ioannes [I], the magistros Bardas [Skleros]… deceived and misled the common people, and 
prepared a terrible revolt against the emperors…’803 Despite the involvement of the military 
and the ‘common people’, Skleros was assigned sole blame for the revolt. Leon adopted a 
dynastic-legitimist stance, recognising as emperors Basileios II and Constantine VIII. The 
perspective of those who had proclaimed Skleros their emperor was irrelevant because he 
was the aggressor and had engaged in sinful behaviour. Concerning the rebellion of 
                                                 
801 Ἐπεὶ οὖν πυκναὶ τῶν βασιλέων ἐπαναστάσεις ἐγένοντο καὶ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐκράτει τά τε τῆς βασιλείας καὶ τῆς 
πόλεως κατημελεῖτο καὶ διέπιπτε πράγματα, ἔτι μὴν καὶ ή τῶν λόγων ἠφανίζετο παἰδευσις καὶ τὰ τακτικὰ 
διελύετο. ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους τῆς τῶν ‘Ρωμαίων κατατρέχειν ἀδεῶς πολιτείας, φόνοι τε πολλοὶ 
καὶ ἀπαγωγαὶ καὶ πόλεων ἁλώσεις. Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 120-121. Translation adapted. 
Emphasis added. 
802 Kazhdan 1994: 214-216; Cheynet 1990: 166-167. 





Konstantios Doukas in 1079, Attaleiates displays identical biases in writing, ‘Fearing neither 
divine justice, as he was the cause of so many evils for the world… he rebelled against the 
emperor and inducted the soldiers into his most evil mutiny… who also incited the civilian 
populace…’804 Although it is evident that a portion of the military and the public supported 
Konstantios, he was to blame for their subsequent actions. The mutiny was his not theirs. He 
‘inducted’ the troops, and they the civilians. All consequent misdeeds were the result of 
Konstantios’ initial action. Later, when reconciliation was effected by Nikephoros III, and 
the soldiery had renewed fidelity, they reportedly ‘admitted that they had been unreliable 
and deranged, that they had used improper words and veered dangerously away from 
reason…’805 Attaleiates strongly implied that they were fooled into joining Konstantios’ 
revolt because of their credulity, mimicking Leon’s comments that those who had supported 
Skleros were ‘deceived and misled’. In framing the revolts in this fashion the justifications 
for rebellion were ignored, ridiculed, or minimised. Moreover, true consensus was denied to 
the rebel: a common movement was presented as a lie, since it was really the work of a single 
man. Consequently, a usurper’s supporters were chastened for their foolishness but not 
completely alienated from the community. They had been ‘exploited’ by the real guilty party. 
This method of attributing guilt primarily to a single individual was also used against 
Andronikos I. Choniates espoused that, ‘Not only did brother ignore brother and father 
neglect son, if such was to Andronikos’ liking, but they also cooperated with the informers 
in bringing about the utter ruin of their families…’.806 Once again, social disintegration was 
blamed on the person who ultimately had encouraged it, not those who ‘betrayed’ their 
compatriots and perpetuated it. The internecine nature of Andronikos’ usurpation was 
replicated by all levels of society because this was to his liking: the (usurper-)emperor acted 
                                                 
804 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 307 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 560-561). 
805 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 308 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 562-563). Emphasis added. 





as a model. 
Wrongdoing could additionally be explained in ways that distanced it rhetorically 
from stereotypically ‘Roman’ behaviour, and which ‘othered’ participants. A letter of 
Ioannes I proposing reconciliation with the rebel Bardas Phokas (c.970), that Leon Diakonos 
purports to reproduce, states ‘When we heard about the rebellion… we thought that this was 
not so much the result of your initiative, but was rather a consequence of the folly and 
barbarous character of your supporters, who were completely struck by divine madness.’807 
This association of a usurpation with ‘barbarian’ characteristics can be seen elsewhere. 
Writing in the context of the rapid turnover of emperors before the Fourth Crusade, 
Choniates disparaged the actions of Alexios III in deposing Isaakios II. He noted that: 
[Some men had] risen up against one another, disregarding the noble gifts 
of nature because of evil-mindedness and the love for greater glory. It is 
for this reason that the barbarian nations regard the Romans with contempt. 
This they reckoned to be the consequence of all the deplorable events 
which had gone before by which administrations were constantly 
overthrown and one emperor replaced by another.808  
Choniates also asserted that citizens had fled the empire in favour of the stability of barbarian 
nations, and suggested that the Komnenoi and Angeloi usurpers were implementing 
behaviours that they had learned from the barbarian peoples they had dwelled amongst.809  
Traditionally, authors had characterised the dichotomy between ethnic or proto-
national ‘Romans’ and antagonistic ‘outsider’ groups along moral-behavioural lines: 
stereotyping foreigners as bloodthirsty and violent, prone to infighting and civil wars.810 This 
served as a contrast to the idealised peaceful taxis of the empire; hence Theophylaktos, 
                                                 
807 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 115 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 164). Emphasis added. 
808 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 453-454 (trans. Magoulias 249). 
809 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 353, 495-496, 529 (trans. Magoulias 195, 273, 290), ‘…such practice 
[mutilation and execution] he [Andronikos I] copied from the barbarous nations with whom he associated 
when, above all men, he was compelled to wonder far and long.’; ‘These Komnenoi, who sojourned among 
the barbarian nations hostile to the Romans, were the utter ruin of their country…’. 
810 See, for example, Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 368-369 (trans. Magoulias 204). Hinterberger 2011, 
on the depiction of Latins in Byzantine hagiography in accordance with these stereotypes. Cheynet 2013b: 68-





praising Alexios I’s military exploits against the ‘barbarians’, counterintuitively 
characterised Alexios’ andreia in terms of ‘humanity’ - emphasising Prudence, 
Philanthropy, and Mildness, which were typical of the moral superiority of the Rhomaioi.811 
By introducing ‘bloodthirsty-barbarian’ paradigms in order to explain the behaviour of 
rebellious Roman citizens, the wrongdoing and ataxia affecting the empire were made 
apparent. Civil war and usurpation, the reader is to infer, simply were not Roman. By 
extension, those involved in these misdeeds must have been infected by barbarism.812  
These expressions of the political ‘othering’ of opponents were not usually intended 
to connote a permanent ‘outsider’ status. Instead, conflicts and disputes were presented as 
temporary problems. After the civil wars, Constantine I had claimed to be ‘eager to restore 
and rejoin the body of our common empire which had been stricken as if with a terrible 
wound.’813 Elsewhere, Skylitzes made a distinction between the ‘healthy’ (ύγιαῖνον) section 
of the army supporting Basileios II, and the implied ‘unhealthy’ units following Bardas 
Skleros from 976-979.814 Aside from the moral-legitimist ascription of the loyalist troops as 
the healthy element, by presenting civil war as a sickness Skylitzes’ formulation implies that 
it was something that could be made well. Those who were acting unlawfully, and had 
distanced themselves from the Romano-Christian community by acting against God’s will, 
nevertheless could be re-joined with that community. They were a rebellious element of the 
politeia, acting like barbarians, but they could be ‘healed’ through reconciliation; it was only 
when the aforementioned Bardas Phokas rejected a reconciliation that Ioannes declared him 
‘incurably ill’ and dispatched troops against him.815 In outlining disputes as temporary evils 
                                                 
811 Theophylaktos, Opera, ed. Gautier 214-243, esp. 216-219. For this interpretation, see Magdalino 1993: 419. 
See also, Frankopan 2008, on some possible criticisms of Alexios’ military record and handling of the eastern 
campaigns in Theophylaktos’ discourse. 
812 On this implication, see Lefort 1976: 286. Cheynet 1990: 180;  
813 Thus Constantine explained his accession to sole rule, and the period of the civil wars, to Arius of 
Alexandria. Eusebius, Vita Constantini, ed. Winkelmann 2.65 (p.516). Author’s translation. 
814 The distinction is noticed by Stouraitis 2010: 156. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 493 (trans. 
Wortley 301). Translation adapted. 





the severity of the danger to the state and dynasty was masked because the problem would 
assuredly be overcome, peaceful resolution was made possible, and rebels might be 
prompted to acknowledge their error. 
 
Considerations 
Modern sociological approaches to civil wars and coups highlight that social disintegration 
is an inevitable by-product, undermining communal-cohesion and actively working against 
traditional strategies employed to affect peaceful resolutions. A unifying foreign enemy, the 
source of bloodshed and blame, is absent and divisions deepen as each side indicts the other. 
Resolution involves the re-establishment of ‘legitimate authority’, a (perceived) cessation of 
the long-term processes that sparked the conflict, and the reintegration of disparate 
communities.816 In Byzantium blame was apportioned to the figurehead on whose behalf 
misdeeds were understood to have been performed, the aggressor. These individuals became 
the cause of all current and subsequent wrongdoing, accruing guilt and sin as a result. The 
misdeeds of this person were reprehensible: he had distanced himself from God through 
bloodshed and perjury, caused physical damage to the state, and undermined the institutions 
of society itself. Oaths of fidelity and social obligations were broken. Families were torn 
apart because they were no longer able to trust one another. By its very nature civil war was 
antithetical to the imperial ideal, which established that peaceful and humane behaviour were 
signs of virtue. In official rhetoric, supporters went along with a usurper because they had 
been misled or were credulous. Therefore, the attribution of consensus for the usurper’s 
actions was denied, denoting the illegitimacy of his revolt. Real power had always ensured 
that a usurper could accede, but the negative perception of bloodshed affected emperors’ 
public images, making moral leadership harder to espouse and even allowing his accessional 
                                                 





guilt to be transmitted to his successors.  
Barring the indiscriminate destruction of all opponents, after the cessation of 
violence a means of reintegration needed to be affected. The need to justify oneself was 
undoubtedly strong, especially during civil wars where the ‘wronged’ party was not an 
individual, but a significant percentage of one’s countrymen; and when the very acts 
undertaken to assume power undermined one’s claims to deserve it. Revolutions were 
presented as sacrilegious until successful, at which point, success could be explained as a 
product of changes in ‘divine favour’.817 This might offer a rhetorical mask with which to 
justify the accession, but it was a weak defence and guilt could not be so easily discharged. 




                                                 





VI. REPENTANT EMPERORS 
 
Imperial repentance (μετάνοια) emerges as a recurring, if inconsistent, theme in the historical 
narratives of Byzantium and the West.818 Public displays and rhetorical allusions allowed 
rulers associated with transgressions to appear to atone for their sins. The histories 
unambiguously attribute public acts of atonement, or espousals of remorse, to at least eleven 
Byzantine usurper-emperors or their successors, for misdeeds committed in seizing the 
throne. Five other figures were associated with acts that may have been considered 
expressions of remorse.819 To this number must surely be added further episodes that went 
unrecorded. As Dagron revealed, the models that these rulers embraced were provided by 
Christian ideology.820 
 
Penitential models and theology 
For Byzantium, world history was biblical. The chronicle tradition relied upon the biblical 
framework, opening with accounts of the creation of the world, and then progressing through 
the histories of the four kingdoms prophesied in the Book of Daniel, and emphasising the 
‘Roman’.821 Within this framework, the principal example of a ruler seeking to expiate his 
sins was King David who, in the Old Testament, faced rebuke from the prophet Nathan for 
the crime of murdering Uriah and taking his wife Bathsheba as his own. After being informed 
that his firstborn son with Bathsheba would die as a result of divine retribution for this crime, 
David made a confession of guilt and humbled himself before the Lord. Attempting to 
                                                 
818 Schieffer’s influential study of royal penance in the West remains an invaluable starting point for the topic: 
Schieffer 1972: esp. 333-370. See also, de Jong 2011; Hamilton 2001; de Jong 1992; Noble 1980. 
819 See Table 3. 
820 Dagron 2003: 104-124. 
821 On Byzantine conceptions of the past, and the chronicle tradition, see Markopoulos 2006; Macrides and 





supplicate God through acts of penance, he prayed, fasted, and slept upon the ground, but on 
the seventh day of his entreaties the boy died and David’s penance was paid. When the King 
later fathered a second son, Solomon, with Bathsheba the child was said to be loved by the 
Lord and the dynasty continued.822  
The story of David’s rebuke and penance was well known throughout late antique 
and medieval Europe, and was just one iteration of David as a penitent. Through his 
entreaties before God, David expressed the source of his power and demonstrated humility: 
acknowledging guilt, allowing him to be forgiven for his crimes, and his rule to continue.823 
Humility was David’s foremost virtue in Byzantine thought.824 He was cited by monastic 
teachers as a penitential model ‘for the disciplining of the monastic self’,825 and Maximos 
the Confessor’s seventh-century Chapters on Love, quoted David as a verse model for 
penitence that a monk should often repeat.826 Humility and repentance thus provided a means 
of expiating guilt. This model of atonement, although usually without the Old Testament 
ideology of blood for blood, was embraced by numerous emperors in order to redress their 
sins. 
As Dagron noted, although in the work of Zosimus and the mid-tenth-century 
Constantinopolitan Patria Constantine I assumed the guise of a penitent emperor and turned 
to Christianity in order to excise his guilt over the executions of his wife and son,827 wider 
Christian historiography exculpated him of this sin. It named him as a persecuting emperor 
who was suitably punished by God with leprosy and successfully repented for his misdeeds 
                                                 
822 2 Samuel 11-12. David’s repentance is further enumerated in the lines of Psalm 51. 
823 On supplication as an acknowledgement of the source of imperial/royal power, see Hamilton 2001: 181. 
824 The Apophthegmata Patrum, John the Persian 4, ed. Migne 165 (trans. Ward 108) records a saying of abba 
John the Persian cataloguing the virtues of the biblical figures and confirming this view of David. 
825 Krueger 2010: 204. 
826 ‘Look upon my humility and my trouble and forgive all my sins.’ Maximos the Confessor, Chapters on 
Love, ed. Cerasa-Gastaldo I.76 (trans. Berthold 43); Krueger 2010: 204. 
827 Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 2.29; Patria, ed. Preger (trans. Berger 114-117); Dagron 1984: 93; Dagron 
2003: 120. The Augusta Fausta and the Caesar Crispus who were executed in unusual circumstances in 326. 
Accusations of intrigue on Fausta’s part, or an affair between Crispus and his stepmother, have overwhelmingly 





through baptism, prostration, and supplication, echoing David.828 Yet Constantine did not 
become synonymous with the figure of the repentant emperor in later historical thought. 
While sojourning in Rome in 390,829 Theodosius I learned that the populace of 
Thessalonike had broken into revolt killing at least one public official.830 Having recently 
faced a series of domestic crises,831 the emperor’s response was swift and ended in a 
massacre that Christian historical tradition ascribed to ‘imperial wrath’.832 In reply, Ambrose 
of Milan penned a missive rebuking the emperor, accusing him of being responsible for the 
bloodshed, denying him the right to partake in the Eucharist until he had shown remorse for 
the crime, and summoning him to perform his penance in the manner of David.833 
Theodosius initially resisted Ambrose’s demands, but after several months of continued 
criticism he acquiesced. Around Christmas 390, Theodosius appeared outside the Episcopal 
Church in Milan and, after being denied entry by Ambrose, publicly humbled himself by 
weeping and asking to be ‘loosed’ of his sins. He also introduced a law providing a thirty-
day suspension of punishment for those accused of a crime and sentenced to corporal 
punishment.834 With his penance performed Theodosius was welcomed back into the 
                                                 
828 Life of Silvester, ed. Combefis p.279, cited in Dagron 2003: 119 fn.91; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst 
III, 7. On the introduction of the story of Constantine’s leprosy to the Constantine legend, see Fowden 1994: 
153-158. 
829 Vecchio 1992, proposed a date of 389 on the basis of the chronology of near contemporaneous events. 
However, Spring/Summer 390 remains the general consensus. For the principal arguments, see Washburn 
2006: 215, with references to secondary literature. 
830 Although the reliability of this version of events has been questioned, the general had supposedly ordered 
the arrest of a popular charioteer on charges of homosexuality and the attempted rape of a male cupbearer in 
the days preceding a race. The population of Thessalonike grew discontent with the extended detainment of 
the charioteer and called for his release. Eventually the misunderstanding grew into hostile revolt, the populace 
rioted, and the magister militum Butheric was killed. Butheric’s status as a prominent Gothic general in the 
military has also suggested an ethnic component to the uprising - as discontent with the position of Germans 
within the army was rife. On this, see Gregory 2010: 95; Frakes 2010, replete with references to the substantial 
corpus of secondary literature on this episode. 
831 The usurpation of Magnus Maximus from 383-388, upheaval in Antioch in 387, and Callinicum and 
Constantinople in 388. On the influence of these earlier crises on Theodosius’ response to the events in 
Thessalonike, see McLynn 1994: 291-315. On events in Antioch, see Browning 1952. 
832 Washburn 2006: 216, n.5. 
833 Ambrose, Letter on the Massacre at Thessalonica (Letter 51) trans. Liebeschuetz and Hill 263-269. 





Christian congregation.835  
The historicity of this event has long proved problematic,836 and it is interesting to 
note that no extant contemporary pagan source discussed either the massacre or the incident 
that sparked it.837 Nevertheless, the story of Theodosius’ penance entered into the cultural 
memory of the Christian world where, like King David, Theodosius became a prominent 
model of royal repentance. When the Carolingian emperor Louis I prostrated himself and 
confessed his sins before the assembled secular and ecclesiastic dignitaries at Attigny (822), 
the Astronomer recorded that he was imitating Theodosius.838 In twelfth-century Byzantium, 
Attaleiates, noted how ‘the extremely merciful’ Nikephoros III restored Theodosius’ law 
requiring a thirty-day halt of punishment, and included a reiteration of ‘the blessed emperor’ 
Theodosius’ penance.839 Although there was no suggestion that Nikephoros himself had 
done anything wrong, the association with Theodosius the Great, as also for Louis, can only 
have enhanced his prestige. By then, the Life of Ambrose, replete with Davidic comparisons 
for Theodosius’ repentance, had been integrated into Byzantine menologia.840 
Five centuries after Theodosius, Leon VI found himself in a similar position. The sin 
on this occasion was not bloodshed, but tetragamy. After Leon’s marriages to Theophano 
                                                 
835 Sozomen, Histoire Ecclésiastique ed. Bidez 7.25; Theodoret, Histoire Ecclésiastique ed. Parmentier and 
Hansen 5.17-18; Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 268-269 (trans. Jeffreys 188); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 72-73 (trans. Mango and Scott 111); Georgios Kedrenos, Compendium 
Historiarum, ed. Bekker I, 559. 
836 Scholarship has been divided between two principal schools: one, accepting the source materials largely at 
face value; the other, recognising the highly partial nature of these materials and which has attempted a 
reconstruction of events. Moorhead 1999: 192-196; McLynn 1994: 317-330; Kolb 1980; Schieffer 1972: 333-
370. See also, Larson 1970: 297-301, who suggests that the sources have no historical reliability.  
837 Frakes 2010: 53, 59 n.59, noting that as there is no mention of the events at Thessalonike in Zosimus it was 
unlikely that his source, Eunapius, recorded the event either, and that Ammianus Marcellinus’ allusions to later 
events include praise for Theodosius, but no mention of the massacre. 
838 Anonymi vita Hludovici, ed. Rau p.314; de Jong 1992: 31-32. Louis was atoning for causing the blinding 
and subsequent death of his nephew. He was reconciled with his brothers after the ceremony. 
839 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 313-314 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 570-573). See also Kedrenos, 
Historiarum Compendium, ed. Bekker I, 559. 





Martiniake,841 Zoe Zaoutzaina,842 and Eudokia Baïna,843 there was still no living son to 
succeed him. Therefore, when his mistress, Zoe Karbonopsina,844 gave birth to the future 
emperor Constantine VII, Leon contravened canon law, taking Karbonopsina as his fourth 
wife in order to legitimise the boy’s future claims to the throne.845 Even after Constantine’s 
baptism, he refused to separate from her.846 Patriarch Mystikos847 excommunicated Leon 
and, at the Imperial Doors, denied him access to Hagia Sophia for the Christmas celebrations 
(906) and Epiphany (January 907). On both occasions the emperor appeared humbled before 
the doors of the Church, performed proskynesis and shed tears.848 On both occasions he was 
granted access to the metatorion849 rather than the nave, and via the right-hand aisle. A 
church council convened to attempt to reach an economy over the marriage. After meetings 
with various metropolitans during which Leon displayed his remorse, only Mystikos’ 
opposition remained to prevent it.850 Leon acted decisively by accusing him of conspiring 
with the rebel Andronikos Doukas,851 and Mystikos resigned himself to confinement at the 
Galakrenai monastery. Thereafter, Leon returned to Hagia Sophia, but always as a humbled 
penitent, standing and weeping at the holy railings of the chancel.852 
                                                 
841 Tougher 1997: 134-140; Alexakis 1995; Rydén 1986: 545-546; Karlin-Hayter 1969. 
842 Tougher 1997: 140-145; Karlin-Hayter 1969: 13. 
843 Tougher 1997: 149-152; Schreiner 1991: 190. 
844 Garland 1999: 118-123; Tougher 1997: 152-153. 
845 Leon’s marriage to Karbonopsina was clearly delayed until after the birth of a son. The sources claim that 
Zoe lived with Leon, but remained uncrowned until the birth of an heir. Leon was evidently unwilling to risk 
another unpopular marriage for no practical political benefit. Tougher 1997: 152-153. The marriage took place 
in April 906 and, in place of the patriarch, was solemnised by the priest ‘Thomas’. On the background to the 
marriage, see Dagron et al 1993: 188-194; Tougher 1997: ch.6, and esp. pp.152-153. 
846 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 185 (trans. Wortley 179). As Tougher 1997: 157 points out, the 
baptism of Constantine VII was a de facto declaration of his legitimacy, but Leon may have been compelled 
to remain married to Karbonopsina in order to secure her legitimacy also, to avoid potential charges against 
her from importuning Constantine. Magdalino 1988b: 114, suggests that Leon’s refusal to separate was a result 
of his sincere love for Karbonopsina and, more importantly, his own belief that he was above canon law. 
847 With the urging of the metropolitans led by Arethas of Caesarea. On Arethas’ role as a leading voice of 
opposition to the marriage, see Tougher 1997: 158, 160. 
848 Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter pp.70-71, 78-79, 84-85.  
849 The small chamber in the southern aisle of the church where the emperor changed his robes for ceremonials. 
Kazhdan et al 1991: 1353. 
850 Vita Euthymii CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter pp.78-84. 
851 Vita Euthymii CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter pp. 90-91. On Doukas’ revolt, see Karlin-Hayter 1966. 





Leon’s repentance may even have occasioned the addition of the mosaic above the 
Imperial Doors of Hagia Sophia. This mosaic, late ninth- or early tenth-century in style, 
depicts an unidentified emperor performing proskynesis before an enthroned Christ. Figures 
of the Virgin and an archangel in military garb accompany those of Christ and the emperor. 
The composition is deliberately dissonant. A large space remains unoccupied on the right, 
and was not subjected to modification.853 As Dagron noted, the lack of identification for the 
emperor transformed the scene into a generic portrayal of imperial humility. Moreover, the 
positions of the Virgin and Archangel in relation to Christ invoke a Deesis scene, with the 
Theotokos intervening on behalf of the imperial supplicant, so that the archangel (Michael?) 
will waive his punishment.854 The imperial figure mimics that of David in Byzantine 
Psalters, again evoking a biblical precedent that emperors might choose to emulate.855 It 
visually memorialised a ritual of imperial penitence at the ceremonial heart of 
Constantinople. 
Yet expressions of imperial remorse and penance were not restricted to this format 
alone. Dagron’s examination of imperial repentance is limited by its focus on emperor-
patriarch relations, and the strict ceremonial format in which he viewed it. Cases that did not 
comply with the Davidic/Theodosian penitential exemplar, a public display of prostration 
and confession to an intercessory figure like the patriarch, were not considered. However, 
contemporary Byzantines noticed and attributed expressions of imperial repentance to other 
acts as well. 
 The Orthodox theological position on penance remained unclear throughout the 
                                                 
853 Mango 1962: 24-25; Hawkins 1968: 151-166; Cormack 1981: 138-141. The suggestion of Schminck 1985: 
211-234, that the emperor is Basileios I, and that he was originally accompanied by a figure of Patriarch Photios 
that was removed in a later damnatio, cannot be supported by the material evidence. This does not rule out an 
identification with Basileios, but Photios certainly was not shown.  
854 Dagron 2003: 115. 





history of the empire.856 Originally a public act, after the fourth century, penance generally 
took the form of a private confession followed by a prayer of absolution pronounced by a 
priest. However, churchmen hesitated to define its status among the church mysteria, and 
frequently associated it with monastic tonsure or the anointing of the sick.857 The practice 
connoted a form of ascetic spiritual direction, and monasticism was associated with the 
penitential lifestyle.858 Sacramental penance, a formal reconciliation with the church, was 
only necessary when an excommunication had occurred.859 Ascetic and canonical literature 
frequently mentioned penitential punishments, periods of excommunication, prostration, and 
charitable works in this category. Absolution was only required when mortal sins (murder, 
apostasy, adultery) had been committed, and even non-ordained monks could absolve 
sinners. In euchologia absolutions usually took the form of a prayer of remission.860 Sin was 
never reduced to a strictly legal crime to be judged and punished.861 The continual role of 
the church in providing asylum and penitential rehabilitation to killers, in contravention of 
Roman law, has been well documented.862 Christian salvation-ideology ‘healed’ the sinner 
through the performance of any of a variety of penitential practices. Offenders therefore had 
recourse to numerous pathways to forgiveness and reconciliation with God. Formal public 
absolutions from a representative of the church, the Theodosian model, were just one 
format.863  
In the early fifteenth century, Manuel II reiterated much of this theological stance in 
                                                 
856 Meyendorff 1983: 195-196; Pargoire 1932: 347. 
857 Meyendorff 1983: 196. 
858 Meyendorff 1983: 195. 
859 Meyendorff 1983: 195. 
860 Pargoire 1932: 348; Meyendorff 1983: 196. 
861 Meyendorff 1983: 196. 
862 Macrides 1988. On the disparate views of church and state towards punishment and sin see the twelfth-
century commentaries of Balsamon. Syntagma I, ed. Rhalles and Potles 188-191. 
863 Meyendorff 1983: 195, has noted that, in his nine sermons tackling the subject of ‘Repentance’, John 
Chrysostom only refers to the church as a direct source of absolution via confession on one occasion. John 





his sixth Ethico-Political Oration composed for his son.864 He established that sin and 
repentance were innate to the human experience and affected all people regardless of social 
status. An emperor, like anybody else, could commit a sin and find himself in need of 
repentance. Manuel asserted that human law was not the same as God’s law, and, therefore, 
sinners were not lost causes. God, because of His philanthropia, forgave all those who 
confessed and sought atonement. All that was required for salvation was an 
acknowledgement of self-responsibility, and repentance. Emulating the divine example by 
performing acts of philanthropia provided a means of curing one’s sins.865 In expressing this 
sentiment Manuel evoked long-held associations of philanthropia, moral rulership, and 
imperial worthiness in classical Greek and Byzantine thought.866 Ostensibly both public and 
private acts might be considered expressions of imperial worthiness in emulation of classical 
and divine example, but also proofs of atonement. 
In her analysis of Oration VI, Kakkoura identifies several instances in which Manuel 
alluded to the usurpation of his brother, Andronikos IV. After asserting that he had ‘seen 
some people hated by their parents’ (Andronikos), Manuel reaffirmed that God never 
deserted those who sinned, but kept trying to secure their salvation.867 Considering persons 
deemed ‘disgraceful vessels’, another probable reference to Andronikos’ usurpation,868 
Manuel again emphasised that all misdeeds could be overcome through repentance. Niketas 
Choniates espoused a similar sentiment in relation to Anna Komnene’s second failed-attempt 
to secure the throne for her husband. Ioannes II uncovered his sister’s conspiracy and 
lamented her disloyalty, intending to disinherit her. This was prevented when the megas 
                                                 
864 Manuel II, Seven Ethico-Political Orations, (Oration VI), ed. Migne pp. 484-528; ed. Kakkoura 404-443, 
hereafter references are to Kakkoura’s recent critical edition. 
865 Manuel invokes the topos of the ‘medication of repentance’ (φαρμάκου τῆς μετανοίας). Manuel II, Seven 
Ethico-Political Orations, (Oration VI), ed. Kakkoura 406. 
866 Constantelos 1992: esp. 33-42, 69-101; McGuckin 2010. 
867 Manuel II, Seven Ethico-Political Orations, (Oration VI), ed. Kakkoura 427 (Text); 144-145 (Commentary). 





domestikos, Ioannes Axouchos, reminded him that ‘[she remains] the sister of a virtuous 
emperor and by repentance will recover’.869 Theoretically, the sins accrued in usurping the 
throne were not insurmountable. In adopting the guise of a repentant emperor a usurper could 
exploit a historically and theologically established means of atonement for wrongdoing.  
Four cases, those of Romanos I, Ioannes I, Michael IV, and Alexios I, typify the 
varied strategies and perceptions of imperial repentance in Byzantium, and allow us to 




The final section of Theophanes Continuatus, early in the narrative of Constantine VII’s 
reign, gives a dramatic report of the circumstances of Romanos’ final atonement. We are 
told that the former emperor, then living as an exiled monk on the island of Prote, was visited 
one night by a prophetic dream that took the form of a ‘Last Judgment’. Romanos saw 
himself naked, being dragged towards a vast fire that occupied the Tzykanisterion of the 
Great Palace and which was tended by a number of demons. A representation of hell.870 
Romanos witnessed two figures being burned alive: his son Constantine, and Bishop 
Anastasios of Herakleia. Romanos was ushered ever closer to the conflagration, but was 
saved at the last moment through the intervention of the Theotokos who stopped his escorts, 
entreated them to show mercy, and then clothed his naked figure.871 According to the 
                                                 
869 ...ἀγαθοῦ τοίνυν βασιλέως καὶ εἰσέτι κασίγνητος μένουσα ἐκ μετανοἰας τὸ φίλτρον αὖθις ἀνακαλέσεται... 
Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 11 (trans. Magoulias 8). Emphasis added. The exact date is unclear but the 
attempted coup on behalf of Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger was uncovered early in Ioannes’ reign, and 
probably very soon after his accession while still securing his position. Cheynet 1990: 103. 
870 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 438-439. For a similar scene of sinners being thrown into hellfire, and 
a last-minute intervention by ‘Mercy’, see The Life of Saint Basil the Younger, ed. Sullivan, Talbot, and 
McGrath 434-699. On middle-Byzantine descriptions of hell more broadly, including a brief account of 
Romanos’ dream sequence, see Ševčenko 2009.  





Continuator, when Romanos awoke the next day, he learned the truth of this dream. The 
bishop had died, and Constantine had been killed in a failed attempt to escape from prison.872  
The Continuator asserts that this premonitory dream shocked Romanos so greatly 
that he performed acts of penance in order to save his soul. On Maundy Thursday 947,873 he 
appeared before three hundred monks, including representatives from Rome, and performed 
a ritual humiliation. He appeared naked, and read his sins from a book one by one, asking 
forgiveness for each. The assembled monks wept for him and chanted the ‘Kyrie Eleison’.874 
The climax of this ceremony was a whipping session before the Communion table, where 
Romanos was insulted by a neophyte and then received absolution.875 With the ceremonial 
repentance completed, he then dispatched the book listing his sins, together with a suitable 
donative, to the monk Dermokaites of Olympus, receiving in exchange a fortnight of prayers 
for his soul. The latter reportedly proved effective when Dermokaites heard a voice chant 
three times ‘God’s mercy has conquered’, and found Romanos’ book of sins miraculously 
blank. Upon Romanos’ death the book was buried with him.876 
The story is unique to the Continuation and, as a product of Constantine’s court, has 
nakedly propagandist overtones. As Calofonos notes, ‘the dream suitably marks the rebirth 
of the Macedonian dynasty with the accession of Constantine VII… [and reaffirms the] 
divine sanction of the dynasty’s legitimacy.’877 In other works produced at Constantine’s 
behest, his low opinion of Romanos was made evident. The burial places of the Lekapenoi 
were brazenly omitted from the imperial list of the Catalogus sepulchrorum.878 On 
                                                 
872 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 438; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 236 (trans. Wortley 
228), confirming the cause of Constantine’s death. 
873 The exact year is not given, however, as the alleged dream happened after Constantine Lekapenos’ death 
(c.946-948), before the attempted coup to restore Romanos (c.947) and Romanos’ death (948), 947 is the most 
likely period. On the chronology, see Runciman 1929: 236. 
874 ‘Lord, have mercy.’ Derived from 1 Chronicles 16:34 ‘…give thanks to the Lord; for he is good; for his 
mercy endures forever…’, and Luke 18:9-14 ‘God, have mercy on me, a sinner.’ 
875 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 439-440. 
876 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 440. 
877 Calofonos 2014: 116. 





Administration, intended as a guide to governance for Constantine’s son, included far more 
overt criticism879 and even alluded to Romanos’ fate, ‘…the end which came upon him… 
through these headstrong acts is sufficient warning to restrain anyone thinking to emulate 
his evil deeds.’880 The exact nature of the sins for which Romanos atoned were not listed by 
the Continuator, however, a reader would have little difficulty inferring what they were. 
Romanos had been divested of imperial attire in the dream: suggestive in itself, but when 
coupled with his son and co-emperor’s death, a co-emperor who had usurped his father’s 
throne and had been displaced by Constantine VII in turn, the sin of usurpation becomes 
more distinct. The ‘official’ tale was a warning also, and Romanos’ opportunity to repent 
served multiple purposes. The grandfather of Romanos II, and father of the Empress Helena, 
could not brazenly be accused of usurpation and condemned to eternal damnation. To do so 
could have brought Helena and Romanos II’s legitimacy into question. Therefore, through 
an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and a return to correct, Macedonian led, order, 
Romanos was spared and his lesson was learned. He humbly accepted exile and tonsure in 
marked contrast to his unrepentant son, Constantine, whose attempted escape upset order 
and resulted in his death. The contrasting fates of father and son reinforced the core lesson. 
Skylitzes also gave details of Romanos’ attempts at atonement, although his narrative 
bears little resemblance to that of the Continuator. The emperor received no mention after 
his unwilling tonsure until his death (June 948), and even then only a single line records the 
event.881 Instead, in the final pages concerning Romanos’ reign we are told that, ‘To 
propitiate the divinity for the oaths he had broken and in repentance of his misdeeds in 
                                                 
879 ‘Ο κύρις ‘Ρωμανός, ὁ βασιλεύς, ἰδιώτης καὶ ἀγράμματος ἄνθροπος ἧν καὶ οὒτε τῶν ἄνωθεν ἐν βασιλείοις 
τεθραμμένων, οὔτε τῶν παρηκολουθηκότων ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῖς ‘Ρωμαϊκοῖς ἐθισμοῖς, οὔτε ἀπὸ γένους βασιλείου 
καὶ εὐενοῦς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐθαδέστερον καὶ ἐξουσιαστικώτερον τὰ πολλὰ κατεπράττετο... ‘The lord 
Romanos, the emperor, was a common and illiterate man, and not from among those who have been raised in 
the palace, and have followed the Roman customs from the beginning; nor was he of imperial and noble lineage, 
and for this reason in most of his actions he was too arrogant and despotic…’ De Administrando Imperio, ed. 
Moravcsik and Jenkins 72-73. Author’s translation. 
880 De Administrando Imperio, ed. Moravcsik and Jenkins 74-77. 





breaking pacts, the emperor Romanos undertook a number of good works which it would be 
a severe task to list.’882 By this point in Romanos’ reign, and Skylitzes’ narrative, the 
emperor’s favoured son and heir, Christophoros, had died.883 His death appears to have 
greatly affected Romanos, and we know from solidi minted at this time (but Skylitzes does 
not report this) that Constantine VII replaced Christophoros in precedence. The class X issue 
depicted a beardless Constantine, now returned to the coinage, standing beside Romanos.884 
The broken oaths and pacts that Skylitzes referred to may be a reference to his promises to 
Constantine VII that were broken in the process of supplanting him. Skylitzes essentially 
confirms this reading in the opening chapter of Constantine’s reign, which recalls that 
‘[Romanos] broke his oaths (and he had bound himself with most awesome oaths that he 
would never aspire to be emperor) and proclaimed himself emperor’.885 The choice of 
Constantine rather than another of his own sons might suggest that Romanos then felt 
remorse for these actions. However, the closest the narrative comes to a gathering of three 
hundred monks is to tell us later that ‘he held all monks in high honour, and especially 
Sergios [the grand-nephew] of Photios.’886 In Skylitzes, Romanos’ penance was not ritual, 
but a collection of public works and acts of philanthropia. He paid the debts of rich and poor, 
‘burnt the promissory notes at the porphyry omphalos of the Chalke’, paid the rents of many, 
and provided for the monastery of the Myrelaion where his tomb had been prepared.887 
It is interesting too that, in his description of the Myrelaion, the Continuator noted 
                                                 
882 ‘Ιλασκόμενος δὲ τὸν θεὸν ὁ βασιλεὺς ‘Ρωμανὸς διὰ τὴν τῶν ὃρκων παράβασιν, καὶ μετανοῶν ἐφ’ οἶς κακῶς 
παρεσπόνδησεν, ἐποίει μὲν καὶ ἄλλας εὐποιΐας, ἅς καταλέγειν ἔργον... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. 
Thurn 231 (trans. Wortley 222-223). 
883 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 420; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 226 (trans. Wortley 
219). 
884 Grierson 1973: III.2, 534-535. 
885 ... ἀλλὰ τοὺς δεδομένους ἀθετήσας ὅρκους (ἦν γὰρ φρικωδεστάταις ὁρκωμοσίαις ἑαυτὸν καταδεσμήσας, 
μὴ ἄν ποτε βασιλείας ἔφεσιν ἐσχηκέναι) ἑαυτόν τε ἀνηγόρευσε βασιλέα... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. 
Thurn 233 (trans. Wortley 225). Author’s translation. 
886 ‘Ο δὲ βασιλεὺς ‘Ρωμανὸς καὶ πάντας μὲν ἐτίμα τοὺς μοναχούς, διαφερόντως δὲ τὸν μοναχὸν Σέργιον τὸν 
ἀνεψιὸν Φωτίου τοῦ πατριάρχου... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 232 (trans. Wortley 224); 
following Symeon Magister, ed. Wahlgren 339; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 327. 
887 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 231 (trans. Wortley 223). Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 





that Romanos moved the remains of the emperor Maurice and his family to the new 
construction.888 No motive was provided, but in suggesting the memory of Maurice, 
including the executions of Maurice’s sons before his own eyes, allusions to Romanos’ own 
circumstances may have been evoked. The reburial itself may have been another act of 
atonement for usurpation. 
Nevertheless, we have two accounts that agree that Romanos was remorseful near 
the end of his life, but which diverge in their descriptions of his expiation. Since Holmes has 
demonstrated Skylitzes’ reliance upon the Continuator’s account for this period, and given 
the provocative nature of Romanos’ penitence in the Continuator’s version, the dream’s 
omission is particularly circumspect.889 Its legitimist propaganda and Continuatus’ 
circulation in court circles890 might suggest that the entire story was concocted. Political 
sympathies were already divided between loyalists of Constantine VII, Romanos I, and 
Stephanos Lekapenos.891 The story invited sympathy for the repentant ex-emperor, but 
would have served as a humbling exemplar for his more troublesome adherents. This 
conclusion is problematic, however, since the invention would have been great, and the 
ritualised penance, although probably exaggerated by contempt, is not exceptional. 
Humiliation through prostration, the confession of sins, begging for mercy, and finally being 
granted forgiveness and reconciliation with the Christian community, was fundamental to 
penitential rituals of the wider medieval world. It was precisely through these acts that the 
                                                 
888 …ἐν οἷς φασὶ συναποκεῖσθαι Μαυρίκιον σὺν τοῖς παισίν· ἃ καὶ ἀπετέθη ἐν τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως ‘Ρωμανοῦ μονῇ 
ἤτοι εἰς τὸ Μυρέλαιον. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 404. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 
231 (trans. Wortley 223), does not mention the translation of the remains in his account of the Myrelaion. 
889 Holmes 2005: esp.126-128 and n.6. See also the conclusions of Flusin and Cheynet reprinted in translation 
in the introduction to Wortley 2010: xxii-xxiii. 
890 Calofonos 2014: 98-101 and esp. 116-117 n.90. 
891 An attempted coup, with the aim of restoring Romanos to power, was thwarted in its early stages c.947/948. 
The parakoimomenos Theophanes was implicated and the conspirators exiled. A second, more serious, 
attempted coup with the aim of establishing Stephanos Lekapenos was then uncovered; Leon Kladon, Gregoras 
of Macedonia, a certain Theodosios, Stephanos Lekapenos’ chief attendant, Ioannes the Rhaiktor, and the 
informer Michael Diabolinos, were implicated in the attempt. Their properties were seized and their persons 
subjected to rhinotomy before being sentenced to exile. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 238-239 





sinner was brought to reconciliation with God.892 The solution to the lacuna instead appears 
to be Skylitzes’ own narrative voice. The story was deliberately ignored in order to attack 
Romanos’ historical image and frame the Lekapenoi as historic wrongdoers. Holmes has 
identified other redactions by Skylitzes of the Continuator’s narrative that serve to omit 
praise for Romanos.893 An excessive display of remorse, possibly evoking pity, would 
detract from the damaging image Skylitzes cultivated. By contrast, the maltreated 
Constantine VII, who had elevated Lekapenos ‘with a most unwilling heart’,894 could emerge 
morally superior from his struggle against him. Both accounts were propaganda pieces on 
behalf of Constantine and the question of remorse was a crucial consideration in their 
construction, albeit exploited in very different ways. 
 
Ioannes I 
In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Nikephoros II in 969,895 Ioannes 
Tzimiskes sought to solidify his position. According to Leon Diakonos and Skylitzes, after 
securing the Great Palace and promoting his supporters, Tzimiskes relieved the former 
emperor’s devotees of their commands and ordered the exile of Nikephoros’ relatives.896 The 
same night, as his supporters continued proclaiming him throughout the city,897 he proceeded 
to Hagia Sophia with a few of his men in order to be crowned with the imperial diadem by 
                                                 
892 Dalewski 2008: esp. 47-48, 90 n.12; Hamilton 2001; de Jong 1992: 29. 
893 Holmes 2005: esp. 136-138. 
894 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 233 (trans. Wortley 225), a quotation of Homer’s Iliad, 4.43. 
895 Nikephoros was assassinated in a coup involving disaffected military officials: Ioannes I, Michael Bourtzes, 
Isaakios Brachamios, Leon Balantes, Leon Pediasimos, and Atzypotheodoros. On the factors that likely 
motivated their involvement in Ioannes’ coup, and an overview of their careers, see McGrath 1996: esp. 89-
90; Morris 1994: 212; Cheynet 1990: 227-328;  
896 Nikephoros’ brother, Leon the kouropalates, and the patrikios Nikephoros (Leon’s son) were exiled to 
Methymne on Lesbos. The patrikios and doux, Bardas the Younger was relieved of command and exiled to 
Amaseia, capital of the Armeniakon theme, where Tzimiskes’ loyalists were particularly influential. Leon 
Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 95-96 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 144-146); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. 
Thurn 284-285 (trans. Wortley 271-272). On these individuals, see Cheynet 1986: 307-309. 





the patriarch’s hand.898 However, Polyeuktos refused him access to the Church, saying in 
the Synopsis that ‘a person whose hands were wet from the freshly spilled and still warm 
blood of a kinsman was unworthy to enter a church of God, but he must show deeds of 
repentance without delay, and only then gain permission to tread the ground of the house of 
the Lord.’ Skylitzes further noted how, ‘Ioannes humbly accepted the punishment and 
promised that he would perform it all. He did, however, give the justification that it was not 
through him that Nikephoros had been killed, but by Balantes and Atzypotheodoros, and at 
the urging of the Empress.’899 Tzimiskes’ association with bloodguilt was clear.  
Leon, although praising the minimal blood spilled, remarked that the murder of 
Nikephoros was an ‘unholy and abominable deed, loathsome to God’, and his opening lines 
on Tzimiskes’ reign stated simply that ‘Nikephoros was murdered’.900 He was also clearly 
shocked by the desecration of the emperor’s corpse, taking care to name those responsible 
for its mutilation901 and noting that it remained unattended outside the palace for an entire 
day before being hastily transported to the heroon of the Holy Apostles.902 In Skylitzes, the 
vivid charge of bloodguilt, first openly proclaimed by Polyeuktos, was then subtly worked 
into the narrative in other ways. A story of the virtuous monk, and later patriarch of Antioch, 
                                                 
898 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 95-99 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 144-148); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 284-285 (trans. Wortley 271-272). 
899 ...μὴ ἄξιον εἷναι φήσας ἑπιβῆναι θείου ναοῦ νεαρῷ καὶ ἀτμίζοντι ἔτι τῷ συγγενικῷ αἵματι σταζομένας τὰς 
χεῖρας ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σπεῦσαι ἔργα μετανοίας ἐνδείξασθαι, καὶ οῦτως ἐφίεσθαι πατεῖν ἔδαφος οἴκου κυρίου. 
τοῦ δὲ ‘Ιωάννου ἠπίως δεξαμένου τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν καὶ πάντα πρᾶζαι μετ’ εὐπειθείας ἐπαγγειλαμένου, 
ἀπολογησαμένου δ’, ὅτι καὶ αὐτόχειρ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐγένετο τοῦ Νικηφόρου, ἀλλ’ ὁ Βαλάντης καὶ ὁ 
Ἀτζυποθεόδωρος ἐπιτροπῇ τῆς δεσποίνης... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 285 (trans. Wortley 
272). Translation adapted. Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 98-99 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 147-148), 
offers a slightly different account in which Balantes’ name alone is volunteered, and only after Polyeuktos had 
asked Tzimiskes to point out the emperor’s murderer. 
900 …‘Ο δέ γε ᾽Ιωάννης, ἐπεὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον θεοστυγὲς καὶ ἀνόσιον μῦσος εἰργάσατο… Τοῦ δὲ αὐτοκράτορος 
Νικηφόρου τὸν τρόπον, ὃν εἰρηταί μοι, ἀναιρεθέντος …ἐν γὰρ ταῖς μεγίσταις τῶν πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς, 
πολλῆς, ὡς εἰκὸς, στάσεως ἀναῤῥιζομένης καὶ ταραχῆς, τότε, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως, παρατυχὸν εὐκοσμἰα τις καὶ 
βαθεῖα σιγὴ τὸν δῆμον κατέσχε, τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Νικηφόρου ἀναιρεθέντος, καὶ τινος ἑνὸς τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν 
ἑτέρου μηδενὸς κἂν ἐπὶ κόῤῥης εἰληφόντος κόνδυλον... Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 90, 93, 98 (trans. 
Talbot and Sullivan 140, 143, 147). 
901 Leon names Atzypotheodoros as the individual responsible. Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 91 (trans. 
Talbot and Sullivan 140). 





Thomas, foretold the proclamation of Tzimiskes ‘but warned him not to be in a hurry, as 
God was going to raise him up to imperial heights… [and to] beware lest by foolishly rushing 
to possess the throne he destroy his own soul.’903 The prophetic nature of the warning was 
evidently intended to reveal that this was exactly what had happened to Tzimiskes through 
Nikephoros’ murder. Skylitzes’ later comment that ‘[the Romans knew] they had God on 
their side, He who has no wish to come to the aid of princes with unclean hands, but always 
helps the victims of injustice…’,904 may be read as comparison rebuking the Rus prince 
Sviatoslav, who had just needlessly killed three hundred Bulgars on the basis of a 
‘suspicion’, but praising Tzimiskes who was leading the Roman forces and had now 
successfully repented for his own bloodguilt to win them divine favour. 
The terms of the penance (ἐπιτίμησιν) that Polyeuktos imposed, as reported by Leon 
and Skylitzes, shows signs of the emperor’s early efforts to minimise his association with 
this bloodguilt. Empress Theophano, named by Tzimiskes as the instigator of the crime, was 
to be removed from the palace and exiled along with Nikephoros’ actual murderers now that 
they had been named.905  
The stated motives for Theophano’s involvement vary between sources and betray 
the efforts of Tzimiskes’ propagandists to further shift the burden of guilt onto her. Psellos’ 
Historia Syntomos and the Epitome of Zonaras inveigh that Nikephoros had intended to 
break his agreement with her and have Basileios and Constantine castrated in order that he 
might subvert the succession.906 Others, including Skylitzes, propose that the empress had 
                                                 
903 …καὶ παρεγγυησάμενον μὴ ἐπισπεῦσαι, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ μέλλοντος αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὕψος 
ἀναβιβάσαι, ἢ μὴν γινώσκειν, ὡς, εἰ ὀλιγώρως διατεθεὶς ἐπιταχύνει τὴν τῆς βασιλείας κατάσχεσιν, τῆς ἑαυτοῦ 
ψυχῆς ἐπίβουλος ἔσεται... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 286 (trans. Wortley 273).  
904 οἱ δὲ ‘Ρωμαῖοι ταῖς εξ ὑπογύου νίκαις γαυρούμενοι καὶ τὴν τὰ πάντα κρῖναι μέλλουσαν μάχην 
προσεκδεχόμενοι, εἰδότες δ’, ὅτι καὶ θεὸν συλλήτορα ἕξουσιν, οὐ τοῖς ἀδίκων χειρῶν ἄρχουσι φιλοῦντα, ἀλλὰ 
τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις διὰ παντὸς ἐπαρήγειν... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 299 (trans. Wortley 285).  
905 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 98-99 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 147-148); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 285 (trans. Wortley 272). 
906 Psellos, Historia Syntomos, ed. Aerts 100-101; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 516-





grown impatient with Nikephoros’ celibacy and endeavoured to manoeuvre Tzimiskes 
(whom she had intended to marry before Nikephoros) into power.907 In the latter version, 
Theophano was motivated by desire, she was to be perceived as an adulteress and politically 
treacherous. Skylitzes’ narrative even extended these characteristics into her past. Rather 
than reporting Theophano’s links to the (aristocratic) Krateros family,908 he asserted that she 
was the daughter of an innkeeper, that she had helped Romanos II to poison his father and 
then urged him to expel his mother from the palace in order to secure her own position,909 
and that she had been instrumental in procuring the death of the former co-emperor 
Stephanos Lekapenos, then exiled in Methymne, Lesbos.910 Strugnell shows that these 
accusations cast Theophano as the archetypal ‘Eve’ figure corrupting the men around her, 
and that it was for this reason that Skylitzes avoided reporting the rumour that Nikephoros 
intended to harm her sons, so that she would not be pitied nor her deeds excused.911 The 
success of this image can be read in the words of Ioannes of Melitene’s epitaph for 
Nikephoros, in which the emperor ‘Is victim of a woman and sword… Nikephoros who 
conquered all but Eve.’912 
Tzimiskes complied with the patriarch’s terms. Theophano was expelled from the 
palace. Balantes, Nikephoros’ killer, and Atzypotheodoros, the corpse’s beheader, were also 
exiled.913 Despite Leon’s statement that ‘Justice’ later pursued all of those involved in the 
                                                 
removal of the basileis from Nikephoros’ coinage may have contributed to this belief. On the coins, see 
Morrisson 2013: 75. 
907 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 279 (trans. Wortley 268); Michael Psellos, Historia Syntomos, 
ed. Aerts 100-103. 
908 Cheynet 2006: 17. 
909 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 246, 252 (trans. Wortley 237, 243); Strugnell 2006: 126. 
910 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 255 (trans. Wortley 246), who links the murder with 
Theophano’s efforts to secure the throne against potential intrigues. 
911 Strugnell 2006: 126-127 and n.48. 
912 … πάρεργον οὖτος καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ ζίφους... ὦ πλὴν γυναικὸς τὰ δ’ ἄλλα Νικηφόρος. Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 282-283 (trans. Wortley 270). Translation adapted. 
913 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 285-286 (trans. Wortley 272-273); Leon Diakonos, Historia, 
ed. Hase 98-99 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 147-148), offers a slightly different account in which Balantes’ 





murder, none of the other participants were named as suffering as a result.914 Instead, the 
exiles bore the majority of the blame, and Tzimiskes was able to retain much of his political 
base. Polyeuktos’ legitimist stance, confirmed through his willingness to accept the change 
in regime,915 was courted through concessions to the church. Tzimiskes repealed 
Nikephoros’ unpopular reforms to monastic endowments, permitted the return of exiled 
bishops, and allowed the church to elect and consecrate bishops without the need for imperial 
approval, a concession Nikephoros had resisted.916 He also appeased the monastic 
communities of the Holy Mountain in order to silence their objections to his reign.917 With 
Tzimiskes’ penance performed, and these concessions granted, Polyeuktos allowed his 
coronation a week later, on Christmas Day.918 The symbolic anointing of the emperor as part 
of the ceremony was declared to have cleared the guilt of Nikephoros’ murder, just as 
baptism eliminated sin.919 This Synodal praxis was later cited in Theodoros Balsamon’s 
twelfth-century canonical commentaries, in connection with the cleansing of an emperor’s 
pre-accession sins through his anointment with imperial power.920  
A cynical reading of these events reveals the obvious political motivations behind 
Tzimiskes’ repentance. The speed with which he acquiesced speaks to his tenuous position 
at that point and the role played by the church in securing his authority and moral-legitimacy. 
Tzimiskes’ speech to Skamandrenos in 970, acknowledging the division of the two earthly 
authorities in terms that conjured the ideological precepts of Photios’ Eisagoge chapters,921 
suggests its continued role in the face of charges of immorality that were being levelled 
                                                 
914 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 91 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 141). On the fates of those involved in 
Tzimiskes’ conspiracy, and this strange statement, see Morris 1994: 212. 
915 Cheynet 1990: 313-315. 
916 Morris 1988: 88. 
917 Morris 1988: 113. 
918 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 99 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 148); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, 
ed. Thurn 286 (trans. Wortley 273). 
919 Les regestes du patriarcat de Constantinople, ed. Grumel II, no.794.  
920 Syntagma III, ed. Rhalles and Potles 44-45; Dagron 2003: 267-271; Angelov 2006: 204 n.46. 
921 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 101-102 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 151); the comparison with Eisagoge 





against Tzimiskes by Nikephoros’ loyalists.922 Yet divine unction proved an insufficient 
defence and Tzimiskes’ humbling before Hagia Sophia, and concessions to the church were 
not his only attempts at repentance. We may question whether his remorse was purely 
political. 
In his description of Tzimiskes’ death, Leon provided details of the emperor’s final 
atonement. Aware that he was not long for the world, Tzimiskes called upon the bishop of 
Adrianople and ‘confessed to him his sins of omission in the course of his life’. He cried 
streams of tears that washed away ‘the shame and filth of his sins’, and he entreated the 
Mother of God to intercede on his behalf on the Day of Judgement. Leon established the 
sincerity of Tzimiskes’ remorse, commenting that, ‘After the emperor made such a 
confession with unhesitating purpose and contrite soul, he departed this world and went to 
his repose in the next…’923 The unusual phrasing ‘sins of omission’ is highly suggestive that 
this was no ordinary deathbed confession. The murder of Nikephoros, for which Tzimiskes 
had never admitted his own culpability and had instead blamed others, was seemingly being 
invoked.924  
To accompany this confession Tzimiskes925 drew lavishly on the imperial treasuries 
in order to distribute alms to the poor. He was especially generous in his donatives to lepers, 
                                                 
922 Bardas Phokas, in reply to a letter from Tzimiskes advising him to abandon his rebellion of 970, rejected 
the advice of the ‘impious and accursed Ioannes, who had mercilessly killed a sleeping lion’ and ‘cruelly and 
inhumanely blinded’ his [Bardas’] father and brother ‘for no good reason.’ He concluded by saying, ‘either I 
will attain imperial glory and will exact complete vengeance from the murderers, or I will bravely accept my 
fate, and be delivered from an accursed and impious tyrant.’ Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 119 (trans. 
Talbot and Sullivan 167-168). On Phokas’ career, see Cheynet 1986: 307-308. 
923 ... τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον αὐτῷ  ἀνεκάλυψεν ἀγνοήματα, κρουναὺς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δακρύων ἐπαφιεὶς, καὶ τῷ 
τούτων λουτῆρι τὰ αἴσχη καὶ τὰ ῥυπάσματα τῶν ἐσφαλμένων ῥυπτόμενος, καὶ τὴν Θεοτόκον ἐπιβοώμενος... 
τοιαύτην ἐξ ἀδιστάκτου γνώμης καὶ συντετριμμένης ψυχῆς τὴν ἐζομολόγησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς  ποιησάμενος, τῶν τῇ 
δε μεθίσταται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκεῖσε μεταβαίνει κατάπαθσιν... Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 178 (trans. 
Talbot and Sullivan 220). Emphasis added. 
924 Talbot and Sullivan, in the notes to their translation, agree with this assessment of the phrasing. Leon 
Diakonos, Historia, trans. Talbot and Sullivan 220 n.116. 
925 A detailed accounting of what may be termed Tzimiskes’ ‘penitential’ activities is provided in an MPhil. 
Thesis presented to the University of Birmingham which discusses aspects of Tzimiskes’ reign: Sinclair 2009. 
Although I do not always agree with the author’s particular interpretations of the evidence, the work supports 
the arguments proposed here. (I am indebted to the author for providing a digital copy of the completed work, 





‘whom he treated more generously than other poor people’.926 Immediately after his 
coronation, Tzimiskes had divided the funds from the sale of his properties amongst needy 
causes,927 and Leon reports that almost half of these were given to the leprosarium of St 
Zotikos which Tzimiskes re-founded.928 He even volunteered his time to visit the patients 
and distribute largess.929 Leon took special care to emphasise the emperor’s compassion and 
sympathy for the patients, whose ravaged and ulcerated limbs he endeavoured to treat, even 
causing him to turn away from the ‘majesty’ and ‘splendour’ associated with wearing the 
imperial purple.930 Tzimiskes’ humility was clearly emphasised, and his affinity for helping 
lepers was politically astute. Leprosy was widely considered a ‘Holy Disease’.931 The 
example of Lazarus provided the association of leprosy with spiritual purity; after his death 
he was warmly embraced by Abraham in contrast to the rich man, who suffered torment.932 
Through the association of Tzimiskes’ repentance with his humble attention to these figures, 
the emperor’s piety and morality were strengthened. He was seen working to atone for his 
accessional bloodguilt even after the patriarch had washed it away. 
Tzimiskes’ coinage also bears signs of this atonement. As Skylitzes noted, his copper 
folles were exceptional: ‘He also ordered that the image of the Saviour be inscribed… and 
on one of the sides there was written Roman letters saying, “Jesus Christ, king of 
kings…”’933 The inscription and the image of Christ replaced the traditional bust of the 
                                                 
926 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 178 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 220). 
927 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 286 (trans. Wortley 273), records that Ioannes had promised 
Patriarch Polyeuktos to distribute all of his holdings as a private citizen to the poor. 
928 The existing hospital was greatly expanded as a result. Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 99 (trans. Talbot 
and Sullivan 148-149). On the history of the leprosarium, established in the fourth century outside the walls of 
Constantinople, see Miller 1994; Miller and Nesbitt 2014: esp. 34, 36. 
929 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 100 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 149). 
930 ...τόν τε τῆς βασιλείας ὄγκον καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁλοθργίδος ἀποτικτόμενον τῦφον τιθείς. Leon Diakonos, 
Historia, ed. Hase 100 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 149). 
931 The sufferer had not been punished by God for their sins, but was instead being purified and made holy in 
preparation for heaven. Miller and Nesbitt 2014: esp. 28, 38ff. This interpretation was not exclusive however. 
932 Luke 16:22-25. Spencer-Hall 2015: 404.  
933 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 311 (trans. Wortley 294-295), Skylitzes was seemingly incorrect 
in also associating Tzimiskes’ gold coinage with the image of Christ as no coins of this type are known. Only 





emperor and his titles, making the coin anonymous. Skylitzes claims this was out of gratitude 
to Christ for the emperor’s military successes, but Grierson concludes that the iconography 
was introduced early in Tzimiskes’ reign, possibly as an act of contrition for murder that all 
could see;934 certainly, humility was implied. A bust of the Virgin shown crowning the 
emperor, a detail that was reintroduced by Nikephoros, was retained on the gold 
nomismata.935 Tzimiskes’ issues reversed the positions of the Virgin and emperor, however, 
so that she was shown crowning Tzimiskes with her right hand as a Manus Dei blessed him 
from above, increasing his favour.936 Under Nikephoros the type was intended to strengthen 
his image as a pious emperor who enjoyed the protection of the Theotokos.937 Tzimiskes’ 
association with the Theotokos also extended to his seals,938 and her favour allegedly 
prompted the favourable intercession of St Theodoros Stratelates939 at the Battle of 
Dorostolon.940 The role of the Virgin as Tzimiskes’ intercessor, and Leon’s assertion that 
Tzimiskes invoked her aid upon his deathbed, may suggest that this type was intended, at 
least in part, to confirm Tzimiskes’ penance, invoking the Virgin’s aid to save his soul. In 
retaining Nikephoros’ iconography Tzimiskes simultaneously honoured his divine 
benefactress and alluded to his remorse for Nikephoros’ murder.941 
 
Michael IV 
In 1034, the next usurper of the Macedonian dynasty, Michael IV allegedly suffered from 
                                                 
934 Grierson 1973: III.2, p.589. 
935 Grierson 1973: III.2, p.580. 
936 Grierson 1973: III.2, p.589. 
937 It also imitated the form of Romanos I’s coinage (although replacing the figure of Christ). Grierson 1973: 
III.2, p.534-535. 
938 Nesbit 2009: 104-105. 
939 Tzimiskes was devoted to the cult of his local, Eastern military saint. Cheynet 2008a: 307-322; Cotsonis 
2005. 
940 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 154 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 197-198); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 308-309 (trans. Wortley 292). The Battle was fought in 979 against the Kievan Rus. 
Tzimiskes’ victory prompted a peace treaty favourable to the empire. 





guilt over his involvement in the assassination of Romanos III. Whilst Yahya of Antioch 
attributed ‘consumption’ as the cause of Romanos’ death, both Psellos and Skylitzes 
described a clandestine love-affair between Michael and the empress Zoe which culminated 
in Romanos’ murder.942 Skylitzes even ascribed the usurpation as the cause of natural 
disasters early in Michael’s reign.943 
As with Tzimiskes, an attempt was made to minimise Michael’s guilt. The account 
of Psellos’ Chronographia therefore proves familiar. The aged Romanos had reportedly 
withdrawn his affections for Zoe, abstaining from intercourse, sexual or otherwise.944 The 
young and handsome Michael was introduced to the empress by his brother, Ioannes the 
Orphanotrophos, and commenced an affair.945 Zoe became increasingly infatuated and was 
observed lovingly seating Michael upon the throne and investing him.946 Finally, when 
Romanos became sick and went to bathe in preparation for the Easter ceremonies, his 
attendants drowned him, with the empress making a brief appearance to check that he was 
indeed dying.947 Psellos’ opening lines on Michael’s reign, make it clear that Zoe did not 
intend to take the throne for herself, but for Michael.948 Skylitzes’ Synopsis, largely hostile 
to Michael, provides an abbreviated version of these events but adds that the cause of 
Romanos’ illness was poison administered at Zoe’s behest.949 It also relates Zoe’s belief that 
                                                 
942 Yahya of Antioch, Histoire, ed. Kratchkovsky III, 536. 
943 These included hailstorms, plagues, and food shortages. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 393-
395, 405, 409 (trans. Wortley 371-372, 381, 384). 
944 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 74-75, 96-97; ed. Renauld I, 34-35, 44 (trans. Sewter 65, 75). 
945 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 96-101; ed. Renauld I, 44-46 (trans. Sewter 75-77). 
946 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 100-103; ed. Renauld I, 46 (trans. Sewter 77-78). Psellos 
maintains that Romanos turned a blind eye to the affair, even when his sister Pulcheria had brought his attention 
to a plot being hatched against his life which involved Michael. Michael was interrogated by the emperor but 
no punishment appears to have followed, and Psellos reports that the emperor believed him innocent. The entire 
sequence should be read as part of Psellos’ portrayal of Romanos as an excessively trusting and incompetent 
emperor. 
947 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 110-113; ed. Renauld I, 50-52 (trans. Sewter 81-83). On the 
death of Romanos III, see Efthymiadis 2005. 
948 ...μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ προεστάναι βραχὺ φρουντίσασα, ὅπως ἂν παραδῷ τὴν προστασίαν τῷ Μιχαὴλ... Psellos, 
Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 114-115; ed. Renauld I, 53 (trans. Sewter 87). 
949 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 390-391 (trans. Wortley 368-369). Psellos does report a rumour 
then in circulation that poison may have been used, but does not clarify whether this was true or not. Psellos, 





she would have a ‘slave and servant’ in Michael.950 The ‘Eve’ typology was invoked in order 
to importune Zoe. Her treacherous image was then extended into Michael’s reign: Psellos 
praised him for his fear of her in light of Romanos’ fate,951 Michael’s relatives dreaded the 
‘Lioness’ empress,952 and Skylitzes names her as the head of a conspiracy to poison Ioannes 
the Orphanotrophos.953 
The Orphanotrophos shared the blame since he had maneuvered the pair together. 
Psellos provides an excursus on Ioannes’ continued influence and scheming under Romanos 
and Michael, and Skylitzes commented in relation to Romanos’ murder that ‘many laid that 
fault at the door of the Orphanotrophos’.954 Michael’s liability for the assassination was 
therefore partly subordinated through a wider redistribution of guilt. He was involved, but 
only indirectly. 
Both authors enumerated Michael’s efforts to repent for this misdeed. Psellos was 
particularly expansive, associating eleven chapters with the subject;955 Skylitzes, just one.956 
Even their contemporary Kekaumenos mentioned it.957 Michael performed no penance 
before Hagia Sophia since none was asked of him, and officially no crime had been 
committed. According to Skylitzes, Patriarch Alexios’ support had been bought with fifty-
pounds of gold, the clergy with another fifty, the pair swiftly married, and a story spread that 
Romanos had proclaimed Michael on his deathbed.958 Michael, ‘To the very end lamented 
                                                 
950 δουλον καὶ διάκονον. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 392 (trans. Wortley 370). 
951 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 120-121; ed. Renauld I, 56 (trans. Sewter 89). 
952 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 134-135; ed. Renauld I, 62 (trans. Sewter 96).  
953 The conspiracy dates to c.1037. Zoe reportedly acted through one of her eunuch attendants, Sgouritzes. The 
protospatharios Constantine Moukoupeles, who had prepared the poison, was summarily exiled. Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 403 (trans. Wortley 380). 
954 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 415 (trans. Wortley 390). 
955 These are chapters 16, 31-32, 34-38, 52-54. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 132-135, 152-155, 
156-163, 176-181; ed. Renauld I, 62, 71, 73-76, 83-85 (trans. Sewter 96,  105-109, 116-118). 
956 That is chapter 7. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 397-398 (trans. Wortley 375). 
957 ‘…when he died, in peace and in a good state of repentance…’ Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij 
p.99 (trans. Roueché). 
958 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 391-392 (trans. Wortley 368-370). Psellos reports nothing of 
this, instead describing deliberations by the empress and senate as to whom would succeed the deceased 
emperor - the senate naming prominent individuals and Zoe continually supporting Michael. Psellos, 





the offence he had committed against the emperor Romanos, propitiating the Divinity by 
doing good works, distributing alms to the poor, erecting new monasteries and installing 
monks in them…’959 Among these philanthropic works were additions to the Church of the 
Saints Anargyroi,960 the construction of numerous monasteries and nunneries, the 
Ptochotropheion, a leprosarium,961 and a sanctuary for the salvation of former prostitutes.962 
Psellos reports that Michael also sought to associate himself with ascetic monks. He often 
embraced them and adopted monastic clothing as his own in demonstration of his humility. 
Having sought their advice regarding his repentance, he also received intercessory prayers 
on his behalf from some.963 The monk Kosmas Tzintziloukios, from whom Michael 
eventually accepted the tonsure, was reportedly among his closest advisors throughout his 
reign.964 In targeting his works towards the healing saints, monks, lepers, and prostitutes, he 
associated himself with the charitable tradition and presented the image of a ruler concerned 
not only with his own salvation, but that of society’s neediest. 
Psellos and Skylitzes were divided over Michael’s own success. Psellos was content 
to end his account of Michael’s reign with an assessment of accomplishments and failures; 
finding the former more prominent, he asserted that Michael had attained a ‘better life’.965 
                                                 
has suggested that the negative presentation of Skylitzes narrative on these events is due to his using an 
ecclesiastic source (Demetrios of Kyzikos); canon law on second marriages required a delay. See also 
Kalavrezou 1994: 247-248. 
959 ἀποκλαιόμενος δὲ καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα ‘Ρωμανὸν ἄχρι τέλους διετέλεσεν ἁμαρτάδα, τὸν θεὸν 
ἱλασκόμενος δι’ ‘γαθοεργιῶν καὶ τῶν εἰς τοὺς πένητας μεταδόσεων, μοναστήριἀ τε ἐκ καινῆς ἀνεγείρων καὶ 
μοναχοὺς ἐγκατοικίζων... Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 397 (trans. Wortley 375).  
960 The healing saints Cosmas and Damian to whose cult Michael IV, a known sufferer of epilepsy, belonged. 
On the Church, see Janin 1969: 287. On the cult of the healing saints, see Mango 1994; Csepregi 2002. 
961 The suggestion of Connor 2004: 220, that Michael was a sufferer of the disease is an intriguing possibility, 
but cannot be confirmed. He would in any case be following an established precedent in tending to lepers. 
962 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 158-161; ed. Renauld I, 74-76 (trans. Sewter 107-108); Zonaras, 
Epitome, III, 603-604. The precedents for such sanctuaries had long existed: Justinian I and Theodora 
reportedly founded such an institution, the ‘Convent of Repentance’. For Justinian and Theodora’s convent, 
see Brubaker 2005: 432; Kaldellis 2010: 150-152. On Michael’s foundation, see Constantelos 1991: 197. 
963 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 158-161; ed. Renauld I, 74-76 (trans. Sewter 107-109). 
964 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 415 (trans. Wortley 389-390); Laurent 1981: II, no. 1271. We 
may wonder if the choice of Kosmas as Michael’s advisor was related to his sharing the name of the healing 
saint. 
965 ἃ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντεξετάζων καὶ παράλληλα κρίνων, πλείω τὰ κατωρθωμένα τῶν διημαρτημένων εὑρίσκω· 
καὶ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα ἐκεῖνον καὶ τῆς κρείττονος διημαρτηκέναι, ἀλλ’ ἀμείνονος ἐπιτυχεῖν λήξεως. 





Skylitzes’ final summation is also positive: ‘[Michael] died repentant and confessed, deeply 
regretting the wrong he had done the emperor Romanos’, and was a decent and honest man 
in every other regard.966 However, earlier, Skylitzes was critical of Michael’s recourse to 
financing these penitential works ‘out of the common and public purse, expecting to receive 
absolution as though… repentance could be purchased with the money of others…’, and was 
unconvinced.967 He asserted that these efforts may have succeeded had Michael ‘renounced 
the imperial purple… rejected the adulteress and wept for his sin, alone.’968 But he did not. 
For Skylitzes, Michael’s attempts to cleanse his soul at the expense of the state, involve 
others in his penance, and remain in power, was incongruous. Although his criticism of 
Michael’s economic policy undoubtedly affected this assessment, Michael contrasted with 
Skylitzes’ earlier example of Tzimiskes. The latter’s penance was performed in public, but 
was a purely private affair. His estates financed his alms, nobody was induced to perform 
penance on his behalf, and the empress and her co-conspirators were exiled. By comparison, 
Michael’s attempts appeared insufficiently personal and insufficiently sincere, something 
that the exhortation to weep alluded to. Michael did not act as a quasi-priestly figure, 
safeguarding the empire from God’s wrath via personal penance, but reversed that duty, 
assigning it instead to the state via its coffers and monastic intercessors. He failed the 
common good. 
                                                 
not believe that this man failed to attain the better life; I believe instead that he did obtain a better lot.’ Psellos, 
Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 180-181; ed. Renauld I, 85 (trans. Sewter 118). 
966 …θνῄσκει ἐν μετανοίᾳ καὶ ἐξομολογήσει, τὴν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα ‘Ρομανὸν ἁμαρτάδα ἀποκλαιόμενος, 
βασιλεύσας ἐπὶ ἔτη ἑπτὰ καὶ μῆνας ὀκτώ, ἀνὴρ τἆλλα μὲν ἐπιεικὴς καὶ χρηστὸς καὶ εὑλαβῶς δόξας βιοῦν, πλὴν 
τοῦ εἰσ τὸν βασιλέα ‘Ρωμανὸν ἁμαρτήματος. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 415 (trans. Wortley 
390). Emphasis added. Translation adapted. 
967 More fully: ...κἀκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ κοινῶν τὰς δοκούσας εὐποιΐας ἀποπληρῶν, εῖθ’ ὑπολαμβάνων 
συγχωρήσεως τυχεῖν, ἀνόητον ἐλογίζετο τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἄδικον, ἀλλοτρίοις χρέμασιν ὠνούμενον τὴν μετάνοιαν...  
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 398 (trans. Wortley 375). Psellos confirms that Michael had indeed 
utilised the public treasury in order to fund his various foundations. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri 
I, 158-159; ed. Renauld I, 74-75 (trans. Sewter 107). Zonaras, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 478-479, 
expresses similar criticism of Romanos I: namely that he had financed his repentance out of the public funds. 
968 Again, in full: ...αὗται δ’ ἂν ἧσαν ἁνύσιμοι, εἰ τήν τε βασιλείαν ἀπέρριψε, δι’ ἣν τἀ τοιαῦτα κακά, καὶ τὴν 
μοιχαλίδα ἀπώσατο, καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀπεκλαίετο τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 397-





There are signs that others of Michael’s contemporaries questioned the sincerity of 
his remorse. The Chronographia provides what amounts to a defence against exactly this 
charge, and it was perhaps for this reason that Psellos was quite so extensive in his 
accounting. In detailing Michael’s efforts to court favour with the politically influential 
monastic community969 and receive prayers of atonement for his sins, we are told that not all 
of those who were asked would comply. In fact, after learning of the hesitation of some, the 
majority subsequently refused. Psellos asserts that, due to a false rumour, they were afraid 
that the emperor had committed a great crime and, being ashamed to confess, would force 
them to contravene the word of God.970 He reassures the reader that Michael ‘appeared 
anxious and eager to obtain forgiveness of his sins’, and the next paragraph constitutes an 
authorial intervention claiming that other narratives were subject to ‘false opinions’ that 
abounded.971  Psellos maintained that his sources, being confidants of the emperor, were 
superior; his account fairer. When, upon his deathbed, Michael took the tonsure he was glad 
and thought himself ‘changed to a higher life’. He declined to meet with Zoe, either because 
of ‘the evils he had brought upon her’, or due to his attentiveness to God.972 By this point 
their association had cooled dramatically,973 but earlier Psellos attributed this change to 
Michael’s shame when he looked upon Zoe and his conversing with ‘saintly people’ about 
the manner in which he had gained the throne; being advised to refrain from relations with 
her as penance.974 Psellos’ overall image is thus of a contrite emperor resolved to atone for 
his sins despite what the ill-informed were saying. 
                                                 
969 In the previous century alone they had been among the prime opponents to the marriages of Leon VI, and 
Tzimiskes had resorted to buying off their voices against his rule. On the influence of the monastic communities 
in the political sphere, see Morris 1995: 3-4, and esp. 241-266. 
970 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 160-161; ed. Renauld I, 75 (trans. Sewter 108-109). 
971 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 160-163; ed. Renauld I, 75-76 (trans. Sewter 109). 
972 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 178-181; ed. Renauld I, 84-85 (trans. Sewter 117). 
973 On the vacillations of Michael and Zoe’s relationship, and its influence upon governance, see Connor 2004: 
207-237; Garland 1999: 139-140; Smythe 1997: 145-146. 
974 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 134-137; ed. Renauld I, 63 (trans. Sewter 96). Abstaining from 
conjugal intercourse constituted a common requirement for married penitents throughout the medieval world. 







Questions about an emperor’s sincerity emerged again, in the context of Alexios I’s 
usurpation. His misdeeds were numerous, he had won the throne through rebellion and civil 
war. On Maundy Thursday 1081 his troops forced entry to Constantinople with the aid of 
the soldiers protecting the Charsios gate.975 Once inside the city, they committed a litany of 
crimes. Where Zonaras wrote that these included looting, shedding blood, the rape of 
married women and virginal nuns, and the plunder of sacred vessels from the divine temples, 
Anna Komnene concealed the charges of rape and repudiated that of bloodshed: ‘they did 
refrain from murder…’976 Botaneiates, realising that there was no hope, withdrew to Hagia 
Sophia and took the tonsure.977 
The discomfiting details of Alexios’ accession reverberated for some time after the 
event. In a remarkably forthright speech delivered before the emperor and imperial family 
in 1091,978 Ioannes Oxeites, the patriarch of Antioch, revisited them. Alexios’ earlier 
military successes had by then been reversed.979 Ioannes, seeking to explain these declining 
fortunes, looked to the sins of the oikoumene for his answer. Finding these too numerous to 
list, he employed the topos of the body politic and ruminated upon Alexios’ sins choosing 
him as the body’s head.980 Alexios’ victories against the usurpers Roussel, Bryennios the 
Elder, and Basilakes, before his accession were contrasted with the dire straits that the empire 
                                                 
975 1 April. The troops were led by Georgios Palaiologos. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 
80-81 (trans. Frankopan 72-73); Zonaras, Epitome, III, 727, offers a bloodier version than Anna (who implies 
collaboration by the guards). 
976 ...τοῦ μέντοι ἀποκτένειν μόνου ἀφιστάμενοι... Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 81 (trans. 
Frankopan 74); Zonaras, Epitome, III, 728-729. 
977 Unresisting according to Zonaras, compelled by Patriarch Alexios according to Anna. Anna Komnene, 
Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 84, 86-87 (trans. Frankopan 76, 78-79); Zonaras, Epitome, III, 730. 
978 Frankopan 2008: 81, 84, concludes that the speech was performed in front of an audience of some form, 
and possibly before the emperor himself. 
979 Chios and Mitylene had been lost, Asia Minor and the Aegean islands were threatened, and Constantinople 
was in danger from the Pechnegs. Frankopan 2012: Chapter 4, and esp. p.59. 





found itself in under his leadership afterwards.981 The ‘illegality’ of Alexios’ accession 
(ἔκθεσμος τῆς βασιλείας) was raised as the proximate cause of God’s anger, so too the 
indefensible confiscations of ecclesiastical treasures in 1082 and 1087, and burdensome 
taxation.982 Ioannes contended that God had been entreating Alexios to perform penance for 
these sins, and that He wanted Alexios to kneel and ‘weep before him’ with ‘humility and 
contrition of heart’.983 As Alexios had apparently not recognised this, nor shown remorse, 
Ioannes advanced King David as an ideal of penitence and humility that Alexios should 
embrace in order to restore taxis.984 Of course, Ioannes’ critique was also patently politically 
motivated, an endeavour to secure better terms for the Church through an attempted shaming, 
but the focus on Alexios’ usurpation reveals that, even a decade later, it remained a sore 
topic.985 
Niketas Choniates was rather more concise: assigning Alexios’ deathbed speech on 
his disputed choice of successor as the first ‘scene’ of the Historia, he had Alexios admit 
that he ‘gained the throne in an unpraiseworthy manner by denying the rights of 
consanguinity and the principles of Christian laws’, and coupled this with a sarcastic remark 
from Empress Eirene about Alexios’ history of secrets and lies.986 Given that Choniates later 
                                                 
981 Ioannes Oxeites, Diatribes, ed. Gautier 22-27. 
982 Ioannes Oxeites, Diatribes, ed. Gautier 28-35, esp. 29; see also pp. 8-9 (Commentary). After the 
confiscations of 1082 Alexios had issued a chrysobull denouncing the act, swearing to reimburse the costs, and 
promising not to repeat the action: Dölger and Wirth 1977: no. 1085. On the confiscations, see Papagianni 
2002: 1068; Hendy 1999: IV.1, 188; Angold 1995: 65-69 (with discussion of Ioannes Oxeites’ critique); Hendy 
1985: 231-232. 
983 …Εἶτα μετ’ οὐ βραχὺ πολέμου σοι ἐπεγερθέντος, δέον κίνησιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο προσκλαίειν αὐτῷ μαὶ 
μετανοεῖν ἐν πάσῃ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ καὶ συντριβῆ καρδίας... Ioannes Oxeites, Diatribes, ed. Gautier 28-29. 
Emphasis added. See also the comments of Hussey 1990: 147. 
984 Ioannes Oxeites, Diatribes, ed. Gautier esp. 36-37. 
985 The accession may also have been criticised by Theophylaktos of Ochrid in his Paideia bailike 
(c.1185/1186) addressed to Constantine Doukas, Alexios’ then co-emperor. Theophylaktos advised 
Constantine that an emperor did not gain authority through bloodshed and force, but the virtue of actions. A 
veiled criticism of Alexios’ accession may have been intended, or (at the very least) suggested by the phrasing. 
For the date of composition, see Theophylaktos, Opera, ed. Gautier 67 (Introduction). Frankopan 2008, has 
outlined other veiled criticisms of Alexios’ rule in the surviving address of Theophylaktos, performed before 
the emperor during the Epiphany celebrations of 1088. See also, Mullett 1994: 261-262. 
986 …εἰ τὴν βασιλείαν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶς εἰληφώς, ἀλλ’αἵμασιν ὁμογενῶν καὶ μεθόδοις Χριστιανῶν ἀφισταμέναις 
θεσμῶν...  Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 6 (trans. Magoulias 5-6). Kaldellis 2009: 79, considers Eirene’s 





claimed that the Komnenoi and their internecine struggles for the throne were the cause of 
the empire’s decay and fragmentation, Alexios’ assigned position as progenitor of the 
dynasty might suggest that his usurpation and inadequacies were designated special 
significance as a prototype for ensuing events.987 The ignominy of Alexios’ accession, 
acknowledged at the start of the work, portended the ignominy of the empire torn apart by 
usurpation, which was the theme of the work. In the Historia, his successors replicated and 
magnified his misdeeds.  
Alexios’ public image, both contemporary and historical, was thus in some quarters 
tarnished by wrongdoing at the outset of his reign and perpetuated in its course.988 The 
Alexias provides an insider’s perspective of the actions that were undertaken to atone for 
these errors and repair that image. Where Tzimiskes and Michael had sought ways to 
minimise their culpability by redirecting blame to the empresses Theophano, Zoe, and a 
handful of their own partisans, Alexios was allegedly more direct in his acknowledgement 
of guilt. To that end, Maria of Alania, whom we are told had called upon the Komnenoi to 
protect her son by overthrowing Botaneiates, was not held up for blame. Instead, shortly 
after Eirene Doukaina’s coronation in April 1081, Alexios made public his remorse for the 
sack of Constantinople. He reportedly called upon Patriarch Kosmas, the Holy Synod, and 
certain monastics, to issue a penance: ‘[Alexios] came before them as a man on trial… he 
confessed everything… the commission of evil… [and] the responsibility for what was 
done.’989 A therapeia was issued, but not just to Alexios. His ‘blood relatives’ and those 
involved in the rebellion were to share the punishment by ‘fasting, sleeping on the ground, 
and performing appropriate rites.’ In a sign of their supporting role in the rebellion, even the 
                                                 
987 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 529 (trans. Magoulias 290). It should be remembered that Choniates 
counted the Angeloi emperors as part of the Komnenian dynasty (as they considered themselves), and that his 
criticism of the Komnenoi is first openly stated in the narrative of Alexios III’s reign. 
988 Magdalino 1983: esp. 329-330, 332, 335, 339. 





Komnenian wives were to share in this, and the palace became ‘a scene of tearful 
lamentation.’990 
Alexios’ voluntary use of the penitential ritual reveals its nature as ‘a two-sided 
phenomenon: a potential instrument of royal power, which could be turned against a 
monarch as well.’991 The salient difference between Alexios and the precedents of 
Tzimiskes, Leon, and Theodosius, was that Alexios invited his performance of a public 
rebuke and penance from the church. He gave it a mandate that allowed him to control his 
penance by transforming it into a proactively negotiated chastisement. Conversely, his 
archetypes had made recourse to public penance at the church’s urging. Political pressure 
had been asserted against them, polemical in the case of Theodosius, polemical and practical 
in the cases of Leon and Tzimiskes whose ceremonial duties were, or would have been, 
noticeably constrained as a result. The actions of the Komnenoi essentially pre-empted an 
embarrassing intervention.992 If Anna’s account is accurate, the Komnenoi appeared sincere, 
even if only to some, and avoided a struggle over church-state authority invoking unwelcome 
‘constitutionalist’ implications, as well as a potentially even more humiliating rebuke.993 
Alexios’ later efforts to position himself as a ‘defender of Orthodoxy’ by rooting out 
heresies, especially via the politically manufactured trial of Italos, allowed him to wrestle 
back political control over the church that he had conceded for moral-legitimisation at his 
                                                 
990 ...καὶ ἧν ἰδεῖν τὰ βασίλεια τότε δακρύων καὶ πένθους ἀνάμεστα... Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and 
Kambylis 99 (trans. Frankopan 91). On the prominent role of the women of the Komnenian family in the coup, 
and their involvement in the penance, see the comments of Smythe 2006: esp. 132. 
991 The phrasing is that of de Jong 1992: 31, talking about a similar manipulation of ritual by Louis I (the 
Pious). 
992 Buckley 2014: 97.  
993 Angold 1995: esp. 45, 67-69, believes that the penance was imposed by Patriarch Kosmas rather than invited 
by the Komnenoi. This is possible, however, it seems that the penance was extracted after Alexios’ coronation 
- possibly weeks or months later - when the patriarch had less leverage over Alexios, or ability to provoke a 
damaging scandal. Possibly the terms of a penance had been negotiated before the patriarch agreed to crown 
Alexios, and the synod was convened to then fulfil that obligation. However, it is equally possible that the 
Komnenoi recognised that there was public disapproval over the usurpation and siege of Constantinople and 
exploited penance on their own accord in an attempt to mitigate the likelihood of this mood turning into an 





accession and as fallout for the financially expedient confiscations shortly thereafter.994 
Paradoxically, Alexios removed himself from a position of public humiliation and a loss of 
authority (helplessness to resist the imposition of a penance) by seeking out humiliation on 
his own accord. ‘Retreat into humility’ aligned one’s own fall with Christian ideals, 
indicating a desire for moral perfection and expressing the foundation of basileia as piety 
and modesty in emulation of Christ.995 
This penitential episode was politically astute, but Oxeites’ speech revealed that 
Alexios’ sincerity was not considered convincing by everyone. Seemingly aware of such 
views, and so that her readers would not believe him to have minimised his responsibility, 
Anna took particular care to convey the additional penance that Alexios accorded to himself. 
Emulating the period of Christ’s Temptation, for forty days and nights he wore a sack-cloth 
beneath the royal purple, slept on the ground with only stones to support his head, ‘bewailed 
his sins’, and with the penance complete, ‘he turned his attention to the administration of the 
empire with clean hands’.996 The phrasing leaves little doubt that he had sufficiently atoned, 
but Anna’s Alexios remained emotionally distraught at the price of his success. ‘He was sick 
at heart, filled with shame…’ and thus a model of earnestness in confessing wrongdoing.997 
                                                 
994 On these aspects of Alexios’ policies towards the church, see Fryde 2000: 50-54; Angold 1996: 411-413; 
Magdalino 1993: 383. On the trial of Italos, see Le Synodikon de l’Orthodoxie, ed. Gouillard pp.56-60; 
Magdalino 2003: 26; Buckley 2014: 125. Given that Alexios had empowered the church to exact a penance 
from him (if we trust Anna’s account), we may even question whether this constituted a submission of imperial 
power to ecclesiastical power since he had, in essence, acted as the head of the church and humbled himself. 
The question (and projection) of ‘agency’ would have been at the heart of how this was understood by 
contemporaries. 
995 On the ideological precepts of ‘retreat into humility’ in the medieval Christian context, see Fałkowski 2010: 
188. 
996 More fully: ὁ δὲ αὐτοκράτωρ, ὁποῖος ἐκεῖνος τὴν εὐσέβειαν, πλέον τί ποιῶν ἐντὸς τῆς βασιλικῆς ἀλουργίδος 
σάκκον περιεβέβλητο ἐν χρῷ ψαύοντα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπὶ τεσσαράκοντα νυχθημέροις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς νυξὶ χαμεύνης 
ἔκειτο ἐπὶ πέτρης μόνον ἀνέχων τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ πενθῶν ὡς εἰκός, εἶθ’ οὕτως τῶν τῆς βασιλείας πραγμάτων 
ἁγναῖς ἅπτεται χερσίν. ‘It was typical of the emperor’s own piety that he would inflict upon himself a further 
penance: for forty days and nights he wore a sackcloth beneath the royal purple and next to his skin. At night 
he slept on bare ground, and his head was supported on nothing more than a stone while he bewailed his sins, 
as was correct. Thereafter, when the penance was complete, he turned his attention to the administration of the 
empire with clean hands.’ Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 99-100 (trans. Frankopan 91). 
Translation adapted. 





Instead, it was Anna who exculpated him of blame. The narrative of the capture of 
Constantinople is littered with her efforts on Alexios’ behalf. Georgios Palaiologos, who led 
the assault on Constantinople, was compared with Ares ‘the smiter of walls’ and was 
supposedly ‘never reluctant to engage in war-like activities and the sacking of cities.’998  
Botaneiates ‘pretended’ that he wanted to avoid civil war and was only prevented from 
provoking one through the patriarch’s entreaties; his servant, Borilos, seeing the disorder of 
the Komnenian entry, ordered an attack. The Komnenoi, desperately sought a means of 
restraining the troops, and even feared a coup against themselves. And the sack was ‘really 
the work of individual soldiers’.999  
The Alexios that emerges from Anna’s exercise in panegyric is an idealised figure 
who took personal responsibility for the actions of others. The crimes committed during the 
sack of the city were assuredly not his fault, yet he believed they were and atoned for them 
anyway, emulating Christ’s example once again. His remorse and innocence were 
established beyond question. 
 
Discussion 
The case studies prove instructive. In each, guilt and sin were believed to have been accrued 
by the circumstances of a usurpation. Recognisable acts of ritual or symbolic repentance 
were performed, publicly or privately, by each emperor and associated with the cleansing of 
guilt accrued at the accession. These acts might be undertaken early in the reign, voluntarily, 
or at the urging of the church. Repentance connoted humility and was usually accompanied 
by philanthropic works that might also court favour with religious figures (supposed sources 
of moral guidance) and the divine. Deathbed repentance is also represented, as are 
                                                 
998 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 80 (trans. Frankopan 73). 





judgements concerning the authenticity and effectiveness of imperial remorse. 
In theory, the emperor was a paragon of heavenly justice. Advice literature and other 
expressive frameworks of rulership asserted that he should comport himself as an ideal of 
morality, in emulation of the divine, or else face charges of tyranny and risk deposition.1000 
If he was known to have committed a sin, he was guilty of a crime and must be seen to atone 
for it, or else face heavenly displeasure of the kind Skylitzes attributed to Michael IV’s 
accession, and Ioannes Oxeites asserted of Alexios’. A divinely unfavoured head of state 
was a potential danger. The political concern was real since the nature of an accession had a 
lasting influence on an emperor’s reputation. Attempts were often made to lessen the impact 
of taking an unpopular route to the throne by redistributing blame among partisans, 
distancing usurpers from involvement in wrongdoing, or by pointing to a particular figure 
and assigning to it the role of a scapegoat. However, these measures were rarely wholly 
successful and in each of the cases we have examined they were accompanied by a form of 
penance on the part of the emperor. Through repentance he subjected himself to heavenly 
law (for Hellenic and Roman tradition proclaimed him beyond that of man, which he should 
voluntarily choose to follow),1001 demonstrated remorse, and became a model worthy of 
emulation. 
With only one exception (Romanos I) every usurper-emperor reported to have 
embraced the repentant model was associated with a violent succession. Romanos’ mode of 
accession, through integration rather than overthrow, was not conducive to an 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing since Constantine was superficially his co-emperor, and 
Romanos’ authority could only have been damaged by any admission. His penitential 
activities under Constantine underscored restored Macedonian authority. The perception of 
                                                 
1000 See above, page 20. 
1001 On the concept of the emperor as ‘living law’, see Dagron 1994; Simon 1984; Beck 1970: esp. 31-33; 





‘legitimacy’, and public relations, were thus crucial considerations in assuming the repentant 
persona. A guilty and unpopular emperor was a much easier political target and so particular 
effort was made to be seen to atone. Ioannes I’s coinage suggests that his ongoing efforts 
sought to engage all levels of society, and Skylitzes’ criticism of Michael’s economic policy, 
although a product of bias against the emperor, reveals that repentance was believed to have 
influenced policy decisions as well. Given that the populace of Constantinople were 
informed about and actively engaged with contemporary political events, seeking 
opportunities to express their views, it should not be surprising to see emperors catering to 
public opinion.1002 Ultimately, their power depended upon it. 
The public performance of a penance, and even the association of charitable works 
with repentance, enabled an abstract concept like remorse to be made tangible. These acts 
could be pointed to if an emperor’s moral qualifications to rule were questioned; Oxeites’ 
example proves that they were. The narratives of Psellos and Anna in particular betray 
attempts to rebut claims of insincerity or insufficient remorse that were espoused by 
contemporaries. The eternal fate of Isaakios I, when his sarcophagus was found to contain 
moisture, was also allegedly widely debated.1003 These deliberations offer an insight into 
authorial intentions, confirm that an emperor’s moral authority was at stake, and that this 
was connected with the perception of sincere repentance. Accusations of deception or 
                                                 
1002 Garland 1992: esp. 46-51, is essential reading on the political activities and sensitivities of the populace in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the established political interplay between emperor and people. On the 
political activities of the wider populace, see Krallis 2009; Kaldellis 2013; Kaldellis 2015: 118-164 (on ‘The 
Sovereignty of the People in Practice’), and esp. 137. 
1003 Some believed this moisture to be symbolic of punishment in Hell for civil war; others for his misrule and 
tax policies; the confiscations of ecclesiastical treasures; a warning to future emperors, although not of eternal 
punishment, because he had repented; still others, that he had not repented after his adoption of the monastic 
habit and was doomed; and finally, those who believed it proof that his repentance had been answered, and 
that no sin could not be overcome. The multiplicity of interpretations suggests how popular a topic discussion 
of the emperor’s fate was. Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 69-70 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 124-127), 
claiming that all of these interpretations had merit. For a comparable rumour about an emperor’s eternal fate, 
note how the fourteenth-century unionist Manuel Kalekas records the ‘common belief’ that Michael VIII’s 
remains had not begun to decompose (they ‘remained uncorrupted’, ‘blackened’, and taut ‘like a drum’) 
because Michael’s heretical unionist policies had brought his salvation into question. Manuel Kalekas, 





insufficient remorse were used as propagandist tools against incumbent emperors in their 
lifetime and political concessions extracted by the litigant. Establishing sincerity was 
consequently a fundamental consideration of sympathetic accounts, and central to the 
redemptive theology underpinning Manuel II’s sixth Ethico-Political Oration, in which he 
talks of ‘pure repentance’ as the only means of purification.1004 In the context of a Christian 
belief system, complete with visions like that of Romanos’ dream establishing what awaited 
unrepentant sinners, the consequences of falsehood were frightening and real. Which 
emperor consigned to hell could be considered legitimate? Which dynasty founded by such 
an emperor, perpetuating his sin, was worthy of ruling? Only genuine atonement could save 
an emperor’s soul and enable moral rule. Expressions of remorse were potentially more than 
nakedly political endeavours.  
Alongside descriptions of charitable works and ritual displays of proskynesis, tears 
emerge as a symbolic and historically recurring motif in the narratives of imperial 
repentance.1005 They frequently serve as a literary shorthand for sincerity. Theodosius I 
reportedly wept profusely during his humbling prostrations before Ambrose, and was even 
said to have ripped out locks of his own hair in an additional sign of earnestness.1006 
Similarly, both of Leon VI’s displays of humility outside Hagia Sophia were accompanied 
by tears expressing his heartfelt piety and remorse. Even his negotiations with the 
metropolitans were accompanied by tears.1007 Romanos I did not weep himself, but his 
monastic witnesses did ‘melt into tears’ (δακρυρροούντων) on his behalf as they chanted 
‘Kyrie Eleison’.1008 Ioannes I wept as he confessed his sins, and the Komnenian display of 
                                                 
1004 (καθαρᾶς μετανοίας). Manuel II, Seven Ethico-Political Orations, (Oration VI), ed. Kakkoura 409. 
1005 For a general overview of scholarship on the symbolism of tears in Byzantine thought, see Grünbart 2009; 
Hinterberger 2006: esp. 35-38; Cameron 1979: 10 fn. 31, 20; Rouan 1981: 433-434; Kazhdan and Constable 
1982: 62. For the significance of tears in Ancient Greek and Roman thought, see Fögen 2009. 
1006 See above, page 173. 
1007 See above, page 175. 





repentance resembled ‘a scene of tearful lamentation.’  
A comprehensive study of imperial emotion is a desideratum, but the public and 
literary impact of these gestures should not be underestimated. Ideally, an emperor’s public 
emotional range was a muted one. Advice literature proposed self-control as a necessary 
virtue and asserted that imperial behaviour, including gestures and emotions, should be 
carefully regulated in order for an emperor to fulfil his duties impartially and immutably.1009 
Photios, in the Letter to Boris, advocated that a ruler should moderate his appearance and 
the motion of his whole-body at all times, while speech and laughter were to be 
controlled.1010 Kekaumenos and Blemmydes advised the same.1011 Formulaic imperial 
portraiture also visualised this concern: the depiction of emotion, grief/sorrow in particular, 
was typically considered inappropriate for an authority figure like an emperor, and was also 
limited in wider artwork.1012 Standard depictions of emperors known from coinage and 
extant portraiture portray them in a dignified pose, frontal, and almost statue like. The stance 
followed easily recognisable prototypes signifying the imperial majesty and dignity.1013 
Literary comparisons of emperors with statues accomplished a similar function and 
constitute a topos. Ammianus described Constantius II’s appearance during his adventus in 
Rome (357) as resolutely impassive and compared him with a clay figurine.1014 Anna 
Komnene and Choniates also repeatedly employed the imagery,1015 with their comparisons 
                                                 
1009 Dimitriev 2015: 8-9; Swain 2013: 104; Hunger 1965: esp. 103-104. 
1010 Photios, Letter to Boris, ed. Laourdas and Westerink §30, 31-32 (trans. White and Berrigan 60-61). 
1011 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij pp.3, 20; Nikephoros Blemmydes, Basilikos Andrias, ed. Hunger 
and Ševčenko pp.46-54, 122-125. 
1012 Maguire 1977: esp. 171-172, concluding: ‘It is true that, compared to post-medieval artists, the Byzantines 
had restricted means at their disposal for conveying emotion. But it could be argued that precisely because the 
Byzantines knew of a narrower range of techniques than we do each formula carried a proportionately greater 
meaning for them… The sanctity of the individual figures also controlled the degree of emotion that they 
displayed. Byzantine artists would have agreed with the dictum of Reynolds: “The joy, or the grief of a 
character of dignity, is not to be expressed in the same manner as a similar passion in a vulgar face.”’ 
1013 Grabar 1936: 9; Spatharakis 1976: 255; Magdalino and Nelson 1982: esp. 163-164; Maguire 1989: 223; 
Brubaker 2009: 38. 
1014 Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, ed. Rolfe 16.10.5-10. 
1015 See for example, Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 387, 441 (trans. Frankopan 360, 412); 





alluding to the immutability and incorruptibility of the emperors they described via control 
over mood and posture.1016 
The restrictive emotional and gestural conventions were thus understood and 
promulgated across a variety of media. Medieval rituals restricted emotion and spontaneous 
behaviour, but, the utilisation of ritual-freed emotions transformed them into public 
communications.1017 Therefore deviations from normative, idealised, behaviour were 
typically carefully staged, innately symbolic, and decidedly political. Althoff has shown that 
tearful displays were a fundamental part of Western medieval rituals of spiritual cleansing, 
associated with virtues befitting an ideal Christian ruler.1018 Leon VI expounded upon the 
virtues of tears in similar terms,1019 and Manuel II later proposed that the illness of sin was 
best fought with ‘warm tears’, warning that ‘many tears and sorrows’ would be necessary 
‘in order to return to the good path’ after sins had been committed.1020 The association of 
imperial remorse with weeping was thus culturally appropriate, revealing an emperor’s 
humility and honest acceptance of wrongdoing. Skylitzes’ retrospective entreaty to Michael 
IV to weep for his sin, an indication that Skylitzes did not believe Michael’s efforts 
sufficiently sincere, reaffirms this reading. A similar appeal was made to Alexios I by 
Oxeites, who urged him to repent by ‘spilling tears’, ‘pouring out his heart’ and 
‘sobbing’.1021  
Physical tears, or their literary counterparts, thus belonged to the emotional repertoire 
and literary topoi associated with the Christian imperial ideal: particularly humility, 
                                                 
1016 Hatzaki 2009: esp. 52-56. Anna compared her father with a statue made of bronze and reports that he would 
sit through the night, even until dawn, working. Unlike his attendants, his mood would never waver nor his 
posture change. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 441 (trans. Frankopan 412). 
1017 Fałkowski 2010: 187. 
1018 Althoff 1996: 239-252. 
1019 In his Instructions for Spiritual Direction. Hinterberger 2006: 47. 
1020 Manuel II, Seven Ethico-Political Orations, (Oration VI), ed. Kakkoura 432, 443 (Text); see also pp. 147, 
153 (Commentary). 
1021 ... δάκρυα χέοντες, τὰς καρδίας ἐκχέοντες, ἐκ βάθους στενάζοντες καὶ ἀνακλαιόμενοι… Ioannes Oxeites, 





entreaty/petition, and repentance.1022 Yet tears remained an aberration from everyday 
imperial behaviour. The emotion was striking and, given the association with honest 
redemption, tears could be used to serve calculated propagandist functions.1023 Their ritual 
significance was to communicate the emperor’s emotional trauma and induce sympathy from 
the audience; to create an interpretive framework in which emotion was easily recognised 
and dictated the observer’s understanding of events and behaviours.1024 Ideally, emotional 
consensus was sought between participant and observer. The emperor grieved and repented 
for his sin, the observer was moved to grieve for/with the emperor. He was redeemed, they 
witnessed his redemption.1025  
Emotional manipulation was never considered a factor by narratives when tears were 
deemed sincere or when an emperor was viewed favourably. By contrast, false weeping 
indicated tyranny. Procopius, ascribed such nature to Justinian I, ‘When he cried it was not 
as an expression of genuine joy or sorrow at anything, but a strategy to serve the needs of 
the moment.’1026 The accusation furthered Procopius’ Kaiserkritik, Justinian’s tears became 
extensions of his enumerated tyrannical qualities.1027 Theophanes, employed a similar 
treatment for ‘the unrighteous emperor Nikephoros I, who always acted for show and never 
according to God’.1028 ‘Nikephoros, who had never respected truth in any matter’, ordered 
                                                 
1022 On tears of petition/entreaty, see Grünbart 2009: 94-96. The shedding of tears also had a longstanding 
association with sincere piety and self-abasement, it was an honourable act. Herakleios was recorded as 
shedding many tears in a display of pious humility, on the occasion of an adventus in Jerusalem marking his 
recovery of the True Cross (discussed along with other humble imagery of Herakleios by Maranaci 2009). 
1023 The potential for which is noted by Grünbart 2009: 89, 92-93. 
1024 Fałkowski 2010: 187. 
1025 For a comparable interpretive framework: Macrides 1988: 534-535, and n.130, draws attention to the 
shedding of tears by those accused of criminal activities (murder) as an inducement for indulgences in these 
cases. The emotion on display was seemingly interpreted as an indication of sincere remorse. 
1026 … καὶ δάκρυα οὐχ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς τινος ἢ πάθους ἐκφέρων, ἀλλὰ τεχνάζων ἐπὶ καιροῦ κατὰ τὸ τῆς χρείας 
παρὸν... Procopius, Anecdota, ed. Dewing VIII.24; ed. Dindorf III, p. 56-57 (trans. Kaldellis 39). 
1027 He was ‘prone to evil’ but ‘easy to lead around’, ‘never spoke the truth to anyone in his presence, always 
saying and doing everything with treacherous intent’, ‘a hypocrite, secretly vindictive, two-faced… highly 
accomplished at hiding his true opinion… always lying, but his lies were prepared… unreliable as an ally, 
treacherous as an enemy, craving murder and money’. Procopius, Anecdota, ed. Dewing VIII, 24; ed. Dindorf 
III, p. 56-57 (trans. Kaldellis 38-39). 





Bardanios Tourkos be blinded in exile on Prote. Those involved were to feign ignorance of 
his authorisation, and Nikephoros swore his own innocence. He ‘deceived many men even 
before he had become emperor’, and confined himself to the imperial bedchamber for seven 
days lamenting Tourkos’ fate. Crucially, Nikephoros was overheard ‘whimpering 
deceitfully’, proof of his ‘natural faculty for a woman’s tears, such as many low persons and 
false-messiahs possess’.1029 His publicised grief and recourse to tears undoubtedly sought to 
distance him from involvement in the blinding and establish his heartfelt sorrow over 
Tourkos’ fate, yet deceit, treachery, and misrule were again evoked by his misuse of tears. 
A final example, Choniates’ Andronikos I, made repeated recourse to crying. His rise to the 
throne was closely associated with staged weeping that won him support during the march 
on Constantinople, underscored his loyalty during the initial audience with Alexios II, and 
accompanied his promotion to co-imperial status before Alexios’ assassination.1030 Each 
instance was coupled with one of Andronikos’ lies or acts of deception. His prayers, ‘bitter 
weeping’, and ‘piteous wailing’ at the tomb of Manuel became a warning of his deceitful 
nature when these remorse-fuelled petitions were revealed as incoherent threats against 
Manuel’s family.1031 Elsewhere, Choniates remarked, ‘[tears] sometimes flow or trickle 
from the tearducts from joy, but this was not the case with Andronikos, for whom the flow 
of tears presaged certain death.’1032 Andronikos’ weeping revealed no genuine remorse or 
joy, only scheming. In all three cases, tears that were usually a sign of virtuous emotion were 
corrupted and became quasi-sacrilegious in nature. The contempt implied for these 
‘deceptions’ only emphasises the ideological significance of tears in penitential rituals. 
For authors describing acts of repentance after the fact, didactic motives become 
                                                 
1029 …δολίως κλαυθμυριζόμενον ...ἐπεὶ καὶ φυσικῶς αὐτῷ γυναικώδη προσῆσαν δάκρυα, ἃ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν 
φαύλων καὶ ψευδοχρήστοις προσεῖναι πέφυκεν. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 480 (trans. Mango 
and Scott 660). Translation adapted. 
1030 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 243-244, 255, 264-265 (trans. Magoulias 137, 142-143, 147). 
1031 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 256-257 (trans. Magoulias 143). 





increasingly evident. Markopoulos argues that, under the early Macedonian dynasty the 
charisma of the imperial office prompted a shift in the structure of historical narratives being 
produced in court circles.1033 The annalistic formula was exchanged for more personality-
oriented works most clearly discernible in Genesios and Theophanes Continuatus, especially 
the Vita Basilii. The purpose of these works was propagandist, to glorify Basileios and the 
Macedonian dynasty and vilify Michael III and any interlopers.1034 This evolution continued 
under subsequent authors, and the narratives adopted a more anthropocentric approach to the 
individuals who were their subjects.1035 The generally unimpeachable, almost Neoplatonist, 
models of rule that had predominated gave way to much more nuanced portraits, emperors 
could be described as deeply flawed without necessarily being the subject of total 
vilification. Thus Psellos could say in reference to Michael IV,1036 ‘Not one of the emperors 
in my time… to my knowledge, bore the burden of rule entirely free from blame to the end… 
So it was with this man…’ - and then proceed to provide a nuanced assessment of his 
qualities and ultimately declare him a good man.1037 Prominent character flaws served to 
teach the reader what not to do, in the same way that virtues were to be embraced.1038 
Usurpation itself provided a teachable moment and was fraught with moral ambiguities.  
The historical narratives show an increased concern to record, and establish the 
sincerity of, acts of repentance. This can be connected with the move toward ‘biography’ 
and to the increasingly instructive functions of history writing. Theophanes Continuatus’ 
                                                 
1033 Markopoulos 2009: esp. 697-699, 713; Markopoulos 2003. See also, Kazhdan 2006: esp. 133. 
1034 Ljubarskij 1992: 184; Kazhdan 2006: 137. 
1035 Markopoulos 2009: 712. 
1036 As Markopoulos 2009: 710-712, has noted ‘[for Psellos] the concern of earlier historiography with what is 
‘proper’ and with ‘setting a good example’ is inconsistent with… his mainly anthropocentric narrative, as the 
personalities he analyses so vividly and in such painstaking detail are not univocal: far from being bound to 
particular ideals, they are changeable. Psellos tends to demystify his heroes, over whose weaknesses he lingers 
more than their strengths.’ 
1037 Psellos relates a similar sentiment in relation to Constantine IX: ‘…I find such inconsistency nothing to 
marvel at; on the contrary, it would be extraordinary if someone were always unalterable… an emperor, one 
who inherited supreme power from God, especially if he lived longer than most, would never be able to 
maintain the highest standards throughout his reign.’ Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 124-125, 274-
275; ed. Renauld I, 58, 130-131 (trans. Sewter 91-92, 169).  





description of Romanos’ dream, like De Administrando’s unedifying portrait of his 
incompetence, was both warning and lesson: usurpers of the Macedonian dynasty were 
doomed to hell, and could only be saved through acknowledgement of guilt, proper order, 
and humiliating atonement. In a similar fashion Tzimiskes’ deathbed confession of his ‘sins 
of omission’ saved Leon Diakonos’ praiseworthy soldier emperor1039 by having him at last 
acknowledge responsibility for Nikephoros’ murder. Psellos undercut Michael’s misdeeds 
in coming to power through his almost immediate recognition of wrongdoing and efforts to 
repent. Finally, Anna moved full-circle as her close personal connection to her subject, and 
her intended comparative critique of his successors, meant that Alexios was described as an 
idealised paradigm of rulership.1040 Proposed as a model that his successors would never 
measure up to, Alexios’ repentance, like his motives, had to be pure or the ideal would 
collapse. Hence Anna offered a personally faultless quasi-usurper who emulated Christ by 
redeeming others through his atonement on their behalf. Repentance became a prominent 
sign of ‘good’ emperors, and Choniates’ Historia testifies to the political cachet of this ideal. 
Its record of the ‘official’ account of Isaakios II’s accession held that the emperor begged 
forgiveness for the murder that brought him to power, inside Hagia Sophia, before the crown 
had even touched his head. Isaakios’ accession was consequently sin-free, another way in 
which it was portrayed as an exemplary popular act.1041 
The narratives now more openly acknowledged imperial misdeeds and character 
flaws. They recorded official propaganda and acted like advice literature by providing 
                                                 
1039 Leon’s praise was (mostly) for the martial qualities of the primary personalities his history records 
(Nikephoros II, Ioannes I, and Svjatoslav). Palace life in particular is subject to the author’s scorn. On Leon’s 
authorial personality and narrative focus, see Markopoulos 2009: esp. 705-706. 
1040 For Anna’s motives in writing the Alexias, see Buckley 2014; Magdalino 2000. 
1041 Καὶ ὁ μὲν ὠς εἶχε τὸν θεῖον εἰσιὼν ναὸν ἄνεισι τὸν ἀνάσταθμον, ὃν οἱ φονεῖς ἀνερχόμενοι τὸ οἰκεῖον 
ἀνακεκαλυμμένως διατρανοῦσι πλημμέλημα τὴν ἐκ τῶν εἰσιόντων τε καὶ ἐξιόντων τὸ ἰερώτατον τέμενος 
αἰτοῦντες συγχώρησιν... ‘On entering the holy temple, he ascended the anastathmos from which murderers 
publicly confess their crimes, asking forgiveness from those entering and leaving the most holy shrine.’ 
Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 342 (trans. Magoulias 189). Translation adapted. See the comments of 





instructive tales for moral rulership that future emperors could learn from in order to avoid 
these mistakes. These concerns did not originate in the literary developments under the 
Macedonian dynasty,1042 they had always been present to some extent in the hagiographical 
corpus with its more biographical focus. However, it was from this point that they became 
pronounced in the narrative histories and were openly debated in literary circles. Before the 
tenth century, narratives of imperial remorse were rare.1043 
It is noteworthy that this amplification of repentance in the historiographical corpus 
roughly corresponds to a period of increased interest in humility and penitential rites in 
Byzantium and the West. The increasing influence of reformist-ecclesiastic ideological 
conceptions of Christian rulership had, in the West, already been felt in the early ninth-
century. A move towards what de Jong terms a ‘penitential ideal’ of rulership in Carolingian 
society was then taking place.1044 ‘Specula principum’ produced in the period bear witness 
to the increased importance of humility, and monastic ideals progressively came to influence 
the royal virtues that were being exalted. This was possibly a by-product of the monastic 
upbringing and education of almost all authors and kings.1045 Furthermore, as the monastic 
life was itself innately penitential, these ideals came to be associated with the ideals of 
empire.1046 That the penitential punishments of harmiscara and paenitentia publica1047 begin 
to make frequent appearance only in the early ninth-century sources, corresponds to the 
promotion of Louis I’s ideals of Christian Empire, and his submission to the bishops in order 
                                                 
1042 Given that Genesios and Theophanes Continuatus were seemingly drawing upon a common source for 
much of their material, we may question exactly when these literary developments began. On the evidence for 
this common source, see Markopoulos 2009: 700-701; Markopoulos 2003: 186 n.18; Karpozilos 2002: II, 318-
324. 
1043 The present study has identified no unambiguous accounts of remorse for a usurpation in the histories and 
chronicles produced (at least) before the reign of Theophilos. Further, there are extremely few detailed accounts 
(that is, more than one or two lines) concerning expressions of imperial remorse more generally in these 
narratives until the tenth century. 
1044 de Jong 2011; de Jong 1992: esp. 32. 
1045 de Jong 1992: 32; Noble 1976. 
1046 de Jong 1992; Noble 1976, focusing on the example of Louis I (the Pious). 





to perform public penance at Attigny (822) and Soissons (833).1048 Bishop Hincmar of 
Rheims, in connection with King Charles II, invoked David’s confession to Nathan as an 
example of a king’s duty to keep his promises.1049 And Anton argues that the exemplar of 
the repentant Theodosius represented ‘the Herrschertypologie of this period’.1050 Acts of 
public penance, even by kings, became more visible in the West and their imposition was 
associated solely with the clergy.1051 
In Byzantium, Leon VI’s humbling prostration before the patriarch was the first 
reported instance of such an occurrence since Theodosius.1052 Patriarch Photios’ earlier 
vision of the imperial office, as outlined in the introductory chapters to Eisagoge, and in his 
Letter to Boris I, was a product of late-ninth century innovation.1053 The works demonstrate 
an attempt by Photios to redefine the emperor-patriarch relationship along Rome’s Pontifical 
lines.1054 The espoused ideology stripped the emperor of absolute and spiritual power, 
established the authority of the church as a separate institution of almost equal temporal 
power to the imperial office, and proposed the patriarch as akin to a pontifical authority with 
influence over the emperor.1055 Title III, §11, of Eisagoge also asserted that the clergy alone 
could decide upon issues of repentance and turning away from sins and heresies.1056 The 
church evidently sought greater authority under the leadership of a charismatic patriarch and 
these politico-ideological issues never entirely went away.1057 
An emergent ‘penitential ideal’ in Byzantium might explain why every emperor co-
                                                 
1048 de Jong 1992: esp. 48-49; de Jong 2011. 
1049 Hincmar of Rheims, Ad Carolum regem pro ecclesiae liberatum defensione, PL 125, col.1040-1; quoted 
in de Jong 1992: 51. For analysis, see Nelson 1977: 248-254. 
1050 Anton 2006: 442-443, 446. Ward 2015: 76-77, has warned against some of the (now outdated) assumptions 
in Anton’s argumentation, but retains this central thesis. 
1051 Hamilton 2001: 104-121; Dalewski 2008: 88. 
1052 Dagron 2003: 114-124. 
1053 Photios’ authorship of the introductory chapters/titles of the Eisagoge was convincingly argued by Scharf 
1956: 385-400; Scharf 1959: 68-81. See also, Barker 1957: 89, 109-112. 
1054 Dagron 2003: esp. 234. 
1055 Dagron 2003: 229-235; Tougher 1997: 71-72; Schminck 1986. 
1056 Eisagoge, ed. Zepos 3.11. 





opted into the Macedonian dynasty either performed or embodied some form of penance: 
Romanos I through his dream and late-life repentance; Nikephoros II wanted to embrace the 
tonsure before he became emperor, slept on the floor and wore a hair vest beneath his attire 
afterwards;1058 Ioannes I performed penance before the patriarch and instituted numerous 
good works; Romanos III had a reputation for piety and expressed repentance for his 
misdeeds in ruling;1059 Michael IV atoned for the murder of Romanos; Michael V expressed 
remorse for his actions in deposing Zoe shortly before he was blinded;1060 and Constantine 
IX funded numerous charitable works and new foundations.1061 Basileios I had employed 
the guise of a New David, and Hagia Sophia’s narthex mosaic was just one example of the 
visualisation of royal atonement in Byzantine art in this period. King David’s repentance 
began to appear in manuscript illuminations produced from the ninth century onwards. 
Cutler documents seventeen aristocratic psalters dating from the ninth to fifteenth centuries 
in which the scene is shown,1062 in several instances, with David prostrate and being rescued 
by Nathan from an angel of justice in the presence of female-personified Metanoia.1063 It has 
also been suggested that the iconographic programme of the eleventh-century Monomachos 
crown was conceived in ecclesiastical circles and heavily indebted to the principles of good 
rulership as expressed in the David story.1064 This origin would explain the non-traditional 
pairing of Humility and Truth in the enamels, which would instead reflect David’s chief 
                                                 
1058 In a further sign of his piety, Nikephoros supposedly slept upon a red-dyed felt and a bearskin that had 
been a gift from his uncle, the saint and monk, Michael Maleinos. He was sleeping on this when Tzimiskes 
and the other conspirators murdered him. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 255, 280 (trans. Wortley 
245, 268). On Maleinos, see Laiou 1998. 
1059 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri Ι, 86-87; ed. Renauld Ι, 40 (trans. Sewter 70).  
1060 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 234-235; ed. Renauld I, 111-112 (trans. Sewter 147). 
1061 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 477 (trans. Wortley 444-445). 
1062 Cutler 1984: 122.  
1063 See also, Dagron 2003: 117 and n.85; citing the mss. Parisinus gr. 510, fol. 143v (c.880/883); Parisinus 
gr. 139, fol. 136v (late tenth-century); and Marcianus gr. 17, fol. IVv (c. 976-1025). 
1064 On the much-debated Monomachos crown, see Buckton 2012: 31-33; Maguire 1997/1998; Maguire 1997a; 
Oikonomides 1994. For the suggestion of the crown’s iconographic influences and origins, see Kiss 2000: 75. 
See also, Kalavrezou, Saboulia, and Sabar 1993, who suggest a similar purpose for the iconographic 
programme of the Vatican Psalter (Ms.Vat. gr. 752). Stylistic similarities between the figure of Humility on 
the crown, and that of monastic Humility in a twelfth-century copy of The Heavenly Ladder, at Mount Sinai, 





virtues in religious thought. In light of these cultural and ideological developments it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the repentant emperor model became more pronounced in 






VII. VICARIOUS REDEMPTION 
 
As the preceding discussion has outlined, the process of usurpation could leave an emperor 
burdened with guilt. The performance of acts of repentance provided a route for the 
politically perceptive to acknowledge and rid themselves of this burden by appearing 
remorseful and propitiating God in accordance with established customs and models of 
rulership. Their efforts were judged and used as a political tool to establish, or undermine, 
sincerity and moral-legitimacy. However, the charismatic nature of rulership and the 
dynastic principle, combined with political realities, meant that the circumstances of an 
accession might not easily be forgiven or forgotten. The long-term political consequences 
might require a successor to take actions to atone for his predecessor’s misdeeds in order to 
settle factional disputes and repair the dynasty’s public image. Three cases exemplify the 
concerns, commonalities, and extent of these efforts. 
 
Theophilos 
Theophilos’ accession in October 829 provides the first clear example of these attempts at 
‘vicarious redemption’.1065 History attributes to Theophilos a well-earned and actively 
cultivated reputation for justice.1066 Petitioners were encouraged to approach him as he rode 
through Constantinople on Fridays to pray at the Church of the Theotokos at Blachernai.1067 
Later, the twelfth-century satirical dialogue Timarion assigned to him the role of a judge in 
the underworld, as a (heretical) Christian emperor who shone with ‘honest judgement’.1068 
                                                 
1065 For the dating see Treadgold 1975; Grierson, Mango, and Ševčenko 1962: 56. 
1066 On this aspect of Theophilos’ reputation, see Codoñer 2014: 449-460; Macrides 2004: 359-360; Laiou 
1994: esp.151-157. 
1067 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 87; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 126-129; Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 50 (trans. Wortley 53); Michael Glykas, Annales, p.537(B). 
1068 Timarion, ed. Romano 33 (trans. Baldwin 64). On the deliberate irony of the heretic Theophilos’ role in 





According to the narratives of his rule, this judicial reputation was earned very early on, in 
connection with the coup that had brought his father, Michael II, to power nine years 
previous.1069 The efforts of Empress Theodora to ameliorate Theophilos’ tarnished image as 
an iconoclast emperor also undoubtedly influenced the strength of this reputation.1070 
Consequently, a recapitulation of the circumstances of Michael’s accession is necessary. 
Leon V had twice accused Michael of treason.1071 On the second occasion the 
evidence was deemed conclusive and Michael was to be executed on Christmas Day 820. 
According to Genesios and Theophanes Continuatus, he was to be thrown into the furnace 
of the imperial baths. This fate was temporarily commuted via the intervention of Empress 
Theodosia, who reminded Leon that an execution at Christmas would be a grave offence to 
God.1072 Whilst imprisoned, Michael professed to feel remorse for his misdeeds and asked 
to make a final confession. The Continuator called this a ‘pretext’ (σκῆψις), and Genesios 
asserted that ‘Michael pretended that his soul was burdened by his sins.’1073 This act of 
blasphemous false repentance provided the opportunity for Michael to contact sympathisers, 
and possibly members of the conspiracy, through the eunuch attendant Theoktistos. He 
reportedly blackmailed them into helping him and, as Leon attended Christmas prayers, the 
conspirators, disguised as clergymen, struck Leon down. Michael was swiftly freed from his 
imprisonment and proclaimed emperor.1074  
The extent of Michael’s involvement in the assassination has been subject to debate. 
                                                 
1069 On 25 December 820. For the narrative treatments, see below. 
1070 Laiou 1994: 156, intimating a restorative function to Theophilos’ presentation as a ‘just king’. 
1071 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 34-35; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 54-55; Genesios, ed. 
Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 15-16 (trans. Kaldellis 18-19), who report that the first accusation was ‘slander’ 
and that Michael had been able to clear himself. 
1072 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 35-36; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 56-57; Genesios, ed. 
Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 16 (trans. Kaldellis 20). The proposed punishment is reminiscent of the legend 
surrounding Constantine I’s execution of Crispus and Fausta following their purported affair, and in both 
narratives the empress Theodosia’s intercession is somewhat frenzied, with Leon rebuking her. Possibly an 
allusion is being made to the Constantine legend for the purpose of Kaiserkritik. 
1073 ...προφασίζεται ὁ Μιχαὴλ τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν ὀφλημάτων ἄγαν κεκτῆσθαι διὰ φροντίδος… Genesios, ed. 
Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 17 (trans. Kaldellis 21). Author’s translation. 
1074 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 38-41 ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 60-65; Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-





Afinogenov argues that Michael was not a direct participant at the moment of his arrest, but 
emerged as a figurehead after the assassination.1075 However, as Codoñer points out, this 
stands in direct opposition to the reason given for his arrest in the sources, and Michael was 
almost certainly involved in the subsequent plot to assassinate Leon; especially given his 
swift release and proclamation.1076 Nevertheless, a climate of paranoia and conspiracy 
certainly existed at Leon’s court in the latter years of his rule. His politics became 
increasingly repressive and factionalism was exacerbated, as suggested by Michael’s first 
arrest due to ‘slander’.1077 
Michael exploited this environment to distance himself from the murder. The fact 
that he was imprisoned at the time of its commission would certainly have lent credence to 
any attempt.1078 Officially, he accepted no responsibility for it. His well-known letter to 
Louis the Pious, betrays no defamatory propaganda towards Leon, and even claims that Leon 
had been killed by some ‘evil doers’. It goes on to describe Michael’s elevation as the work 
of God and the Virgin through a consensus omnium of the patriarch, patricians, and senate 
in accordance with ‘ancient custom’ and in effort to overcome the usurpation of Thomas the 
Slav, which he dates to Leon’s reign.1079 In fact, Lemerle has demonstrated that Thomas’ 
usurpation was a response to the murder of Leon, and that Michael’s version of the 
chronology attempted to conceal the reasons for Thomas’ rebellion as they would have 
damaged his claims to legitimacy.1080 The coronation was evidently used as a means of 
asserting Michael’s supposed popularity, the consensus omnium, as his qualification for 
                                                 
1075 Afinogenov 2001: esp. 338. 
1076 Codoñer 2014: 67. Of course, this does not rule out multiple, simultaneous, conspiracies at court. 
1077 On the increasingly repressive policies instituted by Leon, and the factionalism at court, see Codoñer 2014: 
esp. 20-25, 67-68.  
1078 Afinogenov 2001: 333. 
1079 Michaelis et Theophili Imperatorum Constantinopolitanorum epistula, pp.475-80, and esp. p.476. 
Michael’s legitimising content is discussed in Afinogenov 2001: 332-333; Codoñer 2014: 65, 68. Noble 2009: 
260-264, considers the letter’s reception in the west, and its wider concern with perceived heterodox practices 
within the church. 
1080 Lemerle 1965, discusses the two source traditions. Afinogenov 1999: 446-447, follows Michael’s version 





rulership, in place of dynastic authorisation. These efforts to distance himself from the 
murder were not wholly believable, and Afinogenov has identified references to anti-
Michael pamphlets in circulation.1081 
It is in this context that we must consider Theophilos’ redemptive deeds. In the first 
silention called after his accession, the young emperor1082 ordered all senators and dignitaries 
to assemble at the Magnaura.1083 Addressing them, he explained that his father had left him 
a task on his deathbed and that those who had joined the rebellion against Leon and aided 
Michael were to be well rewarded for their past assistance:  
Since my father your Emperor, O Holy Senate, bound me with fearsome 
oaths as he departed from this life to reward in a fitting manner those who 
rebelled with him against Leon for the danger they incurred, I do not intend 
in any way to neglect this command.1084 
Theophilos complied with his father’s request by asking that these men make themselves 
known. As they came forward the order was given for the eparchos to take them into custody 
at once and apply the laws appropriate to the murder of an emperor. Leon’s assassins were 
promptly identified and executed.1085 
The story has proven contentious for modern scholarship and, given the emperor’s 
cultivation of an aura of imperial justice, it has even been suspected to be a later literary 
invention.1086 Discrepancies exist between the accounts of Theophanes Continuatus and 
                                                 
1081 Afinogenov 2001: 334. 
1082 Theophilos was just sixteen years old at the time of his elevation to sole rule. He appears to have relied 
upon the advice of his step-mother Euphrosyne and his tutor Ioannes Grammatikos at this early stage in his 
reign. Treadgold 1988: 263-264; Brubaker and Haldon 2011: 392-393. 
1083 On the staging of a silention, see Christophilopoulou 1951. On the Magnaura, the hall usually associated 
with the welcoming receptions for foreign ambassadors, see Janin 1964: 115. 
1084 «ἐπειδήπερ ὁ ἐμὸς πατὴρ καὶ ὑμῶν βασιλεύς, ὦ ἱερὰ σύγκλητος, ὅρκοις με διεβεβαιώκει φρικτοῖς 
ἀποιχόμενος, τοῖς συνηγωνισμένοις αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ κατὰ Λέοντος νεανίευμα τῆς ἀγωνίας παρασχεῖν ἄξια, οὐ 
μεθήσειν τῆς ἐντολῆς οὐδαμῶς προτεθύμημαι.» Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 80 (trans. 
Kaldellis 49). Emphasis added. 
1085 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 36 (trans. Kaldellis 49); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
85-86; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 124-127; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 49-50 (trans. 
Wortley 51-52). 
1086 Afinogenov 2001: 332, questions whether the story could be ‘just another fanciful piece of literature’, and 
cites the (likely) fictional bride-show for Theophilos as a precedent for such an invention. The question is also 





Genesios, and those of Symeon Magistros and Leon Grammatikos. In the latter, the event 
took place at the Hippodrome and the executed conspirators abused Theophilos for 
benefiting from their actions.1087 Afinogenov has argued that the only way that Michael 
could have reasonably promoted his own innocence would have been for him to punish those 
responsible. He adduces evidence from the Life of Euthymios of Sardes in which Methodios 
speaks of Michael’s attempts against his fellow murderers: ‘…the beast was slain by his 
enemy and avenger, for it is right to call thus his successor in full accord with the scriptures, 
as he, having been hostile even to death, attempted in turn to avenge himself against his 
fellow murderers…’.1088 However, the speech has been suggested as a rhetorical wordplay, 
and it does not state that Michael was successful in his ‘attempt in turn’.1089 Given the 
divisions in Leon’s court, and the need for Michael to ensure his own security by purging 
some of these factions at the beginning of his reign,1090 might the Life have conflated these 
efforts with the removal of Michael’s own backers, those responsible for the assassination? 
Or might Michael have sought justice against a select few members of the conspiracy, 
offering them as scapegoats?  
The difficulties and acrimonies of the latter possibility were known in the previous 
century when the prominent military figures, Myakios and Bouraphos, co-conspirators of 
the protoasekritis Artemios-Anastasios were blinded and exiled within a fortnight of his 
coronation, supposedly with popular consent. They were proposed as the instigators of the 
                                                 
Theophilos, see Afinogenov 1997; on the historical evidence for the performance of bride-shows, with 
bibliography, see Vinson 1999. 
1087 Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 214-215; Symeon Magister, Chronicon, ed. Wahlgren 
217.  For discussion, see Treadgold 1988: 271, 433 n.376. 
1088 …σφάζεται ὁ θὴρ παρὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ καὶ ἐκδικητοῦ αὐτου· οὕτω γὰρ καλεῖν τὸν τοῦτου διάδοχον 
γραφικώτατα δίκαιον, καθότι ἐχθράνας εἰς θάνατον διεκδικεῖν αὐτὸν πάλιν πειρᾶται ἐπί τε τους 
συνανδροφόνους... La vie d’Euthyme de Sardes, ed. Gouillard §10, 199-201. Translation adapted from 
Afinogenov 2001: 332-333. Emphasis added. 
1089 Codoñer 2014: 69, argues that Methodios is playing with the phrase ‘enemy and avenger’ (παρὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ 
καὶ ἐκδικητοῦ), an allusion to Psalm 8:3 in which God is said ‘to destroy the enemy and avenger’ (τοῦ 
καταλῦσαι ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἐκδικητήν) thus making both terms negative. 
1090 Leon V’s relative Gregoras Pterotos, for example, was exiled to Skyros among the Cyclades islands of the 






coup in the narratives, whereas Anastasios just happened to be the official they decided to 
promote.1091 Their punishment evidently sought to clear Anastasios of dishonour associated 
with the overthrow of Philippikos, and temporarily allayed concerns about the tenuous 
loyalty of military personnel willing to depose an emperor. However, it also fostered 
resentment among the Opsikion thema which revolted again and promoted Theodosios III 
early in 715.1092 The protostrator Rouphos, who had actually blinded Philippikos, remained 
untouched by Anastasios’ purge, suggesting that political expediency and the perception of 
justice, rather than justice itself, were motivating factors behind it. The incident assuredly 
emphasised the importance of carefully handling political reprisals. 
If we attribute executions to Theophilos, as the preponderance of sources do, the 
narratives maintain that his actions punished those who had ‘stained their hands with human 
blood’.1093 Only the figure who delivered the final blow is singled out, yet he remains an 
otherwise anonymous member of the ‘Krambonitai’ family.1094 Ioannes Hexaboulios the 
logothetes tou dromou and conspirator retained his office,1095 and the chartoularios tou 
kanikleiou Theoktistos, Michael’s conduit to his accomplices, remained an important figure, 
even serving as a regent to Michael III.1096 This display of justice was evidently limited to 
                                                 
1091 Philippikos was blinded on the 3 June 713, Anastasios’ coronation took place a day later on Pentecost, 4 
June. The patrikios and strategos of the Thrakesion thema, Theodoros Myakios, was blinded and exiled on 10 
June. The patrikios and comes of the Opsikion thema, Georgios Bouraphos was blinded and exiled on 17 June. 
Of the named assailants of Phillipikos, only the protostrator of the Opsikion thema, Rouphos, who had entered 
Constantinople and blinded Philippikos at the ornatorion of the Greens (in the Hippodrome), remained 
unpunished. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 383 (trans. Mango and Scott 533); Nikephoros, Historia 
Syntomos ed. Mango 114-117; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 170; Brubaker and Haldon 
2011: 71-72; Kaegi 1981: 190-191. For the chronology, see Sumner 1976: 289-291, amending that of Grierson 
1962: 51-52. 
1092 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 385 (trans. Mango and Scott 535-536); Nikephoros, Historia 
Syntomos, ed. Mango 118-119. Kaegi 1981: 191-192, notes that in addition to the removal of the Theodoros 
and Georgios, Theophanes reports how Anastasios appointed new and ‘most capable’ strategoi and civil 
officials at the outset of his reign. For the appointments, Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 383 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 534); Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 120-121. 
1093 …αἵματι ἀνθπωπίνῳ μιάναντες δεξιάν…. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 86; ed. Featherstone and 
Codoñer 126-127. 
1094 On the possible identity of this person, see Codoñer 2014: 69. 
1095 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 22 (trans. Kaldellis 27); Codoñer 1995: 164; Codoñer 2014: 
67. 





those few involved in the physical murder of Leon and not the influential wider membership 
of the conspiracy, who remained untouched. 
But why would Theophilos have then felt the need to execute Leon’s murderers? 
Possibly he believed that they deserved such a fate. Theophilos’ sense of Christian morality 
prompted him to return his stepmother to the monastery from which his father had plucked 
her in order to marry her, and Leon was his murdered godfather.1097 The executions were 
also politically useful. Moments of dynastic transition were fraught with danger, the 
executions may have reflected this concern and served as a warning to deter prospective 
conspiracies. This possibility has too often been overlooked in discussions despite the 
Continuator’s assertion that this was their primary purpose.1098 Although the account is 
noticeably hostile to the emperor, the declaration is not far-fetched, for Theophilos’ reign 
reportedly ended in a similar fashion with the execution of the successful general 
Theophobos, whom he suspected of being a potential threat to Michael III’s regency.1099 The 
Continuator crafts an image of paranoia-inspired brutality to accompany Theophilos’ 
justice, but Genesios too mentions Theophilos’ dynastic concerns.1100 The removal of certain 
members of the original conspiracy early in the reign would have prevented potential 
challenges to it, especially if they had sought to renegotiate terms of support, or replace 
Theophilos with another conspirator. Theophilos retained the backing of certain members 
whom his father had promoted, but rid himself of others whose patronage was politically 
                                                 
1097 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 86; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 126-127; Treadgold 1975: 357. 
1098 ‘Now Theophilos wanted to be known as a fervent lover of justice and righteous guardian of the laws of 
the state, but in truth preserving himself from those who were forming conspiracies, lest anyone should carry 
out revolution against him, and observing the danger which impended, he decided upon the destruction and 
slaughter of all those who through conspiracy had procured the empire for his father, and had revolted against 
Leon.’ Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 85; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 124-125. Emphasis added. 
1099 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 136; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 196-197; Genesios, ed. 
Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 42-43 (trans. Kaldellis 56-57); Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 
227-228.  
1100 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 49 (trans. Kaldellis 65), who claims that Theophilos had 
attempted to execute one ‘Martenakios’ in response to a prediction implying that the Martenakoioi would 





problematic and he could now do without. Furthermore, as Treadgold remarks, ‘[the] 
executions effectively freed Theophilus from any responsibility for the murder that had 
established the Amorian dynasty.’1101 They would have served to conciliate the partisans of 
Leon behind the young emperor, who was seen to be acting on their behalf in bringing to 
justice those who had committed the crime. Claims that he had ignored the murder for his 
own benefit could not be made, and charges of hypocrisy levelled by the unlucky 
conspirators would carry little weight in comparison to his reputation for justice.  
The act distanced Theophilos from blame for the murder by distancing him from 
Michael’s misdeeds in an act of judicial repentance that was also connected, the narratives 
claim, with a deathbed request from Michael. We might question whether that request was 
a polemical device employed to show Theophilos’ capacity for deception, or a record of 
official propaganda designed to indicate Michael’s remorse. A wider attempt to rehabilitate 
Michael and the dynastic image in the early years of Theophilos’ reign could explain why 
the class III solidi, produced to commemorate the death of Theophilos’ heir Constantine in 
the first-half of 831,1102 revived Isaurian practice by placing an effigy of Theophilos’ 
predecessor on the coin. In an apparent display of dynastic pride, both Michael and 
Constantine were shown. The innovation could not have been missed; an emperor whose 
eternal fate was questioned would certainly not have been a candidate for prominence on an 
imperial product. His presence was evidently a sign of his good standing and proof that the 
sins of his accession and iconoclast beliefs had been atoned for. Delayed justice allowed the 
dynasty to redress its sinful role in a historic wrong, while retaining power. Son redeemed 
father. 
                                                 
1101 Treadgold 1988: 272. 
1102 On the basis of the numismatic and sigillographic evidence, Füeg and Grierson have established this as the 
most likely date for Constantine’s death. Codoñer has further established this date on the basis of Theophilos’ 
appointment of a kaisar only after the death of Constantine. Füeg 2007: 25-28, 71-73; Grierson 1973: III.1, 






In Schreiner’s analysis the accession of Leon VI in 886 marked the end of the Macedonian 
dynasty and the restoration of the Amorian.1103 His pronouncement is linked with the belief, 
held by many commentators, that Leon was in fact the son of Michael III by his mistress 
Eudokia Ingerina, the wife of Basileios I.1104 Much ink was spilled on efforts to establish 
Leon’s biological paternity until Karlin-Hayter demonstrated that line of inquiry to be 
intractable, and irrelevant to the more pressing issue of the perception of Leon’s paternity.1105 
She found that historical rumours about Leon’s ‘true’ ancestry were reported only in the anti-
Macedonian chronicle tradition; that they began while Michael was still alive, and provided 
a means of humiliating Basileios. As Tougher then revealed, although rumours also touched 
upon Basileios’ other sons, Constantine and Stephanos, Leon was subject to particular 
scrutiny.1106 A single act performed at the outset of Leon’s reign is responsible for much of 
this debate.  
According to the narratives, the first official action undertaken after Leon’s accession 
was a burial. However, this was not of Basileios, as might be expected, but an exhumation 
and reburial of Michael.1107 Leon dispatched the stratelates Andreas and an attachment of 
senators to the monastery of Philippikos at Chrysopolis, the then resting place of Michael’s 
body.1108 Skylitzes describes how, in the presence of clergymen, Michael was exhumed, 
placed in a cypress wood coffin, and dressed ‘in a manner worthy of an emperor’.1109 An 
                                                 
1103 Schreiner 1991: 186. 
1104 See, for example, Mango 1973: esp. 24; Runciman 1929: 40. 
1105 Karlin-Hayter 1991b. The most complete synopsis of the historical scholarship surrounding the ‘problem’ 
of Leon’s parentage is that of Tougher 1997: 42-67, and esp. 42-44. 
1106 Tougher 1997: 43-44. 
1107 Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 848-849. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 172 
(trans. Wortley 166), establishes that this was undertaken at the same time that charges were being read against 
Patriarch Photios (August-September 886) and the establishment of Stephanos the Synkellos as his successor 
on the patriarchal throne (consecrated December 886). For the chronology, see Jenkins 1965: 99-100. 
1108 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 172 (trans. Wortley 166). 
1109  ...ἐντίμως καὶ βασιλικῶς περιστείλαντας. On the burial, see Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 
172 (trans. Wortley 166). Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 848-849, gives an abbreviated version 





adventus marked the conveyance of his remains to Constantinople. Leon’s brothers, 
Alexandros and Stephanos (the patriarch), accompanied the body in solemn procession, 
complete with songs and hymns, through the city to the Church of the Holy Apostles where 
it was interred in a marble sarcophagus. The reburial was evidently a significant event, and 
Michael was granted full imperial honours throughout the procedure: although in no account 
is Leon VI mentioned as a participant. Michael’s exhumation was respectful and attended 
by church and state dignitaries. The imperial attire was a worthy accoutrement loaded with 
symbolism, and the grandeur of the adventus, involving members of the ruling dynasty, was 
clearly intended to make public a bold political statement.1110  
Precisely what that statement was has been the cause of consternation. Dvornik and 
Kislinger have viewed the event as almost a form of ‘generational-conflict’ against Basileios, 
whom Leon despised. Leon’s imprisonment (883-886), his narrow avoidance of blinding at 
his father’s request, his resentment of the arranged marriage to Theophano, and a sense of 
sympathy with Michael’s own unhappy marriage, were proposed as motives.1111 Mango, 
followed by Magdalino, sees it as public confirmation that Leon believed himself to be 
Michael’s son, and thus it provided an opportunity to honour his true father who had been 
so brutally overthrown by Basileios.1112 The promotion of Niketas Xylinites, who was 
rumoured to have had an affair with Eudokia during Basileios reign, has also been cited as 
evidence of Leon’s alleged ‘anti-Macedonian’ sympathies.1113 Additionally, Magdalino 
contends that Leon’s renewed patronage of Michael’s Constantinopolitan foundations is 
evidence of Leon honouring his parentage.1114  
                                                 
1110 For comparison, the epitomator Zonaras describes how Alexios I did not ‘receive a funeral appropriate to 
an emperor’ because there was nobody to cleanse his body and perform the final ablutions, there were no 
imperial adornments available to dress the body in, and his funeral procession was supposedly sparsely 
attended. Zonaras, Epitome III, 764-765. 
1111 Dvornik 1948: 245; Kislinger 1983: esp. 131-132. 
1112 Mango 1973: 26.  
1113 Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 843; Mango 1973: 24-25. 
1114 Magdalino 1988a: 196. Tougher 1997: 63, draws attention to several false assumptions in Magdalino’s 





The view that has been generally adopted by Adontz, Karlin-Hayter, and Tougher, 
suggests a more penitential reading of events.1115 The reburial was politically adroit. Leon’s 
true first actions upon acceding to the throne must have been to arrange the burial of 
Basileios, but this was quite possibly overlooked in the narratives because imperial burials 
were not usually considered interesting as historical events. By contrast, the reburial of 
Michael was an aberration from normal imperial behaviour. Although it may have suggested 
an anti-Macedonian motive to some contemporaries, this was unintentional. In fact, the 
reburial can be read as an acknowledgement by Leon of Basileios’ responsibility for 
Michael’s murder, and as a highly public attempt to honour the victim and indicate the 
dynasty’s remorse over the circumstances of its own origins. Questions about the dynasty’s 
legitimacy, in light of its foundation through an act of murder, would undoubtedly have been 
circulating. The likelihood that the reburial coincided with the anniversary of Michael’s 
death1116 would have drawn extra attention to the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, but it 
also projected the supposed strength of Leon’s conviction and political position since he was 
not disguising the issue, but tackling it head on. By making the act one of the first of his 
reign Leon sought to avoid his own association with the misdeed that had ultimately enabled 
his rule, by atoning for his father’s sin. Leon’s gesture revealed his possession of the imperial 
virtues of truth and justice through an acknowledgement and posthumous righting of this 
historic wrong. Like Theophilos, he chose to bear the guilt of his father and correct it, helping 
his own cause in the process. Theophilos’ justice may even have provided the model for 
emulation, and given Leon’s frequent comparison to the biblical kings David and 
                                                 
1115 Adontz 1933: 510-511; Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.158 (Commentary); Tougher 
1997: 64-67. 
1116 23/24 September. I follow Tougher’s conjecture that the reburial was scheduled to coincide with the 
anniversary of Michael’s death. Although the precise date is not given, Georgios Monachos Continuatus and 
Skylitzes confirm that the event took place concurrently with the deposition of Patriarch Photios and the 





(especially) Solomon, the image of justice was one that Leon particularly cultivated.1117 
With Basileios’ death, Leon may have seen an opportunity to put an end to anti-
Macedonian factionalism centred on Michael’s partisans. Reconciliation with a 
predecessor’s enemies was a recognised practice at the beginning of a new emperor’s 
reign.1118 A simultaneous conciliation of Amorian loyalists during this period would 
certainly have courted a broad political base for the emperor, and would be in keeping with 
this wider political repositioning.1119 Karlin-Hayter has argued that the Epitaphios composed 
by Leon in 888 for his parents, marked the beginning of a transition. Between 886 and 888 
Leon had undertaken a purge of his enemies from the period of Basileios’ rule. The Vita 
Euthymii names Photios, Santabarenos, Leon Katakoilas, and Nikolaos (later Mystikos) as 
victims. By 888 this purge was approaching completion and the Epitaphios represented a 
moment of ‘stocktaking’.1120 Like Theophilos, Leon was sufficiently distanced from his 
father’s crimes, but could personally claim to have been wronged by him himself, and could 
present himself as a relatively impartial figure seeking to reconcile the Macedonian and 
Amorian dynasties. A potent source of anti-dynastic propaganda could be nullified in the 
attempt. 
Realpolitik, rather than Amorian-sympathising motives, may be inferred since Leon 
was not as respectful of the tombs of the other members of the Amorian dynasty. The 
sarcophagus of Maria, the sister of Michael III, for example, was reportedly stripped of all 
                                                 
1117 On the ideological connection of biblical kingship with the Macedonian emperors, see Riedel 2011; Dagron 
2003: 192-201; Tougher 1997: 110-132; Antonopoulou 1997: 78-80; Tougher 1994: 175. Note also Leon’s 
association with the legal codifications begun by Basileios: the Macedonian’s were law-givers. 
1118 See below, page 248. 
1119 Tougher 1997: chapter 8, and p.86 n.73, identifies that Leon became increasingly partial to reconciliations. 
For example, Theodoros Santabarenos, who had been removed from Athens and sent to the east, was recalled 
to Constantinople and granted an allowance from the Nea Ekklesia. Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. 
Bekker 581. 
1120 Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter pp.10-11, 165-166; Karlin-Hayter 1991b: 105, remarking 
that the Epitaphios may also have sought to distance Leon from rumours about his parentage that he may 
inadvertently have stoked through his reburial of Michael. Dvornik 1948: 250, also remarks on Leon’s change 





its valuable silver ornamentation.1121 Leon’s reverence evidently did not extend to the family 
as a whole, and if he felt a sense of familial affinity with them it seems unlikely that he would 
have defiled the tomb of an aunt. Instead, Leon appears to have carefully venerated the image 
of Michael. Magdalino has outlined how Leon sought to enhance the importance of the 
Palace Church of the Pharos, Michael’s foundation. It was included in the festivities for the 
feast of Elijah, which attained special prominence under the Macedonians,1122 imperial 
wedding celebrations were moved there from St Stephen’s, and a nomisma was issued with 
the Virgin of the Pharos displayed on the obverse.1123 Tougher has suggested that this reflects 
the increased importance of, and Leon’s devotion to, the cult of the Theotokos,1124 and 
practical considerations about the Great Palace’s ceremonial topography.1125 However, the 
importance of perception should not be underestimated and Leon’s patronage of foundations 
associated with Michael would surely have been noticed and remarked upon. Site-
associations were a recognised method of asserting and promoting supposed dynastic 
links,1126 and it would have appeared that Michael was being granted further honour. 
These reverential efforts may in fact have been an attempt to control or appropriate 
the ‘cult’ of Michael into the Macedonian dynasty. As already noted, the presence of 
Alexandros and Stephanos at Michael’s funeral provided a broader dynastic overtone to the 
proceedings, making it appear to be more than just Leon’s project alone. But Michael’s 
remains were accorded an even greater Macedonian dynastic honour since they were 
translated to the Mausoleum of Constantine the Great, and entombed in a marble 
                                                 
1121 Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 794. 
1122 On the importance of Elijah in Macedonian ideology and propaganda see Dagron 2003: 193-199; Brubaker 
1999: 159-162; Antonopoulou 1997: 25, 234-236; Magdalino 1987; Brubaker 1985: 1-13; Moravcsik 1961: 
90-91. 
1123 Magdalino 1987: esp. 56. 
1124 On Leon’s devotion to the cult of the Virgin see Antonopoulou 1997: esp. 165-171; Schminck 1985: 231. 
1125 The Pharos was located next to the Chrysotriklinos and was consequently more convenient. Tougher 1997: 
64-65, and n.114. 
1126 For example, the Angeloi emperors deliberately patronised Komnenian foundations and ceremonial sites 
in order to promote their own connections with the name ‘Komnenos’ and imbibe dynastic legitimacy from the 





sarcophagus taken from the monastery of Euphemia which had previously held the bodies 
of Justin I and the Augusta.1127 The sarcophagus connected Michael with a glorious past 
emperor, and Basileios had turned the Mausoleum into the tomb favoured by the 
Macedonian dynasty itself. The choice would not have been missed, and may have further 
emphasised that Michael was to be considered as a family member who was being 
symbolically restored.1128 The translation of his remains also served to prevent their use as 
relics that could function as foci for the anti-Macedonian movement. Bringing the body to 
Constantinople and housing it in the Macedonian Mausoleum enabled control. A show of 
remorse for the murder, and seemingly embracing Michael as a family member, repositioned 
the dynasty alongside Michael’s partisans by both appropriating and propitiating their 
grievances. 
Herlong, followed by Tougher, has concluded that the Isaurian, Amorian and 
Macedonian lines were in fact ‘a single, diffuse dynasty’ on the basis of the kinship ties that 
existed between the families.1129 Eudokia Ingerina and Theophano, respective wives of 
Basileios and Leon, were relatives and boasted Amorian blood. Additionally, key members 
of court under Basileios and Leon were connected to the Amorians, for example, Leon VI’s 
domestikos ton scholon Leon Katakalon,1130 Stephanos the magistros, and Marianos the 
eparchos.1131 Tougher has even suggested that Basileios replaced Michael as the family-
political figurehead for some of the surviving Amorians.1132 Basileios had been adopted by 
Michael as part of his promotion to the rank of magistros, shortly before his accession to co-
imperial status.1133 In Byzantine thought this connection would have connoted a very real 
                                                 
1127 On Michael’s burials and the appropriation, see Grierson, Mango, and Ševčenko 1962: 44-46. 
1128 On the Mausoleum of Constantine as the tomb for the Macedonian dynasty see Stephenson 2005: 227-238, 
and esp. 228-229. 
1129 Herlong 1986: 217; Tougher 1997: 67. 
1130 Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 855; Tougher 1997: 86. 
1131 Tougher 1997: 100. 
1132 Tougher 1997: 67. 
1133 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 207; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 294-295; Skylitzes, Synopsis 





familial bond between the two. Politically, however, the adoption ‘was only as strong and 
long-lasting as the intentions of the parties to it allowed.’1134 Leon’s later attempts to revive 
the image of Michael, to create a political cult of the Amorian emperor in Constantinople, 
and to appropriate that cult into the Macedonian dynasty might suggest an attempted, 
posthumous, renewal of the adoption. Michael’s reburial would therefore have been a 
symbolic endeavour signifying the fusing of the dynasties and an effort to promote renewed 
continuity in the face of murder. 
As with the story of Theophilos’ justice, there is some tentative evidence that 
Basileios was suggested as the mastermind for Michael’s reburial. In the ‘official’ histories 
Basileios displays no remorse for the murder of Michael. However, both the Life of Basil the 
Younger and Liudprand of Cremona convey that Basileios, on his deathbed, was concerned 
by the effect of Michael’s murder upon his own soul. The Life reports that, as Basileios lay 
dying, ‘…he spoke about the emperor Michael whom he had slain, seizing his throne.’ He 
was approached by an apparition of Michael that only he could see and which asked, ‘What 
did I do to you or how did I wrong you that you so mercilessly have attacked me and 
murdered me?’1135 Liudprand records a similar scene in which Christ appeared before the 
slumbering Basileios holding the hand of Michael, and asked ‘Why did you kill your lord 
the emperor?’ Basileios awoke, realised that he had committed a great sin, and sought a 
means of atoning for this.1136 The similarities of the accounts could be simple coincidence, 
however, they show that considerations of Basileios’ usurpation and fate were widespread 
in (then) contemporary thought, and may suggest that a story of late-life repentance was 
                                                 
1134 Macrides 1990: esp. 117-118, considering the functions and perception of imperial adoptions in general, 
and with reference to the case of Basileios I. 
1135 Τελευτήσαντος δὲ Βασιλείου τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ, ὅς καὶ τελευτῶν ἔφασκε περὶ Μιχαὴλ τοῦ βασιλέως, ὃν 
ἀνῃρήκει καὶ κατέσχε τὰ σκῆπτρα αὐτοῦ, «Θεωρῶ,» φησί, «Μιχαὴλ τὸν βασιλέα πρὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μου 
ἑστῶτα καὶ λέγοντά μοι· ‘Τί σοι ἔπραζα ἢ τί σε ἠδίκησα, ὅτι οὕτως ἀνηλεῶς ἐπέβης μου καὶ ἀπέκτεινάς με;»  
The Life of Saint Basil the Younger, ed. Talbot, Sullivan, and McGrath 68-69. See also Dagron 2003: 121. 
1136 «Ινα τι ἐσφαζες τὸν δεσποτην σου βασιλεα;» Liudprand of Cremona, Antapadosis, ed. Chiesa §10 (trans. 





deliberately espoused in order to revive the emperor’s image in relation to the misdeed. 
Furthermore, some of Basileios’ earlier actions were deemed public expressions of his 
remorse. The reconstruction of the Church of the Archangel Michael near the Arkadianai,1137 
the dedication of the Nea Ekklesia to Michael and Elijah,1138 and the staging of a hybrid 
triumphal coronation-ceremonial in 867 terminating at the Church of Gabriel and 
Michael,1139 are three examples. As Dagron notes, Michael was the ‘celestial judge, patron 
saint of his victim, and protector of the Dynasty’.1140 Basileios’ patronage of the saint would 
have been suggestive, and both Liudprand and the Life considered it an attempt at 
expiation.1141 The perception of imperial remorse was prevalent and, since Basileios was a 
figure particularly associated with the biblical model of David, allusions to his repentance 
would not be incongruous. Given the stories of Basileios’ remorse, the relatively short time 
that elapsed between his death and Michael’s reburial, and Michael’s association with 
Basileios’ dynastic mausoleum, might Basileios have been proposed as the architect behind 
the entire event, with Leon emulating Theophilos by fulfilling his father’s final request and 
redeeming the dynasty and the sinner? 
 
Andronikos II 
Andronikos II’s actions on behalf of the Palaiologan dynasty had much in common with 
those of Leon. However, he was far more extensive in his exhibitions of dynastic remorse, 
and is known to have been following Michael VIII’s own efforts to mitigate his removal of 
                                                 
1137 Janin 1969: 340, 345-346; Dagron 2003: 198. 
1138 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 319; ed. Ševčenko 258-261.  
1139 On this ceremony, see above, page 88. 
1140 Dagron 2003: 198-199. 
1141 The Life asserts that the Arkadianai was ‘built by the emperor Basileios who desired to expiate the murder 
he committed of the emperor Michael …’ (…οὓς ἐδείματο Βασίλειος ὁ βασιλεύς, βουλόμενος τὸν φόνον ὃν 
τετέλεκεν εἰς Μιχαὴλ τὸν βασιλέα...); and Liudprand attributes the same motive to the construction of the Nea 
Ekklesia. The Life of Saint Basil the Younger, ed. Talbot, Sullivan, and McGrath 136-137; Liudprand of 





Ioannes IV Laskaris. 
Both emperors’ labours must be understood in light of the ‘Arsenite schism’ which 
began with Patriarch Arsenios’ response to Michael’s perceived usurpation in 1261, and 
continued until 1310, by then having become a severe internal conflict within the Byzantine 
church.1142 Michael’s usurpation was gradual and controlled.1143 Having established himself 
as Ioannes’ guardian through the assassination of the regent Georgios Mouzalon (1258), he 
then arrested the individual allegedly responsible for the murder: a demonstration of ‘justice’ 
that also distanced him from the event.1144 In 1259, after a last-minute change to the 
coronation proceedings, he was crowned senior emperor alongside Ioannes IV, supplanting 
him in precedence. He swore an oath to Arsenios that he would refrain from ever conspiring 
against the boy.1145 Ioannes was left behind after the reconquest of Constantinople in July 
1261 but was subsequently blinded on Christmas day, his eleventh birthday.1146 He was 
tonsured and then spent more than half of his life in confinement in Asia Minor.1147 Ioannes’ 
blinding prompted the schism. Early in 1262 Arsenios justifiably accused Michael of 
breaking his oath, which had represented a tacit quasi-constitutional agreement, and 
excommunicated the emperor in the third degree.1148 Michael remained an excommunicate 
                                                 
1142 On the Arsenite Schism, see Tinnefeld 2012; Angelov 2007: 368-375; Gounarides 1999; Macrides 1981: 
73-79; Laurent 1945. 
1143 For the chronology of Michael’s proclamation and coronation, see Wirth 1961. 
1144 Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 159-160 (trans. Macrides 346-347), names the protovestiarites 
Karyanites as this individual. He had been appointed by Theodoros II, and Akropolites also claims that he 
escaped from prison and fled to the Turks before being killed. Akropolites evidently sought to remove 
culpability for the murder from Michael VIII by denigrating Karyanites’ reputation. Pachymeres, Relations 
Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 89-91, instead reports that a certain Latin mercenary named Karoulos 
was responsible for the murder, and says nothing about Karyanites’ involvement. He reports that it was the 
latter’s men who fled to the Turks, but only because they believed they would be the next targets of Mouzalon’s 
assassins. Pachymeres’ account implicates Michael VIII who was the megas konstablos, and thus in command 
of the Latin mercenaries (including Karoulos). 
1145 Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 159-161 (trans. Macrides 346-347, 351); Arsenios, Testamentum, 
949-953; Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 134-137. 
1146 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent 254-259; Failler 1979: 154; Angold 1975: 80-
95. 
1147 Macrides 1981: 71. 
1148 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 93-94 (trans. van Dieten 109-111); Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, 
ed. Failler and Laurent I, 268-269. This form of excommunication allowed the emperor’s name to be 





from 1262 until 1267. In 1265 he had Arsenios removed from office on trumped up 
charges.1149 A tribunal, that Arsenios deemed to be illegal, was convened by Michael and 
swiftly declared the deposition of the absentee patriarch, who was exiled soon after.1150 
Germanos III was then elevated to the patriarchal throne, but was considered an uncanonical 
appointment by Arsenios’ supporters in the pro-Laskarid and monastic communities and 
soon tendered his resignation (1266). On 2 February 1267, the day of the Purification of the 
Blessed Virgin, Michael’s excommunication was officially absolved by the recently 
installed Patriarch Ioseph.1151 Arsenios and his supporters cited canon law to reject the 
appointment of Ioseph, and Michael’s absolution.1152 Arsenios was excommunicated in turn. 
This cleavage was then exacerbated by Michael’s stance in favour of uniting the Eastern and 
Western churches after the Second Council of Lyon.1153 
Initially, Michael had been willing to accept his excommunicate status patiently and 
believed that Arsenios would soon readmit him to the church. According to Pachymeres, 
Michael sent mediators to enquire what penance would be sufficient for his absolution. 
When he received a response that Arsenios would not permit this, even if his own life was 
threatened,1154 Michael entreated him in person. However, Arsenios remained obstinate. 
                                                 
until the catechumens were asked to leave. For the details of the excommunication, see Rickelt 2011, with 
replete bibliography. 
1149 Arsenios had supposedly omitted a psalm for the emperor from the morning liturgy, and allowed the sons 
of the former Sultan Izz al-din II to take communion and even bathe in holy water, despite being Muslims. 
Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 336-337; Arsenios, Testamentum 956. The 
fraudulent nature of the charges is considered further in Shukurov 2016: 62. Angelov 2006: 197 n.16, follows 
Zachariadou 1964/65 in noting that some of the Sultan’s sons and descendants were, in fact, recorded as 
baptised Christians. On Izz al-din II, see Failler 1981: 150-154. 
1150 Nicol 1993: 45. 
1151 Installed in December 1266. Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 396-399; 
Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 107-108. 
1152 Arsenios, Testamentum. 
1153 On the council (1272-1274), see Geanakoplos 1953. On the persisting political fallout arising from 
Michael’s stance, see Laiou 1972: esp. 21-36. Maxwell 2014: 181, has suggested that Michael’s favourable 
stance in regard to the Union was also partly an attempt at atoning for the blinding of Ioannes IV. The 
suggestion is intriguing but the potential military and geo-political benefits of Union should not be minimised. 
1154 Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὀ πατριάρχης καὶ πλείω τούτων, καὶ ὠς οὑδ’ ἄν, εἴ τι καὶ υένοιτο, τὸν ἀφορισμὸν λύσειε, 






Whenever Michael would ask him to name a specific penance Arsenios would cryptically 
respond ‘Do penance, and I will accept.’1155 Unable to apologise, or agree upon an oikonomia 
with which to lift the excommunication, Michael faced a political stalemate. He next resorted 
to the Theodosian ritual of repentance. He removed his crown and performed proskynesis 
before Arsenios, clutching at the latter’s knees when this humble entreaty was rejected.1156  
Pachymeres’ account of the thirteenth-century ritual reveals a potential new feature, 
for the first time the imperial sword is mentioned as playing a part. After Michael had 
removed his crown Arsenios motioned to take the sword from him too, but the emperor 
would not allow it.1157 It is unclear how integral a function the sword played in imperial 
ceremonials before this point.1158 The sword held connotations of imperial justice alongside 
the obvious military implications of the imperial position. It was certainly well-represented 
in eleventh-century imperial numismatic iconography1159 and twelfth-century Angeloi 
propaganda. In the Angeloi cases it was connected with the celestial judge, St Michael, and 
with the just overthrow of Andronikos I.1160 Theophylaktos of Ohrid advised minimal use of 
the sword by emperors and associated this with emulation of God and the virtue of 
philanthropia.1161 Pachymeres evidently considered the imagery of Michael’s refusal 
noteworthy, and Angelov believes that, had Michael given over his sword, he could have 
been regarded as having resigned from the imperial office.1162 This interpretation was long 
                                                 
1155 «Ποίει τὴν θεραπείαν καὶ δέξομαι.» Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 280-281. 
1156 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 280-283. 
1157 Καὶ οὕτω λέγοντα, τὴν σπάθην ἀποζώννυσθαι καὶ διδόναι, τῆς ἐκείνου διανοίας ἀποπειρώμενον. ᾽Εκείνου 
δὲ τὴν χεῖρα κατὰ σπουδὴν προτείναντος, ἐφ’ ᾧ λαμβάνειν τὸ δῆθεν διδόμενον, μήπω τελέως καὶ τῆς ὀσφύος 
ἀπολυθέν, παλινῳδίαν τε ᾄδειν τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ὡς ἐπιβούλῳ οἱ τῆς σφετέρας ζωῆς ὀνειδίζειν, εἰ οὔτω 
βούλεται. Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 282-283. 
1158 On the imperial sword in late Byzantine ceremonial and its increased prominence in the ceremonial book 
of Pseudo-Kodinos see Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov pp. 349-351 (Studies), noting 
that the sword was frequently associated with the candlestick that preceded the emperor in ceremonials, even 
in the eleventh/twelfth centuries. 
1159 Hendy 1999: 174; Magdalino and Nelson 1982: 154-160. 
1160 The sword was referred to by court orators as the ‘Sword of Tyrannicide’ and became one of the symbols 
of Andronikos’ downfall. For example: Theodoros Balsamon, ed. Horna 200-201; translated with commentary 
in Magdalino and Nelson 1982: 154-160; Choniates, Orationes et epistulae, ed. van Dieten 89. 
1161 Theophylaktos, Opera, ed. Gautier 208-209. 





understood in Western rituals of royal penance. Louis I’s public penance and deposition at 
Soissons in 833, for example, involved the surrender of his sword and armour at the same 
time that he exchanged his royal attire for that of a penitent.1163 In Western thought, ‘The 
ruler was responsible for the defence of those who were unable to defend themselves or to 
find some protector… A deposition of arms on the altar signified total surrender of honour 
and its instrument, military prowess.’1164 The symbolism of the gesture is therefore apposite 
to Michael’s situation, and suggestive that his failure to uphold justice in relation to Ioannes 
had cost him dearly. According to a speech of Andronikos II that Pachymeres records, 
Arsenios had, in fact, suggested that Michael abdicate as penance for his sin.1165 The gesture 
may suggest a convergence of Western and Byzantine ritual practices by this time,1166 but 
the refusal was even more important as a statement of intent about the balance of power. 
Michael, despite appearing to seek sincere repentance, would not permit Arsenios to dictate 
the way in which he achieved it. 
After several additional failed attempts to procure terms Michael abandoned these 
entreaties altogether and deposed Arsenios. His propagandists nevertheless continued to 
invoke the Davidic exemplar in order to provide a model for reconciliation with the church. 
In his fifth oration, composed c.1205-1207,1167 Manuel Holobolos played the role of 
Michael’s spokesman to address the issue of sin and redemption. Michael confessed his 
‘sinfulness’ to Holobolos and compared himself with a ‘vessel of dishonour’.1168 Michael 
                                                 
1163 de Jong 1992: 29-30. Swords were also associated with the ceremonies of the Latin emperors of 
Constantinople: Baldwin I was preceded by an imperial sword-bearer at his coronation, and it was widely noted 
that Baldwin II left behind an imperial sword when he fled the city in 1261. Discussed in Macrides, Munitiz, 
and Angelov 2013: 349-350. 
1164 de Jong 1992: 45; Little 1979. 
1165 Although the suggestion was not specifically linked with this incident and Arsenios’ Testamentum makes 
no mention of this requirement. Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 330-331; and 
esp. IV, 516-517; Arsenios, Testamentum 956-957. Angelov 2006: 196.  
1166 To claim that this was a wholly new ‘innovation’ in Byzantine ritual, or that it was a ritual borrowed from 
Western practice, would be to make an argument from silence. We cannot be certain that a similar performance 
was not enacted earlier in Byzantine history but remained unrecorded, or that this was not a natural evolution 
of Byzantine ritual practices. 
1167 Angelov 2006: 194-200. 





provided him with an exegesis on scriptural quotations, asserting that through faith in God 
all sins could be forgiven.1169 The exegesis invoked the sins committed by King David, 
quoted David’s penitential Psalm,1170 and sought to position Michael as a ‘New David’ type 
figure.1171 Parallels between the two were clearly articulated and Holobolos, mimicking 
other panegyrics from Michael’s reign,1172 drew attention to the similarly unlikely elevations 
of David and Michael in the face of conflict with their predecessors and a lack of 
successional precedence.1173 Rhetorical allusions to New Davids were well-known,1174 and 
espousing Davidic penitence via rhetorical compositions was an established practice.1175 
However, Michael’s use of the rhetoric was tenuous, for although he admitted to having 
sinned the exact nature of that sin remained unexpressed,1176 nor was canon law invoked to 
help to extricate him from his excommunicate limbo. Instead, as Angelov summarises, ‘The 
special position of the imperial office within the tradition of Old Testament charismatic 
kingship was itself [adduced as] a reason why Palaiologos deserved a pardon for his sinful 
accession to the throne.’1177  
                                                 
1169 Angelov 2006: 200. 
1170 Manuelis Holoboli Orationes ed. Treu p. 27.  
1171 Manuelis Holoboli Orationes ed. Treu p. 24-26, quoting Psalms 37:5; 96:5; 50:3. Angelov 2006: 201-202. 
1172 Angelov 2007; Angelov 2006: 202-203; Macrides 1994: 273-274. 
1173 Angelov 2006: 202. 
1174 Basileios I and Manuel I are two emperors who were prominently and consistently associated with the 
biblical king in official rhetoric, art, and other forms of propaganda. Angelov 2007: 128; Dagron 2003: 198-
201; Brubaker 1999: 147, 184-189; Magdalino 1993: esp. 413-470; Markopoulos 1992; Maguire 1988: 91-93. 
1175 Andronikos I may have employed an identical strategy in the previous century: another of the similarities 
between the two emperors and their modes of accession. Choniates’ Historia employs an unflattering Davidic 
comparison of Andronikos I’s usurpation with David’s abortive attempt on the life of Nabal (1 Samuel 25). 
Choniates says that his chosen comparison was repeated to men of ‘eloquence and learning’ (λόγου καὶ σοφίας) 
by the emperor at court. He also confirms that this was in order to explain Andronikos’ periods of exile and his 
life more generally. Eustathios of Thessalonike, preceding Choniates, instead employed the story of David and 
Bathsheba which was associated with David’s repentance. Choniates’ choice of Davidic story may therefore 
have been a deliberate corruption of official rhetoric invoking David’s repentance, and which was more 
faithfully recorded by Eustathios’ more flattering comparison. If the theory is correct, the emperor evidently 
exploited the Davidic model to rhetorically pardon (through an exegesis) the circumstances of his accession, 
in an almost identical fashion to Michael VIII. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 333-334 (trans. Magoulias 
184); Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-Jones 52-53. 
1176 Michael VIII concealed the precise circumstances of his accession to sole rule in his later autobiographical 
accounts as well. The Vita Sua, for example, asserts that he was ‘persuaded’ to accept the throne, mentions the 
‘jealousy’ of Theodoros II towards Michael, and conveniently ignores Ioannes’ very existence. Imperatoris 
Michaeli Palaeologi de vita sua, ed. Grégoire 453-455 (trans. Dennis 1243-1244).  





In 1267, when Michael’s absolution was finally granted, the emperor again prostrated 
himself at Hagia Sophia. In sight of members of the senate and people, he read out a list of 
his sins, finally including the blinding of Ioannes, and asked the assembled bishops and the 
patriarch for forgiveness.1178 To commemorate his absolution, the Feast of Purification was 
celebrated in the church each year thereafter, an annual reiteration that Michael’s penance 
had been paid despite the continued objections of the Arsenites.1179 
Following Michael’s death (1282), Andronikos had to contend with the continued 
political and legitimist consequences of the schism. Michael’s perceived illegal actions in 
deposing Arsenios and repudiating the excommunication, and the belief that Arsenios had 
called for him to abdicate, had imparted distinctly political overtones that ‘put in question 
the legitimacy of the Palaiologan dynasty born in sin and excommunication.’1180 Pro-
Laskarid conspiracies and political opposition were a recurrent problem. Soon after Ioannes 
was blinded in 1261 the people of the frontier zone at Trikokkia revolted against Michael.1181 
A congenitally blind child was found and proclaimed to be Ioannes, on whose behalf the 
people swore to fight.1182 The revolt was short-lived,1183 but Michael’s political opponents 
were treated increasingly harshly thereafter.1184 Manuel Holobolos, later restored to favour, 
was subjected to mutilation and public degradation along with others connected to the 
Laskarid faction.1185 Yet the Laskarid name remained an important rallying point for future 
rebellions against the Palaiologoi.1186 Another Pseudo-Ioannes appeared at the court of 
                                                 
1178 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 396-399; Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 
107-108 (trans. van Dieten 117-118). 
1179 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 572-573. 
1180 Angelov 2007: 369. 
1181 Bryer 1988-1989: 172, locates Trikokkia to the south of Tarsia, on the right bank of the Sangarios. 
1182 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 258-265. 
1183 Korobeinikov 2014: 237; Laiou 1972: 22. 
1184 Shawcross 2008: 203-227. 
1185 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 258-259; II, 502-505. Holobolos had been 
considered in disgrace, and exiled to a monastery, from 1261 until his restoration in 1265. He was removed 
from office again in 1273 when he voiced objections to Michael’s proposed unionist policies with the West. 
Fryde 2000: 88; Macrides 1980: 17 and n.19. 
1186 Shawcross 2008: 203, remarks that the cause was so prominent that ‘from generation to generation, the 





Charles of Anjou c.1273.1187 Late in 1305 the conspiracy of Ioannes Drimys, who claimed 
Laskarid connections and popular support from the Arsenites, was uncovered and crushed 
in Constantinople.1188 Even Arsenios was linked with plots against the Palaiologoi, including 
the Bithynian uprising in 1262, and the attempt on Michael’s life in 1265.1189 After Arsenios’ 
death in 1273, the Arsenites continued to engage in anti-Palaiologan endeavours.1190 
To counter this, Andronikos followed a careful policy of pacification via political 
reconciliation and proclaimed the dynasty’s remorse for the initial sin.1191 Exemplifying 
these concerns, his first official act was the repudiation of Michael’s unpopular unionist 
policies, returning the empire to ‘Orthodoxy’.1192 The pro-unionist Patriarch Ioannes XI 
resigned within two weeks of Andronikos’ accession1193 and Andronikos received high 
praise for his stance, being named a ‘New Constantine’ and ‘New Zorobabel’.1194 
From the outset of his reign, Andronikos’ coinage preserved and enhanced the aura 
of imperial penance that had been promoted by his father.1195 Michael’s Virgin 
Blachernitissa protecting the walls of Constantinople was retained on the obverse of 
Andronikos’ class I gold hyperpyron, suggesting the piety and divine favour enjoyed by the 
Palaiologoi. More importantly, the reverse portrayed Christ standing holding a bible and 
                                                 
1187 Geanakoplos 1959: 217-218. 
1188 The sources indicate that a substantial number of persons were arrested throughout the city, not just 
Arsenite monks and prominent members of the conspiracy. Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and 
Laurent IV, 652-653. On the plot, see Failler 1996; Ševčenko 1952: esp. 149-150 and notes. See also, Nicol 
1993: 104-105; Macrides 1981: 71 n.25; Laiou 1972: 197. It should be noted that the chronology and details 
of a certain Glykys’ involvement in the conspiracy are problematic. It has been suggested that Glykys is to be 
identified with Drimys, although this connection is not certain and Glykys may have led a separate conspiracy. 
The Correspondence of Athanasius I of Constantinople, ed. Maffry Talbot 258-263 (Letter 103), 430-431 
(Commentary). See also, Ševčenko 1952: 148-149; Macrides 1981: 71 n.25. 
1189 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 370-371; Arsenios, Testamentum 956. See 
also Tinnefeld 2012: 150; Macrides 1981: 73. 
1190 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 504-505. 
1191 Laiou 1972:  20, notes that Andronikos relied heavily upon the pro-Arsenite party in organising his defence 
of Asia Minor. Reconciliation with these figures was crucial to the security of the empire. 
1192 Nicol 1993: 94-95; Laiou 1972: 21, 33. 
1193 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 24-25. See also, Nicol 1993: 95; Laiou 
1972: 33. 
1194 Angelov 2007: 99-100; Laiou 1972: 36; Hilsdale 2014: 187. 





blessing the crown that sat atop the head of a kneeling Andronikos.1196 Andronikos’ pose 
emulated other depictions of proskynesis in this period and reveals his adoption of the 
imagery of a supplicant before Christ.1197 The design was a modification of an earlier 
coronation issue that showed Michael and Andronikos kneeling before Saint Michael, who 
blessed them in a similar fashion.1198 Andronikos’ iconography retained the essential 
features of Michael’s, but the presence of Christ enhanced the symbolic avowal of penance 
and supplication that typified those earlier types. His respective joint issues with the co-
emperors Michael IX, and Andronikos III, also portray them kneeling before Christ.1199 
Imperial proskynesis was evidently a distinctive feature of early Palaiologan 
iconography.1200 Under Michael VIII it may have been perceived as part of his broader 
redemptive efforts and recalled his use of the penitential ritual before Arsenios and Ioseph. 
Under Andronikos the design conveyed dynastic intent and remorse in light of the continued 
questions about Palaiologan legitimacy. Andronikos would neither restore the Laskarids nor 
wholly disavow his father, but he and the dynasty could appear contrite. 
The most salient of Andronikos’ acts of conciliatory atonement occurred c.1290. As 
he travelled to Asia Minor, making preparations for a military expedition to bolster his 
flagging reputation,1201 Andronikos took time to visit Ioannes IV who was then nearly forty 
                                                 
1196 The attribution to Andronikos II of all coins of this type has been subject to much scrutiny. Good general 
summations are to be found in Grierson 1982: 284-285, 337 n.291; Grierson 1999a: 12; Grierson 1999b: 126-
137.   
1197 The well-known portrait of Theodoros Metochites at the Chora Church in Constantinople, for example, 
depicts a kneeling form of proskynesis. Ševčenko 2012. 
1198 Grierson 1982: 284; Hilsdale 2014: 189. 
1199 Protonotarios 1976; Bendall 1995. 
1200 Hilsdale 2014: 137 n.120, comments that depictions of imperial proskynesis, in fact, became more 
prominent under the Palaiologan emperors and were ‘extremely rare before the later Byzantine period’. 
Michael’s kneeling form of proskynesis was also employed for a statue he commissioned of him donating the 
city of Constantinople to the archangel Michael, which was erected atop a column outside the Holy Apostles: 
Talbot 1993: esp. 258-260. 
1201 On the expedition of 1290/1291, see Korobeinikov 2014: 258-261, and esp. 260, who in fact asserts that it 
was ‘hardly a military expedition. The emperor’s route lay far from the most dangerous parts of the Byzantine 
eastern border… Andronikos II’s expedition was only [to visit] the renewed fortifications along a very small 
part of the border.’ It appears to have been a politically calculated attempt to bolster the emperor’s wavering 





years old and living as a monk at the Fortress of Dakibyze.1202 The extraordinary visit was 
remarked upon by Pachymeres and Gregoras. The former provided a summary account, 
introducing the event as merely an incidental occurrence.1203 In this version, Andronikos 
spoke kindly to Ioannes and endeavoured, through his own gentle actions, to mitigate some 
of the wrongs that his father had inflicted upon him. Andronikos reportedly sought Ioannes’ 
forgiveness, an acknowledgement that he was ruling nobly and honestly, and after easing his 
mind about Ioannes’ wellbeing continued into Asia Minor.1204 Gregoras’ version is three 
times the length, and more developed in its employment of political symbolism and the 
supposed personal motivations of the emperor. His narrative, further removed from the event 
than Pachymeres’, reveals that the story attained certain propagandist qualities. Gregoras did 
not introduce it as an incidental happening, but instead asserted that Andronikos was 
motivated by the memory of his father’s transgression against Ioannes. Although 
Andronikos had been an infant at the time, unable to express his soul’s desires and intentions, 
he was now tormented by his ‘conscience’ (συνειδήσεως) because it had been for his benefit 
that Michael had ‘committed a great injustice’ (ἀδικίας) by removing Ioannes from the 
succession. He feared that ‘justice’ might turn against him, and that he might be similarly 
deprived of basileia and eyesight. After considering divine justice, we are informed that 
Andronikos tried to find an appropriate ‘remedy’ for Ioannes’ wound, met with and consoled 
him, and ensured that Ioannes would have everything he needed to be comfortable in 
perpetuity.1205 
As Nicol concludes of the meeting, ‘…the propaganda value of the visit was high, 
                                                 
concerns about his own political image, and being able to claim that Ioannes supported his policies would have 
been a political boost. 
1202 On the Marmara, near Nikomedia. 
1203 ᾽Αλλ’ ὅ με μικροῦ παρῆλθε πρότερον γεγονός... ‘But I almost omitted what had happened before this.’ 
Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 118-119. 
1204 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 118-119. 





and if Andronikos could say that Laskaris had in fact acknowledged him as emperor then 
the effort had not been wasted.’1206 Although Pachymeres’ description reads like the visit 
was hastily arranged and the emperor just happened to be in the area, Gregoras’ attribution 
of deliberate intent transformed the story into a moralising lesson of imperial repentance 
worthy of emulation. Gregoras’ additional emphasis on justice is precisely what the occasion 
would have intended to convey, and exactly what the Arsenites and the pro-Laskarid faction 
had been calling for since December 1261. We may wonder how pervasive Gregoras’ 
version was, but it would certainly have been espoused by Andronikos’ supporters as 
evidence of his just rulership. The very idea of a meeting was loaded with connotations of 
imperial remorse, and showcased the virtues of truth and justice that were inseparable from 
supposedly genuine expressions of this. Where Michael had avoided an audience with 
Ioannes and most-often fell short of acknowledging responsibility for the blinding,1207 
Andronikos appeared forthright in addressing the issue, albeit eight years into his reign. He 
too sought to adopt the guise of a conciliatory figure seeking to redeem the dynasty by close 
association with the last surviving Laskarid. Ioannes, virtually absent from the histories after 
his deposition, was being officially revived for a political purpose. Through Ioannes’ 
supposed acknowledgement of Andronikos those still loyal to the Laskarids, including the 
Arsenites, were being induced to look favourably upon the Palaiologoi and bring an end to 
factionalism. 
Ioannes was even closer associated with the Palaiologoi after his death in 
1304/1305.1208 Andronikos had Ioannes’ remains translated (1305) to the monastery of St 
Demetrios in Constantinople, which had been founded by Georgios Palaiologos in the 
                                                 
1206 Nicol 1993: 99. 
1207 Michael’s autobiographical works produced after his absolution do not mention the blinding of Ioannes IV 
at all: Imperatoris Michaeli Palaeologi de vita sua, ed. Grégoire 453-455 (trans. Dennis 1243-1244). 
1208 Ioannes’ date of death is unknown, but the suggestion of 1305 on the basis of Drimys’ espousal of Laskarid 
dynastic ties as a justification for his plot is highly plausible: Ševčenko 1952: 149.  On the date of Ioannes’ 





twelfth century and recently restored by Michael VIII.1209 As Macrides suggests, ‘The 
presence of his relic there may indicate a conciliatory gesture… to appease the anti-
Palaiologan elements in the city.’1210 The circumstances in which the body was transferred 
to the monastery remain obscure.1211 Discretion was likely a deliberate choice by the 
emperor, for Ioannes’ supporters may not have looked kindly upon his tampering with the 
relics.1212 However, the Laskarid emperor’s association with a Palaiologan foundation, one 
greatly honoured by Michael, could not have been missed and suggested a tacit relationship 
between the dynasties. The presence of Ioannes’ relics must have appeared like a restoration 
of his status or even a co-option into the Palaiologan dynasty, as an honorary figure at least. 
Later, his relic acquired a saintly reputation and developed a cult status in the city, garnering 
veneration from pilgrims like Stephen of Novgorod (1348/1349), and others at least until the 
fifteenth century.1213 
Arsenios’ relics were also posthumously honoured. Long before the end of the 
schism, in 1284, his remains were translated from the island of Prokonnesos and deposited 
at the right of the bema in Hagia Sophia after an adventus through Constantinople.1214 
According to Pachymeres this had been agreed upon at a meeting held at Easter in 
Adramyttion in order to satisfy Arsenite complaints about the injustice of Arsenios’ 
deposition and exile.1215 The emperor, senate, patriarch and clergy, attended the ceremony, 
providing full honours to Arsenios’ memory. The translation may even have occasioned the 
                                                 
1209 On the monastery and the translation of the remains, see Janin 1969: 93; Macrides 1981: 71-72; Shawcross 
2008: 221; Talbot 2010: 271-282. Michael’s typikon for the monastery has also been preserved, see Michaeli 
Palaeologi de vita sua, ed. Grégoire (trans. Dennis).  
1210 Macrides 1981: 72; Shawcross 2008. 
1211 Macrides 1981: 72, questions if Ioannes may have been associated with the monastery in his lifetime, 
meaning he died in Constantinople. 
1212 For the discrete handling of the relics, see Shepard 2012: 75. On the importance of these imperial relics, 
see Shawcross 2008. 
1213 Stephen of Novgorod, in Russian Travellers, ed. Majeska 38-39. See also, Ševčenko 1953: 173, 175; 
Macrides 1981: 72-73; Shawcross 2008: 218-221, 224-227; Shepard 2012: 75; Hilsdale 2014: 187. 
1214 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 94-99. See also, Macrides 1981: 74-75; 
Shawcross 2008; Shepard 2012: 74. The body was later moved to the convent of St Andrew in Krisei by the 
Arsenite supporter Theodora Raoulaina. Talbot 2015. 





composition of the akolouthia, memorialising Arsenios’ office.1216 His relic too attained a 
cult status and was venerated regularly during Andronikos’ reign.1217 
 Shawcross has argued convincingly that, in relocating the relics to Constantinople 
and allowing their veneration, Andronikos sought to prevent their use as focal-points for 
plots against the regime. By appropriating the figureheads of the anti-Palaiologan movement, 
and having their cults celebrated where he could exercise some control over them, 
Andronikos was attempting to neutralise their potential subversive influence.1218 Finally, in 
1310 Andronikos used the relic of Arsenios in a revisionist effort to redeem his father. It was 
brought to the sanctuary of Hagia Sophia, seated on a throne, and a decree of Michael’s 
absolution was placed in its hand and read aloud by Patriarch Niphon. The staged ceremony 
provided a posthumous absolution by the principal opponent of Michael and the dynasty, a 
reconciliation of these two dead figures and their supporters, and a moment of closure on 




The accession of a usurper-emperor connoted, if only to a minority of observers, the 
accession of a guilty party. The measure of culpability varied, but, at the very least, this 
individual had broken sacred oaths to the emperor whom he had overthrown. The potential 
long-term political consequences were grave, as exemplified by the fifty-year Arsenite 
schism and frequent intrigues against the Palaiologoi. Elevations through bloodshed accrued, 
to a greater or lesser extent, the additional charge of bloodguilt. These misdeeds were 
                                                 
1216 Macrides 1981: 75. 
1217 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 96-97, states that the coffin was opened for 
veneration of the relic every third day of the week. See also, Shawcross 2008. 
1218 Shawcross 2008. 






assuredly non-trivial, they could not easily be dismissed, and might irreparably stain an 
emperor’s public image in the histories and wider contemporary thought; potentially leading 
to the designation tyrannos and his overthrow. To help mitigate this risk, the ‘facts’ of sin 
and moral culpability had to be established. Public and private displays of repentance, 
accompanied by strategies for redistributing blame, provided routes by which wrongdoing 
could be acknowledged, communicated, and excised.  
In embracing the ideology of the repentant emperor, a usurper began the process of 
atonement. The fate of the immortal soul was endangered, but Old Testament and late-
Roman prototypes provided precedents for imperial redemption. Christian theology 
permitted and encouraged these efforts, and usurpers were never considered lost causes. 
Repentance was not beholden to a particular format, but ritual penitence in the fashion of 
David and Theodosius provided a ready visual and structural arrangement for its 
‘communication’. This ritual was embraced, willingly or unwillingly, throughout the 
empire’s history. The church was often able to obtain concessions in exchange for its moral 
and political support of emperors utilising these rituals. Less formalised penances, 
proscribed and/or self-imposed, were also commonly embraced by emperors. These often 
took the form of works of philanthropia in emulation and propitiation of the divine, and 
offered evidence of remorse. Repentance could even be associated with policy and was 
potentially articulated through numismatic iconography, a medieval mass media product. 
Expressions of remorse and humility in the face of God and society, sought to minimise 
hostile claims concerning the immorality of an accession or rule. The acknowledgement of 
guilt and remorse showcased the imperial virtues of truth and justice, counterintuitively 
providing an opportunity for positive propaganda and a strengthening of authority. The 
ideologically immutable monolith of the imperial persona here permitted an emotional 





When a new dynasty was widely believed to have been born from sin, a successor 
might also perform acts of atonement for the founder’s transgressions. These actions strove 
to minimise the politico-ideological consequences and factionalism that arose from 
usurpation. Even more than the repentant usurper, repentant successors embodied truth and 
justice, for they were righting wrongs that they had not personally committed. In doing so 
they seemingly appropriated the cause of their chief adversaries as their own and thus 
diverted potential charges of hypocritically and unfairly benefiting from their predecessor’s 
actions.  Dynastic continuity might be suggested, or imposed, in the hope of propitiating the 
wronged faction and facilitating political reconciliation. In the cases of Leon VI and 
Andronikos II, the dynasties their predecessors had displaced were granted honour and 
symbolically subsumed into the new dynasty through the translation of imperial relics, 
personal association, and site-associations. The enduring influence of the dynastic principle 
and hereditary rights on imperial policy were made evident through these actions, criticisms 
of the regime on this basis were being forestalled through the processes of integration. The 
charisma of, and loyalty to, the old regime were being appropriated for the purposes of the 
new. At the same time, the respective choice of distinctly Macedonian and Palaiologan sites 
as resting places for the imperial remains reiterated that the new dynasties were firmly in 
control.  
Changing ideologies in the ninth and tenth centuries prompted increased emphasis 
and scrutiny of these acts of repentance. The initial development was potentially a result of 
early ninth-century Western ecclesiastical ideology being imported to and embraced in 
Byzantium. Byzantine ecclesiastical conceptions of emperorship, with a focus on truth and 
humility that also characterised penitential acts, progressively found expression at this point. 
The documentation of repentance dramatically increased in the histories produced from the 





eleventh, and retaining importance even under the Palaiologoi. Due to literary developments 
taking place in that period, guilt and repentance concurrently became major considerations 
in the construction of narratives that progressively concerned themselves with imperial 
biography, as a source of Kaiserkritik or praise. In the literature, sincerity revealed an 
emperor’s character, swiftly becoming a hallmark of ‘good’ emperors. Tearful displays, 
closely associated with ceremonial acts of repentance and symbolic of earnestness, also 
became marks of authenticity; their corruption a sign of misrule. 
In a society whose prevailing political ideology espoused meritocratic and elective 
principles, both popular and divine, as the basis for basileia; where the position was 
administrative, and popularity essential to political survival, a new emperor had to prove 
himself worthy of the title. Popular perception was the foremost consideration in the 
admission of guilt, its manner of expiation, and the way in which it was subsequently 
recorded. The assumption of imperial power could not eradicate wrongdoing, nor popular 
memory. Real power, popularity, and Christian morality might allow misdeeds to be 
amended and overcome, but ‘genuine remorse’ was deemed necessary. Contrite emperors 








VIII. THE DEFEATED AND DETHRONED 
 
We have seen that the process of challenging a reigning emperor necessitated and acquired 
rituals that were designed to communicate the legitimisation of power and to expiate guilt, 
when deemed necessary. The successful outcome of a coup, or a defence by the existing 
regime, also came to require communicative rituals. Reconciliatory gestures, capital 
punishments, or victory celebrations, served to glorify and legitimise the successful party, 
and to demean the conquered. The present chapter considers the histories, symbolisms, and 
communicative-legitimist functions, of these rituals and punishments as used against 
defeated usurpers and dethroned emperors. Some provisional conclusions about the 
projection of imperial authority in regard to how regimes sought to create, present, and 




The frequency with which rituals of reconciliation between emperors and conspirators recur 
in the histories leaves little doubt as to their importance throughout the political life of the 
empire. Yet they have received only minimal attention from Byzantinists.1220 Nevertheless, 
trends and variations in these rituals’ formats and ideopolitical significance can be identified 
in relation to structural changes in the empire’s internal politics, and some provisional 
comments may be made about how they were understood by the Byzantines themselves. 
                                                 
1220 Grünbart 2008 and Vučetić 2013, are the principal works. Both have limited scope and address particular 
examples taken from the tenth and twelfth centuries respectively. Grünbart provides a thorough analysis of the 
source material for the reconciliation of Bardas Skleros and Basileios II. Vučetić approaches a broader topic, 
the use of deditiones (a contemporary Western format of reconciliatory ritual) for several reconciliations under 
Manuel I, and proposes Manuel’s involvement with the crusader states as a possible source for the introduction 





The initial response to a conspiracy usually involved an attempt to dissuade 
participants from rebellion, and even conflicts involving open war featured attempted 
settlements. Byzantine diplomacy, concern about asphaleia, and the ideology of Christian 
rulership, ensured that resolutions were often attempted. Clemency was a fundamental 
virtue, encouraging emperors to imitate Christ in bearing patiently slander and offenses, and 
by punishing mildly.1221 Reconciliation was built into the practice of rulership itself. 
Traditionally, upon his accession, an emperor would pardon many political prisoners and 
exiles who had fallen into disgrace under his predecessor. Justin I pardoned Appion, 
Diogenianus, and Philoxenus, officials exiled by Anastasius.1222 Michael I reportedly 
followed a ‘prevailing custom of clemency’ in overturning Leon V’s exile.1223 And Ioannes 
I restored many of Nikephoros II’s political exiles.1224 Official pardons typically coincided 
with the occasion of religious holidays; especially Easter,1225 which provided connotations 
of rebirth, resurrection, and political renewal. A similar practice mutatis mutandis is known 
to have characterised the instigation of popular rebellions in Constantinople. Prisons were 
immediate targets, and prisoners were informally pardoned by the instigators to fight for 
their cause.1226 Like the pardon of prisoners during a revolt, pardons at the outset of a reign 
were more practical than virtuous, for they might enable long-running disputes to be ended 
or procure influential support for a fledgling regime. Nikoulitzas Delphinas who, after his 
failed revolt, wrote to Romanos IV to gain leave to return, demonstrates that these 
opportunities were eagerly embraced. Nikoulitzas was disappointed, however, that all he 
                                                 
1221 On clemency as an imperial virtue, see Dmitriev 2015: 10-11. It was always a standard theme in advice 
literature: see, for example, Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij pp.57, 93, 94; Nikephoros Blemmydes, 
Vasilikos Andrias, ed. Hunger and Ševčenko pp.54-55, 125. 
1222 Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 337 (trans. Jeffreys 231). 
1223 …ἀπολύεται ὁ Λέων τῆς ὑπερορίας κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατῆσαν ἔθος χρηστότητος ἕνεκεν τοῖς ‘Ρωμαίων 
βασιλεῦσι, καὶ τῆς θυγῆς κατάγεται. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 12; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 
22-23. 
1224 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 285 (trans. Wortley 272). 
1225 Maleon 2010a: 10. 





gained from his pardon was the promotion of his son Gregoras to the rank of 
protospatharios, and an increased salary for his other son Pankratios.1227 Ingratitude aside, 
the reconciliation was beneficial for both parties: Nikoulitzas and his family profited from 
the connection, Romanos gained loyalists. 
Wartime measures of reconciliation were less low-key, but the narratives are 
typically more concerned with the political outcome of these events than the processes 
involved. Nevertheless, the essential stages of the ritual format, the ideological significance 
of which remained intact with relatively few changes throughout the period of study, can be 
traced. 
 Constantius II’s resolution of the usurpation of Vetranio (350) was the first 
significant reconciliation in Roman history. Vetranio’s proclamation by the troops of 
Illyricum on 1 March was ostensibly a response to the more serious usurpation of 
Magnentius, which precipitated the murder of Constans.1228 Another usurpation, 
Nepotianus’, was quashed after just twenty-eight days when Magnentius’ agents murdered 
him and his mother in Rome.1229 Vetranio’s motives remain unclear,1230 yet he had, or 
claimed to have, the support of Constantius’ sister Constantina,1231 whose role has prompted 
conflicting statements about the relationship between Vetranio’s revolt and the internal-
politics of the Constantinian dynasty: was she trying to help Constantius, or displace him? 
                                                 
1227 Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.72-73. 
1228 Magnentius was proclaimed on 18 January at Augustodunum. On the historical circumstances of these 
usurpations, see Dearn 2003; Drinkwater 2000; Vanderspoel 1995: 84-85. 
1229 Nepotianus proclaimed himself emperor when he entered Rome with his supporters on 3 June 350, 
defeating the Praefectus urbi, a loyalist of Maxentius in the process. He was killed on 30 June 350 when 
Maxentius dispatched the Magister Officiorum, Marcellinus, against him. For details, see Vanderspoel 1995: 
85. 
1230 Bleckmann 1994, and Drinkwater 2000, propose that he was acting purely as a self-interested usurper, 
whereas Dearn 2003 considers Vetranio to have consistently presented himself as a loyal and subordinate 
colleague of Constantius. Dearn 2003: esp. 180-183, draws attention to the use of a wreath in the numismatic 
iconography of Vetranio, which contrasts with the diadem - denoting seniority - worn by Constantius. The 
choice of insignia is believed to have connoted Vetranio’s efforts to espouse his deference to Constantius, and 
was a consistent element on his issues. 
1231 Constantina’s involvement is especially prominently mentioned in the fragments of an Arian History, 
collected and translated in: Philostorgius, Church History, trans. Amidon 220 (Appendix 7). Constantina is also 





Or was she simply being used?1232 Whatever Vetranio and Constantina’s motives, it appears 
that Constantius offered support to Vetranio while concluding his own campaigns in the east. 
Funds were sent to bolster Vetranio’s flagging opposition, and later narratives falsely 
asserted that a diadem was sent by Constantius in acceptance of Vetranio’s proclamation as 
Augustus.1233 Yet, by summer Vetranio had allied with Magnentius, and together they 
approached Constantius with a proposal. Constantius would retain seniority, but recognise 
the usurpers as co-Augusti. Constantius would marry Magnentius’ daughter, and Magnentius 
would marry Constantina. Constantius rejected the proposal and marched into Illyricum in 
late autumn.1234  His troops met no resistance from Vetranio, and supposedly took him by 
surprise at Serdica.1235  
Weeks later, on 25 December, the two figures appeared before their combined forces 
at Naissus to enact the public divestiture and retirement of Vetranio. This peaceful settlement 
of hostilities was then without parallel in Roman history and garnered exorbitant praise in 
official panegyrics.1236 According to the Chronicon Paschale,  
[Constantius] received Vetranio with great honour… he set up a dais high 
in the plain, and in the presence of the army and with Vetranio at his side 
he gave a speech in which he said that it was fitting for the state that power 
should be held by the same man who had received it from the emperors 
who were his forebears and that it also benefitted the state to have public 
affairs properly administered by only one authority… As for Vetranio… 
Constantius divested him of the purple robe… and at the same time 
entertained him at his own table…1237 
Zonaras adds that,  
…after he [Vetranio] had stripped off the marks of imperium, Vetranio, in 
                                                 
1232 The main arguments concerning Constantina’s involvement are summarised, with bibliography, in Dearn 
2003. 
1233 Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte, ed. Bidez III, 22 (trans. Amidon 57). 
1234 Vanderspoel 1995: 85-86, with references. 
1235 Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 38. 
1236 On the then singular nature of the settlement, see Drinkwater 2000: 155. On the praise for the settlement 
in panegyric, see Dearn 2003: 176; Vanderspoel 1995: 86. 
1237 Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 539-540. Translated adapted from, Philostorgius, Church History, 
trans. Amidon 218 (Appendix 7). See also, Sozomen, Histoire Ecclésiastique, ed. Bidez et al. 198-201: 





the garb of a commoner, embraced the emperor’s feet. And Constantius 
embraced Vetranio, called him ‘father’, and, offering his hand to him and 
supporting him (since he was elderly), made him his dinner companion.1238 
Scholarship has traditionally followed the sources in believing Vetranio’s divestiture an 
unexpected betrayal achieved through bribery and rhetorical prowess exploiting the 
military’s historic loyalty to the Constantinian dynasty.1239 However, the image of 
spontaneity which served to flatter the dynasty’s continued popularity, and Constantius’ 
shrewd leadership in the face of challengers, must be suspected.  
Drinkwater proposes an alternate reading. Constantius’ uncontested access to 
Illyricum was too miraculous to be accurate.1240 Vetranio was an experienced general 
unlikely to have neglected the principal access point into his territory. The fact that 
negotiations with Constantius had been undertaken before the appearance at Naissus,1241 that 
Vetranio’s partisans did not challenge his resignation, and that he did not hear about mass 
bribes, in fact, suggests a pre-arranged and highly choreographed sequence of events taking 
place.1242 The Augusti had travelled together for a week before the reconciliation-divestiture, 
presumably both wearing imperial attire and claiming titulature. Vetranio began the 
ceremony wearing his insignia and was thus treated as a colleague at the outset. Although 
the ‘ritual divestiture of a defeated leader had been associated with the army in the fourth 
century’,1243 can we be certain that Vetranio’s divestiture was intended as that of a defeated 
usurper? His proskynesis was a traditional sign of respect shown to a senior emperor, and an 
expected one considering Vetranio’s retirement left Constantius as the sole ‘legitimate’ 
emperor, for the first time. Rather than a forced humiliation, the divestiture-retirement could 
                                                 
1238 Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 38 (trans. Banchich and Lane 163-164). Translation 
adapted. 
1239 Vanderspoel 1995: 85-86, for example, summarises how Constantius ‘dispossessed Vetranio of his throne 
by deceit and oratory.’ 
1240 Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte, ed. Bidez III.24 (trans. Amidon 58). 
1241 This is stated explicitly by Sozomen, Histoire Ecclésiastique, ed. Bidez et al. 198-201. 
1242 Drinkwater 2000: esp. 155-157. 





be interpreted as a wholly voluntary act, especially as Constantius’ gestures showed 
deference and respect in return. The staging before the troops was not intended to degrade 
Vetranio, but to suggest their involvement in providing authorising consensus for his 
retirement, just as they had been responsible for promoting him.1244 Furthermore, their 
transferral of loyalty to Constantius, allegedly on the basis of his dynastic appointment and 
aversion to polyarchy,1245 was preceded and authorised by Vetranio’s presence and actions. 
Rather than an unforeseen divestiture, the whole sequence makes more sense if interpreted 
as a negotiated settlement between colleagues celebrating a ‘handover’ of power. Where a 
forced humiliation may have divided loyalties, a respectful reconciliation-retirement 
removed Vetranio whilst engendering unity. The fact that the iconography of Vetranio’s 
coinage consistently demonstrated his subordination to Constantius has been interpreted as 
further evidence that he anticipated his own abdication, ‘an event not forced… but expected 
and orchestrated.’1246 
The reconciliation of Bardas Skleros and Basileios II (c.989-991)1247 provides the 
next detailed account of ritual procedures. It employed similar rites to establish Basileios as 
sole emperor.1248 Skleros’ usurpation had succeeded that of Bardas Phokas when the latter’s 
troops, and widow, chose him as successor.1249 Basileios sought a diplomatic resolution to a 
conflict that might continue for years. In exchange for the cessation of hostilities and 
divestiture, Skleros was granted assurance and the rank of kouropalates, second only to 
Basileios himself. Furthermore, his supporters were exempted from punishment.1250 
The receipt of assurance had always been a significant element of negotiations, but 
                                                 
1244 Drinkwater 2000: 157. 
1245 Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle, 2.44.2-4. 
1246 Dearn 2003: 170. 
1247 The exact date is contentious, but the reconciliation certainly occurred before 6 March 991 (Skleros’ death). 
1248 On the sources, and the procedure of this reconciliation, see Grünbart 2008. 
1249 April/May 989. For chronology, see Holmes 2005: 240-246. 
1250 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 36-39; ed. Renauld I, 16 (trans. Sewter 42); Skylitzes, Synopsis 






Basileios’ offer of titulature was more important, for it suggested that he believed himself 
incapable of victory.1251 Similar offers known from the eleventh century were never made 
from a position of strength but were intended to forestall a dethronement.1252 
Although Skleros delayed his response, he agreed to Basileios’ terms and met him at 
Didymoteichon, away from Constantinople where it was undoubtedly feared that Skleros 
might foment unrest.1253 The scene for the ceremony was the imperial tent. Skleros was 
escorted by Basileios’ guardsmen; already blinded according to Skylitzes, frail on account 
of his old age according to Psellos.1254 Both works record Basileios’ alleged mockery of 
Skleros’ need for assistance: ‘He of whom I stood in fear and dread is approaching being led 
by the hand.’1255 Only Psellos details subsequent proceedings. Although Skleros had already 
divested himself of all other insignia, Basileios noticed that he still wore a pair of red sandals 
and refused to allow him an audience until he had removed them. After submitting to this 
requirement, rendering himself barefoot, Skleros approached and the pair embraced. He 
apologised for the revolt and Basileios accepted this, calling their disagreement ‘evil 
fortune’. A shared drink cup was produced to seal the reconciliation, with Basileios taking 
the first draught to confirm that it had not been poisoned. Basileios asked Skleros’ advice on 
how best to campaign and govern, and Skleros retired to his family estates, dying soon 
after.1256 
                                                 
1251 Bardanes Tourkos received an oath of assurance from Nikephoros I before surrendering himself to tonsure; 
the reconciliation of Theophilos and Theophobos had been preceded by such an oath; and Kekaumenos records 
the role of the patriarch in guaranteeing the validity of oaths of assurance. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de 
Boor 479 (trans. Mango and Scott 657); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 124, 136; ed. Featherstone and 
Codoñer 179, 195; Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij p.72 (trans. Roueché). 
1252 Cheynet 1990: 171. 
1253 Grünbart 2008: 220. 
1254 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 339 (trans. Wortley 321); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri I, 38-41. Although Psellos does not state that Skleros had already been blinded, Grünbart 2008: 
218-219, and n.21, draws attention to Psellos’ repeated use of the word ἰδὡν (five times) in this passage. The 
repetition appears to indicate that Psellos was subtly alluding to a blinding, yet it remains unclear whether he 
means to suggest that this preceded or followed the reconciliation. 
1255 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 339 (trans. Wortley 321); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri I, 38-39; ed. Renauld I, 17 (trans. Sewter 42). 





The use of forced divestiture as a humbling measure is more pronounced in Skleros’ 
entrance. Although his assembled loyalists and Basileios troops saw him being led into the 
imperial tent, the reconciliation itself was restricted to those officials inside. The image of 
frailty and submission that characterised Skleros’ assisted approach and divestiture 
(presumably involving bending or kneeling and thus resembling proskynesis), was 
consequently the only one witnessed by the troops, and was perpetuated through Basileios’ 
apparently well-known remark.1257 It clearly contrasted with the relatively intimate and 
egalitarian image of proceedings inside the tent, after reconciliation had begun. We may 
suspect that Skleros had not simply forgotten to remove this insignia, but had agreed to enact 
a divestiture as part of the meeting; possibly in order to preserve the imperial dignity given 
that Basileios had clearly failed to defeat the rebels after years of warfare. Undertones of 
consensus politics, although in a narrower form to Vetranio’s resignation, were also 
expressed through Basileios’ supposed enquiries regarding how best to govern. Ideally, 
Basileios’ administration was shown to respect and acknowledge the opinions of the 
aristocracy who were encouraged to engage with policy decisions rather than resorting to 
civil war. The effort may be linked with the wider ‘aristocratization’ of the imperial image 
in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.1258 The fact that Psellos provided a critique of 
Basileios’ introverted and absolutist style of rulership in the next paragraph suggests his 
deliberate efforts to undermine Basileios’ propaganda in this area.1259 Nevertheless, the ritual 
performance reveals how a stalemate was transformed into an apparent imperial victory, and 
then a symbolic concession to Skleros’ supporters amongst military aristocracy whom 
Basileios was attempting to placate. The reconciliations of Vetranio and Skleros reveal that 
these rituals were malleable and useful instruments of imperial propaganda, alongside viable 
                                                 
1257 If we may understand its reproduction in almost identical form in two narratives to be evidence of ‘public’ 
or ‘widespread’ knowledge. 
1258 On this trend, see Kazhdan 1984; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 99-102. 





methods of conflict resolution during periods of open warfare.  
From at least the ninth century, formal reconciliations also came to play an 
increasingly important role in dynastic politics and family rivalries. The reign of Basileios I 
provides the first substantive example: in 883, after Leon VI had been accused of conspiring 
against his father during a hunting trip, Basileios removed him from precedence and 
confined him to the Palace. Although the details of the conspiracy were suppressed and 
remain unclear,1260 the protovestiarios Helladikos, the domestikos ton scholon Andreas, and 
the magistros Stephanos fell from favour along with unnamed ‘others’.1261 Yet, the fall of 
Leon’s faction did not end his political aspirations. By 886 Basileios was unpopular and had 
withdrawn from public life as a result of illness. He narrowly avoided being overthrown by 
a senatorial conspiracy headed by Ioannes Kourkouas.1262 Leon’s supporters within the 
senate and aristocracy now attempted to intercede on Leon’s behalf.1263 The intervention of 
the megas hetaireiarches, Stylianos Zaoutzes, prompted Basileios to permit Leon’s 
restoration to precedence.1264 Pragmatic concerns about the succession and the dangers faced 
by the dynasty forced Basileios’ hand. Leon was brought before Basileios on the occasion 
of the Feast of Elijah. His ‘clothes of mourning’ were replaced with imperial attire, and his 
hair clipped.1265 The date of this restoration (21 July) was commemorated annually 
                                                 
1260 Details about exactly what prompted Leon’s fall from favour are scarce and dependent upon later traditions. 
Although it does appear that Leon was accused of conspiracy against Basileios with his faction, we cannot be 
certain that he intended to assassinate Basileios as the sources claim, or assume that what details about the 
episode that they do provide are accurate. On the uncertain circumstances and motives of the plot, and for 
discussion of the sources, see Tougher 1997: 57-60. 
1261 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 81 (trans. Kaldellis 100); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
348-350; Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 324-331; Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 846-847; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 168-169 (trans. Wortley 161-162), listing the Margarites (‘Pearl’) as the place 
of Leon’s confinement. 
1262 On the conspiracy of Kourkouas, uncovered in March 886, see Vlyssidou 1985. 
1263 Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 330-333; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 350-351. 
1264 Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 847; Tougher 1997: 58-61. 
1265 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 169-170 (trans. Wortley 163). See also, Vita Basilii, ed. 
Ševčenko 332-333; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 351. Attributing Leon’s restoration not to Zaoutzes’ 
intervention, but to Basileios’ change of heart after a parrot (kept for the emperor’s entertainment) repeated 
Leon’s name during a banquet with influential members of the senate, causing them to express their shame at 





thereafter. Leon broached the episode (in vague terms) in Homily 34, performed on one such 
commemoration. He accepted full responsibility for wrongdoing including plotting 
‘countless deaths’, claimed not to have deserved forgiveness, and called his father’s patron 
saint, Elijah,1266 the heavenly intercessor responsible for his salvation.1267 The Homily served 
as another confession of wrongdoing, and the reconciliation’s timing to coincide with the 
Feast was evidently intended to invoke supernatural protection for the reunified dynasty and 
Basileios successor. Although Leon’s plot had been an embarrassment, the formal 
reconciliation projected the restoration of dynastic unity at a time of political weakness, since 
the factions of Leon and Basileios were ostensibly no longer in conflict.  
The successional disputes of Leon’s descendants, and the struggle to establish 
hereditary succession, mitigated against further ‘dynastic reconciliations’ under the 
Macedonians. However, the role of reconciliation in dynastic politics re-emerged under the 
Komnenoi. At the same time that administrative roles were becoming increasingly restricted 
to Komnenian and ‘client’ family members, and concepts like noble birth were promoted to 
reinforce this situation, the main threats to the dynasty increasingly came from within. To 
counteract these divisions being exploited, the facade of interfamilial and intrafamilial unity 
is known to have been especially promoted,1268 and public and private reconciliations 
constituted an essential element in maintaining that image.  
Of course, it should be noted that, wherever possible, nascent plots against the 
Komnenian emperors involving members of this core group were concealed from public 
knowledge. Although we cannot realistically confirm that the Komnenoi were more prone 
to masking dissent than previous dynasties they appear to have had greater success in 
                                                 
1266 The saint responsible for reconciling Ahab with God after Ahab had repented for murder and other 
misdeeds (1 Kings 21). 
1267 For analysis of the content of the Homily, see Antonopoulou 1997: 234-236. 





regulating the leak and production of potentially damaging information.1269 In particular, the 
reign of Alexios I was ‘characterised by an extraordinary dearth of primary narrative 
materials’ in comparison to those which preceded and succeeded it.1270 Revisionist 
historiography concerning the wider Komnenos-Doukas dynasty’s origins was one example 
of a ‘unification and suppression’ programme in action. We may add several other 
reconciliatory and unificatory efforts to this list. 
In 1094, whilst on campaign, Alexios uncovered the conspiracy of Nikephoros 
Diogenes and Constantine Doukas. According to the Alexias, a large part of the army and 
many ‘leading figures’ were implicated. Maria of Alania and Alexios’ brother, Adrianos, 
also had prior knowledge.1271 Alexios reportedly feared for his life when those involved were 
called to assemble, and the scale of the nascent conspiracy precluded mass arrests given the 
shortage of loyal troops, prompting a general amnesty. Diogenes and Kekaumenos 
Katakalon became scapegoats. The involvement of Constantine and Maria was then turned 
to Alexios’ benefit. A false-rumour was spread that Constantine had been the one to inform 
Alexios of the conspiracy, and Maria’s foreknowledge was wholly concealed.1272 In 
reporting this, Alexios was able to present the image of continued unity with the Doukai, 
enabling his status to be reaffirmed by those who had originally supported it and who held 
influence with the rebels, and in opposition to Diogenes, whose claims to basileia were also 
dependent upon his relation to the Doukai. Adrianos’ involvement was similarly concealed 
and, given his position as megas domestikos, his subsequent absence from proceedings is 
                                                 
1269 In the words of Frankopan, ‘It seems that the Komnenoi were singularly skilful at establishing and servicing 
an image of the family which not only promoted individual members and above all the group as a whole, but 
at snuffing out any criticism of the dynasty.’ Frankopan 2008: 79-80. See also, Frankopan 2007; Magdalino 
1993: esp. 414. 
1270 Frankopan 2008: 79. Aside from the brief account in Zonaras’ Epitome, Alexios’ reign was documented 
by an insider, Anna. 
1271 Conspicuously, a lacuna exists in both of the oldest manuscripts just as the author begins to name those 
involved in the conspiracy: Frankopan 2007: 19. 





indicative of Alexios’ strong suspicions about him.1273 Suggestively, both Constantine and 
Adrianos disappeared from the political sphere shortly after the coup, with Adrianos possibly 
taking the tonsure.1274 The tenuous image of dynastic unanimity was clearly central to 
Alexios’ immediate survival once his dubious control over the state had been uncovered.1275 
His attempts to engineer a narrative of what had taken place allowed him to retain this image, 
project strength through the punishment of Diogenes and Katakalon, and surreptitiously 
remove Constantine and Adrianos from authority. 
Alexios’ successors, Ioannes and Manuel, were often unable to create ‘alternative 
narratives’ but attempted to maintain an image of unity through reconciliations with hostile 
family members. Ioannes successfully weathered the intrigues of Anna Komnene and 
Nikephoros Bryennios c.1118-1119 and reportedly instigated a reconciliation.1276 After 
Manuel had secured the throne by isolating his elder brother Isaakios at the Pantokrator 
Monastery, and subverted Isaakios’ hereditary claims, he sought reconciliation soon after 
the coronation. Isaakios was summoned to the Great Palace, swore fidelity, and the pair were 
formally reconciled after exchanging the Kiss of Peace.1277 Around the same time, Manuel’s 
uncle, the former sebastokrator Isaakios, who had been exiled by Ioannes because of his 
repeated plots against the throne, was summoned from Pontus and pardoned.1278  
                                                 
1273 Frankopan 2007: 24, argues that Adrianos would have been expected to be present when the conspirators 
were assembled so as to prosecute them, or defend Alexios, if asked to. Yet Adrianos is wholly absent from 
events after the conspiracy was uncovered. Given Anna’s particular attention to detail in recording what 
happened at this point, Adrianos’ absence does not seem to have been a mere oversight on her part: he was 
simply not present. 
1274 Frankopan notes that a necrological notice indicates that Adrianos died in 1105 having assumed the 
monastic habit and taken the name ‘Ioannes’. Tonsure would explain his absence from the political realm in 
the aftermath of the conspiracy. Alongside Adrianos’ absence from Byzantine dealings with the crusaders, and 
the Cuman campaigns, Frankopan points to Nikephoros Bryennios (the Younger’s) assumption of Adrianos’ 
duties as further evidence of Adrianos’ disgrace after the conspiracy: Frankopan 2007: 27-31. 
1275 Frankopan 2007: 26-28. 
1276 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 11 (trans. Magoulias 8-9). Anna Komnene and Nikephoros Bryennios 
(the Younger) reportedly conspired against Ioannes II’s accession with Empress Eirene, and were involved in 
an intrigue at some point during the first year of his reign (now against Eirene’s wishes).  
1277 Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 32 (trans. Brand 34); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 52 (trans. 
Magoulias 31). 
1278 Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 32-33 (trans. Brand 34), whose chronology indicates that this 





Manuel’s most significant reconciliations involved Andronikos I. In 1166, the self-
exiled Andronikos was cooperating with the Cumans against the empire. Manuel made his 
return the foremost priority despite Hungarian incursions along the Danube frontier. Little 
is known about the ensuing reconciliation, although Choniates states that Manuel summoned 
Andronikos, they exchanged mutual oaths, embraced, and Andronikos was later appointed 
governor of Kilikia.1279 It is possible that the format had been negotiated.1280 A second 
reconciliation, in July 1180, after Andronikos had spent the period from 1167 as a self-exiled 
rebel, was described in greater detail. Andronikos’ wife and children had been taken captive 
by Manuel,1281 prompting Andronikos to request safe passage to Constantinople. This was 
granted and, at the audience with Manuel, Andronikos allegedly manipulated 
proceedings.1282 At an opportune moment he revealed a chain around his neck and prostrated 
himself before the emperor, shedding tears and begging for forgiveness. Manuel was moved 
by the display and ordered his attendants to raise Andronikos who immediately demanded 
that one of the onlookers, the future Isaakios II, dash him against the throne, which he did. 
The ceremony complete, Andronikos was granted titles and dispatched to govern 
Oinaion.1283 
                                                 
1279 For the reconciliation: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 132 (trans. Magoulias 75). For Andronikos’ 
appointment: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 137-138 (trans. Magoulias 78); Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. 
Meineke 250 (trans. Brand 188). 
1280 An analogous situation arose in 830, when Theophilos’ intermediaries negotiated a reconciliation with his 
general Manuel ‘the Armenian’ who had been raiding the empire in collusion with the Abbasids. He was 
promoted domestikos ton scholon after his return. Manuel had defected to the Abbasids circa 829 when accused 
of conspiring against the emperor by the logothetes tou dromou Myron. He was reconciled and promoted after 
meeting with the emperor at the Church of the Mother of God at Blachernai (presumably where he renewed 
his oath of fidelity) and was appointed godfather to Michael III. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 71 
(trans. Wortley 72); Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 219-221; Georgios Monachos 
Continuatus, ed. Bekker 796-798, Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 118-120; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 
170-173.  
1281 This is the last reference to Andronikos’ illegitimate wife Theodora Komnene (married unlawfully c.1167), 
the mother of his son Alexios, and daughter Eirene. It is unclear what happened to Theodora after her capture 
although it is probable that she subsequently accompanied Andronikos into ‘retirement’ at Oinaion. She must 
have died c.1180-1181, as she did not accompany Andronikos when he marched on Constantinople, and his 
marriage to Anna/Agnes of France in 1183 would not have been possible had Theodora still been alive (no 
divorce is mentioned). 
1282 The location for this audience is not stated, but was most likely held at the Blachernai Palace. 
1283 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 226-227 (trans. Magoulias 128-129). Oinaion was located on the Black 





Yet again, we have good reason to question the presentation of events. The 
negotiations preceding Andronikos’ return in 1180 gave plenty of opportunity for the 
ceremonial format to be discussed. Moreover, the ritual elements that Andronikos performed 
‘unexpectedly’, in fact, conform to the contemporary Western deditio format known to have 
been used by Manuel elsewhere. Deditiones represented a ceremonial surrender of a rebel 
before a king/lord, and are known from at least the early tenth century.1284 They replaced a 
real surrender and implied a victor’s duty to show lenience.1285 The ritual details were often 
negotiated in advance and ‘borrowed elements of public penance, especially the clothing, 
for a somewhat different purpose.’1286 The ritual humiliation communicated imperial 
victory, and preceded gestures denoting forgiveness and reunion.1287 Rebels appeared 
wearing a sackcloth and barefooted in imitatio Christi, before submitting themselves to the 
ruler, rather than God or a bishop.1288 The religious undertones of the ritual were intentional, 
and cast the supplicant in the guise of a political penitent.1289 Although a deditio did not 
automatically connote a rebel’s restoration, it strongly implied it.  
Vučetić has discussed Manuel’s use of deditiones, believing him to have introduced 
them modelled on practices observed in Antioch.1290 Accordingly, the submission of Renaud 
de Châtillon (1159)1291 resembled a deditio. William of Tyre records the ritual: after 
preliminary negotiations, Renaud, unarmed and on foot, first led Manuel’s horse during the 
triumphal entry into Antioch.1292 He appeared bareheaded, barefooted, wearing a black 
                                                 
1284 Dalewski 2008: Chapter 2, and esp. 44-54; Reuter 2006: 160; Bagge 2002: Chapter 2, and esp. p.164-169; 
Althoff 1997; Althoff 1989. Althoff summarises the format thus: a set of ritual elements and their precise 
implementation are agreed upon in advance; these ritual elements are then performed before an audience; the 
guilty party prostrates himself and admits wrongdoing; a pardon is granted by the wronged party, and a 
restoration of the guilty party’s titulature and privileges may be granted. 
1285 Bagge 2002: 164. 
1286 Reuter 2006: 160; Dalewski 2008: 46. 
1287 Dalewski 2008: 45. 
1288 Reuter 2006: 160; Dalewski 2008: 52-53. 
1289 Reuter 2006: 162. 
1290 Vučetić 2013: esp. 496; Anca 2010. 
1291 As part of Manuel’s retribution for Renaud’s alliance with Thoros II, and their pillaging of Byzantine-
controlled Cyprus in 1156. Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 178-179 (trans. Brand 136-137). 





woven tunic, with a rope around his neck, and holding his sword pointed towards himself. 
At the terminus, Renaud handed his sword to Manuel (denoting submission), he prostrated 
and wept, swore fidelity, and was forgiven.1293 Kinnamos stresses that the entire procedure 
was witnessed by ambassadors assembled from across the medieval world, and that Manuel 
was standing on a dais.1294 The Hungarian populace of Zemun had performed similar acts in 
1151 and 1165,1295 as did Stefan Nemanja in 1172.1296 
The chain worn by Andronikos in 1180, his penitential acts, and entreaties for 
forgiveness were therefore expected ritual components. As Beihammer argues, the sequence 
was most likely concocted as a way of settling hostilities between two branches of the family 
which had, since the revolt of Ioannes II’s brother Isaakios (1130), been in regular conflict. 
Manuel undoubtedly considered the reconciliation essential to the dynasty’s stability and 
wanted to end his charismatic cousin’s troublemaking, especially now that Alexios II was to 
succeed him.1297 The reconciliation of 1166 may similarly have coincided with Manuel’s 
plans to raise Bela-Alexios to precedence, and thus aimed to remove Andronikos as a 
possible rival.1298 Despite authoring a chrysobull (1167) calling for Andronikos to be 
captured and blinded, Manuel had always displayed a propensity for forgiving his cousin.1299 
                                                 
1293 William of Tyre, Chronique, ed. Huygens 18.23, p.845.  
1294 Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 182 (trans. Brand 139). 
1295 Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 115, 245 (trans. Brand 91-92, 184). For commentary, see Zupka 2016: 
105-106; Vučetić 2013: 498 (considering the Hungarian reconciliation of 1165 only). 
1296 Kinnamos and Choniates place this event at different points in their respective chronologies. Choniates 
suggests Nemanja was reconciled with Manuel in 1168, a year after the Byzantine victory over the Hungarians; 
Kinnamos, correctly, places it in 1172. Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 287-288 (trans. Brand 215); 
Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 159 (trans. Magoulias 90). For discussion of the chronological issues, see 
Vučetić 2013: 494; Lilie 2009. 
1297 Beihammer 2013: 181; see also Vučetić 2013: 498-499; Grünbart 2009: 105-107. 
1298 Magdalino 1993: 200. If this was Manuel’s intent, it failed spectacularly. Andronikos objected to the oath 
of fidelity that Manuel demanded for Bela-Alexios and Maria, was dispatched to govern Kilikia for a second 
time, and there seduced Philippa of Antioch, Manuel’s sister-in-law. 
1299 Along with the reconciliations of 1166 and 1180, Manuel’s forgiveness/indulgence of Andronikos was 
exemplified by his unwillingness to believe (accurate) rumours about Andronikos’ incestuous relationship with 
Eudokia Komnene (c.1152); reluctance to accept rumours about Andronikos’ collusion with the Hungarians in 
1154/5; feigned ignorance of Andronikos’ supposed attempt to assassinate him whilst on campaign (1154/5); 
and his rebukes of Andronikos’ early failures in Kilikia made only in private. Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 
124, 126-128, 130 (trans. Brand 98, 100-101, 102); Choniates, Historia, ed. van. Dieten 104-106, 132, 227 
(trans. Magoulias 59-61, 75, 129).  On the Komnenian propensity to indulge relatives, see Magdalino 1993: 





Consequently, the scene in 1180 was probably not a demonstration of Andronikos’ wiliness, 
but a sequence of agreed-upon-acts that corresponded to normative treatments of defeated 
opponents, and which demonstrated Manuel’s clemency without risking a loss of prestige. 
Choniates’ account likely reflects Angeloi propaganda depicting Andronikos as a 
consummate manipulator who won the throne through deceit.  
In the West, in terms of their value in honour-conscious societies, deditiones were 
public humiliations that accompanied a loss of honour while allowing the victim to retain 
his life, property, and office. Their severity can be inferred from their position as the most 
serious punishment used against magnates in the Ottonian and early-Salian periods, when 
members of this group were almost never executed.1300 The adoption of deditiones at a time 
when Byzantine society was becoming increasingly conscious of ‘honour’ may have seemed 
a natural development that better served to exploit the importance of nobility, and shame 
wrongdoers, than the divestiture-proskynesis format. 
The dynasty of Michael VIII, who was twice reconciled with Theodoros II,1301 saw 
the emergence of reconciliation as a defining feature of successional politics. Andronikos II 
and Andronikos III were reconciled twice before the grandson successfully deposed his 
grandfather. The first resolution concerned a conspiracy by Andronikos III’s faction, 
                                                 
1300 Bagge 2002: 164-165. 
1301 First, after his acquittal in 1253 Michael was reconciled with Theodoros II in autumn 1254 at the behest of 
the patriarch and clergy. Michael had to renew his oath of fidelity as part of the terms of his reconciliation. 
Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 92-101 (trans. Macrides 259-263, 268); Pachymeres, Relations 
Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 38-41; Macrides 2013b, with bibliography. Second, after his return from 
self-imposed exile - during which he had helped the Turks to raid the borders of the empire. The reconciliation 
had been negotiated following the receipt of an oath of assurance and letters of security from Theodoros in 
1256/1257. The reconciliation occurred in early 1257, and Gregoras asserts that Theodoros had taken the 
initiative to reconcile with Michael; Pachymeres asserts that Michael took the initiative and repented for his 
misdeeds (treasonable activities). It is possible that Theodoros did not wish to contend with the charismatic 
figure of Michael Komnenos Palaiologos attacking the empire on one front (and posing a potential threat to his 
continued reign), and combat the advances of the Epirot emperor, Michael II Komnenos-Doukas on another 
front. Palaiologos’ swift dispatch to the west, removed him as an immediate threat and it may have been hoped 
that he would be killed in battle (Akropolites emphasises the meagre quality and size of the force given to 
Michael to command – this may have been an invention to emphasise his military exploits, or, more likely, 
reflect the reality that he could not be trusted with a superior force). Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 143-
144 (trans. Macrides 326); Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 45; Gregoras, 





uncovered shortly before Easter 1321.1302 According to Gregoras, Andronikos II summoned 
the patriarch and bishops to the palace, along with numerous other officials, in order to 
interrogate and admonish his grandson. The younger Andronikos entered, sat upon his 
customary throne, and was examined. Eventually, mutual oaths were exchanged to the effect 
that he would remain Andronikos II’s successor and would never plot against him.1303 
Kantakouzenos provided more detail about the ritual aspect: after being rebuked, 
Andronikos III performed proskynesis before his grandfather, begging for forgiveness and 
refusing to rise until it was granted. Andronikos II lifted and embraced his grandson who 
then prostrated again, kissed the emperor’s foot, and stood to receive a kiss in return. The 
patriarch and senators praised God for the settlement, and all parted.1304 
The accounts differ on how Andronikos III’s partisans responded. Gregoras’ pro-
Andronikos II version claimed that they considered the reconciliation a betrayal of their 
cause and rebuked him for breaking his oath to them. Kantakouzenos’ pro-Andronikos III 
version asserted that all were overjoyed and celebratory. In any case, at Easter, Andronikos 
III fled to his allies, Kantakouzenos and Syrgiannes, at Adrianople, and civil war ensued. By 
6 June, following extensive negotiations, peace was restored; in part through Syrgiannes’ 
mother’s mediation. The empire was divided between the two emperors, who ruled as 
colleagues, separately at Constantinople and Adrianople.1305  
By December the situation had deteriorated again. Syrgiannes, believed himself 
insufficiently remunerated, switched allegiance to the elder Andronikos, gained the title 
megas domestikos, and advocated renewed war.1306 The elder emperor agreed and war 
                                                 
1302 Andronikos III was accused of ‘unchristian conduct’. The terms of the settlement of the dispute indicate 
that he was believed to be plotting against Andronikos II’s throne. The circumstances of Andronikos III’s ‘trial’ 
and the literary aspects of Kantakouzenos’ narrative of the event are considered in Angelou 2013: esp. 275-
278. 
1303 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 312-314. 
1304 Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 75-76. 
1305 Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 107-123; Nicol 1993: 154-157. 





consumed Thrace for the next six months. Although Andronikos III lacked finances to pay 
his mercenary troops,1307 he was able to win the support of Lemnos and Thessalonike.1308 
Faced with these reverses and the threat of Turkish advances, Andronikos II sued for peace 
in July 1322. The terms, negotiated through Andronikos III’s mother, were more favourable 
to the younger emperor. He would now rule jointly over the whole empire, be crowned as 
heir,1309 receive an annual allowance of 35,000 hyperpyra, and his troops would be paid by 
the state. His grandfather would remain senior emperor and decide all domestic and foreign 
policy.1310  
A reconciliation was enacted outside Constantinople. Andronikos III approached his 
grandfather who waited before the city walls, both were on horseback. As he drew within a 
stadion of him,1311 Andronikos III descended from his horse to walk on foot. The grandfather 
motioned his grandson to stop and made to deny him as, according to Kantakouzenos, this 
was a breach of protocol: only an emperor’s entourage were to dismount at a meeting of two 
emperors, the emperors themselves were to meet on horseback, the junior (having removed 
his hat) would incline his head and grasp hands with the elder, and would then kiss him on 
the face.1312 The grandson nevertheless proceeded on foot to kiss his grandfather’s hand and 
foot which was still astride the horse. He proceeded to remount his own horse, embraced his 
                                                 
1307 Ioannes Kantakouzenos interceded to pay for his own mercenaries out of his own estates. Nicol 1993: 157. 
1308 Bosch 1965: 31-32. 
1309 He received a [second] coronation at Hagia Sophia on 2 February 1325, the date of the Feast of the 
Purification. Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 196. 
1310 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 358-395; Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 167-169; Bosch 
1965: 33-34; Nicol 1993: 158. 
1311 Approximately 180 meters (600 feet): a not insignificant distance for the emperor to traverse on foot and 
giving ample opportunity for spectators to observe and comprehend this humble act. 
1312 ‘When they drew close to each other, the young Emperor jumped from his horse to welcome the Emperor 
on foot. But the elder Emperor, using his bridle, pushed his horse back. He wanted to make clear what was 
correct should a co-emperor not greet the audience on foot, but on horseback. For, an ancient custom has 
prevailed amongst the emperors of the Romans, that when they encounter each other, those who are of the 
entourage (of each) dismount from their horses and follow on foot, but they themselves encounter each other 
[mounted], and the younger emperor bends and clasps hands with the elder emperor, having first taken off his 
hat from his head, while the father, while he reigns, kisses his face in reply.’ Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. 





grandfather, and received the Kiss of Peace in return, before the pair conversed.1313 In 
modifying horse protocol, Andronikos transformed a standard meeting into a reconciliation 
and quasi-supplicatio; he performed standing proskynesis. Kantakouzenos clarified that the 
breach of protocol was due to the excellent character of Andronikos III who was rendering 
‘the greatest respect and obedience, demanding more than duty and custom’. The public 
nature of the ritual was also emphasised, for the army was reportedly filled with ‘joyful 
lamentation’.1314 A ritual adventus followed, with the grandson visiting the Hodegetria 
before joining his grandfather in the Palace. He spent fifteen days meeting officials before 
returning to Adrianople.1315 But even this proved insufficient and in 1328 Andronikos III 
ousted his grandfather. 
Recurring reconciliations typified each accession of the century and the deditio 
format known from Manuel I’s reign was either deemed inappropriate for a co-emperor to 
perform, or had fallen out of practice during the period of ‘exile’. Ioannes V and Ioannes VI 
were reconciled and ruled jointly after the latter’s success in the civil war of 1341-1347. 
Kantakouzenos’ abdication (December 1354) was achieved after a reconciliation between 
the pair specified continued joint rule and Kantakouzenos’ seniority.1316 In 1381, after his 
restoration and two years spent besieging his son Andronikos IV and grandson Ioannes VII 
at Pera, Ioannes V was reconciled with them.1317 Andronikos had been formally disinherited 
in 1373, after an earlier conspiracy, but he and his son now had their successional rights 
                                                 
1313 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 359-360. 
1314 Τότε δὲ οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἔθος ὁ νέος βασιλεὺς κατέβη τοῦ ἵππου, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα καὶ πλέω τοῦ δικαίου 
καὶ συνήθους αἰδῶ καὶ εὐπείθειαν τῷ πάππῳ ἁποδῷ. Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 168. 
1315 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 360; Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 168-169. 
1316 On the terms and circumstances of both of these settlements, see Nicol 1968: 63, 84-85; Nicol 1979: 237-
246. 
1317 Where Andronikos had taken as hostage his mother, the Empress Helena, his maternal grandfather, Ioannes 
VI Kantakouzenos, and two aunts (probably including Theodora Kantakouzene, the widow of the Ottoman 
Sultan Orhan Gazi). Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 73 (trans. Magoulias 79-81); 
Chalkokondyles, Historia, ed. Darkó I, 57-58 (trans. Kaldellis 98-101); Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, 





restored. Andronikos was granted a semi-independent ‘appanage’,1318 and the settlement was 
confirmed after he had begged for forgiveness, and renewed fidelity.1319 The arrangement 
was intended to quell Andronikos’ aspirations whilst re-unifying the dynasty against those 
who had exploited the rift, especially the Ottomans and Genoese. It sought to satisfy 
Andronikos’ faction in Byzantium and his Genoese backers; all parties signed a treaty in 
Constantinople in November 1382 pledging mutual aid against all enemies except Sultan 
Murad.1320 However, Andronikos’ restoration alienated the other branch of the family. 
Manuel II was removed from precedence and began an independent rule in Thessalonike, 
following a different foreign policy to his father.1321 Even Andronikos was discontented and 
rebelled again in 1385. He was defeated and died later that year. Ioannes VII’s usurpation 
and conquest of Constantinople for five months in 1390, was ended when Manuel came to 
Ioannes V’s aid.1322 Ioannes VII fled to Selymbria but continued to fight.1323 Although the 
sources are unclear about the circumstances, a reconciliation of Ioannes VII and Manuel II 
was achieved in 1399 with the assistance of Boucicaut,1324 the Marshall of France. Boucicaut 
approached Ioannes at Selymbria and escorted him to Constantinople. The presence of a 
retinue including Ioannes’ mother, Maria-Kyratza, may suggest that terms had been 
negotiated in advance and that he was not under duress.1325 Ioannes was adopted by Manuel 
and ruled as his proxy while Manuel spent three years in Europe seeking aid against the 
                                                 
1318 Comprising Selymbria, Daneion, Herakleia, Rhaidestos, and Panidos. Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, 
ed. Grecu 73 (trans. Magoulias 80-81); Kydones, ed. Loenertz II, §155, 198, 201, 218-220, 222. See also, 
Necipoğlu 2009: 129; Kianka 1992: 161-163. 
1319 Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 73 (trans. Magoulias 80). 
1320 Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Schreiner I, Chr. 9/29; Nicol 1988: 324-325. 
1321 Necipoğlu 2009: 130. 
1322 Ioannes’ rule over Constantinople lasted from 14 April to 17 September. Ignatius of Smolensk, ed. Majeska 
100-103; Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Schreiner I, Chr. 7/21-22, 10/6. Necipoğlu 2009: 131-137; 
Nicol 1988: 328-330. 
1323 Kydones, ed. Loenertz II, §442. 
1324 Jean II Le Maingre, who had been named megas konstablos. 
1325 Doukas reports that Ioannes had exchanged oaths with Manuel before arriving in Constantinople, and the 
presence of a retinue might suggest that he had had time to call upon his supporters to join him, before heading 
to the meeting. Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 77 (trans. Magoulias 86). For analysis of the 
sources and scholarship on this reconciliation, see Barker 1969: 160-165, 490-493. See also Dölger 1931; Nicol 





Turks.1326 Upon Manuel’s return in 1403, Ioannes ceded the throne to his uncle and Manuel 
was again recognised as sole emperor. A dispute soon broke out and Ioannes was sent to 
Lemnos in disgrace.1327 He joined his father-in-law, Francesco II, to lead a naval expedition 
against Thessalonike. Another reconciliation followed; the terms were confirmed in a written 
oath and documented by the Castilian ambassador Clavijo. Both Manuel and Ioannes would 
retain the title autokrator. Ioannes would succeed Manuel. Manuel’s son, Ioannes VIII, 
would succeed him, and Ioannes VII’s son, Andronikos V, would follow him. An ivory 
pyxis, (possibly) created to commemorate Ioannes VII’s receipt of Thessalonike, records the 
arrangement within its iconographic programme.1328 The deaths of Ioannes VII and 
Andronikos (1407 and 1408 respectively) pre-empted the succession.  
By this time, reconciliation between warring parties, now usually members of the 
imperial family, had become a political game. Instead of a humbling method of surrender 
and control, with the defeated rival striving to keep his life and his holdings, reconciliations 
could extend power and dominion. The creation of appanages under the Palaiologoi, an 
extension of the Komnenian practice of dispatching relatives to safe regions and granting 
some autonomy (itself a response to centripetal and ‘quasi-feudal’ developments in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries), became more extreme.1329 The empire was increasingly 
divided amongst emperors, co-emperors, and aristocracy, in a way that was reminiscent of 
the failed tetrarchic and Constantinian successions. Infighting and foreign gains were 
perpetuated by an unwillingness to use harsher penalties against imperial relatives, and the 
                                                 
1326 For Ioannes’ adoption by Manuel, recorded in archival documents dating to the first two decades of the 
fifteenth century, see Oikonomides 1977: 331, n.11. In addition, Manuel Palaiologos, Dialogue with the 
Empress-Mother on Marriage, ed. Angelou 110-113, composed c.1394-1397, mentions a previous proposed 
reciprocal-adoption that would have established a clear line of succession (Manuel was to adopt Ioannes VII, 
and Ioannes VII was to adopt Ioannes VIII, Manuel’s new-born son, in the name of the ‘common interest’). 
The plan was never enacted but it seems that Manuel had long intended to place his relationship with his 
nephew on a more ‘secure’ footing, via adoption. 
1327 Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 111-113 (trans. Magoulias 100-101). 
1328 On the pyxis see, Oikonomides 1977; Hilsdale 2014: 210. 
1329 On the late-Byzantine practice of creating appanages, see Barker 1971; Malatras 2014: esp. 112-113; 





involvement of foreign powers in the political sphere lent an ‘international’ dimension to 
these internal disputes, raising the spectre of wider conflict.1330 From the early fourteenth 
century, reconciliation was the indispensable tool of internal diplomacy and the principal 
response to usurpation. Reconciliations were an integral component of a subjective political 
system wherein disputes were decided by the use of force or negotiated compromise instead 
of objective laws and procedures. Calculations of potential gains or losses were equally 
important as general rules and privileges.1331 They allowed the dynasty to espouse strength 
in the face of division, partially veiling insecurities. 
It is apparent that gestures, both shared and individual, were of central importance to 
reconciliatory rituals, as communicative signifiers of mutual-relations and social hierarchies. 
They encapsulated the underlying political ideology, were easily seen by even a distant 
audience, and were sometimes recorded in the histories. A handful of motions are attested, 
with each being intended to connote intimacy or familiarity. The embrace which 
characterised the reconciliation of Ioannes II with his brother and nephew, after their 
rebellion (1130), implied trust and acceptance.1332 Psellos’ account of the promotion of 
Romanos IV, for example, includes an alleged embrace from Michael VII which implied his 
acceptance of Romanos as friend and senior.1333 The Kiss of Peace was another recurrent 
gesture suggesting fealty and friendship.1334 The Book of Ceremonies records its liturgical 
                                                 
1330 On these concerns, see Wright 2017: esp. 290-291. 
1331 As shown by Bagge 2002: 165-166, in the western medieval context. 
1332 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 32 (trans. Magoulias 19). Perhaps one of the reasons that Choniates (in 
particular) so frequently listed these kinds of gestures was because his narrative detailed and lamented the 
breakdown of taxis and kin-relations under the emperors of his day. By contrast, these gestures of reconciliation 
between imperial family members stressed the importance of familial unity and kin-relations - they suggested 
a partial (and usually transient) restoration of taxis. 
1333 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 328-329; ed. Renauld II, 156 (trans. Sewter 349). Certainly, a 
more trusting image than that suggested by the histamenon of Romanos, on which both Romanos and Eudokia 
are depicted crowned by Christ on the reverse, and her sons are shown in place of Christ on the obverse, 
denoting their right of succession and Eudokia’s equal authority to grant it. The Romanos ivory, if indeed it 
depicts Romanos IV and Eudokia Makrembolitissa (I am inclined to agree that it does), also employs a visual 
hierarchy for their coronation by Christ that affords the empress equal authority with Romanos, as it was from 
her that power was being transferred. On the histamenon and ivory, see Kalavrezou-Maxeiner 1977: esp. 314. 
1334 Burrow 2004: 11-12, 52-53: ‘…men bound themselves together as lord and vassal “by mouth and hand”’, 





usage: the emperor and patriarch would exchange the Kiss outside the Sanctuary, before the 
emperor entered the metatorion. Emperors might also exchange the Kiss with senators and 
dignitaries whilst standing at the nave.1335 According to Pseudo-Kodinos, a ritual of the Kiss, 
performed on Easter Sunday, involved Western courtiers kissing the emperor’s right foot, 
right hand, and right cheek.1336 Although status differences could thus be visualised, 
embraces and kisses also carried implications of equality because, ‘although one party most 
often takes the initiative, the participants commonly perform more or less the same physical 
act reciprocally.’1337 Linguistically too, reconciliation invoked reciprocal/collective acts: 
Choniates used the terms σπένδεται (‘share a common drink’), and συμβαίνω (‘stand 
together’), as synonyms for καταλλαγή/καταλλάσσω (‘reconciliation’).1338 Shared drinks or 
meals that were used to conclude reconciliations also denoted a form of intimacy since only 
those believed to be favoured by the emperor would join his table.1339 In the west, a king 
who received the submission of a rebel and then immediately dined with him was 
announcing his formal restitution.1340 Obviously, it does not follow that, in performing 
mutual acts, reconciled individuals were understood to be the emperor’s equal, but, rather, 
                                                 
by kiss and grasped hands. French knights would also exchange a Kiss of Peace in order to achieve 
reconciliation after conflict. 
1335 On the liturgical context, see Majeska 1997: 6-8. For a biblical precedent, see 2 Samuel 15. 
1336 Pseudo-Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 184-189; Macrides 2011: 224.  
1337 Burrow 2004: 32. 
1338 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 52 (trans. Magoulias 31). 
1339 On the honour of dining with the emperor in Late Antiquity (but still applicable in later contexts) including 
its occasional connotations of equality between those present, see Malmberg 2007: esp. 75-76, 79-80. See also, 
Liudprand’s account of his embassy of 949-950 including the shared meal of Constantine VII with the 
ambassadors, and the order of precedence used when dining with Nikephoros II during the embassy of 968 
which Liudprand perceived as deliberately insulting to himself. Liudprand of Cremona, Antapodosis, ed. 
Chiesa §6.8 (trans. Squatriti 119); Liudprand of Cremona, Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana, ed. 
Chisea §11 (trans. Squatriti 247). The significance of dining with a former enemy was a cross-cultural 
phenomenon: in 1071, Romanos IV was permitted to dine with Alp Arslan after his own capture at Manzikert. 
Attaleiates even claims that the emperor was granted equal honours and status with the sultan while dining 
with him. Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 165 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 298-299), ‘[the sultan] invited 
him to sup with him and share his table, not placing him off to one side but made him sit next to him at an 
equal situation to his rank and share the same honours.’ Additionally, in 1203, after the flight of Alexios III 
and the restoration of Isaakios II (with Alexios IV), the leaders of the Fourth Crusade entertained the restored 
emperor at their camp across the Peraia. Isaakios and Alexios reportedly shared a tent and dined with these 
figures. Choniates also reports that the Crusaders had already been similarly entertained at the Palace. 
Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 551-552 (trans. Magoulias 302). 





were equally members of the community to which they were then being restored and of 
which he was the head. 
Power dynamics and culpability were clearly emphasised in the ceremonial format. 
The reconciliatory gestures generally followed, or incorporated, the rebel’s performance of 
proskynesis, typically associated with rituals of worship, repentance, or submission. The 
polyvalent character of proskynesis, in religious and secular contexts, even suggests a 
merging of ideologies. Transgressions against one’s faith and emperor were expiated 
through similar rites. Consequently, the deditiones seen under Manuel I, which further 
emphasised the rebel’s penitence and subjugation, need not have been imported as Vučetić 
believes.1341 The essential ritual gestures already existed in Byzantine society, and the 
increasing prominence of penitential humility in tenth- and eleventh-century Byzantium, 
alongside an increasing emphasis on nobility and the special status of imperial family 
members, may naturally have influenced reconciliatory procedures which had traditionally 
provided a reasonable compromise for both parties and continued to do so until the fall of 
the empire.  
Finally, some similarities drawn with caution between gestures used in reconciliatory 
rituals and kin-making rituals can be suggested. At the conclusion of an adoption, the 
adopted son would prostrate himself at the feet of his father while the latter intoned a prayer. 
The son would then rise, and the pair would embrace, denoting their newfound spiritual 
kinship.1342 Ceremonies of adelphopoiesis, wherein two men were united in ‘spiritual 
friendship’, involved the pair placing their hands, one atop the other, onto the gospel and 
reciting a prayer before embracing as brothers. Often this ritual preceded a shared meal 
                                                 
1341 It should be noted that the deditio of the Hungarians in 1151, which was missed by Vučetić, preceded that 
of Renaud de Châtillon by almost eight years. Therefore it is unlikely that Manuel’s period in Antioch was the 
source for the innovation in the Byzantine ritual’s format. Of course, the Hungarians were in close contact with 
the medieval West, so it remains possible that a western connection inspired the deditio of 1151.  





marking their brotherhood.1343 The clipping of Leon VI’s hair, may have recalled the famous 
occasion of Leon’s childhood tonsure, and the receipt of a lock of his hair by fifty ‘tonsure 
godparents/sponsors’.1344 The performative structures of reconciliations closely resembled 
these ceremonies, restoring an individual to the wider community and making them a 
‘brother’ once more. In fact, in 923 the reconciliation of Romanos I and Symeon of Bulgaria 
involved an embrace at the outset, and Symeon was termed Romanos’ “spiritual brother” in 
official correspondence thereafter.1345 
In resembling ritual gestures that were well-known for creating kinship ties, the 
restoration to the community of individuals who had been portrayed as political ‘outsiders’ 
in official rhetoric could be better understood, and might gain potency.1346 The connotation 
of renewed kinship would assuredly have been obvious to anyone witnessing a ‘dynastic 
reconciliation’ under Basileios II, the Komnenoi, or Palaiologoi, and may be alluded to in 
the case of Vetranio whom Constantius allegedly called ‘father’.1347 Therefore, in some 
sense, reconciliations may have been considered a symbolic form of ‘civil’ or ‘communal 
adoption’ performed by the emperor as the chief representative of the community, in order 
to restore taxis through the reconstitution of that community. 
 
Sanctuary, tonsure, and exile 
When reconciliation was unlikely, other strategies were employed to attempt to secure 
merciful treatment from a victorious party. A great number of conflicts resulted in either the 
                                                 
1343 Rapp 2016: 48-86 (the ritual), 69, 257 (the significance of the shared meal); Karlin-Hayter 1968: 37. The 
shared meal is an ongoing practice of these rituals in the Orthodox Church.  
1344 On Leon’s first tonsure, see Constantine Porphyrogennetos, Book of Ceremonies, ed. Reiske II, 620-622 
(trans. Moffatt and Tall II, 620-622); Dagron 2003: 46; Tougher 1997: 46-47. 
1345 On this episode, and its presentation in the extant sources, see Howard-Johnston 2006; Grünbart 2012. 
1346 For their status as political ‘outsiders’, see above, page 168. 
1347 It should be noted that this could equally be Zonaras’ twelfth-century interpretation of the ritual, as, to my 
knowledge, none of the other sources for Vetranio’s reconciliation with Constantius mention him being 
addressed as ‘father’; instead all agree that he was treated with appropriate honour and respect. This does not 
discount Zonaras’ possible use of a no longer extant source, but the prospect of a later interpretation or 





conspirators or imperial family claiming church asylum. Among the imperial cases we may 
count: Basiliscus and his family;1348 Tiberios, the six-year-old son and co-emperor of 
Justinian II;1349 the sons of Constantine V;1350 Michael I and his family;1351 Michael V;1352 
the Komnenian women; Nikephoros III;1353 and finally, the kaisarissa Maria Komnene and 
her husband Renier.1354 Alongside these cases, there are more than a dozen other clear 
references to usurpers and conspirators requesting church asylum in the face of imminent 
capture.1355  
From the fourth century, legislation acknowledged the custom of asylum and dictated 
that criminals were safe whilst within the boundaries of a church. Anyone who tried to 
remove them by force would suffer a penalty: originally death, but later other forms of 
physical punishment.1356 The refugee had to surrender any weapons and submit to the 
authority of the clergy. They would be interrogated as to the nature of their crime, might be 
judged in an ecclesiastical court, and receive a penance.1357 Although not originally 
applicable to murderers, the right of asylum was expanded under Constantine VII to include 
                                                 
1348 They sought refuge in the Great Church in August 476, before being exiled to die of exposure in 
Cappadocia. Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 107-108 (trans. Whitby 142); 
Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 303 (trans. Jeffreys 210).  
1349 Tiberios was crowned co-emperor in 705. In December 711, he was taken to the Church of the Theotokos 
at Blachernai by his grandmother in order to claim asylum, but was then dragged from the sanctuary and 
executed by Philippikos’ loyalists: Head 1972: 120-121. 
1350 In October 797, after their tonsure (780), and mutilation and confinement to the Palace of Therapeia 
(August 791), the brothers sought sanctuary in Hagia Sophia. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 473 
(trans. Mango and Scott 650).  
1351 They claimed asylum at the palace Church of the Pharos in June 813, abdicated to Leon V, and took the 
tonsure. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 19-20; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 32-33. 
1352 He fled to the Stoudios Monastery in April 1042, but was dragged from the sanctuary to be paraded in 
disgrace, and blinded. See below, page 299. 
1353 The Komnenoi sought refuge at Hagia Sophia in 1081 at the outset of Alexios’ revolt. Nikephoros 
mimicked them when Alexios captured Constantinople, but he subsequently abdicated and took the tonsure. 
Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 66-67, 86 (trans. Frankopan 60, 78). 
1354 They claimed asylum in Hagia Sophia in 1181 during their conflict with regency government of Alexios 
II, and were subsequently reconciled with the regents. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 232, 241 (trans. 
Magoulias 131, 136). 
1355 See Table 4. 
1356 Zachariä von Lingenthal 1892: 326-330, §75; Macrides 1988: 510-511. 





protections and punishments for these criminals.1358 Crucially, the laws of asylum did not 
apply to those accused of treason, and our case-list indicates that asylum did not assure 
safety.1359 Consequently, usurpers and conspirators put themselves at the mercy of the clergy 
and emperor. They hoped that the latter might show clemency to them because they had 
submitted, and that the clergy might protect them. 
The decision to accept political refugees was a calculated one since the clergy were 
not obliged to do so, and were taking a political risk when they did. Theodosios 
Monomachos, a cousin of Constantine IX, was abandoned altogether by his supporters and 
subsequently denied sanctuary in Hagia Sophia when the patriarch closed the doors in his 
face (1056).1360 His pitiable usurpation offered little political value for the Church compared 
with the risk of imperial displeasure. Anna Komnene described the difficulties faced by the 
Komnenian women even in gaining refuge (prosphygion) at St Nicholas’ chapel. Sanctuary 
was only granted to them after an unspecified member of the group wilfully deceived a 
verger.1361 When Botaneiates was informed, Anna Dalassena was able to secure her own 
passage from St Nicholas’ to Hagia Sophia to pray. After making a third genuflection she 
grasped the sanctuary doors and loudly proclaimed: ‘Unless my hands are cut off, I will not 
leave this holy place, except on one condition: that I receive the emperor’s cross as guarantee 
of safety.’1362 The scandal forced Nikephoros’ compliance, and Dalassena, her daughters and 
daughters-in-law, were confined at the Petrion Monastery.1363  
                                                 
1358 Macrides 1988: 511-512. By the twelfth century the right of asylum was so prominent that murderers were 
coming to Hagia Sophia (in particular) from across the empire to confess and gain protection. Manuel I was 
prompted to issue legislation critical of the church and existing practices. On this legislation and the status of 
Hagia Sophia as a place of refuge for murderers, see Macrides 1988: esp. 512-514; Macrides 1984. The 
prominence of Hagia Sophia as a place of refuge, was due to its reputation for successfully defending those 
seeking asylum. 
1359 Zachariä von Lingenthal 1892: 328. 
1360 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 482 (trans. Wortley 450). 
1361 She claimed that the Komnenoi women were impoverished easterners who intended to pray before 
returning home. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 66-67 (trans. Frankopan 60). 
1362 ...εἰ μὴ τὰς χεῖρας ἀποτμηθείην, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἱεροῦ τεμένους ἐξέλθοιμι, εἰ μὴ τὸν τοῦ βασιλέως ὥσπερ 
ἐχέγγυον τῆς σωτηρίας δεξαίμην σταυρόν. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 67-68 (trans. 
Frankopan 61). 





Patriarchal support had mixed successes in ensuring safety. In 605 the deposed 
Empress Constantina and her daughters were granted assurance by Phocas after Patriarch 
Kyriakos refused to permit their removal by force. A conspiracy to proclaim the patricius 
Germanus with Constantina’s support had failed, but the women and Germanus escaped with 
tonsure and confinement thanks to the patriarch’s intervention.1364 In 1181 the kaisarissa 
Maria was able to orchestrate an opposition movement from Hagia Sophia because she was 
protected by the clergy. However, Basiliscus, and Bardanes Tourkos, who were both granted 
asylum and imperial assurances, were swiftly made victims of other penalties.1365 
Circumstance, political cachet, and strength of will, determined the outcome of any claim to 
asylum. 
Tonsure was another merciful fate for political opponents and was used by nineteen 
usurpers against their predecessor or his co-emperor(s).1366 It represented the most common 
treatment of deposed emperors in the eighth century and from the tenth century onward, 
when execution of deposed emperors was rarely practised. Although tonsure did not mean a 
wholesale abandonment of one’s previous lifestyle,1367 renunciation of worldly concerns and 
re-devotion to the spirit was implied, and it was often a person’s final late-life act.1368 To 
accompany the transformation, initiates would exchange their civil attire for simple black 
robes, and their heads would be shaved in imitation of the Apostle Paul. This mutatio 
differentiated monastics from laypersons and was deliberately dissonant, both the hairstyle 
                                                 
1364 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 293 (trans. Mango and Scott 421-422). 
1365 Basiliscus and his family were left to die of exposure, a punishment that did not technically breach the 
emperor’s oath of assurance to Basiliscus: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 303 (trans. Jeffreys 210); 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 124-125 (trans. Mango and Scott 192). Bardanes was blinded 
(probably on Nikephoros’ orders) whilst living as a monk: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 479-481 
(trans. Mango and Scott 657-660). 
1366 Those induced to take the tonsure include: Leontios, Artemios-Anastasios, Theodosios III, Artabasdos, 
Staurakios, Michael I, the children of Leon V, Romanos I, Stephanos and Constantine Lekapenos, Empress 
Zoe, Michael V, Michael VI, Isaakios I, Michael VII, Nikephoros III, Isaakios II, Alexios III, Andronikos II, 
and Ioannes VI. See Table 1. 
1367 Caseau 2008: 257-259, noting that the main complaint of those newly tonsured was the change in diet. 





and dark attire were humbling features.1369 The contrast between the splendour of imperial 
insignia, to which victims had aspired, and the simplicity of monastic garb was considered 
particularly striking. Attaleiates’ narrative of Empress Zoe’s tonsure and exile exploited this 
contradictory imagery: in contrast to the ‘luxurious and expensive fabrics… gold and silver 
ornaments’ associated with Michael,1370 Zoe ‘was made to dress in black, shorn of her hair,’ 
and exiled to Prinkipos.1371  
Additional humiliation and scorn could also be invoked. In September 780, shortly 
after the death of Leon IV, the former kaisar Nikephoros was uncovered as the head of a 
conspiracy to dispossess Eirene and Constantine VI. High-ranking figures were tonsured and 
exiled,1372 but Nikephoros and his brothers were kept in Constantinople to receive tonsure 
and administer the communion to the emperor and senate on Christmas Day. Eirene thus 
manipulated the ceremony to humiliatingly emphasise the fact of their defeat and tonsure. 
Their inferior status and seeming acceptance of the Empress’ authority was ritually enacted, 
and a public distribution of largess subsequently courted popular support.1373 In 1081, the 
recently tonsured kaisar Ioannes Doukas was mocked for aiding Alexios’ revolt, since his 
appearance proved a source of ridicule for Constantinople’s defenders.1374 Tonsured 
opponents were visually ‘othered’ and it was hoped that their spiritual vows would prevent 
them from engaging in future treason. 
                                                 
1369 On the religious significance of hair cropping as a Christian initiatory rite, see Baun 2013: 123-126. 
1370 He was celebrating the ceremonial procession of the Feast of the Resurrection (17 April 1042). 
1371 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 12-13 (trans. Kaldellis 18-21). Psellos also emphasised the visual 
dissonance of a divestiture, commenting that Leon Tornikios’ ‘magnificent robes’ were replaced by ‘rags’. 
Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 38-39; Renauld II, 16 (trans. Sewter 207).  
1372 Among the named conspirators were: Gregoras, the asekretis and logothete of the course; Bardas, the 
former strategos ton Armeniakon; Constantine, son of Vikarios (the former spatharios and domestikos ton 
exkoubitoron); and Theophylaktos, the son of Rhangabe, droungarios of the Dodecanese.  
1373 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 454 (trans. Mango and Scott 627); see also, the summary remarks 
in Rochow 1994: 229-230 (Nikephoros §48). 
1374 ‘Ioannes was annoyed at this command [from Alexios], for he had only recently adopted the monastic garb 
and he knew he would be laughed at by the soldiers on the walls and ramparts if he came near them in such 
dress. And this is just what did happen, for when he followed Alexios against his will, they immediately spotted 
him from the walls and sneered at “The Abbot” with certain ribald epithets’. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. 





Constantinople, Chrysopolis, and northern Asia Minor remained favourite locations 
for deposed emperors to receive their tonsure. Churches in Kyzikos, the metropolitan see, 
were favoured by early emperors.1375 The monasteries of Delmatos and Stoudios in 
Constantinople, Elegmoi in Bithynia, Chrysopolis, and those of Prote became other 
favourites. Their close proximity allowed opponents to be monitored, and monastic 
foundations with connections to reigning emperors might be selected for extra security. The 
Elegmoi, a probable Lekapenoi foundation, was the destination for the sakellarios 
Anastasios under Romanos I,1376 and Michael V under its later Macedonian patrons.1377 
Under the Komnenoi-Angeloi, Nikephoros III was kept in Constantinople at the Peribleptos, 
a foundation of Romanos III distinguished for its relics which were used in ceremonial 
processions.1378 Andronikos Lapardas was sent to Anna Dalassena’s Constantinopolitan 
foundation, the Pantepoptes,1379 and both Alexios Axouchos1380 and the sebastokrator 
Alexios (an illegitimate son of Manuel) were sent to Mt Papykios in Thrace, where the 
emperors were held in high regard.1381 The tonsure of the sebastokrator was overseen by 
Choniates in-person, on behalf of Isaakios II, an indication of its political importance.1382 In 
1211, during the period of ‘exile’, Alexios III was tonsured at St Hyakinthos in Nikaia, the 
                                                 
1375 The Caesar Basiliscus was ordained as Bishop of Kyzikos (although only a boy) early in Zeno’s second 
reign in order to dispose of him, and for Zeno to escape his agreement with Armatus the magister militum 
Praesentalis. Basiliscus had first been enrolled as a reader at an unspecified church in Blachernai. Justinian I 
dismissed John the Cappadocian and ordained him deacon of Artake, near Kyzikos. Malalas, Chronographia, 
ed. Thurn 305, 406 (trans. Jeffreys 211-212, 285-286). On Basiliscus, see Croke 1983: esp. 84-85. 
1376 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 400; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 214 (trans. Wortley 
208). 
1377 Michael took the tonsure at the Stoudios monastery, before being blinded and exiled to the Elegmoi. He 
was moved to Chios under Constantine IX. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 421 (trans. Wortley 
396). The Macedonian emperors are believed to have taken over patronage of the Elegmoi monastery after the 
fall of the Lekapenoi. On the Elegmoi monastery, see Byzantine Monastic Foundation Documents, ed. Thomas, 
Hero, and Constable 1042-1043, §33 (Institutional History). 
1378 Romanos III and Nikephoros III were buried at the monastery. On the Peribleptos monastery, see Janin 
1969: 218-222; Dark 1999; Mango 1992. 
1379 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 278-279 (trans. Magoulias 154-155). On the Pantepoptes, see Stanković 
and Berger 2013: 20-22. 
1380 Axouchos was tonsured during the reign of Manuel I. Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 269 (trans. Brand 
202); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 144 (trans. Magoulias 82). 
1381 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 425-427 (trans. Magoulias 234-235). On the relationship between the 
Komnenoi and the monastic communities, see Angold 1995: esp. 280-316. 





then seat of the Patriarchate and future burial place for Theodoros I and Anna, a loyalist 
stronghold.1383 And Ioannes VI, after abdicating, was tonsured at St Georgios at 
Mangana.1384 He was denied a transfer to Mt Athos, by Ioannes V, and was housed at the 
Peribleptos. Matthew Kantakouzenos remained a threat, and Palaiologos was undoubtedly 
concerned about the potential for his father-in-law to abscond and renew hostilities if 
allowed to leave the city.1385 
Exile (ἀειφυγία) was yet another potential fate. It was an imperial prerogative that 
became a regular sentence in the second century.1386 The penalty intended that victims were 
literally excluded from the community and thus forgotten or deemed xenoi. It could be a 
temporary or permanent sentence, and a law of Botaneiates had patriarchs remind emperors 
of exiles’ identities.1387 However, emperors had to be wary of exiling charismatic figures 
who might subsequently foment local movements or act as foci for conspiracies as Artemios-
Anastasios, the sons of Constantine V, and the Lekapenoi, were able to do.1388 Consequently, 
exiles were often moved to prevent networks forming around them. They lived in fear lest 
they be considered a threat best solved by execution. Occasionally, political or religious 
dissidents might voluntarily choose exile, to elude punishment or to continue resistance.1389 
Exile was a popular literary theme: Leon Choirosphaktes, exiled in connection with 
the revolt of Andronikos Doukas,1390 appealed for reconciliation with the emperor and 
bemoaned his ill health and impoverishment.1391 Theophylaktos of Ohrid offered 
                                                 
1383 Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 17 (trans. Macrides 131; and 132, n.9 (Commentary)); Skoutariotes, 
Synopsis Chronike, ed. Sathas 457. 
1384 On St Georgios at Mangana, see Kazhdan et al 1991: 1283-1284. 
1385 Nicol 1979: esp. 245-248, adopts a rather more sympathetic interpretation of Ioannes VII’s abdication and 
the decision to remain in Constantinople, asserting that Ioannes was ‘persuaded’ to remain to advise his son-
in-law, and had intended to enter monastic orders for a long time before his abdication. 
1386 Garnsey 1968: 144-145. 
1387 See below, page 301. 
1388 See Table 1. 
1389 Maleon 2010b: 352. See also, Beihammer 2011, considering some examples from the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries. 
1390 Tougher 1997: 11-13, 177. 
1391 Mullett 1997: 250-251: Constantine VII appears to have pardoned him at the beginning of his reign because 





metaphorical insights into conditions: his missives speak of his sense of separation from the 
cultural life of the empire, his difficulty communicating with his old associates, and having 
to wait for letters to arrive whilst fearing that they might not. His surroundings were 
‘barbarous’ and strange; a ‘desert’, both inaccessible and dry. He even worried that he was 
becoming a barbarian by association.1392 Even Niketas Magistros, exiled on his own estate, 
complained about his exclusion from metropolitan culture.1393  
Although undoubtedly exaggerated, poor physical conditions and hardships were not 
merely a topos.1394 Judicial exile specified a place, beyond the capital. In Late Antiquity, the 
preference was for border regions, far from geographical and cultural centres, where the 
empire’s power and control was tenuous. Island destinations were used, including the central 
islands of the empire like Sardinia, Sicily, or Rhodes. This engineered isolation and control 
over movement.1395 Environments were generally hostile and communication difficulties 
typically made it unfeasible to formulate tangible resistance. Under Zeno, Basiliscus was 
exiled to Cappadocia and died of exposure, and the usurper Marcian was sent to Papyrios, 
also in Cappadocia.1396 Later, the future Leon III was exiled to Mesembria on the Thracian 
border.1397 Kherson, was also well represented until the mid-eighth century. It was far from 
the capital and served as a naval station, theoretically affording supervision of exiles.1398 
However, both Justinian II and Philippikos escaped from the city and successfully marched 
on Constantinople. Thereafter the region’s use as a place of banishment declined and 
Kherson fell under Khazar control between the mid-eighth and early-ninth centuries. It was 
                                                 
1392 Mullett 1997: 274-276. A theme that we have already seen employed by Choniates against Andronikos I, 
and a recurring motif in descriptions of the actions of rebels during a usurpation. 
1393 Mullett 1997: 251. 
1394 Mullett 1997: 253, 256. 
1395 Maleon 2010b: 353.  
1396 For Basiliscus, see Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 303 (trans. Jeffreys 210); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 124-125 (trans. Mango and Scott 192. For Marcian, see Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 127 (trans. Mango and Scott 195. 
1397 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 391 (trans. Mango and Scott 542). 





substituted for the islands as the foremost place of exile. Most often these were inaccessible 
locations where people generally refused to live.1399 The island landscape was typically 
mountainous and arid, and they were often exposed to dangers from storms, piracy, and 
irredentism in periods when the maritime frontier was contested.1400 The latter danger was 
why the Cyclades fell out of favour as destinations for exiles in the tenth century. The islands 
of the northern Aegean, the Marmara, and coastal Asia Minor, then allowed secure 
supervision of prisoners.1401 The Prinkipos islands, off the coast of Constantinople, 
eventually became the most renowned of these ‘political islands’. Four of the nine were 
inhabited, with monasteries instead of prisons. Thessalonike, Athens, the Pontic coast, and 
thematic strongholds were other regular places of exile. Constantinople and Chrysopolis 
were used for ‘house-arrests’. And in the final centuries, a mixture of secure fortifications, 
islands, and cities were preferred, with Lemnos and Selymbria becoming the principal 
locations for exiles of the Palaiologan dynasty.1402 
The major shortcomings of exile and tonsure as punitive measures was the potential 
for the victims to flee to the enemies of the empire or renounce their monasticism and 
reinitiate hostilities. Artemios-Anastasios, Bardas Phokas, and Leon Tornikios, had each 
been tonsured before initiating usurpations and civil wars.1403 The monastic condition was 
insufficient to disbar a candidate from claiming basileia, even if it could provoke scorn and 
condemnation. 
 
                                                 
1399 Their inhospitable character and contemporary concerns about the dangers of sea travel were commonly 
adduced as reasons for the islands to be avoided. Malamut 1988: 26-27; Maleon 2010b: 353; Pryor 2002: 57-
58, quoting Nikephoros Ouranos on the difficulties of sea travel. 
1400 Malamut 1988: 30-31, 55-58. 
1401 Maleon 2010b: 354. 
1402 Manuel II was twice exiled to Lemnos by his father (1387 and 1389), and Ioannes VII was exiled to Lemnos 
in 1403. Andronikos IV was exiled to Selymbria in 1384, and Demetrios Palaiologos in 1442. 





Body politics and the body politic  
Although execution was always prescribed as the legal penalty for treason, bodily 
mutilations were alternative punishments frequently used alongside, or in place of, tonsure 
and exile. Christianity played a moderating role by encouraging these alternatives to 
execution.1404 They were not a traditional feature of Roman law, under which deliberate 
disfigurement of high-born Romans (honestiores) was exceedingly rare, commonly 
commuted to fines or exile; instead, mutilations were reserved for slaves, foreign prisoners, 
and low-status citizens (humiliores). In late antiquity they were prescribed extra-legally, and 
Justinian I introduced legislation limiting their discretionary application by members of the 
judiciary.1405 They were adopted gradually in legal practice in the two-hundred year period 
after Justinian, culminating with their systematisation in the Ekloga (726).1406  
Since imperial ideology necessitated that the best candidate reign, in theory, that also 
meant the best physical specimen, making bodily integrity a consideration for office.1407 
Leviticus offered a biblical justification: the physically imperfect were ‘unclean’, unable to 
serve as priests, or enter the sanctuary.1408 Consequently, disfigurement would curtail an 
emperor’s quasi-priestly duties and prevent him from emulating Christ. Execution became 
                                                 
1404 Kazhdan 1994: 204, notes that Byzantine religious figures and private correspondence often quoted Ezekiel 
33:11, ‘I have no desire for the death of the wicked. I would rather the wicked man should mend his ways and 
live.’ 
1405 Corpus Iuris Civilis, ed. Schöll and Kroll, §134.13; Robinson 2007: 168.  
1406 This process of adoption and the eventual codification of judicial mutilations was documented in a seminal 
study by Patlagean 1984.  
1407 Karayannopoulos summarised this ideology thus: ‘… according to Byzantine imperial reasoning, only the 
best man might aspire to be emperor. But what constitutes the best? Herein lies the importance of bodily 
integrity and soundness of limb. The mutilation of a limb meant its owner was deprived of a vital qualification 
for ascending the throne, for theoretically an amputee was considered handicapped and under no circumstances 
could he aspire to the imperial throne and authority.’ Karayannopoulos 1987, quoted in translation in 
Lascarotos and Marketos 1992: 134. 
1408 ‘And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, “Speak to Aaron, saying: ‘No man of your descendants in 
succeeding generations, who had any defect may approach to offer the bread of his God. For any man who has 
a defect shall not approach: a man blind or lame, who had a marred face or any limb too long, a man who has 
a broken foot or broken hand, or is a hunchback or a dwarf, or a man who has a defect in his eye, or eczema or 
scab, or is a eunuch. No man of the descendants of Aaron the priest, who has a defect, shall come near to offer 
the offerings made by fire to the Lord. He has a defect; he shall not come near to offer the bread of his God. 
He may eat the bread of his God, both the most holy and the holy; only he shall not go near the veil or approach 






unnecessary when maiming could achieve the same ‘political death’. Therefore, the 
physically ‘perfect’ were expected to gain prominent positions. The seventh-century usurper 
Mizizios was praised for his statuesque beauty.1409 Michael III announced that Basiliskianos 
had ‘the appearance of a ruler’;1410 and Alexios I sought to protect the conspirators Leon and 
Nikephoros Diogenes because of their handsome physiques and leadership potential.1411 
Idealised physical descriptions of favoured candidates were regular features of histories and 
other media. Laiou outlined how Anna Komnene manipulated those of the nobility in order 
to emphasise the perfection of aristocratic status, making beauty an attribute of the 
powerful.1412 Gregoras advised rhetorically disguising or correcting physical flaws so as not 
to mar a person’s image for posterity.1413 
Physical imperfections and deformities were frequently associated with divine 
punishment and provoked derision.1414 ‘Ugliness’ was a political weakness in a society that 
valorised beauty, and physiognomy considered imperfections symptoms of poor 
character.1415 Thomas the Slav’s heir, Anastasios, was described as ‘a very ugly man’ and 
villainous because of his ‘great stupidity’.1416 Propaganda ridiculing the failed coup (c.1200) 
of Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos), a grandson of the megas domestikos Ioannes Axouchos, 
exploited his obesity to proclaim him mentally deficient for believing he could ever be 
emperor.1417 In a speech of Euthymios Tornikios, Ioannes’ obesity caused the throne to 
                                                 
1409 Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 221-222; Hatzaki 2009: 51. 
1410 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 113 (trans. Wortley 114); Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 96-101. 
1411 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 271 (trans. Frankopan 249). 
1412 Laiou 2000: 9; followed by Hatzaki 2009: 16-18. 
1413 Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 11.  
1414 Hatzaki 2009: 10-48. In the twelfth century, the ‘most hideous looking little man’ Zintziphitzes was 
ridiculed for his disproportionate limbs. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 315 (trans. Magoulias 174). The 
birth of malformed children or the arrival of malformed individuals from abroad was also widely reported and 
could be interpreted as an ill-omen: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 225 (trans. Magoulias 128); Gregoras, 
Historia, ed. Schopen I, 546-548. 
1415 Hatzaki 2009: esp. 11-12, 37-42. By contrast, Eusebius of Caesarea asserted that Constantine I’s natural 
beauty and physical perfection were illustrations of his exceptional spiritual and athletic qualities. Eusebius, 
Vita Constantini, ed. Winkelmann 26, 86 (trans. Cameron and Hall 77, 125). 
1416 Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 27 (trans. Kaldellis 34). 
1417 On the circumstances of this failed coup, see Angold 2015; Angold 2005: esp. 59-64. It is noteworthy that 





collapse beneath him, but Ioannes failed to realise its significance because his intellect did 
not match the size of his body.1418 Choniates described him as ‘potbellied and with a body 
shaped like a barrel’, a man who drank water ‘like a dolphin’, and ‘gushed forth’ perspiration 
like a ‘spring’. Having captured the Great Palace, Ioannes grew lazy, neglected to guard the 
gates, and allowed his troops to lounge around in the Hippodrome in emulation of himself. 
Alexios III dispatched the Varangians who quickly restored order and executed Ioannes.1419 
Mesarites and Chrysoverges were similarly scornful.1420 ‘Ugliness’ was aligned with other 
shortcomings unworthy of basileia.  
One’s appearance, including disfigurements, was believed to be deserved and 
mutilations provided a means of rendering the body unsuited to power. Constantinou argues 
that grotesque descriptions of the diseased body in Hagiography ‘served as vehicles through 
which the divine makes itself perceptible…’, ‘punishments and therapies performed by the 
saints suggest that the divine… manifests itself in horrifying, and sometimes comic, 
grotesque forms.’1421 The histories indicate comparable beliefs. Patriarch Nikephoros, for 
example, remarked of Herakleios’ sons with Martina, that ‘Justice’ had punished the 
incestuous progeny, causing Flavius to be born paralysed and Theodosios deaf.1422 The 
negative connotations of imperfection, led Zonaras to describe both Zeno and Staurakios as 
unsuitable for the throne because of their displeasing visages and lack of wisdom.1423 We 
may question how seriously these associations were taken, but the criticisms were 
exploited.1424 Rhetoric employed against political foes often drew attention to physical flaws 
                                                 
him. 
1418 Euthymios Tornikios, Les Discours, ed. Darrouzès 66-70, §12-18. 
1419 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 526-528 (trans. Magoulias 289-290).  
1420 Nikolaos Mesarites, Die Palastrevolution des Johannes Komnenos, ed. Heisenberg; Nicephori 
Chrysobergae ad Angelos orationes tres, ed. Treu 1-12. 
1421 Constantinou 2010: 44-45, 53. See also Metzler 2013: 24, on this theme in Western hagiography. 
1422 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 52-53. 
1423 Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 126-127; III, 304. 
1424 The power of this kind of natural, ‘physical charisma’, is recognised by sociologists to have a real effect: 





or simply invented them.1425 As Hatzaki notes, this implies that an emperor was chosen as 
much on the basis of his appearance as his character, and Zonaras’ ‘manner-of-fact wording 
suggests that among his contemporaries all this would be far from foreign.’1426 
Disfigurement intended to transform victims into social outcasts by using the body 
as an indelible means of inscribing its occupant’s misdeeds. Penalties exploited symbolisms 
to ‘other’ victims and connect them with sacrilegious of contemptible behaviours. This 
encouraged abuse and ridicule to be directed against them, engineering a change in their 
public identity and turning them into warnings to others. 
 
Amputation and castration 
Amputations were the most common penalty for conspiracies that fell short of outright 
usurpation, and a principal penalty for secondary figures. The loss of any combination of a 
hand or foot was intended as a disabling punishment, making life harder for the victim and 
physically inhibiting their continued participation in treasonable activities. The tenth-century 
Pseudo-Constantine Doukas (actually a certain ‘Basileios’), for example, had a hand 
amputated after his first rebellion against Romanos I, but brazenly commissioned a copper 
prosthesis and sword to replace it when he later resumed his insurrection.1427 Amputations 
were also particularly prevalent during the civil wars preceding 1204, and were among the 
tortures inflicted on Andronikos I prior to his execution.1428 The hands and feet of an emperor 
held a quasi-sacral status:1429 they were kissed during deferential rituals of supplicatio and 
                                                 
1425 For example, the propagandist use of ‘old age’ as a means of undermining charismatic authority, led 
Andronikos I to order Maria of Antioch depicted as an old woman in official art despite her relative youth. 
Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 333 (trans. Magoulias 183). 
1426 Hatzaki 2009: 40. 
1427 Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 912; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 421; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 228 (trans. Wortley 220). 
1428 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 342-349 (trans. Magoulias 192-3). 





proskynesis that were a recurrent feature of imperial ceremonial,1430 and their loss would 
have served to undermine imperial ‘sacrality’ by proving that a victim’s body was neither 
divinely protected nor mysterious. Therefore, severed limbs featured in posthumous 
ceremonies of degradation, but Andronikos was the only living emperor to receive such 
mutilation. A preference for tonsure, execution, or subjection to more debilitating 
disfigurements, often rendered amputation redundant for deposed emperors.  
As a legal penalty, the Ekloga prescribed the amputation of a hand for the loss of 
military animals, selling of another’s slaves, desecration of graves, and theft of livestock.1431 
The roughly contemporaneous Farmers Law1432 prescribed it for the damage of crops, or 
encroachment.1433 From the reign of Herakleios the loss of a hand remained the penalty for 
the counterfeiting of coins and official documents.1434 Judicial amputations were thus 
associated with theft or activities liable to be financially damaging to the wronged party. As 
conspirators were physically and symbolically correlated with thieves, and reduced from 
elite status to that of common criminals, their treasonable activities were associated with the 
attempted ‘theft’ of basileia. 
Castration was employed intermittently against political rivals, especially between 
the ninth and mid-eleventh centuries. The Justinianic code had forbidden it on imperial 
territory, the Ekloga advocated it for crimes of bestiality, 1435 and Leon VI’s Novel 60 
reiterated Justinian’s prohibition.1436 However, eunuchs were conspicuous in Byzantium in 
                                                 
1430 Pseudo-Kodinos, for example, describes the ritual of the Kiss, performed on Easter Sunday: ‘All of the 
titleholders enter, each one down to the humblest, and kiss, first the right foot of the emperor, then his right 
hand and, after this, his right cheek. If, at that moment, the podestà of the Genoese in Galata also happens to 
be at the place where the emperor is, he too enters and with his companions kisses the emperor in the manner 
of the titleholders…’, trans. Macrides 2011: 224. 
1431 Ekloga 17.10, 11, 13-14, 16; Patlagean 1984: 406. 
1432 Itself a codification of existing rural practices. On the Farmer’s Law, see Ashburner 1910: 85-108; Lemerle 
1979: 27-67; Patlagean 1984: esp. 407-411; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: esp. 5. 
1433 Patlagean 1984: 409. 
1434 Lopez 1942/1943. 
1435 Ekloga 17.39. 
1436 It also called for offenders to be maimed in kind. Ringrose 2003: esp. 71-72; Patlagean 1984: 411; Tougher 





the higher echelons of politics, in the religious context, and as valued servants.1437 They 
became part of the system of internal control, holding positions in place of potential political 
rivals, and were often sought from beyond the empire. Numerous families breached 
prohibitions by castrating their younger sons in order to secure future career 
advancements.1438 Basileios I’s son, Stephanos, was castrated in youth and eventually made 
patriarch by Leon VI (886).1439 Theophylaktos, the youngest son of Romanos I, was castrated 
and given to the church before ascending to the patriarchate at the unprecedented age of 
sixteen and governing for twenty-three years.1440 But this political-eunuchism became less 
prevalent in the changed dynastic-administrative landscapes of the Komnenoi, Laskarids, 
and Palaiologoi, when eunuchs’ court roles were granted to family members (especially 
imperial women) as a way of encouraging participation in politics and counterbalancing the 
increased threat from within.1441  
For those castrated before puberty, bodily development was also radically altered and 
believed to render them unhealthy.1442 Despite their potential social advancement, eunuchs 
were viewed as a gender apart and were associated with the negative stereotypes of 
women.1443 The change in status for an ideologically ‘brave’ and ‘honourable’ aristocrat 
must have been profound. However, the social stigma was seemingly less important as a 
                                                 
1437 Tougher 2008. 
1438 Herrin 2000: 59; Herrin 2013: 268. 
1439 He was then nineteen years old, and administered until May 893: Jenkins 1965: 99; Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 134 (trans. Wortley 133). 
1440 Symeon Magister, ed. Bekker 742-743; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 227 (trans. Wortley 
220); Herrin 2013: 267. 
1441 Gaul 2002: esp. 201, 208-209. For contrast: Guilland 1943, concluding that the decline of political 
eunuchism in the later empire was a result of a westernisation of Byzantine society, and the predominance of 
hereditary-dynastic succession in contemporary political thought rendering them unnecessary. See also, 
Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 99-102, on the ‘aristocratization’ of politics in the eleventh and twelfth centuries 
as a contributing factor to the increased prominence of women in the political sphere. For comparison, Neville 
2010: esp. 72, drawing attention to the classical Roman models and behavioural ideals still underpinning many 
of the narrative histories produced in this period, and suggesting that our current beliefs about the emerging 
prominence of women in Byzantine politics at that time are overstated, and may actually owe more to our 
misreading of gendered Kaiserkritik and literary fiction than to objective historical fact. 
1442 The medical implications on bodily development are summarised in Tougher 2008: 32-34. For the 
perceived side-effects of castration, see Ringrose 2003: 56-57. 





punitive measure than the victim’s physiological transformation and inability to provide a 
viable heir: as Psellos remarked, it would be impossible for a bastard or eunuch to usurp 
power from a ‘legitimate’ heir.1444 Although castration may not outwardly have appeared as 
disabling as the loss of limbs or senses, which inhibited the victim’s ability to function on a 
daily basis, it could be regarded as a worse fate. For, in medieval terms, the ‘functional’ body 
encompassed gender, fertility and procreative ability in addition to mobility and sensory 
perception.1445 An individual incapable of procreation was not ‘whole’. 
In connection with usurpation, castration was always accompanied by tonsure and 
normally targeted younger family members who could otherwise have claimed a hereditary-
dynastic right to basileia, raising the spectre of revolt. Among the political castrati we may 
count: Marinos, the son of Constantina and Herakleios, castrated after the elevation of 
Konstans II. The sons of Michael I,1446 and of Leon V,1447 who were mutilated in the 
immediate aftermath of their fathers’ respective overthrows. Stephanos Doukas, the son of 
the usurper Constantine Doukas, who was a victim of an outright purge of the charismatic 
and popular family, and whose castration ensured the elimination of that entire branch.1448 
The sebastophoros Romanos Lekapenos,1449 and Basileios ‘the parakoimomenos’,1450 who 
                                                 
1444 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 10-11; ed. Renauld I, 3 (trans. Sewter 28). 
1445 Metzler 2013: 22. 
1446 July 813. Theophylaktos, the eldest surviving son (and co-emperor) was castrated and tonsured on one of 
the Prinkipos isles. He died five years later (January 849) and was buried with his father on Plate. Niketas 
assumed the name Ignatios after his tonsure and went on to become patriarch. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, 
ed. Thurn 8-9 (trans. Wortley 9). 
1447 December 820. Symbatios-Constantine, Basileios, Gregory, and Theodosios accompanied their mother to 
Prote where all were tonsured and the boys were castrated. Symbatios died as a result of the mutilation and 
was buried with his father. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 41; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 64-65. 
1448 This may be dated c. June 913. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 385; Georgios Monachos Continuatus, 
ed. Bekker 876-877; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 200 (trans. Wortley 194). Stephanos’ cousin, 
Michael, had died with Constantine, and Stephanos’ mother was tonsured on her Paphlagonian estate. Polemis 
1968: 2, 25, concludes that this branch of the Doukai became extinct in the male line by 917. See also, Whittow 
1996: 338. The charismatic threat of the Doukai was indicated by the enduring loyalties to them exhibited in 
the two rebellions of Basileios ‘the Copperhand’, and the persistence of elements of Constantine’s life story in 
the epic poem Digenes Akrites.  
1449 Skylitzes’ chronology places the castration of Romanos after Easter 945, possibly indicating a date in April 
or May. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 238 (trans. Wortley 230); Tougher 2008: 180, n. 23, 25. 
1450 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 238 (trans. Wortley 230), asserts that Basileios was castrated 
on the orders of Constantine VII. This appears incompatible, however, with Basileios prominent role as a 





became victims of imperial foresight. (Since they were potential threats to the successors of 
Romanos I and Constantine VII respectively, they were prevented from contesting power.) 
And Michael V’s relatives, who ‘whether they were full grown men with a blooming beard 
or just adolescents, he had castrated.’1451 The imposition of the penalty on mature men was 
incredibly rare, and in the latter instance was precipitated by political expediency (they were 
plotting against him). Michael was allegedly ‘ashamed to kill them openly: he preferred to 
compass their destruction by mutilation.’1452 In each case the victim was prevented from 
ever holding the imperial office. Castration allowed a prospective threat to be mitigated, 
whilst appearing to demonstrate imperial philanthropia. Its documentable use against 
dynastic rivals ends in the late-eleventh century when ‘nobility’ became increasingly 
synonymous with ‘lineage’ and connections to the reigning dynasty, making the procreative 
potential of the elite essential for the continued status of their families. 
 
Rhinokopia and tongue-cutting 
Rhinokopia, the amputation or ‘slitting’ of the nose, was a seventh-century penalty for 
usurpers of the Herakleian dynasty.1453 It first appears in 635/637 as punishment for the 
failed conspiracy of Ioannes Athalarichos, an illegitimate son of Herakleios.1454 Athalarichos 
was to be elevated in a bloodless coup that also implicated prominent Armenian nobles at 
court and Theodoros (nephew of Herakleios).1455 All were condemned to suffer the 
                                                 
Impellizzeri I, 10-11; ed. Renauld I, 3 (trans. Sewter 28), claims that Basileios had been castrated as an infant 
(born ca. 925) to prevent him from ever contesting the throne. See also, Ringrose 2003: 62; Brokkaar 1972. 
1451 1034. Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 12 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 16-19). 
1452 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 234-235; ed. Renauld I, 111 (trans. Sewter 147). 
1453 For a comparative study of nose-cutting in medieval and modern contexts, see Skinner 2014. On nose-
cutting as an ongoing practice of so-called ‘honour’ mutilations in tribal societies of modern day Pakistan, with 
similar connotations to medieval practices, see Frembgen 2006. 
1454 Martindale, Jones, and Morris 1992: IIIa, 706 (Ioannes 260). 
1455 On the conspiracy, see: Kaegi 2003: 260-261; Brandes 2009: 309-316. The prominent Armenians were, 
the kouropalates Varaztiroch, and David Saharuni (Athalarichos’ cousin). Theodoros was also the magister 
officiorum. Martindale, Jones, and Morris 1992: IIIa, 389-390 (David Saharuni 6); IIIb, 1284-1285 (Theodorus 
171); 1363-1364 (Varaztiroch). On the prominence of Armenians in the empire at this time, see Charanis 1959: 





amputation of their noses and right hands. The Armenians escaped, but Athalarichos and 
Theodoros were mutilated.1456 At the time, Herakleios was attempting to mitigate the threat 
of the Islamic conquests and settle the Monophysite-Chalcedonian schism.1457 The 
conspiracy exposed fractures within the imperial family, increased mistrust, and implicated 
prominent individuals.1458 The severity of Herakleios’ response should be understood as a 
reaction to the danger, not just to his office but the empire itself. 
The penalty was next used in November 641 during the overthrow of Heraklonas and 
his mother, Empress Martina, who were accused of poisoning Constantine III and having 
designs against his son Konstans II. When a popular uprising captured the palace and 
removed Heraklonas, his brothers David and Marinos, and Empress Martina, Konstans 
ordered Heraklonas’ nose cut and Martina’s tongue slit (glossotomia).1459 A forty-year 
lacuna in the punishment’s documented political use followed this deposition. Then, in 681, 
Constantine IV removed his brothers from precedence in order to secure the throne for 
Justinian II. Rhinokopia was used against each, and they disappear from the historical record 
at this point.1460 In 695, Justinian was overthrown in a popular revolt at Constantinople that 
proclaimed Leontios, strategos of the Helladic thema. Spared execution in a display of 
Leontios’ philanthropia, Justinian’s nose was amputated and tongue slit before his exile to 
Kherson.1461 Then, in 698 Tiberios-Apsimaros, droungarios of the Kibyrrhaeot thema, was 
                                                 
1456 The former was then exiled to Prinkipos, and the latter to Gaudomelete (Malta), where one of his legs was 
also amputated. Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 72-73; Sebeos, trans. Thomson 93, 107. 
1457 On the Monophysite controversy, see Frend 1972. 
1458 Kaegi 2003: 260-262. 
1459 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 341 (trans. Mango and Scott 475). John of Nikiu’s account differs 
slightly in asserting that Martina and all three sons were subjected to rhinotomy and exiled to Rhodes, where 
Marinos was castrated causing his death. John of Nikiu, Chronicle, trans. Charles 197.  
1460 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 352, 360 (trans. Mango and Scott 492, 502); Michael the Syrian, 
ed. Chabot II, 454-456; Brooks 1915. 
1461 According to the narratives the crowds had called for Justinian to be executed, but Leontios spared him out 
of ‘love’ for the emperor’s father, Constantine IV. It is possible that Patriarch Kallinikos was, in fact, able to 
stay Leontios’ hand, in exchange for his assistance and moralising-authority in the revolt. The public execution 
and burning of Justinian’s chief finance ministers seems clear evidence that Leontios was not unwilling to 
resort to executions as a means of garnering support. The story that these latter executions were ‘against his 
will’ is assuredly later propaganda intended to bolster his merciful image; had he wanted the executions 





proclaimed in a military revolt and captured Constantinople with aid from the Greens, field 
armies, and the exkoubitoroi. The now traditional disfigurement was repeated on Leontios 
before his tonsure.1462 
The penalty was never again used on a deposed emperor or would-be usurper. The 
usurpation in Sicily of Basileios Onomagoulos (717), and the failed restoration of Artemios-
Anastasios (719), report rhinokopia imposed against secondary figures but not against the 
usurpers.1463 The revolt against Basileios I’s promotion as co-emperor (866) initiated by 
Symbatios, and Georgios Peganes, reportedly ended with their blinding and maiming, 
including Peganes’ nose being cut.1464 The last certain reference1465 to rhinokopia in relation 
to an attempted usurpation concerned the efforts of Leon Kladon to return Stephanos 
Lekapenos to power (c.947). Constantine VII ordered confiscations, nose-cutting, and exile 
against those found guilty, but Stephanos remained untouched.1466  
This seventh-century penalty for political opponents was a temporary innovation, but 
it was not a new or exclusively Byzantine practice. Malalas attests to its use as a punishment 
at the time of Julian, inflicted on Sasanian nobility.1467 Jordanes’ sixth-century Getica details 
                                                 
them. Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 96-97; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 369 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 515). 
1462 He was tonsured at the Monastery of Delmatos in Constantinople. Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. 
Mango 100-101; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 370-371 (trans. Mango and Scott 517). See also 
Haldon 1997: 75-76; Head 1972: 101-102. It is noteworthy that the involvement of the ‘Greens’ in Tiberios-
Apsimaros’ revolt is known only from the thirteenth-century manuscript ‘Anonyme de Cumont’. 
1463 For Basileios Onomagoulos, see Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 124-125; Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 398-399 (trans. Mango and Scott 549-550). For Artemios-Anastasios, see 
Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 126-127; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 401 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 552). 
1464 The strategos of the Thrakesion thema and komes tou Opsikiou, respectively. Both men were later 
sentenced to exile. The revolt was ostensibly in defence of Michael III’s rights which were believed to be at 
risk from Basileios: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 241, 263; Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 76-77, 128-131; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 130 (trans. Wortley 129-132). 
1465 It should be noted that Ignatius of Smolensk, Russian Travellers, ed. Majeska 100-101, reports that, in 
1390, fifty persons were arrested and exiled from Constantinople by Ioannes V. And that some of this group 
were subjected to rhinokopia and others to blinding. However, it is unclear if these figures were partisans of 
Ioannes VII attempting a coup. 
1466 See Table 1. 
1467 By the Sasanian King Shapur II. Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 254-255 (trans. Jeffreys 180), 
asserting that Shapur had sent these nobles to Julian in order to mislead him and draw him deeper into Sasanian 
territory; eventually resulting in the defeat at Ctesiphon. Possibly Malalas’ presentation of the mutilated nobles 





how the first wife of Huneric was returned to her father with her nose and ears removed, 
after she was suspected of poisoning her father-in-law Gaiseric.1468 Rhinokopia was 
controversial in the Frankish Kingdoms,1469 and served as a punishment for a wide variety 
of crimes ranging from theft to sexual deviancy throughout the medieval world.1470 
Despite falling out of favour as a punishment for usurpers, rhinokopia was not 
abandoned altogether: a cleric found guilty of sedition was maimed by the rebel Leon 
Phokas,1471 Manuel I ordered a certain Katides’ nose slit after battle,1472 and Andronikos I’s 
supporter Hagiochristophorites was allegedly ‘shameless’ in flaunting his slit-nose.1473 
Nevertheless, rhinokopia is almost wholly absent from accounts after the tenth century 
when, blinding, exile and tonsure became the preferred methods of disqualifying 
opponents.1474  
                                                 
power by cutting his own nose in order to win the trust of the Babylonians and then weakening the city’s 
defences on behalf of Darius’ armies. Herodotos, Histories 3.150-160. 
1468 ‘…and because of the mere suspicion that she had been preparing poison for him, he cut off her nose and 
mutilated her ears, ruining her natural beauty, and sent her back to her father in Gaul. Thus the wretched girl 
presented the appearance of a disfigured corpse ever after, and the cruelty which would stir even strangers all 
the more strongly incited her father to vengeance.’ Jordanes, Getica, ed. Mommsen. 36.184. 
1469 Laws from the fifth and sixth centuries prescribing heavy fines for deliberate cases of rhinotomy, and the 
sixth-century Bishop Gregory of Tours criticised King Chiperic for unjustly mutilating the nose of one 
‘Gailen’. Charlemagne repeated the sixth-century provisions en-masse in his eighth-century revision of the 
laws. Skinner 2014: 49-50, and n.21. 
1470 Skinner 2014; Groebner 2008. In the Crusader States, for example, the canons of Nablus prescribed 
rhinotomy for adulterous women: Mitchell 2004: 128; Kedar 2006: 313. Psellos provided a detailed report on 
the blinding and rhinotomy enforced upon Dolianos, the opponent of the lawful heir to the Bulgarian throne, 
Alousianos, involving a hastily purloined ‘cook’s knife’: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 174-175; 
ed. Renauld I, 81-82 (trans. Sewter 115). There is also extensive evidence of rhinotomy being used as a 
punishment by Muslim populations before the arrival of the crusaders, probably as a result of Byzantine legal 
influences. The crusaders too, may have borrowed the custom from the Byzantine legal codifications: Catlos 
2014: 371.  
1471 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 395. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 209-210 (trans. 
Wortley 203), says that the priest was flogged and had his ears cut, but makes no mention of rhinokopia. In 
fact, the two punishments were similarly symbolic, indicating sexual crimes. On the link between punishments 
involving the ears and nose, see below. 
1472 ‘As the emperor was rushing to seize the Turks as booty for the taking and easy prey, Katides frightened 
them off by telling them of the emperor’s arrival. Thus provoked, Manuel flew into a rage and decreed the 
destruction of his nose as punishment.’ Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 195 (trans. Magoulias 110). 
1473 Hagiochristophorites had purportedly attempted to make a marriage alliance above his own status, bedded 
his would-be bride, and been found out. Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-
Jones 44-47. See also Garland 1990: 18; Hatzaki 2010: 99. 
1474 Skinner 2014: 60-61, also raises doubts about its prevalence in early Byzantine and medieval society, 
describing its use as exceptional, intended to punish and deter extreme cases, and which allowed narratives a 





We may question what prompted the shift to facial mutilation. Rhinokopia was 
usually non-fatal and a better choice if the victim was supposed to survive, and was by far 
the most noticeable disfigurement. Simply, when one thinks of a face it is typically a face 
with a nose; total nasal amputation has historically been considered a means of rendering a 
victim ‘faceless’.1475 As signs of potential disgust, bodily-orifices, like the nose, ears, and 
mouth, are particularly relevant in Bakhtin’s theory of the ‘grotesque-body’.1476 He notes 
how nasal mutilation is perceived to expose the inner body, revealing the ‘grotesque’.1477 
Miller goes further, emphasising the nose’s importance in evoking disgust, referring to its 
contaminating mucus.1478 Consequently, victims were removed from participation in regular 
society by provoking revulsion, causing observers to turn away or mock them. Dreambooks 
connected the nose with honour,1479 and Hagiochristophorites allegedly did not even try to 
hide from ‘ridicule’ (indicating derision as a natural response).1480 Jordanes’ account of the 
mutilation of Huneric’s wife asserted that she consequently had the ‘appearance of a 
disfigured corpse’, and facial mutilation was commonplace in ceremonies of posthumous 
degradation: rhinokopia and the dishonoured dead were linked.1481  
In Byzantine law, rhinokopia was prescribed in eleven statutes governing sexual 
offences in the Ekloga, including incest, abduction, and adultery.1482 Leon VI’s Novel 35 
                                                 
1475 Groebner 2008: 67-85. This remains, for example, one of the aims of nose-cutting as an honour-inspired 
bodily mutilation in tribal societies in modern-day Pakistan: Frembgen 2006: esp. 252. 
1476 Bakhtin 1987: esp. 357. 
1477 Bakhtin 1987: esp. 78. 
1478 Miller 1997: 89-108. 
1479 The Oneirocriticon of Manuel II, trans. Oberhelman p.206, §21 and n.88, 89. 
1480 See the comments of Hatzaki 2010: esp. 99, on Byzantine concepts of beauty and the mocking attitude 
taken towards Hagiochristophorites (although mistakenly attributing Eustathios’ words to Niketas Choniates). 
The Life of Basileios the Younger, ed. Sullivan, Talbot, and McGrath 96-97, asserts that those whose ears or 
nose had been cut, were ‘a source of laughter to all those who see [them].’  
1481 On facial mutilation as a feature of posthumous degradation, see Varner 2004. 
1482 These include: union with a nun (wedded to the Church of God), abduction of a nun or virgin, union with 
or marriage to a godparent, incestuous unions with stepchildren (the crime of cousins and second-cousins 
illegally marrying was punished with separation and flogging. (Ekloga 17.37.)), adultery or condoning 
adultery, “corruption” of a minor (namely under thirteen years old), union with a betrothed girl, union with a 
mother and her daughter (or complicity between the two). Ekloga 17.23-28; 17.30-34; Patlagean 1984: 406. 





confirmed a provision of Basileios I in which accomplices to violent kidnappings would no 
longer be sentenced to death, but subjected to nose-cutting and flogging.1483 The association 
with sexual crimes had biblical origins,1484 and significantly, the legal penalty was tied to 
acts of betrayal: fidelities (spousal, spiritual, or political) were typically being broken.1485 
Rhinokopia thus ‘othered’ victims by associating them with disloyal persons considered 
amongst the worst members of society. The punishment itself was a metaphor for sexual 
crimes because the nose and ears were associated with fertility and nasal mutilation implied 
castration.1486  
The initial cases of Athalarichos, Heraklonas and his brothers, offer a tentative origin 
based on these sexual symbolisms. Athalarichos was an illegitimate son, associated with 
Theodoros, whose father had criticised Herakleios’ incestuous union with Martina.1487 
Heraklonas, David, and Marinos, were considered offspring of that incestuous union. These 
victims were turned into sexual offences/offenders by utilising a punishment associated with 
sexual crimes. They were de-legitimised and marked by reference to their dubious lineage. 
Herakleios’ mutilation of Athalarichos served to silence Athalarichos’ probable criticism of 
the marriage to Martina by implying the illegitimate son’s own hypocrisy, and (at least, in 
                                                 
1483 Patlagean 1984: 410-411. On this law, and abduction in Byzantium more generally, see Burton 2000: esp. 
381-382. 
1484 The story of Oholibah, who, even after the death of her sister for prostitution, continued her own ‘sinful 
ways’, states that God threatened all prostitutes that their lovers would ‘cut off your noses and your ears, and 
those of you who are left will be consumed by fire.’ Ezekiel 23:25.  
1485 It is briefly worth noting that the law was less concerned with a breach of marriage in these cases than with 
immoral sex itself. The symbolic association with sexual infidelity and betrayal was merely incidental: 
Humphreys 2015: 121. 
1486 Groebner 2008: 12-13, 73-75; Frembergen 2006: 243-260. A frequent assertion in medieval medical texts 
was the belief that semen was passed down from the brain through the veins behind the ears, and that cutting 
those veins would thus render a man sterile. On Hippocratic beliefs, see Pirsig 2001: 45; Cadden 1993: esp.16. 
Byzantine dreambooks often associated the nose, hair, and ears, with sexual prowess: Patlagean 1984: 423. 
Modern cultural practices of nose-cutting are also believed to exploit ideas of sexual symbolism relating to the 
nose. A wide-ranging summation is provided by Frembgen 2006: 243-247. The disfigured nose is also a 
symptom of advanced syphilis (a long-understood connection).  
1487 According to Nikephoros’ source, Herakleios’ brother, Theodoros, had harshly rebuked the union: ‘His sin 
is continually before him.’ Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 68-69. Kaegi 2003: 261 has even 
proposed that the ‘parade of infamy’ resulting from this statement was the reason Theodoros’ son, also named 





Herakleios’ mind) confirmed Constantine III and Heraklonas’ legitimate birth by 
comparison. Konstans II then denied Heraklonas’ legitimacy by marking him (and mother 
and brothers) as crimes of incest, highlighting his own legitimate birth (as a child of 
Herakleios’ lawfully born son, Constantine III) in the process.1488 
The clipping of Martina’s tongue, aside from being an aberration from (usually) 
sparing imperial women, was perhaps an expression of personal discontent with her 
prominent, vocal, role in public matters.1489 Glossotomia was an irregular political 
penalty.1490 Its most conspicuous use was against the sons of Constantine V at Saint Mamas 
after a conspiracy against Eirene and Constantine VI (792). They were variously subjected 
to blinding and glossotomia dependent upon their perceived prominence, and glossotomia 
appears to have been considered a lesser penalty which probably did not involve the 
complete excision of the tongue.1491 Its next prominent use was against Constantine Barys 
for his attempted usurpation under Constantine IX, and then in 1255 against Nikephoros 
Alyates, the epi tou kanikleiou, for collusion with the ‘European aristocracy’ against 
Theodoros II.1492 On both occasions most important conspirators received the harshest 
treatment.1493 
                                                 
1488 In fact, Konstans’ legitimacy was also contestable, since his mother Gregoria was a second cousin of 
Constantine and their union was therefore considered incestuous under the rules of consanguinity: Nikephoros, 
Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 64-65; Mango 1985: 105, 113-114. 
1489 Garland 1999: 70. For the sparing of imperial women, see Head 1982: 43. 
1490 Here I disagree with Patlagean 1984: 414, that the penalty of glossotomia was the second most-practised 
method of removing potential rivals for the throne. There are only a handful of episodes in which it was 
employed, and that which side-lined the sons of Constantine V was exceptional in terms of the number of 
persons it marked (only four). If its near nonexistence in the narrative histories in this regard should be 
understood as more than just repeated authorial omission (as assuredly it must), the number of episodes in 
which it was employed are unlikely to have greatly exceeded single digits. 
1491 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 468 (trans. Mango and Scott 643), names Christophoros, Niketas, 
Anthimos, and Eudokimos as the brothers subjected to glossotomia. Nikephoros, the former kaisar, on whose 
behalf the conspiracy was instigated, was blinded. 
1492 For Bary’s usurpation: Vita S. Lazari auctore Gregorio Monacho §105; Ševčenko 1979/1980: 725-726. 
On the conspiracy of 1255, see Puech 2011: esp.75-76. 
1493 Kourkouas was blinded along with the Bulgarian chieftain Bogdan, and Glabas and Goudelios. Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 372 (trans. Wortley 351). Alyates was evidently considered a middling threat; 
Theodoros Philes the governor of Thessalonike, and Constantine, son of the governor of Serres were both 
blinded. Alexios Strategopoulos was removed from office; and Alexios Raoul the protovestiarios (whose sons 
were imprisoned), Constantine Tornikios the megas primmikerios, and Georgios Zagarommates the 





Glossotomia represented the legal penalty for those found guilty of perjury.1494 The 
Oneirokritikon of Achmet asserted that a king whose tongue was cut would descend into 
misrule and his enemies be victorious.’1495 At the time of Achmet’s composition the 
connection between glossotomia and political mutilation was evidently common-knowledge 
and the interpretation relevant.1496 The associations with disloyalty and perjury were also 
reflected in historical practice. In 662 Maximos the Confessor was tried for his refusal to 
accept Monotheletism, found guilty of heterodoxy, and had his hand and tongue amputated 
so that he could never again communicate heresy.1497 This punishment mimicked another 
inflicted over seven-hundred years earlier: in 43 BCE, Cicero’s hands and tongue were 
posthumously amputated as they were his instruments for profaning Caesar.1498 The later 
practice was therefore consistent with Roman tradition, and the mutilation of Martina’s 
tongue may have been understood as a traditional response to disloyalty and blasphemy. 
Possibly it was intended to indicate her alleged involvement in Constantine III’s death, or as 
a lesser punishment for her incestuous marriage (profaning Chalcedonian canons). 
Justinian’s mutilation occurred over fifty years later when the tale of Constantine 
III’s poisoning and Martina’s usurpation on behalf of her sons was well known.1499 The 
precedent of Constantine IV’s brothers’ disqualification was also available. Consequently, 
when Leontios ousted Justinian, he selected the traditional penalty of the Herakleian dynasty, 
and one connected with a famous populist uprising like his own. The sentences of Martina 
                                                 
Macrides 339-340); Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 41-43; 61. 
1494 Ekloga 17.2; Humphreys 2015: 181. Note also: Statute 28 of the Farmer’s Law calls for glossotomia in 
cases where a herdsman commits perjury relating to the loss of an ox; and Statute 3.14 of the Rhodian Sea-
Law (ed. Ashburner) calls for glossotomia in cases of perjury involving a contract. The association of 
glossotomia and perjury is confirmed by the dreambooks, where the tongue was a good omen for those involved 
in legal professions or attending the lawcourts. See, for example: The Oneirocriticon of Daniel, trans. 
Oberhelman p.73, §102 and n.118. 
1495 The Oneirocriticon of Achmet, trans. Oberhelman p.109, §62. 
1496 On the date of composition, see The Oneirocriticon of Achmet, trans. Oberhelman 13-14 (Introduction: The 
Author), which place it between the early-ninth and late-eleventh centuries. 
1497 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 351 (trans. Mango and Scott 491).   
1498 Dio Cassius, Roman History, ed. Cary and Foster 47.8.3-4; Richlin 1999. 
1499 Konstans spread the story soon after their overthrow: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 342 (trans. 





and her sons were combined; Justinian mutilated and with the stigma of tainted speech, 
which had always been derided in elite-culture where verbal dexterity was highly praised.1500 
Tiberios-Apsimaros merely followed precedent, with involvement by the Green faction and 
elements of the military and senate allowing him to present his revolt as yet another populist 
movement. The tradition was ended by Justinian’s return in 705, when he simply beheaded 
Leontios and Tiberios-Apsimaros. His second reign marked the failure of rhinokopia as an 
exclusionary mutilation, but introduced that most commonly identified with Byzantium. 
 
Blinding 
Concurrent with the execution of the interloper emperors Justinian instigated a purge of 
political opponents. Patriarch Kallinikos, who had aided Leontios’ rebellion became the first 
recorded victim of political blinding (τύφλωσις) in Byzantium.1501 In 709 Archbishop Felix 
of Ravenna became the second.1502  
In total, twelve senior emperors were subjected to blinding.1503 The first of these, 
Philippikos, was taken captive by soldiers of the Opsikion thema as he returned from the 
Zeuxippus baths on 3 June 713. He was taken to the Ornatorion of the Greens, blinded, and 
                                                 
1500 According to Anna Komnene, Alexios I was mocked by the captive Basilakios for his lisp when 
pronouncing ‘ῥῶ’ sounds, and John Italos was criticised for mispronouncing his syllables like a Latin who had 
studied Greek without truly mastering it. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 30, 164-165 
(trans. Frankopan 26, 149). Choniates decried the promotions of ‘…attendants from foreign-language 
[speaking] nations who spoke broken Greek and drivelled in their speech…’ Choniates, Historia, ed. van 
Dieten 204 (trans. Magoulias 116). 
1501 Kallinikos was subsequently exiled to Rome. Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 102-105; 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 375 (trans. Mango and Scott 523); Leon Grammatikos, 
Chronographia, ed. Bekker 169. 
1502 Justinian supposedly dispatched the fleet to punish certain Ravenese citizens who had been involved with 
Leontios’ revolt and blinded Felix as part of this punitive expedition. Felix was then imprisoned in 
Constantinople. Other victims were reportedly subjected to amputations, or simply executed. More likely the 
purge aimed to prevent potential civil-disobedience, in memory of the humiliation of the protospatharios 
Zacharias by the inhabitants in 693. (Following the interpretation of events suggested by Noble 1984: 20.) 
Liber Pontificalis, ed. Vogel I, 389. Curiously, no account is provided by either Theophanes or Nikephoros. 
They were either unaware or assigned it less importance than events taking place in Kherson involving 
Philippikos. 
1503 These were (in order of their blinding): Philippikos (713), Artabasdos (742/743), Constantine VI (797), 
Michael V (1042), Romanos IV (1072), Andronikos I (1185), Isaakios II (1195), Alexios V (1204), Alexios III 





exiled without the public’s knowledge. The alleged perpetrators became the next victims 
when they were blinded and exiled by Artemios-Anastasios within a fortnight of their 
coup.1504 Political blinding then recurred during the civil war between Artabasdos and 
Constantine V (c.741-742/743). When Artabasdos captured Constantinople (741) he blinded 
several of Constantine’s loyalists.1505 Constantine returned the favour in November 742/743, 
retaking the city and blinding the asekretis Athanasios and domestikos Artabasdus.1506 When 
Artabasdos, his elder son Niketas the monostrategos, and his younger son the co-emperor 
Nikephoros, had were captured in 742/743 all three were publicly paraded, blinded, and 
exiled to the Monastery of Chora.1507 Constantine’s cousin Sisinnios, strategos ton 
Thrakesion, was blinded forty days later, possibly for a suspected usurpation.1508  
Herrin contends that the decision to blind Artabasdos, rather than simply executing 
him, can be attributed to his coronation. It would have been inappropriate, Herrin argues, for 
Artabasdos to have been executed even though he had gained the throne through 
usurpation.1509 If this was the reasoning employed by Constantine, it suggests that he had 
accepted Artabasdos’ coronation and reign as ‘legitimate’, or recognised that a substantial 
percentage of the population had. Execution would have risked making Artabasdos a martyr 
and could potentially have provoked loyalist revolts, whereas blinding and degradation 
publicly undermined Artabasdos’ charismatic authority and capacity to lead an army, whilst 
                                                 
1504 Probably as scapegoats aiding the emperor’s penitential and reconciliatory efforts, and to rid him of 
politically toxic and potentially treacherous supporters: see above, page 220. 
1505 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 134-135. This information is not corroborated by Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 415 (trans. Mango and Scott 575), who states that those punished were subject to 
scourging, tonsure, and imprisonment. It should be remembered that Theophanes’ account presents a more 
sympathetic picture of Artabasdos in light of the author’s criticisms of Constantine V. 
1506 Other figures were reportedly subjected to flogging, degradation parades, and beheading. Nikephoros, 
Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 136-137; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 419-420 (trans. Mango and 
Scott 580-581). 
1507 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 136-137; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 420-421 
(trans. Mango and Scott 581). On the punishment of Artabasdos and his family, see Speck 1981: 34-36, 292-
295; Brubaker and Haldon 2011: 160.  
1508 Rochow 1991: 157-159. 





demonstrating clemency.1510 Artabasdos’ overthrow also fell within the period of non-fatal 
dethronements beginning with Philippikos’ blinding and ending with Leon V’s murder 
(820). Executing emperors was temporarily ‘unfashionable’, with less than one fifth of 
conspiracies in this period resulting in execution. 
Blinding’s wider political role was established at the end of the eighth century after 
its use in suppressing a sequence of conspiracies. The strategos ton Armeniakon, Alexios 
Mousele, and Nikephoros, son of Constantine V, were both blinded by Constantine VI in 
792. Nikephoros had been involved in conspiracies previously, and Mousele was considered 
a potential threat due to his popularity with the army.1511 Mousele’s troops subsequently 
broke into revolt and blinded the commanders of the imperial force sent against them. 
Constantine emerged victorious in 793 after uniting the other themata against the 
Armeniakon (whose turmarchs he sentenced to death).1512 These penalties were imposed 
under dire circumstances for the dynasty and seemingly represented a ‘last resort’ for 
Constantine.1513 Eirene then famously blinded Constantine when she assumed sole rule 
(797), and used the penalty against the remaining sons of Constantine V (799) when their 
conspiracy with the Slavs and Helladic thema was uncovered.1514  
The moral ambiguities of the penalty became subject to increasing debate. 
Constantine VIII believed it more humane than other measures,1515 and Akropolites detailed 
the ‘compassionate’ application of the law by Ioannes III after the conspiracy of Isaakios 
                                                 
1510 Artabasdos’ tonsure and confinement in Constantinople also meant that he was kept close at hand, where 
Constantine could monitor potential conspiracies centred on the family. 
1511 The Armeniakon thema had declared Mousele their commander against Eirene’s wishes in 790 when they 
had refused to swear the oath of fidelity to her alone. 
1512 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 469 (trans. Mango and Scott 644). 
1513 Theophanes even states that Constantine had been entreated to do so by Eirene, who told him that he would 
assuredly be overthrown if he refused: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 468 (trans. Mango and Scott 
643). 
1514 The brothers had been exiled to Athens soon after Eirene’s usurpation. It appears they had taken sanctuary 
in Hagia Sophia, either under the mistaken belief that the populace would revolt against Eirene and proclaim 
one of them emperor, or for fear that Eirene would instigate a purge and have them executed or blinded. 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 473 (trans. Mango and Scott 650). 





Nestongos (c.1224/1225) since only Nestongos and Makrenos were blinded.1516 However, 
censure of emperors who used blinding existed in Roman traditions about ‘bad’ 
emperors,1517 and Constantine VI’s punishments of Nikephoros, and Alexios Mousele, were 
called ‘unjust’ by Theophanes who considered Constantine’s blinding by Eirene to be divine 
recompense.1518 Tzimiskes’ blinding of Nikephoros and Leon Phokas was termed by Bardas 
Phokas, as ‘cruel’ and ‘inhuman’.1519 Psellos’ Chronographia outlined the fickle character 
of Constantine VIII which caused him to employ blindings ‘irrespective of high or low rank’ 
and without distinguishing crimes from suspicions.1520 In the following century, Andronikos 
I garnered a reputation for cruelly blinding his opponents, inspiring the epithet μισοφαὴς 
(‘hater of the light’).1521 Imperial authorisation was a pre-requisite,1522 and escalation of 
punishment from warning, to exile/imprisonment, to blinding, became a customary response 
to repeated plotting that fell short of civil war. This was the progression used against Leon 
Tornikios, who was first exiled to Iberia, then tonsured in Constantinople, and finally blinded 
on Christmas Day 1047.1523 Manuel I similarly dealt with Andronikos I’s conspiracies 
                                                 
1516 They were blinded and subjected to amputation of a hand. Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 36-37 
(trans. Macrides 169). The merciful treatment of conspirators was also mentioned in Akropolites’ funeral 
oration for Ioannes. Akropolites, Opera, ed. Heisenberg II, 22. 
1517 Nero (poorly sighted himself) reportedly inherited a penchant for blinding from his father, who had gouged 
the eye of a senator at the Forum for being ‘outspoken’, and himself mocked a certain Clodius Pollio (possibly 
one of his victims) as ‘The One-Eyed Man’. Suetonius, Nero 5 (on the senator’s blinding); 26.2 (on the gouging 
of Clodius Pollio’s eyes); 51.1 (on Nero’s poor vision). Domitianus, also poorly sighted, gouged the eyes of a 
steward who plotted to kill him, and was feared for the ferocity of his gaze. (Suetonius, Domitianus 1.1; 17.2. 
Commodus ridiculed his victims as ‘one-eyed’; Elagabalus found amusement in inviting eight one-eyed men 
to banquet with him. The Historia Augusta, ed. Magie, Commodus I, 10.6; Elagabalus II. 29.3. In blinding in 
the Roman context, see Trentin 2011: 199-203; Trentin 2013: 101-103. 
1518 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 468, 472 (trans. Mango and Scott 643, 648-649). 
1519 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 119 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 167). 
1520 Furthermore, after inflicting these punishments, Constantine’s mood would change, he would be brought 
to tears by his actions, and beg for forgiveness. In Psellos’ opinion, this remorse was the only feature that 
distinguished him from Basileios II (Psellos’ ‘tyrant’ prototype). Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 
58-59; ed. Renauld I, 26 (trans. Sewter 54). On Basileios II’s presentation as a tyrant in the Chronographia, 
see Kaldellis 1999: 43, 54.  
1521 καὶ οὗτος μισοφαὴς ὢν καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν κόραις ἀκορέστως ἀντικαθέμενος τοῦ φωτὸς τούτους 
ἀποστερεῖ. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 264 (trans. Magoulias 147). He also earned the lament, ‘O, the 
light of how many eyes have you extinguished with your hot flow?’ ὢ πόσων ἔσβεσας κόρας θερμότερον 
προχεθέν. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 295 (trans. Magoulias 164). 
1522 Lampsidis 1949: 39-41. 
1523 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 30 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 50-51), emphasising that Leon and 
his co-conspirator Ioannes Vatatzes were taken before the emperor and blinded without being given a chance 





against him, first rebuking him in private, then imprisoning him, and finally issuing orders 
for his capture and blinding (c.1167-1179).1524 The use of the penalty had to be deemed 
necessary or else an emperor could be revealed to be immoral. 
The next impositions of blinding against emperors demonstrated this principle. In 
1042 Michael V became the next imperial victim. The ‘commoners and craftsmen’ of 
Constantinople rebelled over his supposed maltreatment of Empress Zoe, proclaimed 
Theodora, and dragged Michael from the sanctuary of the Stoudios monastery. Despite 
receiving an oath assuring his safety, sworn on ‘holy relics’, Michael was publicly blinded 
at the Sigma with his uncle, the kaisar Constantine, and died within months.1525 The sources 
indicate little public sympathy for his plight.  
Thirty years later,1526 Romanos IV was similarly tonsured and blinded after defeat in 
the civil war against his stepson Michael VII, who had been proclaimed autokrator after 
Romanos’ failure against the Turks at Manzikert. Like Michael, Romanos perished soon 
after, yet his fate proved contentious. Simply, the popular consensus of 1042 had not been 
replicated against Romanos. The twelfth-century Timarion, cast him as the Iliad’s 
Kebriones, the brave warrior who breached the Argive wall only to be slain by a stone that 
knocked out his eyes.1527 Romanos proves a pitiable figure even in Hades, ‘[his eyes] had 
been gouged out with iron’, he could be heard groaning from afar, and poison ‘oozed’ from 
his mouth. The reader is reminded that ‘instead of being restored… he was overwhelmed by 
                                                 
chance to speak they were blinded at the hands of the executioners…’. We may infer that Constantine IX feared 
that potential support could be roused for Tornikios if he were allowed to speak. 
1524 For Andronikos’ conspiracies, see above, page 259. Note also the Manuel’s punishment of Manuel 
Kantakouzenos who was first advised to refrain from ‘rashness’, then confined in prison, and finally blinded 
after a probable escape attempt: Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 293-294 (trans. Brand 219-220). Manuel 
denied responsibility for the blinding, yet none of Kantakouzenos’ gaolers were subject to punishment for 
implementing it without permission.  
1525 Michael had died of his wounds by August 1042. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 240-243; ed. 
Renauld I, 114-115 (trans. Sewter 149-150). 
1526 June 1072. 
1527 Timarion’s description of Romanos lying ‘great in his greatness, forgetful of his horsemanship, resembling 
not a man that eats grain so much as a wooded peak’ is taken from the account of Kebriones’ death and the 





a revolt and by treachery, being blinded… in spite of an oath.’1528 Aside from the addition 
of poisoning,1529 this version provides an accurate summation of events. Some of Michael’s 
contemporaries were equally shocked at Romanos’ treatment by him. Psellos hints at the 
backlash by providing an apologia for the decision and endeavouring to shield Michael from 
direct involvement. Alongside defamatory descriptions of Romanos as deceptive and self-
serving he had supposedly rejected earlier offers of peace.1530 Psellos confessed reluctance 
to discuss the blinding, contended that it should never have taken place, but conceded that 
political instability had necessitated it: an authorisation based on the needs of the state, 
rejecting ethical or legal impediments to Romanos’ mutilation.1531 Nevertheless, Psellos 
insisted that the emperor’s advisors (read Ioannes Doukas) authorised Romanos’ blinding 
without Michael’s knowledge,1532 and that Michael shed tears for Romanos and would have 
continued mourning had he not feared ‘public resentment’.1533  
Attaleiates, writing under Nikephoros III, had been involved in Romanos’ disastrous 
campaign and was more direct in apportioning guilt. He adopted structural and linguistic 
conceits associated with tragedy and martyrdom, casting Romanos in that vein.1534 
Romanos’ eyes, which ‘even beamed beauty out’, were praised at his first mention.1535 He 
was someone who ‘laid down his life for the welfare of the Romans’, and was repaid by an 
                                                 
1528 Timarion, ed. Romano 20-22 (trans. Baldwin 56-57). 
1529 Presumably believed to be the cause of his death, although this is not made clear. Possibly this addition to 
the ‘Diogenes legend’ was rumoured after his death, or promoted by Botaneiates to discredit Michael VII. 
1530 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 353-352; ed. Renauld II, 168 (trans. Sewter 362). See also 
Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 128-129, confirming the peace offer and ‘amnesty’ for his actions. 
1531 ‘… an action which should not have happened, but – to repeat what I just said in only a slightly different 
way – which had to happen at all costs: the former on account of piety and religious scruple against cruelty, 
the latter on account of the state of things (τὰ πράγματα) and the precariousness of the moment.’ Psellos, 
Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 360-361; ed. Renauld II, 171-172 (trans. Sewter 365). Kaldellis 2015: 51, 
also considers this a moral justification parsed on the basis of the needs of the people and state.  
1532 A charge repeated by Skylitzes Continuatus, ed. Tsolakis 154-155; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and 
Büttner-Wobst III, 705-706. 
1533 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 356, 360-363; ed. Renauld II, 170, 171-172 (trans. Sewter 363, 
365-366). See also, Braounou-Pietsch 2010, for a discussion (and translation) of Psellos ‘Letter to Romanos’, 
in which Michael VII’s remorse and tears were adduced for a wider audience. 
1534 Papaioannou 2012: esp. 162-165. 





executioner who ‘belonged to the race of God-killers’ (an Christological comparison).1536 
The Jewish executioner’s involvement was not intended to distance the event from Romano-
Orthodox hands, but to indicate the indignity of the act. The cruelty of Romanos’ blinding 
was contrasted with his amiable treatment by the Turks, and Attaleiates attributed blame to 
Michael: ‘As for you, O emperor, what was this order that you gave? …you will give in to 
your rage and frenzied and insatiable lust to rule and show no respect either for his monastic 
status or for your mother’s breast, which you shared with his sons, your brothers.’1537  
The later Material of Bryennios, confirmed the sense of horror, asserting that 
Andronikos Doukas had asked the kaisar Ioannes to intervene as it would become a cause 
for divine retribution.1538 Divine recompense in the form of Nikephoros’ usurpation was also 
alluded to by Attaleiates,1539 which may indicate that Nikephoros’ propaganda exploited 
Romanos’ blinding as proof of Michael’s ‘illegitimacy’. And Nikephoros went further: in 
December 1079, he issued a chrysobull reviving Theodosios’ thirty-day delay before a 
capital sentence could be carried out.1540 It (theoretically) restricted imperial powers, and 
exploited Michael’s unpopularity with the church by inviting the patriarch to regularly 
remind emperors of political exiles.1541 Crucially, the law was not addressed to Nikephoros, 
who already accepted its validity, but his successors.1542 It implied that lawful order was 
being restored, something Nikephoros’ predecessors had neglected and successors should 
                                                 
1536 ... τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν θέντος ὑπὲρ πάσης τῆς ‘Ρωμαίων εὐετηρίας... Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 
178 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 322-325). 
1537 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 176-177 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 320-321). 
1538 Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 138-139. 
1539 ᾽́Οψεται δὲ πάντως καί σέ ποτε ὄμμα τιτανῶδες καὶ κρόνιον καὶ τὰς τύχας σοι πρὸς τὴν ὁμοίαν παραστήσει 
κακότητα. ‘One way or another, a day will come when an Evil Eye, Titanic and Kronian, will turn its gaze 
upon you and push your fortunes to the same evil fate.’ Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 177 (trans. 
Kaldellis and Krallis 320-321). 
1540 Capital sentences included, ‘a fatal blow… the severance of a hand, or the gouging of his eyes...’ Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 315 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 574-575). Emphasis added. 
1541 It stipulated that his predecessor’s relatives and servants could not be punished or subjected to confiscations 
without due process, was confirmed by the senate and synod, and deposited at Hagia Sophia. Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 313-318 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 570-581; Dölger and Wirth 1977: § 1047. See 
also, Gouillard 1959-60: 29-41; Laiou 1994: esp. 178-181; Burgmann 1994; Angold 1995: 38. 





follow. The blinding of Romanos could not have been overlooked in reference to this law, 
and Laiou argues that its promulgation was a response.1543 Consequently, Nikephoros 
exploited popular and elite opinion to undermine Michael’s reputation and differentiate 
rhetorically his authority. The importance of legal sanction is evident in Doukai and 
Nikephorian propaganda. In the former, Romanos’ blinding was performed for the people 
and state, in the latter Michael acted extra-legally and perjured himself. 
The cultural impact of Romanos’ blinding also influenced Alexios I’s propagandists, 
who endeavoured to ameliorate his association with political mutilations. The Alexias begins 
by clarifying the record of Alexios’ service under Michael and Nikephoros. Allegedly, 
Roussel’s blinding was merely a ruse to quell his partisans after his capture. Roussel played 
along as Alexios mimed blinding him, and ‘roared like a lion’ to feign agony. Although he 
appeared to have been blinded, when his bindings were removed from his eyes they were 
whole and ‘fiercely blazing’.1544 Bryennios the Elder was captured by Alexios, but it was 
Borilos who escorted him to Constantinople, blinding him en-route.1545 Basilakios was 
maimed in similar circumstances: Alexios offered assurance, but Basilakios ignored the 
offer, was captured, and blinded by Botaneiates’ agents.1546 The denials continue during 
Alexios’ rule. The blinding in exile of Nikephoros Diogenes supposedly began as a rumour 
spread by Alexios in order to prevent Diogenes’ partisans from reviving their conspiracy.1547 
However, ‘certain men’ decided to blind Diogenes for real alongside co-conspirator 
Kekaumenos Katakalon, without Alexios’ authorisation. Anna admits uncertainty, claiming 
an inability to discover the truth,1548 yet this belies her authoritative account and suggests 
                                                 
1543 Laiou 1994: 180. 
1544 ...τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς πυρωπὸν ἀπαστράπτοντας. Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 16-17 
(trans. Frankopan 13-15). 
1545 This Borilos is the same figure that later called for Alexios to be blinded, sparking the Komnenian revolt. 
Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 27 (trans. Frankopan 23-24). A sequence corroborated by 
Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 282-283. 
1546 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 33 (trans. Frankopan 29). 
1547 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 277 (trans. Frankopan 255). 





historical revisionism was at work. The blinding of Pseudo-Diogenes was ordered by Anna 
Dalassena, similarly distancing Alexios from involvement;1549 and even Alexios’ decisions 
to blind Michael Anemas and Gregoras Taronites, who were independently spared, were 
deemed ‘pretences’.1550  
We would be excessively naïve to clear Alexios of involvement in all of these 
blindings, as Anna intends. Instead, it seems that he had developed a bad reputation as a 
result of his role in Roussel’s blinding and the capture of victims under Nikephoros (who 
had exploited the cruelty of the penalty to help justify his usurpation). Elsewhere, Anna 
comments that the population of Adrianople had refused to acclaim her father during his 
rebellion because they still blamed him for Bryennios’ fate; which reveals Alexios’ 
association with the blinding rather than Borilos’.1551 Alexios then exacerbated this 
reputation with the handful of blindings of prominent figures during his reign. The misdeeds 
of his soldiers during the capture of Constantinople could not have lessened this violent 
image. Anna, writing after Ioannes II had eclipsed Alexios as a ‘merciful’ ruler, sought to 
revive him.  
The negative perception of blinding at the end of the eleventh century nevertheless 
failed to prevent its use. Although Ioannes II and Manuel I were more restrained in imposing 
it,1552 the final decades of the twelfth century witnessed a significant revival. Four of the five 
emperors crowned immediately before the capture of Constantinople became victims. 
                                                 
Kambylis 279 (trans. Frankopan 257). 
1549 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 292-293 (trans. Frankopan 271). 
1550 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 377-378 (trans. Frankopan 350). See also, Adontz 
1936: 24-26. 
1551 A far more likely belief given that Alexios’ fame, and responsibility for the victory and capture. Anna 
Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 71 (trans. Frankopan 66). 
1552 Ioannes blinded nobody, Manuel was only slightly less restrained: using the penalty against Theodoros 
Styppeiotes and Manuel Kantakouzenos, and issuing an order (that was never executed) for the future 
Andronikos I to be blinded after his second conspiracy against him came to light. Choniates, Historia, ed. van 






Andronikos I was subjected to various tortures including the gouging of one of his eyes.1553 
Isaakios II was blinded and tonsured immediately after Alexios III’s proclamation.1554 And 
Alexios was then responsible for the blinding of Alexios V (October/November 1204).1555 
Angelos had Doukas blinded and left him for the Latins before fleeing to Thessaly.1556  
Doukas was captured, found guilty of treason against Alexios IV, and thrown from the 
Column of Theodosios.1557 Angelos himself became the next imperial victim when he was 
captured by his son-in-law Theodoros I after the Battle of Antioch on the Maeander (1211), 
divested, tonsured, and blinded with the approval of the senate and army.1558 In the next 
centuries, Michael VIII blinded Ioannes IV, and in 1373 Andronikos IV and Ioannes VII 
were maimed in one eye after their revolt against Ioannes V.1559 Blinding’s return, after its 
relative absence for most of the twelfth century, was probably due to the need to permanently 
disqualify opponents at a time of perpetual revolution. Its debarring reputation can be read 
in Akropolites’ assertion that c.1237 Theodoros Komnenos Doukas claimed that he ‘did not 
wish to be called emperor, because of the condition of his eyes, but named his son Ioannes 
emperor.’1560  
                                                 
1553 September 1185. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 349 (trans. Magoulias 192). 
1554 Isaakios was tonsured at the monastery at Vera, southern Thrace (1195). Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 
452 (trans. Magoulias 248). 
1555 After the latter had usurped the throne from the restored Isaakios II (and Alexios IV), lost Constantinople 
to the Crusaders, and joined Angelos near Mosynopolis bringing Angelos’ wife and daughter’s with him. 
1556 It seems probable that more preferable future marriage alliances and genuine distrust were responsible for 
this betrayal. Angelos was still calling himself basileus and autokrator, probably considered another emperor 
who had been crowned at Constantinople to be a threat, and later married his daughter Euphrosyne (Doukas’ 
wife) to Leon Sgouros the autocephalous ruler of Corinth (from c.1201/1202 to 1208), naming him despotes 
in exchange for protection and military aid in reclaiming the throne. See above, page 116, and footnote 570. 
1557 In the Forum Tauri. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 608-609 (trans. Magoulias 334). The curious 
method of execution (to my knowledge unattested for any other Byzantine usurper or emperor) appears to have 
been influenced by cultural practices known to Baldwin I as Count of Flanders. The story of Marcus Manlius, 
a Roman consul, who was thrown from the Tarpeian rock on suspicion of desiring to establish a ‘tyranny’, was 
popular in medieval France. Manlius’ fate was known as a punishment for ‘usurpers’: Winn 2015: 191-216.  
1558 Οί δὲ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ τὸ διαφέρον αἰτήσαντες καὶ λαβόντες αὐτὸν, αἰτίαν προσάψαντες 
τὴν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν σουλτάνον προδοσίαν καὶ τῶν χωρῶν τῶν Ρωμαϊκῶν, μετὰ δίκην στεροῦσι τοῦ φάους τῶν 
ὀφθαλμῶν… Skoutariotes, Synopsis Chronike, ed. Sathas 457. Skoutariotes’ invocation of the senate and army 
thus affirms ‘legality’ through the notion of political consensus. 
1559 The revolt was in collaboration with Sultan Murad I’s son, Savci Bey. Andronikos and Ioannes were lucky 
to receive such mild punishment as Murad had pressed for their executions alongside Savci: Nicol 1993: 277.  
1560 Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 61 (trans. Macrides 207). Theodoros had been blinded by the 





Executioners were trained in several procedures.1561 Destruction with a knife or pins 
(ἐκκοπή) regularly caused death through secondary infections, potentially one of the reasons 
for its use.1562 ‘Blinding by fire’ (πήρωση) used a heated implement, to indirectly damage 
the retina and allowed some victims to retain a modicum of functional vision.1563 The latter 
procedure was considered the least aesthetically damaging and the most ‘humane’, hence 
Michael VIII received sardonic praise for choosing it for Ioannes IV.1564 There were no 
provisions for the prevention of infections, and bandages/bindings were primarily 
aesthetic.1565 Victims were to be rendered helpless, since they would always require 
assistance in their daily life. 
Blindness also held symbolic connotations in Byzantine society. Theophanes 
invoked the ‘sun-king’ ideology for Constantine VI by suggesting that two solar eclipses 
from that period were a direct response to his maiming.1566 The imperial splendour, like the 
light of the sun, was being denied to humanity. The destruction of one’s eyes was in some 
sense a destruction of individuality. Imperial panegyric required remarks about the imperial 
visage, and the eyes were considered indicative of personality.1567 Acts of damnatio 
                                                 
(trans. Macrides 182).  
1561 The blinding of Romanos IV, for example, was said to have been badly performed because his unnamed 
Jewish executioner had not been properly trained: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 178 (trans. Kaldellis 
and Krallis 322-323). See also, Lascarotos and Marketos 1992; Herrin 2000: 56-57.  
1562 Lascarotos and Marketos 1992: esp. 135, 142. 
1563 The potential to retain functional vision was probably why Roussel appeared not to have been harmed by 
his ‘feigned’ blinding by Alexios I (performed with a heated iron) and explains Anna’s pun about his ‘eyes 
fiercely blazing’. Less commonly, boiling oil or vinegar were used, a method Doukas attributes for the partial 
blinding of Andronikos IV and Ioannes VII: Lascarotos and Marketos 1992: 138-140, 143.  
1564 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 256-257, in recording the mutilation of 
Ioannes IV commented:... τοῦτο μόνον φιλανθρωπευσαμένων τῶν περὶ τὸν ᾽Εξώτροχον ἐξυπηρετουμένων τῷ 
μιαρῷ τολμήματι τὸ μὴ σιδήροις ἐκπυρωθεῖσι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς λθμήνασθαι, ἀλλ’ ἠχείῳ τινὶ πυρωθέντι ἐπὶ τῶν 
ὄψεων φερομένῳ ἐξοπτῆσαι τῷ νεανίσκῳ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, ἀπομαρανθέντας τῇ ἐκπυρώσει καὶ ἠρέμα 
σβεσθέντας τὸ ὀπτικόν. ‘…the only gesture of humanity offered by Exôtrochos and the other executors of this 
shameful attack, was damaging his eyes without using hot iron [pins], but burning the boy’s eyes by holding a 
heated cylinder before them; they were consumed by fire and slowly lost their sight.’ 
1565 The transportation of Romanos IV to Constantinople, for example, did not include medical assistance of 
any kind. Attaleiates’ uncensored account states that the emperor’s wound remained untended and exposed, 
became infected, and infested with maggots. Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 179 (trans. Kaldellis and 
Krallis 324-325). On the solely aesthetic value of the binding cloths, see Lascarotos and Marketos 1992: 141. 
1566 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 472 (trans. Mango and Scott 649); Patlagean 1984: 423-424; 
Herrin 2000: 65. 





traditionally involved disfigurement of the face, and especially the eyes, on statues and 
coins.1568 After Maxentius’ death his imperial images were mutilated and their facial features 
show signs of repeated attack. The sensory ‘power’ of the images was being negated and 
signs of life expunged.1569 Therefore, it is probably not a coincidence that blinding became 
established against the background of Iconomachy. The struggle over images led to 
numerous mutilations of religious and lay figures in this period.1570 The blinding of icons 
was also attested as part of iconoclast practice1571 wherein the covering or destruction of the 
icon’s eyes inhibited its power.1572 Other forms of facial disfigurement became an important 
part of this struggle: Theophilos ordered the faces of the iconophile ‘Graptoi’ saints tattooed 
with verses documenting their crime and punishment.1573 As Ousterhout notes, ‘[this 
                                                 
and earnestly at eyes at once delightful and terrible… as if they were examining those ancient books which 
interpret physical characteristics’: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 15.8.16. See also, Psellos’ 
remark that Basileios II’s eyes ‘were neither deep-set (denoting cruelty and violence) nor too protuberant (a 
sign of indolence), but shone with a manly glow’. Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 50-51; ed. 
Renauld I, 22 (trans. Sewter 48). Translation adapted. An anonymous ekphrasis commemorating the jousts of 
Manuel I gave special prominence to the emperor’s eyes: ‘The eyes of the sun-king have a novel look… They 
are like violets in hue, eyes such as Homer described in hexameters with reference to the eyes of Athena, who 
is wisdom, with flashing glances, moist with all desire, and “washed with milk”, as the Scripture says, “as if 
by pools of waters.”’ trans. Jones and Maguire 2002: 106-107. The quotation is proceeded by descriptions of 
how Manuel’s hair was cut to reveal his eyes. His eyebrows did not press down heavily upon them, but were 
graceful and symmetrical. His cheeks were endowed ‘with the full measure of desire that comes from the eyes.’ 
1568 Varner 2004: esp. 3; Kristensen 2016: 335. 
1569 Varner 2004: esp. 216-219; Freedberg 1989; Trentin 2013: 101, noting ‘… it is the power of the gaze that 
motivates one to harm the eye(s) of an individual.’ 
1570 In an incident in 764, a group of nineteen monks were subjected to a degradation parade and blinded, 
probably for their involvement in an attempted coup: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 437-438 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 605). Constantine V was reportedly responsible for numerous mass blindings of Iconophile 
monks, among a variety of other tortures and executions: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 442 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 610). 
1571 The ninth-century Patriarch Ioannes Grammatikos (in)famously ordered a servant to gouge the eyes of an 
icon of Christ, the Mother of God and the Archangels at the monastery to which he was exiled by Theodora, 
allegedly remarking ‘I cannot bear to look upon its form’ (…ὡς «τὴν αὐτῆς οὐ δύναμαι μορφὴν ἐνορᾶν»). The 
destruction of the icons’ eyes was said to have prevented their gaze from descending upon him. The story was 
found in the common source of Theophanes Continuatus and Genesios: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
157-158; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 224-225; Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 59 (trans. 
Kaldellis 75). On Ioannes’ fate and the various narrative traditions surrounding his life after his exile, see 
Lemerle 1971: 144-145, n.152. It is also important to bear in mind the influence of later iconophile propaganda 
and narrative traditions on the presentation of the iconoclasts, and, in fact, a policy of covering or whitewashing 
icons seems to have been preferred to their outright destruction: Brubaker and Haldon 2011: 199-212. 
1572 The principle of extramission, although not exclusively, explained one’s ability to see. It held that the eye 
was active and sought out the object of its focus. To see an object was, in a sense, to understand and touch an 
object. Icons were not inanimate objects but were imbued with this same ability to perceive and understand 
those who entreated them. On Byzantine theories of extramission, see Nelson 2000. 
1573 On the tattooing of the Graptoi, Theodoros and Theophanes, see: The Life of Michael the Synkellos, ed. 





represented] an important symbolic moment in the history of iconoclasm, when the 
venerators of images are themselves defaced.’1574 And, significantly, blinding was the 
antithesis of the biblical metaphor for gaining faith: Christ’s symbolic baptism of the blind 
men which also restored their sight.1575 
Exclusionary and sacrilegious connotations of blindness also emerge in sources that 
influenced Byzantine culture. Sightless were often linked with the gift of ‘inner vision’, 
recompense for their disability.1576 Blindness was also indicative of divine punishment:1577 
transgressing sacred boundaries and glimpsing the Gods were frequent causes in 
mythology,1578 and Oedipus blinded himself when he discovered Jocasta’s identity. The 
symbolic value of these traditions coexisted with contemporary Byzantine interpretations of 
blinding; hence Romanos IV’s comparison to Kebriones.1579 In Byzantine dreambooks the 
eyes symbolised ‘faith, reputation, and spiritual illumination’; blindness connoted a loss of 
faith, short life, or public shaming; a blind emperor would lose his kingdom and die.1580 The 
fourteenth-century dreambook attributed to Manuel II, offered two interpretations: first, that 
a blind man in one’s home indicated a conspiracy. If he recovered sight in one eye the secret 
                                                 
Ousterhout 2015: 100; Brubaker and Haldon 2011: 395. Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 52 (trans. 
Kaldellis 68), says that the tattooing was ‘in the manner of the Scythians’. Either the practice was then highly 
unusual, or Genesios (or his source) sought to other the emperor’s choice of penalty to suggest barbarism. 
1574 Ousterhout 2015: 100. 
1575 In the Gospels, six blind men were healed by Christ and joined the Christian community. Two who already 
followed Jesus in Jericho (Matthew 9:27-34); two who sat by the way in Jericho (Matthew 10:46-52; Luke 
18:35-43); one at Bethesda (Mark 8:23-26); and a man who was born blind and healed at Siloam (John 9:1-
12). The healing of Siloam, a ‘water miracle’ in which Jesus cured blindness by rubbing mud onto Siloam’s 
eyes and then washing it away, had obvious baptismal connotations and was often depicted in Byzantine 
miracle cycles. Hoskyns 1947: 363-365; Kazhdan et al 1991: I, 298. 
1576 Homer was referred to as the ‘Blind Bard’ by many ancient sources: Peirano 2013: esp. 258. The famous 
seers Teiresias (mythical) and Euenius (historical) were both blind. The latter, in legend, exchanged his sight 
for ‘the faculty of divination’ offered to him by Apollo and Zeus, and the story was used as a foundation myth 
by certain lines of seers. Flower 2008: 37 and n.40, 51. 
1577 Trentin 2013: esp. 94-106. 
1578 Teiresias was blinded because he unwittingly witnessed Athena bathing, Aipytos was blinded and died 
after entering the temple of Poseidon Hippios at Mantineia. Kelley 2007: 43. 
1579 The comparison of Romanos IV with Kebriones, for example. 
1580 But ‘large and beautiful’ eyes signified state prosperity and the defeat of foes. Additionally, cataracts were 
symbolic of impending military defeats for the emperor or the illness of his children. The Oneirocriticon of 





would be half revealed, if both eyes the secret would be fully revealed.1581 And second, that 
‘the eyes are judged as friends and beloved relatives. If someone dreams that he lost one of 
his eyes or even both of them, he will be deprived of much loved friends and blood 
relatives.’1582 Evidently, Manuel was invoking recent events within the Palaiologan dynasty 
(Andronikos IV’s usurpation and partial blinding) and connected the penalty with political 
morality. Dreambooks thus partially reaffirmed the historic religious symbolism, but 
unmistakably associated blindness with the mechanics of rulership and conspiracy. That 
dreambooks allowed for an emperor to be deposed reveals both a pragmatic acceptance of 
historic practice and their subversive potential. They were not strictly beholden to dynastic-
legitimist propaganda but reflect contemporary thought about the impermanence of the 
imperial position. The pitiable social-stigma attached to sightlessness is implicit, and 
political blinding associated with shame and ostracism. 
Although blinding was not absent in ancient Roman practice it was far less common 
than the death penalty.1583 Lampsidis concluded that it was imported from Persia, where 
Procopius attests to its use in a variety of forms.1584 The Carolingians appropriated Byzantine 
practice and occasionally prescribed blinding for rebellious relatives.1585 The Ekloga 
introduced blinding (combined with exile) solely as a punishment for theft from a church 
                                                 
1581 The Oneirocriticon of Manuel II, ed. Oberhelman p.196, §5. On the dating and authorship, see The 
Oneirocriticon of Manuel II, ed. Oberhelman p.14-16 (Authors, Dates and Texts). 
1582 The Oneirocriticon of Manuel II, ed. Oberhelman p.206, §22. 
1583 Nevertheless, like other mutilations it was not known in Roman law: Berger 1953: 489-490 (Humiliores); 
Patlagean 1984; Herrin 2000: 58; Humphreys 2015: 181. 
1584 Lampsidis 1949; Procopius, History of the Wars I.6, 16-17. On this passage, see Cameron 1985: 155. The 
methods ranged from boiling olive oil to heated needles. Blinding was prominently used against Shah Djamsap 
by his brother, the restored Kavadh I (c.499). For background and chronology, see Kia 2016: 253-254. The 
Sassanids used it against dynastic rivals: most prominently, in 309CE, the new-born Shapur II was crowned 
after the disbarring-blinding of his brothers by nobles seeking to control the throne. The unexpected elevation 
even led to the mythical tale that he had been crowned in utero. Furthermore, in 590, Shah Hormisdas was 
killed in a rebellion led by the satrap Bahram, but, before his execution, was blinded to prevent him from 
escaping or contesting rulership. Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historia, ed. de Boor 170-171 (trans. Whitby 
111); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 264-265 (trans. Mango and Scott 387). 
1585 King Bernard of Italy, for example, was seized at Chalon in April 818, found guilty of rebellion and 
condemned and blinded. He succumbed to his injuries two days later. The lay-conspirators were also blinded, 
and clerics deposed and imprisoned. On this episode and the penalty of blinding in the medieval West, see 





sanctuary. By comparison, the more general crime of theft from a church necessitated only 
tonsure and exile.1586 The Farmer’s Law prescribed its use in three statutes vis-à-vis serious 
crimes detrimental to livelihood, community, and trade.1587 Leon VI’s Novel 72, regarding 
the criminal penalties for unlawfully gouging another’s eyes, emphasised the penalty’s 
perceived gravity: an offender would not receive like punishment, but the victim would be 
recompensed for the injury.1588 The legal history thus confirms that victims were to be 
associated with figures accused of sacrilege or the worst kinds of theft and activities, 
necessitating ostracism.  
Blinding contrasted the rhetorical-ideological artifice of imperial divine appointment 
with the mutilation’s historic association with religious transgressions. Its frequent coupling 
with tonsure reinforced its ‘sacrilegious’ symbolism. Justinian II’s initial disfigurement of 
two ecclesiastics and the penalty’s adoption in the period of Iconomachy evidently sought 
to cast victims as heretics. Offenders were habitually marked as social pariahs, and additional 
meaning could be attached to the act dependent upon the interpreter’s education. 
 
Degradation ceremonies 
Depending upon the prominence of the victim, and the political circumstances of the 
moment, the implementation of a penalty might be combined with a ceremonial ‘parade of 
infamy’. The essential format was inherited from ancient Rome and constituted a traditional 
feature of triumphs, but infamy parades increasingly came to be performed independently of 
                                                 
1586 Ekloga 17.15. 
1587 These concerned the theft of livestock, wheat, and wine, or causing the death of livestock in an attempted 
theft. Ashburner 1910: p.103, p.106, §42, §68, §69; Patlagean 1984: 409-410. The penalty was primarily linked 
with the loss of livestock through theft, which necessitated immediate blinding of the guilty party. By contrast, 
it was only to be used as a penalty for the theft of wheat or wine after the culprit was apprehended for a third 
time: first transgressions warranted whipping; second, reimbursement equal to twice the value of the stolen 
goods. It was evidently reserved for the more severe crimes appropriate to a pastoralist setting. 
1588 They were to receive half of the perpetrator’ property: Patlagean 1984: 411. This reflects legal thought in 
the West, closely connected with nose- and tongue-cutting, in which victims received financial recompense: 





a ‘triumph’ per se.1589 Termed ‘status degradation ceremonies’ by sociologists, these were 
communicative events that generated and exploited communal moral indignation towards 
identified persons in order to detrimentally affect their public identity. Parades 
communicated a victims’ guilt, forced them to adjust their behaviour by modifying their role 
within the community thereafter, or precipitated their withdrawal from society.1590 In order 
to be successful, the ceremony and the victim had to be recognised as ‘standing out of the 
ordinary’, and comprehended as the antithesis of an ideal citizen.1591 Consequently, a range 
of humiliations could be employed as necessary, and variants existed to distinguish the 
degradation of the living from that of the dead. First, we shall examine the living. 
A victim’s disgrace began before the parade when measures were taken to prepare 
him for public scorn. Flagellation, amputations, or beatings, might be performed during 
imprisonment. The most common preparatory element transformed the victim’s appearance 
by removing his hair and beard. As Maguire notes, the shearing of the victim’s hair, 
especially those with imperial pretensions, reversed a familiar topos of Komnenian imperial 
panegyric, namely the eulogising of the emperor’s hair.1592 The humiliations of Anemas and 
Taronites (c.1106/7), involved both men being shorn.1593 Baldness was a regular source of 
mockery: when Andronikos I was shaved for his execution, he was said to resemble ‘an egg, 
shining before all’.1594 Ioannes Doukas’ bald head made several appearances in Choniates’ 
Historia: reportedly inducing amusement at the moment of Isaakios II’s proclamation, and 
laughter when it shone ‘like a full moon’ at Alexios III’s coronation.1595 By contrast, a child’s 
                                                 
1589 McCormick 1986: 186-187, notes that by the ninth century these parades were usually enacted 
independently from a triumph. 
1590 Garfinkel 1956: esp. 421. 
1591 Garfinkel 1956: 422. 
1592 Maguire 2013: 422. Perhaps these important ideological symbolisms make sense of Ioannes II’s reported 
penchant for checking the style/cut of his relatives’ and subordinates’ hair: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 
46-47 (trans. Magoulias 27). 
1593 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 374-375, 377 (trans. Frankopan 347, 350). 
1594 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 349 (trans. Magoulias 192). 
1595 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 345, 458-459 (trans. Magoulias 190, 251-252). On the Byzantines’ 





first haircut, or a baptismal haircut, were celebrated ritual moments.1596 Shaving was an 
eighth-century penalty for sexual crimes and (like tonsure) implied social abnormality.1597 
Beardlessness connoted shame after beards became symbols of masculinity in the sixth 
century and were depicted on coins as a means of distinguishing between senior emperors 
and junior colleagues.1598 The former were traditionally portrayed with the full beard 
historically associated with philosopher emperors, signifying able rulership.1599 The 
beardlessness of undereducated minors, or effeminate eunuchs thus provided a scornful 
context in which to ridicule failed imperial aspirations. In the late eleventh century the beard 
acquired additional importance as a symbol of cultural pride in opposition to the clean-
shaven Latins.1600 Thus the victim was ‘othered’ before the public parade had even begun. 
There was no formal procedure or route that a parade had to take, although a small 
number of destinations became associated with particular penalties. Victims were marched 
through the ‘streets and marketplaces’ of the city before a final sentence was enacted. In 
practice this meant the ceremonial heart near the Senate and Great Palace, and emulated the 
routes chosen for triumphs.1601 Anemas was paraded to the Hippodrome, and the thirteenth-
century humiliation involving Manuel Holobolos, involved a detour past Hagia Sophia in 
order to ‘intimidate the clergy’ supporting Arsenios.1602 The Hippodrome, Forum Bovis, 
Sigma, Covered Hippodrome, and Amastrianon, constituted the most common termini if a 
mutilation or execution was to be enacted. The Hippodrome was also the preferred 
                                                 
1596 On the significance of these events, see Rapp 2016: 12, 88-89, 259; Baun 2013; Dagron 2003: 46-47. Note 
also that Leon VI’s reconciliation with Basileios I was noted for the clipping of Leon’s hair as part of his 
restoration to precedence. 
1597 Patlagean 1984: 406; Ekloga 17.29, lists it as a penalty for men who had union with a virgin and were 
unwilling to marry her, or unable to remunerate her family. 
1598 On the shameful connotations of beardlessness, see The Oneirocriticon of Achmet, ed. Oberhelman 94-95, 
99; The Oneirocriticon of Daniel, ed. Oberhelman 71; The Oneirocriticon of Nikephoros, ed. Oberhelman 129; 
The Anonymous Oneirocriticon, ed. Oberhelman 175; The Oneirocriticon of Manuel II, ed. Oberhelman 206.  
1599 On the ‘philosophical’ association of the beard, which presumably also held connotations of paideia, see 
Elsner 1998: 60-61. 
1600 Kazhdan et al 1991: I, 274. 
1601 McCormick 1986. Phocas, for example, was paraded from the Augusteon along the Mese: Mango 2000: 
173-186. 





destination if an emperor decided to show mercy to a victim, in person. Each site provided 
space for the public to observe subsequent proceedings and held political symbolism as 
locations of popular (or imperial) power.  
The ride of disgrace, in which the victim was mounted astride an ass or mule, was 
another recurring component. Mellinkoff has outlined its uses in a variety of contexts 
throughout time-periods and cultures.1603 In 426, the execution of the usurper John was 
preceded by amputations and his procession through the hippodrome at Aquileia atop an 
ass.1604 The supporters of Thomas the Slav were likewise paraded through the Hippodrome 
of Constantinople before being exiled,1605 and Michael V to the Sigma on the back of a mule 
before being blinded.1606 From the eighth century, entering the Hippodrome via the Diippion 
Gate was an additional indicator of disgrace: notably, the restorations of Justinian II and 
Constantine V were marked by races at which their defeated rivals were processed through 
this gate.1607 Flags drew further attention, while forcibly riding backwards invited additional 
humiliation.1608 The procession of Anemas and his co-conspirators involved their being 
driven through an unspecified palace courtyard, and the agorae, mounted backwards astride 
oxen.1609 A foremost dishonour was to hold the tail. This offered no stabilising support for 
the rider or functional control over the animal but was visually dissonant ‘slapstick’ 
humour.1610 Donkeys and mules were symbols of dishonour chosen to demean the figures 
                                                 
1603 Mellinkoff 1973. 
1604 Ζῶντα δὲ Βαλεντινιανὸς ᾿Ιωάννην λαβὼν ἔν τε τῷ ᾿Ακυληίας ἰπποδρομίῳ τὴν ἐτέραν ταῖν χεροῖν 
ἀποκοπέντα εἱσῆγεν ἐπόμπευσέ τε ὄνῳ ὀχούμενον, καὶ πολλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀπὸ σκηνῆς ἐνταῦθα παθόντα τε καὶ 
ἀκούσαντα ἔκτεινεν. ‘And Valentinian took John alive, and he brought him out in the hippodrome of Aquileia 
with one of his hands cut off and caused him to ride in state on an ass, and then after he had suffered much ill 
treatment from the stage-performers there, both in word and in deed, he put him to death.’ Procopius, History 
of the Wars, III.3.4-9. 
1605 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 70-71; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 102-103; Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 41 (trans. Wortley 44). 
1606 Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 17 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 26-27). 
1607 Mango 1950: 152. 
1608 Andronikos I so paraded the protosebastos Alexios ‘preceded by a flag tightened on a cane’: Choniates, 
Historia, ed. van Dieten 249 (trans. Magoulias 147-148). 
1609 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch 273-276 (trans. Frankopan 345-348). See also, Smythe 2006: 133. 





astride them, who were usually associated with ‘noble’ equine sports.1611 Attaleiates called 
the mule ‘pitiful and wretched’, ‘an object of ridicule’.1612 Dreambooks associated them with 
exile and considered them ‘very evil’ because their mixed breeding and inability to have 
offspring made them ‘mischievous and mean’ (perhaps connecting their use in parades with 
sexual slander of the victim).1613 Bakhtin’s theory of the grotesque is also suggested, in 
connection with the medieval propensity for scatological humour, since lifting the tail 
exposed another of Bakhtin’s ‘body hells’, in the form of an animal already viewed with 
ridicule.1614 
In hagiography, waste products of the body were celebrated aspects of the grotesque 
associated with madness and the devil, as something to be avoided.1615 The mentally ill lived 
near their own ordure, even consuming it.1616 Parades similarly invoked this framework of 
‘grotesque realism’, with excrement assuming a mocking role concurrent with its ability to 
provoke disgust and ridicule.1617 Constantinou, commenting on a patient of a healing saint 
provides an approximation of this status: ‘[the victim] lies somewhere between life and 
death, still oozing and flowing. He is filthy, dirty, and smelly. His state is offensive to the 
senses, and therefore he is treated as taboo.’1618 Waste products served as manifestations of 
                                                 
1611 Horses were associated with high-status and royalty in Byzantium. Royal sports like tzykanion (a form of 
polo adopted from the Sassanians) made use of the animal and for the most part high-officials and military 
members rode horses, with others in society using donkeys: Morrison and Sodini 2002: 200; Haldon 2005: 32. 
Legal codes, reinforced social status by denying Jews the right to ride horses: Kazhdan et al. 1991: I, 122. 
1612 ... ἡμιόνῳ τῶν εὐτελεστέρων καὶ ταπεινῶν φόρτον τοῦτον τιθέασι καταγέλαστον... Attaleiates, Historia, 
ed. Pérez Martin 17 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 26-27). 
1613 The Oneirocriticon of Achmet, ed. Oberhelman 232; The Oneirocriticon of Germanus, ed. Oberhelman 
157; The Oneirocriticon of Manuel II, ed. Oberhelman 196, 202. See also, The Oneirocriticon of Daniel, ed. 
Oberhelman 66, 68. 
1614 It should be noted that Mellinkoff 1973: 175, has documented cases from elsewhere in medieval Europe in 
which the ride involved the victim being tied with their face forced against the animal’s anus. Although I am 
not aware of any comparable references to this practice in Byzantium, it is possible that this did happen, 
especially given the recourse to scatological elements in parades (see below). 
1615 On the products of the body as an element of the grotesque: Bakhtin 1984: 317, noting that the functions 
of the material body, ‘eating, drinking, defecation, and other elimination …as well as copulation, pregnancy, 
dismemberment, [and] swallowing up by another body [lay at the heart of grotesque realism].’ On these 
elements in hagiography (particularly that concerning healing saints), see Constantinou 2010: esp. 46-47. 
1616 Constantinou 2010: 51-52. 
1617 Bakhtin 1984: 152. 





contempt which also altered the victim’s appearance and ‘othered’ him.1619 Faeces darkened 
him, rendering him ‘ugly’, ‘shameful’, or ‘malformed’.1620 Darkened skin invited mocking 
comments like those directed towards Manuel I when a Venetian crew parodied his 
coronation.1621 The triumphal procession marking Georgios Maniakes’ defeat, involved 
captives shaved, mounted, and with features obscured by faeces.1622 Andronikos I was pelted 
with excrement and urine, with the crowd using sponges to smear his face and eyes.1623 The 
process was essentially a damnatio of the (imperial) visage: an inverted ‘whitewashing’ 
performed on a living victim in order to erase their identity. 
The dominance of the state was also expressed through forced divestiture. Forced 
nudity was used against several of Phocas’ victims, and against Andronikos I during his 
execution.1624 Disrobing mirrored the destruction of status that these rituals aspired to 
achieve since the victim was publicly divested of the attire associated with his former 
identity, which he had been deemed unworthy of possessing (simultaneously reinforcing his 
loss of agency), and constituted a potent sexual shaming in accordance with Christian 
notions of original sin.1625 Anemas and his co-conspirators were made to wear sack cloths 
typical of rituals of penance and submission, where their willing adoption was considered a 
praiseworthy debasement. By contrast, forced adoption for degradation ceremonies merely 
communicated a humiliating lack of agency. The recurrent theme of absurdity also allowed 
                                                 
1619 The public were actively encouraged to spit upon the victims, Theophanes, Chronographia 441 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 609-610). 
1620 On the Byzantine’s aesthetic association of dark skin with ugliness, see Hatzaki 2009: 35. Dreambooks 
regularly refer to dark skin as symbolic of shame or disease, they connect it with periods of sorrow. Washing 
dirt off one’s head or arms is said to indicate escaping from trouble, and white skin was deemed ‘exceedingly 
auspicious’: The Oneirocriticon of Daniel, trans. Oberhelman 66, 70; The Oneirocriticon of Nikephoros, trans. 
Oberhelman 125; The Anonymous Oneirocriticon, trans. Oberhelman 175. 
1621 The dark-skinned Ethiopian parodying Manuel also inverted the sun-king topos, pronouncing, ‘I am black 
and beautiful, because the sun has looked askance at me.’ Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 86 (trans. 
Magoulias 50-51); Maguire 2013: 421. 
1622 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 14-23; ed. Renauld II, 4-17 (trans. Sewter 194-199). 
1623 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 349-350 (trans. Magoulias 192-193). 
1624 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 294 (trans. Mango and Scott 423). 
1625 On divestiture as a denial of identity, see Shepard 2013: 345-346. On the divestiture as a means of sexual 





inversions of gender norms via forced transvestitism. In 1047 the rebel Theophilos Erotikos 
was paraded in the Hippodrome wearing women’s clothing.1626 Outright sexual slander was 
also invited. Theophanes Continuatus described how the songs and melodies accompanying 
infamy parades were supplemented by dancing and music, and deemed these elements 
‘worthy of a brothel’.1627Anemas’ parade was attended by a song in the ‘vulgar tongue’ 
concerning ‘those rebels wearing horns’: implying that Anemas and his co-conspirators were 
cuckolds.1628 And Choniates’ noted that Andronikos’ paternity was bought into question by 
the crowds.1629 Identity and legitimacy of birth, interrelated concepts (especially for ‘noble’ 
aristocrats) were ridiculed and redefined throughout the parade. 
Yet another ritual disgrace might be enacted at the terminus if the emperor was 
present. The defeated opponent could be forced to perform supplicatio through proskynesis, 
entreating the emperor to show mercy by sparing his life. In form, the supplicatio closely 
resembled ritual acts of reconciliation and public penance (with the emperor in place of the 
divinity),1630 but often without the reintegration or restitution of the supplicant into the 
community as an equal. The emperor’s quasi-saintly, and judicial, charismata were 
undoubtedly strengthened by the imitation. Justinian’s triumph of 534, celebrating the 
successful campaign against the Vandal King Gelimer, exploited both stages of this 
                                                 
1626 Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 429 (trans. Wortley 404); McCormick 1986: 179. Note also, 
that after the loss of Rhason (1129/1130) the commander Kritoplos was paraded through the streets of 
Constantinople dressed in women’s attire, atop an ass. Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 12 (trans. Brand 19). 
On the use of women’s attire in these parades, see Magdalino 2007b: 68. 
1627 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 245. In 601, when Maurice barely escaped public unrest on the 
occasion of the Feast of the Purification, the public placed a man resembling Maurice, dressed in black and 
crowned with garlic stalks, upon an ass and paraded him through the streets. This mocking ride was 
accompanied by a chant in the vernacular tongue: ‘He found his heifer tender and soft,| and he fucked her like 
the proverbial young cock,| and fathered children like chips off the block. |Now no one dares speak; he's 
muzzled us all.| My holy Lord, my holy Lord, fearful and mighty,| let him have it on the head to stop his 
conceit,| and I'll bring you the great bull in thanksgiving.’ Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 283 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 408). For other attestations of comic and mocking chants and verses, see Garland 1990: esp. 
13-14; Maguire 2013: 418. 
1628 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 375 (trans. Frankopan 347). 
1629 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 350 (trans. Magoulias 193). 





ritual.1631 Gelimer was brought to Constantinople as a prisoner being led by Belisarius, who 
had recently been accused of ‘aspiring to tyranny’. Justinian used the triumph to 
communicate his own supremacy. Belisarius was made to process on foot, not horseback, a 
gesture unlikely to have been missed given the rarity with which prominent figures walked 
within the city.1632 He performed proskynesis with Gelimer in the Hippodrome, prior to 
Gelimer’s calcatio. The visual uniformity of the two figures’ gestures would have been 
striking, and there can be little doubt that observers would have understood Belisarius’ 
supplicatio alongside Gelimer as denoting anything other than joint subordination. 
Justinian’s political primacy was thus reinforced through this gesture at a time of political 
uncertainty, and Belisarius’ triumph became Justinian’s.1633 
After the entreaty, the emperor might implement the custom of calcatio colli 
(trachelismos), the ritual trampling of the neck, which signified the brutalisation of the 
defeated opponent, his absolute subjugation, and the emperor’s authority to grant life or 
death.1634 In 610, Herakleios used calcatio to humiliate the usurper-emperor Phocas in front 
of a select audience of officials and supporters, before parading Phocas’ decapitated head 
through the city streets.1635 In 706, Justinian II’s parade and execution of Leontios and 
Tiberios-Apsimaros in the Hippodrome included ritual trampling. Roman custom was 
combined with Christian kingship suggesting the usurpers’ sacrilege, for the crowd allegedly 
intoned Psalm 90: ‘You have set your foot on the asp and the basilisk, and you have trodden 
on the lion and the serpent!'1636 Calcatio was used against Thomas the Slav after his betrayal 
                                                 
1631 Procopius, History of the Wars, ed. Dewing II, 278-283. 
1632 McCormick 1986: 127 n.202. 
1633 The best study of the political motives and symbolism of the triumph is that of Börm 2013: noting, that 
there was no resistance or uproar to/against the popular general’s treatment by the emperor–a testament, 
perhaps, to Justinian’s successful reapportioning of blame for the massacre of the Nika Rioters. On the triumph 
of 534, see Pazdernik 2006: esp. 200-205; McCormick 1986: 125-129; Cameron 1985: 138-139. 
1634 Malone 2009: esp. 60-63. 
1635 On the sources (and potential locations) for this calcatio, see McCormick 1986: 70. 
1636 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 375 (trans. Mango and Scott 523). On the possible dates, see 





to Michael II at Adrianople, and called a ‘custom’.1637 Unusually for the period, Thomas’ 
degradation was not performed in Constantinople, but at Adrianople in front of the now 
reunified army. This staging concealed his popularity with the troops and emphasised the 
failure of his endeavour to those with questionable loyalty by having them bear witness.1638 
To my knowledge, the last reference to a calcatio pertains to Andronikos I, who entreated 
Alexios II to perform one in 1182 (independent of a parade).1639  
The parades have been explained as a temporary inversion of social hierarchy and 
identity, yet this is a slight mischaracterisation.1640 In fact, parades enacted a ritual 
destruction of a person’s old identity, and revealed their new ‘true’ identity.1641 Humbling 
was total, reducing victims to the lowest in society. Social hierarchies were not temporarily 
inverted, but wholly redefined. An ‘aristocrat’ was no longer an aristocrat, but someone 
lower than the mob. Future restoration of status was not guaranteed and was irrelevant for 
the duration of the parade. Although restoration was a possible outcome, popular memory 
(and disfigurements) perpetuated a victim’s disgrace, ensuring ongoing shame and taunting, 
and permanently redefining his identity in the public sphere. The public humiliation of 
Herakleios’ brother Theodoros, as his sole punishment after questioning Herakleios’ 
marriage to Martina, is evidence of its perceived retributive value.1642 As McCormick notes,  
[the] celebrations provide a counterproof to the positive evidence of the 
aristocracy’s desire to be seen in honourable positions in honourable 
parades. The humiliation... must have been an extraordinary one for the 
scions of the great families of Byzantium since, on more than one occasion, 
                                                 
1637 Thomas was betrayed to Michael’s besieging army in October 823. Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
69; ed. Codoñer and Featherstone 102-103. 
1638 McCormick 1986: 144-146; Lemerle 1965: Anastasios, Thomas’ second adopted son and heir, received 
identical punishment after his capture at Byze: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 70-71; ed. Codoñer and 
Featherstone 104-105. 
1639 Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-Jones 36-37. This was undoubtedly 
part of his ritual displays of deference to Alexios II, performed when Andronikos had assumed real power upon 
entry to Constantinople in 1182. 
1640 Heher 2015a: esp. 19. 
1641 Garfinkel 1956: 421-422, commenting that by the end, the victim was revealed as what, ‘after all’, they 
had always been.  





it replaced the death penalty.1643  
Structurally, degradation ceremonies inverted those of inauguration rituals.1644 As we have 
seen, traditional sites/routes associated with consensus politics and investiture were utilised. 
Ritual elements of the adventus were reversed: pure white horses exchanged for beasts of 
burden,1645 the legitimising acclamation transformed into insulting denunciations, crowns of 
garlic stalks or viscera replaced the imperial diadem,1646 the imperial insignia were 
supplanted by humbling attire or nudity, affluence with effluence. The ritual reinforced 
power-relations of the emperor and public by having them ratify his authority in direct 
opposition to his defeated opponent. The usurper’s failure was given ritual form which 
denounced him for ‘unlawfully’ acting against consensus and made him the target of it.1647 
Where inauguration ritually legitimised the basileus’ election, degradation ritually 
legitimised a tyrant’s deposition. 
These events were ‘filled with the spirit of carnival, which liberates the world from 
all that is dark and terrifying: it takes away all fears and is therefore completely gay and 
bright.’1648 Consequently, the centripetal forces which had sparked the ataxia of conspiracy 
or civil war were temporarily masked, a new unity forged through the laughter and 
communal spirit directed against recognised enemies of state. In ancient Rome, the 
population was encouraged to participate in similar rituals engendering solidarity among the 
body politic through the shared execution of ‘non-persons’ like slaves, captives, or rebellious 
subjects.1649 They became part of the penal system whilst retaining their character as public 
                                                 
1643 McCormick 1986: 186. 
1644 Garfinkel 1956: 421, noting that by design they always must. 
1645 The contrast was especially apparent in the degradation of captives as part of triumphal processions. The 
captive troops of Georgios Maniakes, for example, were forced to ride on donkeys whilst the victorious general 
Stephanos the sebastophoros, rode a pure white horse. Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 428 (trans. 
Wortley 402-403); Attaleiates, Historia, ed. 20 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 32-33). 
1646 Andronikos I was allegedly crowned with garlic stalks, Michael Anemas with animal intestines. 
1647 Beihammer 2013: 198, on this political function of the ceremonial as used by Isaakios II against 
Andronikos. 
1648 Bakhtin 1984: 26. 





spectacles glorifying the state. Yet, as Robinson notes, their judicial value remained critical, 
for they provided a contrast with private executions which might be perceived as murder, 
and gave popular sanction to public executions intended as deterrents.1650 The community 
bore witness to the emperor’s safeguarding/reconstitution of state taxis on their behalf, 
through the implementation of the law.  
Emperors could not act as private individuals with personal complaints. Their 
grievances had to be presented as those of the whole community for the ceremony to succeed 
in providing the semblance of popular authorisation. Emperors had to identify themselves as 
representative of the politeia, its ethos, and will. They drew upon commonly held and 
verified experiences, and what they claimed to be true had to be understood as true by 
witnesses.1651 Failure to invoke consensus, risked suggesting that they acted unjustly and 
immorally, exposing basileia as tyrannical.1652  
Ostensibly, parades represented an opportunity for the people to ‘interact’ with the 
emperor (or his representatives) and express ‘their’ will in a ritual-freed context. Anna 
Komnene asserted ‘people of all ages’ were present, and narratives typically emphasised 
inclusivity through the agency of women in the crowd.1653 The presentation of the populace 
as agents in the victim’s humiliation was essential. In some narratives imperial 
representatives were wholly (or largely) absent, and the people act as denouncers enacting 
the law. Psellos’ description of Michael V’s parade,1654 and Choniates’ narrative of 
Andronikos’, read as if the Constantinopolitan crowds acted spontaneously in forcibly 
                                                 
1650 Robinson 2007: 196 and n.51, quoting A. Alison: ‘Private execution in prison is pure judicial murder; for 
it is unattended with only the circumstance that can justify the taking away of life – the exhibition of an example 
which may deter others.’ 
1651 Garfinkel 1956: 423-424. 
1652 See the comments of Magdalino 2007: 63-64: on the need for emperors to employ derision carefully and 
in specific contexts, or else risk condemnation. 
1653 ἅπασα μὲν οὗν ἡλικία ἐς τὴν τοιαύτην θέαν συνέτρεχεν... Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and 
Kambylis 375 (trans. Frankopan 347). 
1654 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 236-243; ed. Renauld I, 113-116 (trans. Sewter 148-150). See 





marching them. Michael was dragged from the Stoudios and through the streets by the 
‘mob’, and Choniates mentions only the ‘people of the marketplace’ and Latin executioners 
as those overseeing Andronikos.1655 Both authors bore witness to the scenes they described 
and scholarship has tended to accept these narratives prima facie.1656 Andronikos’ parade 
has even been read as evidence ‘for the lack of imperial authority in Constantinople after the 
death of Manuel’.1657 Yet, this recurring image of public spontaneity, which undoubtedly 
was intended, was a façade. Psellos recounts rebuking Michael and the nobelissimos 
Constantine in the presence of Theodora’s newly-appointed eparchos, guardsmen, and other 
notables, before the pair were dragged from the Stoudios.1658 Andronikos had been kept 
prisoner for several days at the Anemas whilst Isaakios secured the Great Palace. He had 
been tortured, including by aristocrats he had persecuted.1659 In both cases, delays allowed 
preparations to be made, and the crowd to be calmed/controlled. The division between 
private (elite/aristocratic) rebukes, preparatory tortures, and public parades, also tells us that 
these were carefully devised sequences.1660 The presence of imperial guardsmen indicates 
that crowd controls were in operation.1661 Attacks during the parade were traditional and 
expected, so too the routes and destinations.1662 Neither case appears excessively 
extemporaneous. However, the suggestion of imperial absence in favour of public 
‘spontaneity’ was useful, and confirms aspects of contemporary political thought: the people 
decided who the emperor was, they deposed the unworthy, and punished the immoral 
                                                 
1655 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 349 (trans. Magoulias 193). 
1656 Charanis 1978: 72-73; C.M. Brand 1968: 73, ‘The city mob had not lost any of the liking for bloodshed… 
the circumstances of his elevation to the throne compelled him to allow the populace to destroy their former 
hero and saviour.’ Garland 1992: 39-40, ‘The ex-emperor was abused and mocked with great savagery by the 
citizens…’ Maleon 2010a: 17, ‘[Andronikos I’s] ordeal was not a strictly organised execution, but the gross 
manifestation of his subjects.’ Kaldellis 2015: 130, ‘There is no hint in our main source, Niketas Choniates, 
that this was anything but a popular action.’ For a more critical interpretation of events with regard to 
Andronikos, see Beihammer 2013: 197-198 (in large-part followed here). 
1657 Heher 2015a: 19. 
1658 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 230-235; ed. Renauld I, 109-112 (trans. Sewter 145-146). 
1659 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 342 (trans. Magoulias 192). 
1660 A detail astutely noted by Beihammer 2013: 198, in reference to Andronikos. 
1661 As do the choices of termini. On crowd controls during triumphs and parades, see McCormick 1986: 94. 





(although, in reality, they were often simply enacting the imperial will). 
Alongside showcasing popular discontent with the victim(s), ‘spontaneity’ distanced 
emperors from acts potentially deemed cruel or abhorrent. Psellos regretted his collusion 
with the crowd against Michael, Choniates condemned those involved in Andronikos’ 
procession, and church officials were never present.1663 Yet close reading and comparisons 
with other parades, indicates just how diligently ‘absent’ emperors monitored proceedings. 
Theodora’s representatives were present throughout and oversaw Michael’s handover to the 
crowd’s leaders:1664 a normal occurrence, since we know that by the eighth century parades 
were organised with representatives of the πολῖται and δημόται.1665 Executioners arrived 
with fresh orders from Theodora, and senators accompanied the crowd’s leaders, even 
consoling Michael.1666 Anemas’ procession equally suggested Alexios’ absence from 
proceedings. Yet Anna Komnene and her sisters observed from the Palace windows ‘in 
secret’ and were joined by Eirene. They entreated Alexios to intervene and spare Anemas’ 
sight before he passed ‘The Hands’, beyond which there could be no clemency. Alexios did 
so through a messenger.1667 Alexios’ supposed response to the emotional consensus of the 
crowd aside, his merciful decision indicates either how attentively he monitored proceedings 
in order to achieve a last-minute intervention, or how prearranged parades were. 
Furthermore, there was an imperial presence, albeit at the Palace. Anna’s explanation of the 
judicial significance of ‘The Hands’ outlines that interventions were anticipated.1668 
                                                 
1663 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 234-235; ed. Renauld I, 112 (trans. Sewter 147), comments: 
‘For my own part, I thought that their [the mob’s] turbulence would go no further. I was still fascinated by the 
drama of the thing.’ 
1664 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 236-239; ed. Renauld I, 113-114 (trans. Sewter 148). 
1665 McCormick 1986: 135. Thus the ‘handover’ of prisoners from ‘imperial’ (judicial) representatives to 
‘public’ representatives would have been a commonality of degradation parades. 
1666 Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 238-241; ed. Renauld I, 114 (trans. Sewter 149); Attaleiates, 
Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 17 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 26-27). 
1667 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 375-376 (trans. Frankopan 348). See also, Buckley 
2014: esp. 232-235; Smythe 2013: 263-264, commenting on the classical construction and gender divisions of 
Anna’s first person account of this episode, and the orchestrated structure of the ceremony she describes. 
1668 ‘Either the pardon arrives on the near side of the hands, in which case the unfortunate criminals are snatched 
from danger; or they pass by the hands, and there is no more salvation. For my part, I attribute everything to 





Anemas’ alleged last-minute prayers for forgiveness, directed at the palace, suggest that it 
was generally understood that emperors would observe proceedings.1669 Even if Michael’s 
actions were exaggerated, Anna’s readers were expected to understand the significance of 
his entreaties towards the palace. Andronikos I was purportedly seen observing the 
procession and execution of Constantine Makrodoukas and Andronikos Doukas from the 
upper floors of the Mangana, and Alexios III was seen looking down on Ioannes Komnenos(-
Axouchos) from the Blachernai.1670 We may wonder if these appearances were actually 
variations of the Komnenian prokypsis or reflect historic appearances in the kathisma.1671  
Anemas’ reprieve is additionally instructive of the propaganda value of clemency 
mid-ritual. Alexios’ intervention portrayed as merciful an unpopular emperor associated 
with cruel blindings and other misdeeds. It magnified his philanthropia before a populace 
already united against Anemas, but who were ‘moved to tears and lamentations’ by his 
prospective blinding.1672 It also implied Alexios’ unshaken sense of security after uncovering 
this conspiracy involving prominent Anatolian military families, and senators.1673 In 607, 
Phocas had similarly granted mercy to the demarchs Theophanes and Pamphilos, who had 
                                                 
who on that day moved us to pity him.’ Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 376 (trans. 
Frankopan 348-349). Note that Anna constructs the narrative so that all of the family were moved to pity by 
Anemas’ plight; the inclusivity of the parade and its ritual-freed emotion was extended to the whole of society, 
including the imperial family. An emotional consensus was invoked, and Alexios responded to it. 
1669 Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 375 (trans. Frankopan 347). It is interesting to consider 
that Anna creates a dualism at this point in the narrative since Alexios is said to have been deep in prayers 
(presumably for Anemas) from the start of the parade, but was moved to intervene when Anemas himself 
resorted to prayer. Might there be an inference that Alexios’ decision to spare Anemas, stemming from the 
‘emotional consensus’ was God-inspired, and thus provide proof of Alexios’ authority and moral qualification 
in contrast to the pitiable and treacherous Anemas? 
1670 For Andronikos I, see Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 293 (trans. Magoulias 162). For Alexios III, see 
Mesarites, Die Palastrevolution des Johannes Komnenos, ed. Heisenberg 46, 48. We may add that in 1281 
Michael VIII was seen observing the triumphal procession of prisoners from above, in the Blachernai Palace: 
Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 651. See also, Macrides 2013a: 278; Pseudo-
Kodinos, ed. Macrides, Munitiz, and Angelov 371-372 (Studies) listing other such appearances by emperors. 
1671 On the ritual of prokypsis, see Jeffreys 1987; Magdalino 1993: 240. Jeffreys dates the ritual’s origins to the 
reign of Manuel I, near the passage of the First Crusade (1147). 
1672 …ἅπασα φύσις πρὸς δάκρυον καὶ οἰμωγὰς κεκίνηται… Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 
375 (trans. Frankopan 347-348). 
1673 The plot of Ioannes Solomon, for which Anemas was paraded, had the support of Anemas’ brothers, the 
Antiokhoi, Exazenos Doukas and Hylias, Niketas Kastamonites, the Kourtikioi, and Georgios Basilakios. Anna 





(treasonably) placed the laurata of Phocas’ daughter, Domentzia, and son-in-law Priscus, on 
columns with his own.1674 The demarchs’ executions during the consular races were 
commuted thanks to the pleas of the populace.1675 Where execution would have hurt Phocas’ 
image (given the divided loyalties of the crowd) mercy allowed him to act in accordance 
with the popular will, appease it, and castigate treason. 
 
What remains to be seen? 
Ritual degradations of the deceased were similar to those of the living, and the body was 
used to ritually communicate shame and mortality. Control over the deceased’s remains 
represented the ultimate form of power over their memory. Imperial funerals were grand 
procedures and observers commented when they were substandard.1676 Ideally, ante-mortem 
preparations of the soul (baptism and penance) were the first stage.1677 Post-mortem the 
deceased was washed, perfumed, and wrapped in burial-swaddling clothes, before (typically) 
being adorned with the divitision, chlamys, purple/red kampagia, and finally the diadem.1678 
The body was laid in prothesis facing east and, following acclamations for the successor, 
transported in formal procession from the palace to the mausoleum.1679 The procession 
represented the final public ceremony of the deceased emperor, and offered an opportunity 
to renew support for the dynasty. Emotion was displayed by the crowd and those 
processing,1680 as grief was to be shared. Finally, after funerary psalms were performed, the 
                                                 
1674 Phocas interpreted this as treason and even changed the inscriptions of his coinage to denote his supremacy. 
Grierson 1973: III.1, 454; Morrisson 2013: 73. 
1675 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 294 (trans. Mango and Scott 423); Bury 1889: 202. 
1676 Karlin-Hayter 1991a. 
1677 Karlin-Hayter 1991a: 121-126. 
1678 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, The Book of Ceremonies, ed. Reiske II, 84 (Moffatt and Tall II, 84). 
Variations in burial attire were permitted, however: Michael IV and Manuel I, for example, were buried in their 
monks’ habits. Karlin-Hayter 1991a: 126-127. On the Greek and Roman influences on Byzantine funerary 
rites, see Koukoules 1951: IV, 141-185, and esp. 156-157; Tritsaroli and Valentin 2008: esp. 94. 
1679 Karlin-Hayter 1991a: 129-139. 





body was interred and the diadem removed.1681 Interment signified the moment of 
succession. Private funerals followed the same pattern, but on a much reduced scale.1682 
They usually took place two or three days after death, when the body was taken to church 
for the epicede psalm, and then to the cemetery for burial. By the fifth and sixth centuries 
prohibitions on burial grounds within cities gave way to church graveyards and designated 
categories of burial. There were ‘correct’ places for the body to be interred.1683 Orthodox 
funerary rites and mortuary practices aided the eternal soul’s ascent.  
The deliberate interruption and denial of these rites symbolically condemned the 
deceased’s soul and required witnesses. The hated Caesar Gallus, for example, was divested 
of his attire, beheaded, subjected to posthumous mutilations, and abandoned in public.1684 
The seventh-century skribon, Makrobios, was executed at the Hebdomon and displayed on 
a spear for conspiring against Phocas.1685 And the purge that followed Justinian II’s 
restoration witnessed numerous impalements along the city walls near Blachernai.1686 These 
locations were not incidental. Each was an accessible space in which the corpse could be 
easily seen, and held associations with wronged or legitimising factions. Gallus was left to 
rot in a public space, representative of those public persons he had wronged in the East. The 
choice of the Hebdomon for Makrobios’ execution provided a warning to disloyal troops, 
but also testifies to the military’s political importance at that time since they were granted 
the proof of his death and were being courted for Phocas’ continued protection. The walls of 
the city provided height so that Justinian’s victims were prominently displayed to passers-
                                                 
1681 Karlin-Hayter 1991a: 140-141. 
1682 On Byzantine burial practices more commonly, see Tritsaroli and Valentin 2008: 96; Kazhdan et al 1991: 
II, 808-809; Kyriakakis 1974; Velkovska 2001: esp. 36, 43. 
1683 Christian cemeteries were distinguished from Jewish, suicides were separate from natural causes, etc. 
Tritsaroli and Valentin 2008: 96-97; Kazhdan et al 1991: I, 396-397. 
1684 At Poetovio in Noricum, after his interrogation at Pola in Istria. Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 
XIV.11.23. 
1685 Other conspirators included the deposed empress Constantina and the praefectus Theodore. Chronicon 
Paschale, ed. Dindorf 696; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 297 (trans. Mango and Scott 426). 
1686 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 100-105; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 375 (trans. 





by, and represented a statement of his power over the inhabitants (who had originally 
deposed him and then refused him entry upon his return) and the city itself, which belied the 
reality of his then still tenuous position. An increasing number of locations were used over 
the centuries, but they were generally open spaces, highly visible, and conducive to 
exhibition. Chrysopolis, the Perama, and the walls of the city were particularly favoured. 
Additional disgrace could be apportioned by association with Jewish graveyards or 
communal burial pits used for petty criminals.1687  
Execution and parading were often penultimate stages of damnatio memoriae. 
Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos) was deposited at the southern gate of the Blachernai Palace 
as fodder for dogs and birds, ‘an act deemed cruel and inhuman by all’.1688 His head was 
taken for the emperor’s inspection, and publicly displayed as a warning to those who had 
aided his revolt.1689 A similar fate had evidently been intended for Nikephoros II whose 
remains were left exposed in a courtyard of the Great Palace before being interred. Karlin-
Hayter believed this a combined degradation ceremony and funeral,1690 in fact, it appears 
that Tzimiskes had wanted to parade Nikephoros’ corpse. He had already shown off the head, 
and his supporters were destroying Nikephoros imperial images throughout the city.1691 
However, Tzimiskes was forestalled when Polyeuktos humbled him at Hagia Sophia. A 
parade would only have prompted further admonition, and Nikephoros’ swift removal to the 
Heroon of the Holy Apostles inside an improvised coffin speaks to Tzimiskes’ need to lessen 
his own wrongdoing rather than defame his quarry.1692 
Unlike saints, the dismemberment of a lay body drastically impacted its potential 
                                                 
1687 Andronikos Doukas, for example, was impaled in a Jewish graveyard in 1184: Choniates, Historia, ed. van 
Dieten 294 (trans. Magoulias 163).  
1688 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 527 (trans. Magoulias 289). Translation adapted. 
1689 On the role of the populace in supporting Ioannes’ revolt, see Angold 2015: 121, 127-130. 
1690 Karlin-Hayter 1991a: 116. 
1691 On the destruction of Nikephoros’ imperial images, which presumably must have occurred before 
Tzimiskes’ recourse to penitential efforts over the murder, see Ioannes Geometres, Ethopoiia, quoted and 
discussed in Bourdara 1982: 338-339. 





resurrection.1693 Obviously, the head and face were important for the purposes of 
identification. Faces were depicted on coins and imperial art as a representation of the whole, 
and their destruction rendered the victim ‘malformed’. In Ancient Rome, the burial of a body 
without its head, was not considered a proper funeral, the same was true in Christian 
thought.1694 The decapitated heads of opponents therefore assumed a prominent role in 
propagandist rituals of victory and damnatio. The decapitated heads of usurpers might 
become the focus of private court degradations.1695 Beheading was always the principal 
method of prisoner execution and was commonly associated with the execution of 
ignominious criminals in Late Antiquity (a fact emphasised by Ammianus).1696 In Rome, 
from the first century BCE, the heads of state enemies were exhibited in the Forum,1697 a 
practice that continued under the itinerant court of Late Antiquity,1698 and in Constantinople, 
at the Hippodrome. A total of nine senior emperors were beheaded in the period covered by 
this study, and all but Alexios II were then publicly displayed.1699 Phocas had those of 
Maurice and his sons displayed in the Hebdomon, another signal of where Phocas’ 
powerbase lay and deference to those who had elevated him.1700 Phocas’ overthrow and 
execution by Herakleios saw his corpse paraded through Constantinople with his excised 
genitals and right arm affixed atop spears.1701 And Artemios-Anastasios’ head was paraded 
                                                 
1693 Hayes 2003: 21; Maleon 2010a: 14. 
1694 Kristensen 2016: 334, noting, however, that in ancient Rome the head could be buried alone, acting as a 
substitute for the whole body. This was not true for Christian burials. 
1695 Choniates is particularly detailed in his descriptions of this custom: Alexios II’s head was reportedly kicked 
around by Andronikos and his entourage, Alexios Branas’ was thrown about in the Palace by Isaakios II and 
members of court, and Vatatzes’ was kicked around by Alexios III. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 274, 
388-389, 486 (trans. Magoulias 152, 213-214, 267). 
1696 Discussed in Varner 2006: 69; Kristensen 2016: 332. 
1697 Kristensen 2016: 327. 
1698 Circa 413, those of the usurpers Jovian and Sebastianus were shown in Rome and Ravenna. Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 81 (trans. Mango and Scott 126). 
1699 Those decapitated were: Phocas, Leontios, Tiberios-Apsimaros, Justinian II, Artemios-Anastasios (in 719, 
following his revolt against Leon III), Nikephoros I, Leon V, Nikephoros II, and Alexios II. 
1700 Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historia, ed. de Boor 339 (trans. Whitby 229); Theophanes, Chronographia, 
ed. de Boor 288-290, 291 (trans. Mango and Scott 412-414, 418-419). 





in the Hippodrome after his execution at the Kynegion during the races.1702 These activities 
constituted traditional components of triumphs, where the heads of enemies were paraded 
alongside captives. The usurper Maxentius’ head was exhibited throughout Rome a day after 
Constantine’s victory at Milvian Bridge, accompanied by ridicule from the crowd.1703 Heher 
has shown that, after the fifth and sixth centuries, the parading of heads generally indicated 
the victim’s involvement in civil war; they had been killed outside Constantinople, 
permitting a triumph to take place, and decapitation was generally a post-mortem mutilation, 
rather than their manner of death.1704 Bardas Phokas suffered this fate,1705 and so too 
Georgios Maniakes, whose head was first exhibited in the Hippodrome and then paraded 
during a triumph.1706  
After exhibition in the capital, heads were often sent around the empire to quell 
remaining opposition. Maxentius’ head was paraded for his supporters in Carthage,1707 that 
of the usurper Procopius was dispatched to the towns and cities of the east in order to end 
their rebellion,1708 and the head of Justinian II was displayed in Ravenna.1709 Although the 
public’s ability to identify remains was dubious,1710 special efforts were made to preserve 
                                                 
1702 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 126-129. 
1703 Kristensen 2016: 328.  
1704 Heher 2015a: 15-16. 
1705 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 175 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 216-217). 
1706 Maniakes’ head had been suspended in the Hippodrome before being used in the triumphal procession. 
Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 18-21; ed. Renauld II, 6-7 (trans. Sewter 194-199); Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 428 (trans. Wortley 403); Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Pérez Martin 20 (trans. 
Kaldellis and Krallis 32-33). According to legend, the Ottomans perpetuated this ritual with Constantine XI in 
1453. Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 375-377 (trans. Magoulias 231-232). 
1707 Carthage was a major centre of support for Maxentius’ usurpation, and the chief source of Rome’s grain 
supply. It was therefore vital that any lingering support for the charismatic figure was crushed swiftly and 
effectively. Kristensen 2016. 
1708 Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 14.11.23. 
1709 Agnellus, The Book of Pontiffs, trans. Deliyannis p.267, §142. 
1710 Victims were important persons, unlikely to have been easily recognisable except to their fellow notables. 
Given that the emperor’s effigy was widely distributed (and in a generalised format), we might only imagine 
the difficulty faced by the public in identifying conspirators, or usurpers who controlled but a few cities and 
never minted coinage. It was for exactly this reason that attire denoted rank and status, it provided an easier 
method of identification. From a distance, therefore, any suitably mutilated head (or attired body) would surely 
have been an adequate substitute for such a deception. We have accounts in which even imperial guardsmen 
were unable to identify the emperor by sight, without his imperial attire to distinguish his status: see, for 





body parts for ritual degradation. The heads of Onomagoulos and his commander, Georgios, 
were preserved in vinegar for transport to Leon III.1711 And in 1189, the head of a Pseudo-
Alexios II was dispatched to Isaakios II whose brother noted its close resemblance to the 
deceased emperor.1712 In theory, showing heads to the public provided proof that the victims 
really were dead, preventing rumours about their possible escape from gaining credibility, 
and ruling out the emergence of pretenders after their death.1713 As one source stated of the 
tenth-century usurper Constantine Doukas: ‘[his head was displayed] so that those who had 
placed their hopes in the doux might be shamed at their failure’.1714 
After it was determined that remains had been exhibited for long enough, in the 
majority of cases they were removed for private burials. Tiberios, the son of Justinian II, 
who had been denuded, paraded to the postern at Blachernai and publicly executed, was 
entombed at the Holy Anargyroi.1715 Leon III was conveyed with his family to Prote and 
interred alongside his son Theodosios.1716 There was even an attempt to bury the supposedly 
universally reviled Andronikos I whose remains were removed from the vaults of the 
Hippodrome, where they had been thrown after his execution, and taken to the Monastery of 
Epheros.1717 However, Isaakios refused even that burial and Andronikos remained unburied 
at the time Choniates was writing: a perpetual damnatio.1718  
                                                 
1711 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 398 (trans. Mango and Scott 549-550). 
1712 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 422 (trans. Magoulias 232). 
1713 Kristensen 2016: 327, discussing the posthumous uses of Maxentius’ remains, draws a parallel with the 
rumours surrounding the “true” fate of Osama bin Laden after his body was buried at sea by American Special 
Forces in May 2011. The official release of photographic evidence was considered to counteract these rumours. 
Deaths unseen by the populace were unconfirmed and could be exploited; hence Maxentius’ head was retrieved 
and paraded. 
1714 The Life of Saint Basileios the Younger, ed. Sullivan, Talbot, and McGrath 102-103. 
1715 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, 110-113. 
1716 Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 40-41; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 64-65. 
1717 Isaakios forbade Andronikos’ interment at the Mausoleum he had prepared at the church of the Forty 
Martyrs: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 332 (trans. Magoulias 183). 
1718 Choniates claims that Andronikos’ remains were still visible at the time he was writing. Although we 
cannot offer a precise date, we may reasonably assume that this was before his revision of the original 
manuscript, and before he had fled Constantinople in 1204: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 352 (trans. 
Magoulias 194). On this damnatio, see Beihammer 2013: 174. On the possible locations of the Monastery of 





Throwing the corpse into the sea or a river was another established, if irregular, 
method of degradation. It placed victims ‘elsewhere’, at the boundary of the space inhabited 
by daily life, and facilitated the rapid decay of remains. When Constantine’s victory at 
Milvian Bridge resulted in Maxentius drowning in the Tiber, later accounts exploited the 
circumstances.1719 Eusebius invoked Pharaoh’s drowning in the Red Sea,1720 whereas 
Panegyrici latini XII framed the Tiber as an agent of divine power that wanted to partake in 
Constantine’s victory.1721 The discarding of executed criminals and defeated enemies in the 
Tiber played an important role in Roman memory politics. Sulla’s enemies, along with the 
emperors Vitellius and Elagabalus, were treated thus, and Maxentius’ ritual degradation 
entered into memory-history.1722 In Constantinople, the Bosporos replaced the Tiber. Phocas 
executed Maurice and his sons at the Harbour of Eutropius:1723 observers became unwitting 
participants in the victims’ fates, and the shore of Chalcedon was filled with spectators.1724 
The Catalogus sepulchrorum also lists the remains of Leontios, Tiberios-Apsimaros, and 
Justinian II amongst those thrown to the sea. Corpses remained exposed for several days 
before burial, if removed at all. Maurice and his sons were interred at St. Mamas;1725 
Leontios and Tiberius-Apsimaros were buried on Prote, but (symptomatic of his image) the 
                                                 
1719 The battle took place outside Rome on the 28 October 312. 
1720 Eusebius, Vita Constantini, §38.4. See also, Kristensen 2016: 334. 
1721 Divine favour in the pagan context. ‘Sacred Tiber, once advisor to your guest Aeneas, next saviour of the 
exposed Romulus, you allowed neither the false Romulus to live long nor the City’s murderer to swim away. 
You who nourished Rome by conveying provisions, you who protected her by encircling walls, rightly wished 
to partake of Constantine’s victory, to have him drive the enemy to you, and you slay him.’ Panegyrici latini, 
12[9].18.1 (trans. Nixon and Rodgers 321). See also, Kristensen 2016: 334-335. 
1722 Kristensen 2016: 334. 
1723 ‘The bodies of the dead were hurled to the waves of the sea as a pitiful game, and one could behold the 
sea’s current, so to speak, now bestowing the freshly slain bodies upon dry land, now enfolding them with 
eagerly returning counter-thrusts towards the receptive sea.’ Τὰ μὲν οὖν σώματα τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐπίδακρυ 
παίγνιον τοῖς-τῆς θαλάσσης ἀκοντίζονται κύμασι· καὶ ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸ ῥεῖθρον ὡς ἔπος εἰνος εἰπεῖν τὸ θαλάττιον 
ποτὲ τῇ χέρςῳ τὰ νεοσφαγῆ φιλοτιμούμενον σώματα, ποτὲ φιλυποστρόφοις τισὶνςἀντωθήμασι πρὸς τὴν 
ὑποδεξαμένην ἐναγκαλιζόμενον θάλατταν. Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historia, ed. de Boor 337-338 (trans. 
Whitby 228). Translation adapted. On the Harbour of Eutropius, in Chalcedon, see Janin 1964: 228-229. 
1724 ‘The shores of Chalcedon were filled with the crowds who received the narrative of their own folly, as they 
gazed at the sea-waves’ naked exhibition of the emperors’ bodies like depictions of misfortunes.’ 
Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historia, ed. de Boor 338 (trans. Whitby 228). 





destiny of Justinian’s corpse is unrecorded.1726 The negative connotations of consignment to 
the sea led to the accusation that Phocas, Justinian II, and Andronikos I tied victims of their 
purges in sacks before throwing them in.1727 This variation of poena cullei, the Roman 
penalty for parricide which had been reinstituted by Justinian I, was officially abolished by 
the Basilika and its abuse evidently formed a shorthand for the immorality and brutality of 
tyrants.1728 It is notable that each of these defilements took place outside the city and its 
harbours, assigning them a different ‘space’ and suggesting that a cultural taboo prevented 
Constantinople’s spiritual ‘pollution’ (victims were washed away). 
Although generally used in connection with public rituals, consignment to water also 
occurred surreptitiously, especially when a crowd might have turned against an emperor. 
Following Justinian I’s suppression of the Nika rioters, Hypatius and Pompeius were spared 
a parade that could easily have revived anti-imperial sentiment, but were executed and 
disposed at sea after reportedly begging Justinian for mercy. Their deaths were then 
announced throughout the city in an effort to undermine lingering support. We may wonder 
if the story of their appeal for mercy was not deliberately spread in order to emphasise 
Justinian’s resolve to any foolhardy agitators.1729 Similar considerations of popular opinion 
undoubtedly led Andronikos I to dispose of Alexios II in the same way. Alexios’ decapitated 
head was allegedly buried clandestinely in the Katabate district and his body dumped at sea 
in a weighted coffin that remained unseen and unrecoverable.1730 Yet Alexios’ 
                                                 
1726 Grierson, Mango, and Ševčenko 1962: 50-51. Although it is conceivable that the remains of all three were 
cast to the sea, extant contemporary sources do not list this as part of their executions and degradations. Instead, 
they assert that both Leontios and Tiberius-Apsimaros were simply beheaded in the Hippodrome, and Justinian 
was beheaded and his remains sent to Italy as proof of his death.  
1727 ...ἄλλους ἐν τῷ βυθῷ σάκκοις ἐμβαλὼν ἀπέρριπτε... Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 104-105; 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 296-297, 375 (trans. Mango and Scott 426, 523); Roger of 
Hovenden, Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, ed. Stubbs II, 202, reports that Empress Maria was strangled and then 
thrown into the sea in a sack, on Andronikos’ orders.  
1728 Corpus Iuris Civilis, Digest, ed. Schöll and Kroll §48.9. 
1729 The story may have served to present Justinian as a resolute figure in the face of such a large-scale revolt. 
Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 400 (trans. Jeffreys 280). On the Nika Riot and the historical sources, see 
Greatrex 1997. 
1730 Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-Jones 52-53; Choniates, Historia, 





‘disappearance’ was a misstep; the proclamation of several Pseudo-Alexios’ necessitated 
confirmations of his execution, and exposed enduring loyalties to Manuel’s line.1731  
Immolation provided a more complete destruction of the body, preventing funerary 
rites altogether. Cremation was forbidden to Christians on the basis of its associations with 
paganism and denial of resurrection.1732 Most often associated with the execution of heretics 
from the seventh century onwards, the Basilika replaced poena cullei with burning at the 
stake or pyre as the penalty for parricide.1733 It held demonic connotations,1734 and served as 
a temporal manifestation of eternal suffering in Hell. Its victims were consequently amongst 
societies most reviled. Like deposition at sea, immolation is rarely recorded in association 
with treason and usurpation:1735 suggesting these methods’ reservation for use against 
particularly despised figures or prominent rivals whose deaths an emperor needed the public 
to tacitly endorse. The Forum Bovis, Amastrianon, and Sphendone of the Hippodrome were 
used most often, ensuring a plentiful audience, and Anna Komnene’s account of the burning 
of Basileios the Bogomil (c.1098) expresses the excited anticipation of the crowd.1736 
                                                 
1731 Although it is possible that Andronikos feigned Alexios’ execution and the disposal of his corpse, and that 
Alexios had either been secretly exiled or had escaped Constantinople, there is simply no way of proving this 
given the limited source material available and the influence of Andronikian and Angeloi propaganda 
surrounding the event. Of more importance was the contemporary willingness to believe that Alexios survived. 
Four Pseudo-Alexios II’s are attested in the sources, emerging between the accession of Andronikos I and the 
deposition of Alexios III. Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-Jones 52-53; 
Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 420-421, 422-423, 462-463 (trans. Magoulias 231-232, 232-233, 253-254). 
See also, Cheynet 1990: 118, 123-124, 130. On Andronikos’ confirmation that Alexios had been executed, see 
Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville-Jones 52-53.  
1732 Prokurat, Golitzin, and Peterson 1996: 100-101, noting that cremation remains somewhat taboo even in the 
modern Orthodox Church. 
1733 Justinian II first instituted its use against Paulicians who refused to adopt orthodox beliefs. The earlier laws 
of Justinian I had called for the execution of Manicheans but did not prescribe a particular method of execution: 
Head 1972: 63-64; Hamilton, Hamilton, and Stoyanov 1998: 13, and n.42; 175-178.  
1734 Anna Komnene describes in detail the public execution by burning of the eleventh-century Basileios, an 
adherent of the Bogomil heresy. As Kazhdan noted, Anna’s concern in describing the execution was not the 
victim’s fate (from Anna’s perspective, her father, as a defender of Orthodoxy, had done the right thing in 
executing this heretic who may have greatly damaged the oikoumene had he been allowed to live), but rather 
a fear that ‘demons’ might be unleashed to save Basileios from the flames. Choniates’ description of the 
immolation of Mamalos connects it with ‘demonic books’, and the accusation of treason was linked to outlawed 
occult practices. However, Choniates expressed pity for the victim who was unwillingly corralled towards the 
pyre with pikes. He scornfully commented that the whole procedure resembled ‘tauroscythian cruelty’, that 
avenging demons were being offered a burnt sacrifice. Kazhdan 1994: 213-215. 
1735 The present study identifies only nine instances in which its use is documented against a defeated emperor, 
usurper, or conspirator (all nine are referenced in the main text, below). 





Immolations of less prominent persons are also recorded on the Asian shore of the Bosporos, 
in the Anaratai suburb.1737  
In 605, the patricius Elpidius was consigned to flames after his participation in a 
wide ranging conspiracy against Phocas, involving the deposed Empress Constantina, was 
uncovered.1738 The same fate befell the hated finance ministers of Justinian II; a certain 
Stylianos, who was believed to be acting on the orders of the co-emperor Alexandros, after 
his attempted assassination of Leon VI; Basileios ‘the Copperhand’ after his second revolt 
posing as the deceased Constantine Doukas; and Mamalos who had conspired against 
Andronikos I.1739 The story that Michael II was to be thrown to the furnaces of the Palace 
baths on Christmas Day, was seemingly a later invention justifying his usurpation and 
emphasising Leon V’s cruelty.1740 Only three emperors were immolated, none of them 
living. Soon after execution and mutilation, the corpse of Phocas was dragged to the Forum 
Bovis and thrown onto a pyre.1741 After the restoration of icons (843), Theodora ordered 
Constantine V’s remains exhumed, burned at the Amastrianon, and cast into the sea 
(supposedly in emulation of his treatment of the relics of St. Euphemia).1742 Nikephoros I 
                                                 
1737 Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 64-65 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 113-114), recounting the case of a 
mother and daughter who were executed (by immolation) for throwing stones at the emperor Nikephoros II as 
he returned to the Great Palace after the procession of the Ascension of the Saviour in 967. 
1738 The conspirators had aimed to execute Phocas during the Hippodrome races and promote the praefectus 
praetorio Theodore. The conspirators, including Constantina, were tortured for information. Theodore was 
flogged to death, Constantina and her daughters were taken to the harbour of Eutropius and executed. The other 
conspirators were reportedly beheaded. Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 696-697; Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 295, 297-298 (trans. Mango and Scott 423, 426), Theophanes offers two partially 
contrasting accounts. 
1739 On Theodotos and Stephanos, the finance ministers: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 96-99; 
Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 369 (trans. Mango and Scott 515). On Stylianos’ attempted 
assassination of Leon VI on 11 May 903 at the mid-Pentecost feast at St. Mokios church: Vita Euthymii 
Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter 66-67; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 181 (trans. Wortley 176). 
On Basileios: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 228 (trans. Wortley 220). On Mamalos: Choniates, 
Historia, ed. van Dieten 310-312 (trans. Magoulias 172-173). 
1740 Michael’s proposed fate stood in contrast to the public nature of such executions, and the initial choice of 
Christmas Day would have been extremely unusual for an assassination that would not have resulted in a 
proclamation/coronation. On this episode, see above, page 217. 
1741 Nikephoros, Historia, ed. Mango 34-39; Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 701; Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 299 (trans. Mango and Scott 426). 
1742 On this ‘burial’, see Grierson, Mango, and Ševčenko 1962: 53, and n.143. For the desecration of the relics 





was burnt after his death in battle against the Bulgarian Kahn Krum, although his skull was 
retained as a trophy.1743 
Like the processions of the living, those of the dead inverted recognised ritual 
formats and symbolisms to engender public condemnation of the victim. The parading of 
excised body parts reversed imperial triumphs and funerary processions: glory and grief 
were substituted for indignity and opprobrium. The decision to display limbs, genitals, and 
heads, demystified the victim, exposing his mortality and shame, and destroyed familiar 
symbols of the imperial sacral charisma. The target was denied a true Christian burial, 
forever impeding their chances of resurrection, and methods of anonymous burial ensured 
that nothing remained to become the focus of a cult of personality; victims were physically 
erased from the public record. 
 
He’ll be back? Apolitical afterwords 
The penalties imposed on defeated opponents were believed to preclude their ever assuming 
power. Yet, unless opponents were executed, after the eighth century their return was not 
inconceivable. Justinian II’s restoration marked the first failure of political mutilation and 
forever presented aspirants with a precedent for a physically ‘imperfect’ person’s accession. 
Of course, Justinian did not present things in that manner. Instead, his coinage indicated an 
uninterrupted reign.1744 His maimed nose was disguised with a golden prosthetic, and was 
depicted uninjured in post-restoration iconography.1745 The artistic conventions of physical 
integrity were retained, brazenly denying the stigma of imperfection which evidently still 
functioned. In the histories, Justinian’s reign was divided into two periods and, consequently, 
                                                 
1743 Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 491 (trans. Mango and Scott 673-674); Grierson, Mango, and 
Ševčenko 1962: 55. 
1744 Bellinger 1966: 122. 





(for these authors) he had achieved an impossible return. Yet Justinian had never believed 
himself ineligible or overthrown and immediately after his banishment to Kherson a 
prophecy of return circulated.1746 The promulgation of the prophecy articulated an 
uncomfortable fact for usurpers: unless their predecessor was dead, they always had to fear 
his restoration. The factions had made the same point to Phocas at his coronation, ‘Go back. 
Learn the protocol. Maurice is not dead.’1747 The emperors Isaakios II, Andronikos IV, and 
Ioannes VII were similarly subjected to physical mutilation (blinding) that theoretically 
disbarred them, yet were restored to the throne (Isaakios), or gained the throne through 
rebellion in emulation of Justinian (Andronikos and Ioannes).  
The four represent the only cases of imperial restoration after political mutilation. 
They reveal the difficulty of contesting ‘physical integrity’. However, these successful 
challengers do suggest that, under certain circumstances, integrity was not an impregnable 
criterion. Each shared common features and Justinian II became the prototype. Around 704, 
he was made aware that Tiberios-Apsimaros intended to have him executed in Kherson. Pre-
empting his executioners, Justinian fled north to the town of Doros, and then appealed to the 
Khazar Khagan, Ibousiros Gliabanos, for refuge. He was treated with imperial honour and 
secured a marriage alliance with the Khagan’s sister, who took the baptismal name 
Theodora. The choice of name once again suggested Justinian’s intention to reclaim the 
throne by invoking the political and cultural memory of the first Justinian and Theodora, 
figures known to have faced a popular uprising by the Constantinopolitans and brutally 
crushed it.1748 However, the Khagan soon betrayed Justinian: he had been bribed by Tiberios-
Apsimaros and now plotted Justinian’s death. Alerted by Theodora, Justinian fled to the 
                                                 
1746 Allegedly made by the future Patriarch Kyros. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 372 (trans. Mango 
and Scott 520).  
1747 ὕπαγε, μάθε τὴν κατάστασιν· ὁ Μαυρίκιος οὐκ ἀπέθανεν. Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historia, ed. de Boor 
335 (trans. Whitby 226). Translation adapted. 





Bulgarian Khan Tervel.1749 In exchange for the title of kaisar and a prospective marriage to 
Justinian’s daughter, Anastasia, Tervel provided troops for Justinian’s successful restoration. 
They marched on Constantinople and took the city by subterfuge after several failed 
entreaties to the populace.1750  
In 1203, the instatement of Isaakios II and Alexios IV was achieved in an almost 
identical manner. The diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople, on behalf of 
Alexios IV, prompted Alexios III’s absconsion. Isaakios was swiftly restored by a faction 
headed by the treasurer Constantine Philoxenites and the Varangians in order that he 
negotiate favourable terms with the crusaders proclaiming his son as emperor: a 
proclamation the city had already rejected.1751 
Andronikos IV and Ioannes VII were equally reliant upon foreign troops to 
overthrow Ioannes V. Andronikos, who had been partially blinded with his son and removed 
from precedence after his attempted coup in 1373,1752 instigated another attempt in 1376. He 
approached the Genoese in his confinement at Pera, exploiting Ioannes V’s ceding of 
Tenedos to the Venetians,1753 and also entreated Murad I (realising that Ottoman 
authorisation would be necessary for any attempt against the throne). Andronikos offered 
Murad allegiance, tribute, and a marriage alliance to his sister, in exchange for Ottoman 
cavalry.1754 They attacked Constantinople and imprisoned Ioannes V, along with 
                                                 
1749 Autumn/Winter 704. 
1750 Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 102-103; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 375 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 523). 
1751 Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 550 (trans. Magoulias 301-302). For the rejection of Alexios IV by the 
populace (and by Alexios III’s envoys), see Robert de Clari, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. and trans. 
Dufournet 108-109. 
1752 On this first attempt, see Loenertz 1939; Charanis 1942/43: 293-295; Dölger 1961; Nicol 1993: 277-278; 
Necipoğlu 2009: esp. 119-121. 
1753 Venetian control of Tenedos threatened Genoese commercial interests: Nicol 1988: 305-307. Andronikos 
had also been instrumental in preventing the ceding of Tenedos to the Venetians in 1370, probably acting under 
the influence of Genoese backers: Necipoğlu 2009: 121 n.6, 125-126 and n.26. 





Andronikos’ brothers Manuel and Theodoros. Andronikos refused to execute them,1755 
immediately granted extensions to the colony at Pera, and ceded Tenedos to the Genoese as 
reward for their assistance.1756 Although Necipoğlu has identified a faction comprising 
members of court and the Constantinopolitan populace who favoured Andronikos’ accession 
and his pro-Ottoman/anti-Venetian stance, it was foreign support that secured the throne.1757  
Ioannes VII’s short-lived usurpation of his restored grandfather’s throne in 1390, was 
achieved in similar fashion. He approached the Genoese and Bayezid I for assistance and 
took Constantinople when his supporters opened the Charsios Gate.1758 
All four successions, even when they had the backing of a populist faction, were 
reliant upon foreign troops and the emperors involved had previously exercised sole rule or 
had been named co-emperor. Desperate circumstances and lucrative rewards for foreign 
allies, thus enabled the promotion of maimed emperors with dynastic claims and access to a 
network of notables, or the potential to resurrect those networks.  
To these successful examples, we may add a handful of episodes in which a mutilated 
or imperfect figure was proclaimed by Byzantines. The sons of Constantine V were foci for 
several confirmed, and alleged, conspiracies against Constantine VI and Eirene even after 
tonsure, exile, and escalating mutilations.1759 Basileios ‘the Copperhand’ exploited regional 
loyalty to the deceased usurper Constantine Doukas by adopting his identity and anti-
dynastic sentiments in the wake of the famine of 928, to incite revolt for a second time. The 
fact that he had been deprived of a hand was evidently not an impediment for his 
supporters.1760 And the blind Pseudo-Ioannes IV of Trikokkia was proclaimed by Laskarid 
                                                 
1755 The decision not to execute them was reportedly in contravention of Murad’s wishes. Chalkokondyles, 
Historia, ed. Darkó I, 56-57 (trans. Kaldellis I, 96-99); Doukas, Historia, ed. Grecu 73 (trans. Magoulias 79-
80). 
1756 Necipoğlu 2009: 122. 
1757 Necipoğlu 2009: 123-126. 
1758 Ignatius of Smolensk, in Russian Travellers, ed. Majeska 100-103. 
1759 See Table 1. 
1760 Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 912; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 421; Skylitzes, 





loyalists who, despite his condition, pledged to die for his cause.1761 In these instances, the 
potential of real power, and political disaffection, allowed charismatic figures (or political 
puppets) to be proclaimed although considered by others to be physically ‘ineligible’. Their 
failures should be understood in two ways: firstly, as an incidental reinforcement of 
prevailing dogmas of integrity; secondly, and more significantly, as unrealised instances of 
physically imperfect figures being thrust into power because their loyalists considered them 
genuinely viable.  
Finally, there is significant evidence that mutilation did not automatically end one’s 
career. Even some who suffered severe disfigurements lived long lives and returned to high-
ranking positions. Hagiochristophorites returned to the bureaucracy without feeling shame, 
and Ioannes IV survived for decades. Even victims of blinding were not precluded from 
holding governmental or military posts. After the loss of one eye in an accident, the 
sebastokrator Andronikos’ son, Ioannes, was recompensed by the emperor Manuel I with 
promotion as protovestiarios, and elevation to the ranks of the protosebastoi.1762 The totally-
blind Alexios Komnenos, a second cousin of Isaakios II, had been blinded by Andronikos I 
but was reappointed to lead a fleet in 1186. Choniates’ assertion that Alexios was considered 
unfit for duty was evidently a polemical explanation of the fleet’s subsequent failure rather 
than a genuine assessment of his physical capabilities.1763 Later, the Epirot Theodoros 
Komnenos Doukas remained the real power behind his son.1764 And in 1324 the renowned 
general Alexios Philanthropenos, blinded by Andronikos II for his rebellion in 1295, was 
returned to service after renewing fidelity. His heroic reputation remained unaffected.1765 
                                                 
1761 Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 259-67. 
1762 Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 126 (trans. Brand 99). 
1763 The campaign ended in abject failure when the fleet and its ground troops were captured by Isaakios and 
the ‘pirate’ Megareites. Those captured were allegedly taken to Sicily as labourers, swore loyalty to Isaakios, 
or were subjected to torture and mutilation in Cyprus. Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 369 (trans. Magoulias 
204). 
1764 Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 61 (trans. Macrides 207). 





These examples emphasise how easily a treasonous party under one emperor could be 
restored to favour by a successor, their wrongs erased but still written on the body. Even the 
disbarring potential of penalties was subjective and we may wonder how frequently victims 
were reappointed.1766  
 
Chapter Summary 
The imposition of a penalty, or the mutilation imposed on an unsuspecting imperial victim 
was adapted to the particular circumstances of a usurpation and was never strictly dependent 
upon legal prescriptions. Reconciliations remained a viable means of avoiding punishment 
altogether and bringing an end to civil conflict. They projected the supremacy of imperial 
power through ritual formats that involved a defeated opponent paying deference to the 
emperor who was then seen to ‘restore’ their membership to the Romano-Christian 
community. Reconciliation permitted that community to be reconstituted with minimal (or 
no) penalties for those responsible for its disintegration. This method of conflict resolution 
became increasingly important under the Komnenoi, and especially the Palaiologoi, when 
dynastic conflicts and the political-territorial division of the empire among family members 
and prominent aristocrats engendered infighting. Penalties like tonsure and exile remained 
potential options throughout the history of the empire, and were typically preferred for minor 
or first infractions, or coupled with political mutilations in response to more serious offences. 
Disfigurements served as disabling and disbarring penalties that intended to punish 
and preclude further wrongdoing. Their popularity vacillated with some becoming 
traditional penalties and then falling into disuse. Penalties were drawn from existing cultural 
                                                 
1766 There is need for a comprehensive study to address this omission in our understanding of the lives and 
responsibilities of the blind and physically disabled in Byzantine society. The topic has been well-covered for 
Ancient Greece, and blindness in Roman society is being increasingly scrutinised, yet Byzantium remains 
underexplored (Efthymiadis 2017). Trentin 2013, provides a useful introduction to the state of this research for 





practices represented in the legal codes, or from cross-cultural interaction with neighbouring 
civilizations. All of them held symbolic connotations that associated victims with particular 
forms of crime.1767 Blasphemy, perjury, sexual deviancy, or theft, were typically invoked 
and identified conspirators with immoral persons considered to be among the very worst in 
society. Since one’s appearance was a sign of character, and injuries were believed to have 
been warranted by God, victims were understood to have distanced themselves from divine 
favour. Since victims of mutilations were indelibly marked they became warnings of what 
could happen to others. Old identities were denied through the imposition of a penalty 
because the public would henceforth be encouraged to view these persons with disgust and 
opprobrium on account of their deformity and transgressions. 
Degradation parades, performed independently of a punishment, or attendant with a 
punishment, ritually delegitimised a victim. Usurpers were publicly shamed through a 
parody of inauguration rites, and an engineered consensus was directed against them. The 
preceding fragility of the imperial office was concealed through this demonstration of 
‘popular’ unity. Emperors might feature solely as observers, which allowed them to claim 
that the people had determined the penalty and had ratified imperial authority through their 
denunciation of the victim. The latter’s identity was ritually invalidated and replaced with a 
new (shameful) identity, he was ‘othered’ and isolated from the community. At a parade’s 
terminus, if the emperor chose to be present, imperial power could be communicated through 
the imposition of calcatio or supplicatio. The dominance of the people and the state, in the 
form of the basileus, was demonstrated over someone who had been revealed as an 
illegitimate and immoral tyrant. Deceased opponents were subjected to similar rituals, with 
body parts being used as proof of death and imperial victory.  
The imposition of a penalty had to take contemporary sensitivities into account. 
                                                 





Recourse to clemency, seemingly in response to public opinion (perhaps on occasion 
actually in response to public opinion), allowed emperors to demonstrate their exceptional 
virtue of philanthropia and demonstrate that they were attuned to the populace’s wishes and 
needs, where punishment might reveal them to be petty or unjust: signs of tyranny. Perceived 
injustice, or excessive punishment, risked a public backlash. The unexpected blinding of 
Romanos IV invited criticism of Michael VII that was exploited by Nikephoros III’s 
propagandists as proof of the emperor’s ‘injustice’. It introduced a period of disapproval 
with the penalty, which can be seen in the use and accounts of blindings in the decades that 
followed. It was probably not a coincidence that blinding fell out of favour under Alexios 
I’s immediate successors, when the Komnenian dynasty had linked itself so closely to the 
other aristocratic families: blinding one of their own would have undermined the notion of 
aristocratic perfection promoted elsewhere and exacerbated resentments; castration had 
fallen out of use in the eleventh century for similar reasons.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that so many of the historical narratives give detailed 
accounts of the fates of the defeated and deposed. The particulars of punishments are 
generally recorded: to which destination victims were paraded, the order in which penalties 
were applied, which body parts were damaged, etc. Since most authors had spent careers in 
government service, and had to deal with these issues as a matter of course, an interest in the 
Roman legal tradition and the application of ‘correct’ sentencing was a natural corollary. 
Furthermore, authors often belonged to the same section of society as prominent members 
of conspiracies and thus shared their concerns; the penalties imposed against one member of 
that group were a potential fate for other members. Communicative-legitimist efforts should 
not be overlooked either: detailed accounts attest to the success of regimes in ‘advertising’ 
a victim’s punishment and fate, and served to legitimise an emperor by comparison. 





taxis were worthy of recording, and served as a warning to those who might raise the spectre 









‘The glory of ruling’ did not make all things permissible. Emperors were subject to an 
ongoing process of evaluation and popular ratification, in opposition to political rivals. At 
each stage of a usurpation rituals and propaganda allowed the usurper to engender a dialogue 
with the populace. Moral leadership on behalf of the community was what both sides sought 
to convey because the exercise of power was legitimised with respect to ‘moral’ norms and 
emperors were overthrown when the representative consensus groups found them wanting. 
Success in usurping the throne was dependent upon the dynamic balance of power 
of the consensus groups of state and their support for a particular candidate. Meritocratic and 
republican ideologies, stemming from the Roman tradition, persisted in political thought and 
in the historical narratives. These ideas competed with hereditary-dynastic theories of rule 
that allowed individuals possessed of ‘superior’ lineage to claim a ‘right’ to the throne. 
However, the latter theories were only ever weakly established and could always be 
contested in practice. Vaguely defined notions of moral rulership, founded on Christian 
principles and the imperial virtues, provided the basis with which to assess the degree to 
which a reigning emperor or usurper exercised ‘lawful authority’. When an emperor failed 
to act in accordance with normative behaviours associated with moral rulership he could be 
accused of slipping into tyranny, oppressing the people, and opposed. A usurper could justify 
his intervention in the political realm on the basis that an emperor should always behave in 
a manner that protected the people from possible injustices, and which emulated the divine 
example. This was implicit within rhetorical formulations addressed to emperors concerning 
their status as living law, and in the oaths of loyalty sworn by their subjects in which service 
to the emperor and service to the state were not automatically synonymous. 





usurper to proclaim his own superior leadership and virtues. Economic, military, and 
political disapprobation lay at the heart of this propaganda, serving as evidence of imperial 
wrongdoing and the descent of the state due to mismanagement. Typically a usurper would 
present himself as reluctant to engage in a revolt. This was communicated through rhetorical 
accounts of his selection, or through a ritualised display of reluctance in the moments before 
his investiture and proclamation. These efforts served to reveal the moral superiority of the 
reluctant candidate who had been chosen to lead the state against his own inclinations, but 
in accordance with popular and divine will. His reign, it was inferred, would be a model of 
ideal rulership since he had shown humility and introspection when confronted with the 
prospect of his being raised to the imperial office, and had also demonstrated his deep respect 
for the law and concern for the wellbeing of the people by initially resisting the calls to rebel. 
If successful, he emerged blameless from a revolt since he was merely serving the will of 
the God as expressed by the entreaties of the people; he was legitimate from the outset. 
From the perspective of the usurper’s supporters, his proclamation represented his 
transition to imperial rule and his investiture ritually communicated this transformation from 
private citizen to basileus by conferring prerogatives associated with basileia. The 
acclamation of acknowledgement constituted a popular ratification of his authority, and 
allowed him to appropriate insignia that imitated those worn by the emperor in 
Constantinople. He could then make promotions and establish a rival court in order to 
manage his empire and strengthen his hold on authority.  
The capture of Constantinople and the Great Palace revealed his possession of real 
power, and enabled him to enact a coronation. The ceremony provided a symbolic 
‘universal’ ratification since his authority was then shown to have been accepted by all of 
the representative groups of state, at the capital (symbolic of the empire). The sacral charisma 





by the patriarch. The format of the ceremony was open to subtle modifications which 
allowed usurpers to communicate aspects of their imperial ideology and (re)define the 
sources of their authority. Basileios I and Michael VIII used a second coronation as an 
opportunity to distance themselves from the misdeeds that had established their rules, and to 
seek divine authorisation for their ascensions, whereas Herakleios and Ioannes VI appealed 
to the authorising authority and the historical tradition of coronation to correct deficiencies 
in previous coronations performed outside the capital. Investitures were subjective since they 
could not confer authority but merely demonstrated that it was dependent upon the consent 
of the people. 
The mechanisms of usurpation meant that misdeeds were invariably committed by a 
usurper in coming to power. Although oaths provided a tendentious excuse for rebellion on 
the basis of defending the interests of the state in opposition to those of a particular emperor, 
breaking them still connoted an act of perjury that distanced one from God. The perjurer was 
understood to have committed a sin and was liable to be excommunicated and suffer eternal 
damnation as a result. Bloodshed and civil war represented the other major sources of 
wrongdoing. They endangered the immortal soul and damaged state taxis by dividing the 
oikoumene and undermining social relations. Like the emperor whose subordinates 
committed misdeeds on his behalf, the misdeeds of a rebel’s supporters became his 
responsibility. His supporters were misled by him, distanced themselves from the Roman 
community through their illegal activities, and became almost barbarian by comparison. 
If he succeeded, the usurper could perform acts of repentance in order to atone for 
his sins and the wrongdoing committed on his behalf. This atonement might take private or 
public form, and could be forced upon a usurper by a patriarch before the latter would agree 
to participate in a coronation. A performative ritual of repentance, modelled on the examples 





witnessed, ritual-freed, gestures of humbling remorse and contrition that deviated from 
normal imperial behaviour, it served to ritually re-establish imperial moral authority and 
legitimise rulership by showing that an emperor was acting in accordance with divine law. 
It revealed his transformation from rule by force (the tyrannical acts performed during his 
usurpation), to lawful authority (the implied future respect for moral norms as basileus). The 
concern shown by authors to recording emperor’s private acts of repentance was inspired by 
cultural and literary developments, but testifies to the interest in, and perceived importance 
of, imperial repentance. The immortal soul was at stake, and the emperor acted as a model 
for emulation: if his authority was founded on misdeeds and he did not atone for them then 
the state was put at risk of divine retribution. 
Since guilt could be transferred from reign to reign, a failure to be seen to have 
suitably atoned might force dynastic successors to perform acts on their predecessor’s behalf. 
These served to validate the successor’s concern for truth and justice, legitimising their 
authority through their correction of a misdeed in which they had played no part. Vicarious 
redemption was achieved through symbolic gestures towards the memory of previous 
emperors, particularly through the use of imperial remains, and by bringing to justice other 
perpetrators of the crime. These gestures of atonement allowed schisms to be healed and 
connections to preceding dynasties to be forged. Ultimately this enabled the creation of 
networks of support for the new dynasty and provided the semblance of dynastic continuity 
as the most senior figure of the preceding dynasty was ritually ‘adopted’ (or ‘appropriated’) 
by the new dynasty. 
The treatment of defeated opponents was not beholden to legal prescriptions and took 
a variety of forms. Reconciliation was a recurring possibility and became an essential tool 
of conflict resolution under the Komnenoi and Palaiologoi, in connection with their 





initial phases of a rebellion, and at the beginning of a new emperor’s reign when he sought 
to find favour with the enemies of his predecessor. Formal rituals were innovated and 
facilitated the restoration and reintegration of the rebel as a member of the community 
through the public performance of shared acts or gestures with the emperor, the senior 
representative of the community. The sequence allowed the misdeeds performed by a rebel 
to be forgiven since he first displayed subordination through his enactment of deferential 
deeds like proskynesis or via association with humbling attire and other ritual gestures. 
Performative similarities with rituals of kin-making enhanced the ritual’s restorative 
symbolism. 
Punitive measures were attuned to contemporary sensibilities, preferences, and even 
to the mood of the populace, who were believed to have authorised an emperor’s use of 
them. Christianity encouraged these alternatives to execution, allowing mutilations to be 
considered a more merciful fate, and permitting emperors to espouse their philanthropeia 
and clemency. Political mutilation transformed a victim by altering his appearance in order 
to render him ‘othered’, and served to theoretically disbar him from ever holding office. This 
exclusionary function stemmed from the belief that physical integrity was necessary in order 
for an emperor to imitate Christ and perform his quasi-sacral duties. The penalties associated 
victims with moral-behavioural transgressions by visually associating them with people 
accused of the very worst crimes in Byzantine society, and especially with sexual and 
sacrilegious transgressions. They symbolically reversed the moral imperial ideal and served 
as an expression of the victim’s illegitimacy. The ritual degradation parades exploited similar 
symbolisms to publicly establish and project the extent of a usurper’s immorality. The 
formats of investiture rites were inverted in order to ritually invalidate a usurper’s claims to 
be the legitimate basileus. What emerged at the end of the ritual was an individual who had 





established in memory-history. His denunciation by the crowd served to legitimise the 
emperor by comparison. It acted as an expression of popular consensus against a victim who 
was shown to have acted against the will of the people and thus to have never been a 
legitimate emperor. The moral and elective principles that underpinned imperial authority 









Table 1: A provisional list of attempted usurpations and their outcomes (306-1453) 
 
Note: usurpations that succeeded in installing an emperor are marked in bold type. Prosopographical references are listed alongside the primary sources and are drawn from: 
A.H.M. Jones, J.R. Martindale, and J. Morris 1971-1992. Prosopography of the Late Roman Empire (PLRE); R.J. Lilie, et al. 1998-2013. Prosopographie der 
mittelbyzantinischen Zeit (PMBZ); M. Jeffreys, et al. 2016. Prosopography of the Byzantine World (PBW); J.-C. Cheynet 1990. Pouvoir et contestations à Byzance, 963-1210 
(Cheynet 1990); K. Varzos 1984. Η Γενεαλογία των Κομνηνών (Varzos 1984); and E. Trapp, et al. 1976-1996. Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit (PLP). For the 
period 963-1210 there are discrepancies between the counts given in the present work and Cheynet 1990. This is a result of the broader subject matter of Cheynet’s work 
(rebellions more generally) and of differing interpretations of the primary material. 
 
 
(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
Constantine I [306-337] 
(Oct 306 – Oct 312) Maxentius, son of Maximianus 
Augustus  
Description: Proclaimed by the praetorians at Rome. Initially styled himself ‘princeps invictus’, in emulation of 
Octavian-Augustus. Later claimed the title of Augustus. 
Fate: Defeated at the Milvian Bridge and drowned in the Tiber (28 Oct 312). Posthumously subjected to a degradation 
parade in Rome. Remains paraded in North Africa. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 2.9.2. - 2.16.4; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst II, 617-620; PLRE: I, 571 
(Maxentius). 
(308-310/311) Domitius Alexander, Vicarius of 
Africa 
Description: Proclaimed himself in opposition to Maxentius who had called for Domitius to demonstrate loyalty by 
sending his son to Maxentius as a hostage. 
Fate: The praefectus praetorio Rufius Volusianus and Zenas, the paucissimis cohortibus, defeated and captured 
Domitius. He was strangled in captivity. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 2.12.2. - 2.14; PLRE: I, 43 (Alexander 17). 
(333/334) Calocaerus, magister pectoris camelorum Description: Proclaimed Augustus on Cyprus. 
Fate: He was defeated by Dalmatius the censor, tried, and then executed at Tarsus. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 29 (trans. Mango and Scott 49); PLRE: I, 177 (Calocaerus). 
Constantius II [337-361], with Constans I [337-350], and Constantine II [337-340] 
(Jan 350 – Aug 353) Magnentius and Decentius Description: Magnentius was proclaimed Augustus by the troops at Augustodunum and was responsible for the 
assassination of Constans before February 350. 
Fate: Defeated by Constantius’ forces in July 353. Recognising that their cause was lost, the pair committed suicide 
within a week of each other. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle, 2.42-43; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 39-45 ; PLRE: I, 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
(Jun 350) Julius Nepotianus, nephew of Constantine 
I 
Description: Was proclaimed emperor and captured Rome from Magnentius’ adherent the Praefectus urbi, Titanius.  
Fate: He was killed on 30 June 350 when Maxentius dispatched the Magister Officiorum, Marcellinus, against him. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle, 2.43.2-4; Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 349; PLRE: I, 624 (Nepotianus 5). 
(Mar 350 - Dec 351) Vetranio, Magister Militum 
Imperium 
Description: Vetranio was proclaimed by the troops of Illyricum in response to the elevation of Magnentius. 
Constantina may have asked him to proclaim himself, in a loyalist effort to check Magnentius’ possible advances 
against her brother, Constantius II. Initially Vetranio sided with Constantius and received finances for his 
campaign, but, faced with reverses, he entered into negotiations with Magnentius. 
Fate: He was divested of his imperial attire and title and entered into retirement after performing a public reconciliation 
ceremony with Constantius (25 December 350). 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle, 2.44.2-4; Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte, ed. Bidez III, 22 (trans. Amidon 57); 
Sozomen, Histoire Ecclésiastique, ed. Bidez et al. 198-201; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 
38; PLRE: I, 954 (Vetranio 1). 
(Aug-Sep 355) Silvanus, magister peditum Description: Proclaims himself Augustus at Colonia Agrippina on 11 Aug 355 after being slandered to Constantius II. 
Fate: Dragged from a Christian shrine on 7 Sep 355 and assassinated by soldiers who had been bribed by Constantius. 
Sources: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 15.2.3; 15.5; PLRE: I, 840-841 (Silvanus 2). 
(Feb 360 – Nov 361) Julian, Caesar, brother-in-
law of Constantius II 
Description: Julian had been appointed Caesar by Constantius II on 6 Nov 355, in response to Claudius Silvanus’ 
usurpation in Gaul. He was proclaimed Augustus of the West in February 360 (at Paris) after Constantius ordered 
troops from Gaul to join his eastern campaigns. 
Fate: Although he attempted to gain Constantius’ recognition for his promotion, the two Augusti marched against each 
other in 361. An outright battle was only forestalled when Constantius died of natural causes on 3 Nov 361, 
having officially recognised Julian as his successor upon his deathbed. 
Sources: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 20.5-8; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 50-52; PLRE: I, 
477-478 (Iulianus 29). 
Julian [361–363] 
Jovian [363–364] 
Valentinian I [364–375] in the West, with Valens [364–378] in the East 
(Sep 365 – May 366) Procopius, comes, a relative of 
Julian; and Marcellus, protector, a relative of 
Procopius 
Description: Proclaimed Augustus at the palace in Constantinople on 28 Sep 365 with the support of the soldiers of the 
Divitenses and Tungricani, after hearing that Valentinian and Valens were planning to arrest him. He had 
previously been guaranteed the succession by Julian. 
Fate: Defeated by Valens after a mass desertion and beheaded on 27 May 366. His head was paraded at cities that had 
been loyal to him.  
Sources: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 26.5-9; Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle, 4.4.2 - 4.8.4; PLRE: I, 742-
743 (Procopius 4). 
(May/June 366) Marcellus, appointed Caesar by 
Procopius 
Description: Proclaimed himself Augustus in May/June upon the death of Procopius. 
Fate: Marcellus was captured by Valens and executed with his principal supporters soon after. 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
(Marcellus 5). 
(c.372-375) Firmus, son of the Moorish prince 
Nubel, a military officer 
Description: Proclaimed Augustus by the troops in Africa after a tax dispute. 
Fate: His armies were defeated and he committed suicide to prevent his capture. 
Sources: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 29.4-6; Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle, 4.16.3-6; PLRE: I, 340 
(Firmus 3). 
Valens [364-378] in the East, with Gratian [367-383] and Valentinian II [375-392] in the West 
(Spring 383 – Aug 388) Magnus Maximus, comes; 
and Flavius Victor, his son 
Description: Proclaimed Augustus in a military revolt by the troops of Britannia. 
Fate: Maximus was captured in a surprise attack by Theodosius I, divested of his imperial attire, and publicly 
executed on 28 Aug 388 after his crimes against the state had been read out. Flavius committed suicide upon 
hearing of his father’s defeat. 
Sources: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, 31.4.9; Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 4.35.2-4.47; PLRE: I, 588 
(Maximus 39) 
Theodosius I [379-395] in the East, with Honorius [393-423] in the West 
(Aug 392 – Sep 394) Eugenius, magister Description: Proclaimed Augustus in Aug 392 by the Magister Militum Arbogast who had assumed real power after 
the death of Valentinian II. 
Fate: He was captured and beheaded in a surprise attack by Theodosius I. His head was affixed to a spear and paraded 
around his troops’ encampment. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 4.54-58; Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 394; PLRE: I, 293 (Eugenius 6). 
Partition of Empire (395) 
Honorius [393-423] in the West, with Arcadius [395–408] in the East 
(406/407) Marcus Description: Proclaimed Augustus by the troops in Britannia. 
Fate: Executed by the troops and replaced with Gratianus. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 6.2.1; PLRE: II, 719-720 (Marcus 2). 
(406/407) Gratianus Description: Proclaimed Augustus by the troops in Britannia after the execution of Marcus. 
Fate: Executed by the troops after four months and replaced by Flavius Claudius Constantine [III]. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 6.2.2; PLRE: II, 518-519 (Gratianus 3). 
(407 - Sep 411) Flavius Claudius Constantine [III] 
and Constans [II], his son 
Description: Proclaimed Augustus by the troops in Britannia after the execution of Gratianus and established himself 
at Arles. 
Fate: He was tacitly recognised as Augustus by Honorius in 409 when he was sent an imperial robe by the emperor. 
However, he was besieged at Arles by Honorius’ troops in 411, sought asylum in a church, and received the 
tonsure. He surrendered to Honorius with his son Julius but they were executed. His head was displayed at 
Ravenna in Sep 411. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 6.2.2. - 6.13.1; PLRE: II, 316-317 (Constantinus 21). 
 Honorius [393-423] in the West, with Theodosius II [408-450] in the East 
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Fate: After the death of Gerontius in 411, Maximus was deposed by the troops. He either fled to join ‘the barbarians 
of Hispania’, or was executed. 
Sources: PLRE: II, 744-745 (Maximus 4). 
(409/410-411) Constans [II], son of Flavius Claudius 
Constantine [III] 
Description: Proclaimed Augustus by his father Flavius Claudius Constantine [III] in late 409 or early 410, in response 
to the usurpation of Maximus. 
Fate: Attacked and killed at Vienne in 411. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 6.4.1. - 6.13.1; Jordanes, Romana et Getica (Romana), ed. Mommsen 324; 
PLRE: II, 310 (Constans 1). 
(409 - Summer 410) Priscus Attalus, eparchus Description: Proclaimed Augustus by Alaric at Rome, after his second siege of the city. 
Fate: Deposed by Alaric following the latter’s reconciliation with Honorius in 410. Detained until 412, when he joined 
the Visigoths. 
Sources: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 6.7.1. – 6.12.3 ; Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte, ed. Bidez XII.3 (trans. Amidon 
155-156); PLRE: II, 180-181 (Attalus 2). 
(411-413) Jovinus and Sebastianus, his brother Description: Proclaimed Augustus at Mundiacum (Germania) in 411 with the support of Burgundian, Alan, and 
Frankish troops. 
Fate: Jovinus surrendered to Athaulfus in 413. He was beheaded at Narbo as he was being taken to Honorius. His head 
was displayed at Ravenna. 
Sources: Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte, ed. Bidez XII.6 (trans. Amidon 159); Jordanes, Romana et Getica 
(Romana), ed. Mommsen 165; PLRE: II, 621-622 (Iovinus 2). 
(412-413) Sebastianus, brother of Jovinus Description: Proclaimed Augustus by his brother Jovinus in 412, against the wishes of Athaulfus. 
Fate: He was captured by Athaulfus and beheaded. His head was displayed with that of his brother, at Ravenna. 
Sources: Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte, ed. Bidez XII.6 (trans. Amidon 159); Jordanes, Romana et Getica 
(Romana), ed. Mommsen 165; PLRE: II, 983 (Sebastianus 2). 
(c.412 – March 413) Heraclianus, comes Africae, 
consul 
Description: Rebelled in Africa and intended to be proclaimed Augustus (may actually have been proclaimed 
Augustus). 
Fate: Was defeated in battle near Ultriculum after sailing to Italy. He fled to Carthage where he was murdered in March 
413. 
Sources: Jordanes, Romana et Getica (Romana), ed. Mommsen 325; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 81 
(trans. Mango and Scott 126); PLRE: II, 539-540 (Heraclianus 3). 
(414-415) Priscus Attalus, former usurper/Augustus Description: Proclaimed Augustus for a second time, by the Visigoths. 
Fate: Abandoned by his Visigoth supporters he was captured by Honorius. Two of the fingers on his right hand were 
amputated and he was exiled to the island of Lipara. 
Sources: Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte, ed. Bidez XII.4-5 (trans. Amidon 157-158); PLRE: II, 180-181 (Attalus 
2). 
Valentinian III [423-455] in the West, with Theodosius II [408-450] in the East 
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notariorum Fate: Was captured in 425 after defeat against Theodosius II and Valentinian III. He had a hand amputated and was 
executed in the Hippodrome at Ravenna (426) after a degradation parade. 
Sources: Procopius, History of the Wars, II.3.4-9; PLRE: II, 594-595 (Ioannes 6). 
Marcian [450-457] in the East, with Valentinian III [423-455] in the West 
(Mar-May 455) Petronius Maximus, son-in-law of 
Theodosius II 
Description: Murdered Valentinian III on 16 Mar 455 and proclaimed himself emperor in the West on the next day. 
Fate: Assassinated in Rome during Gaiseric’s attack on the city (allegedly stoned to death by the mob). 
Sources: PLRE: II, 749-751 (Maximus 22). 
(June-Aug 455) Avitus, Magister Militum 
Praesentalis 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by Theodoric II at Arles after the death of Petronius Maximus, and marched on 
Rome.  
Fate: He was recognised by the Roman senate, and Marcian, as Augustus in the West. 
Sources: PLRE: II, 196-198 (Avitus 5). 
Marcian [450-457] in the East, with Avitus [455-456] in the West 
(456 - Apr 457) Majorian, Magister Militum Description: As comes domesticorum Majorian rebelled against Avitus, with Ricimer. He defeated and deposed Avitus 
at the Battle of Placentia (Oct 456) and had him murdered soon after. Majorian was appointed Magister Militum 
in 457 (probably by Leo I), and was proclaimed Augustus of the West in April with the approval of Leo. 
Fate: He was confirmed as Augustus in December 457. 
Sources: PLRE: II, 702-703 (Maiorianus). 
Leo I [457-474] in the East, with Majorian [457-461] in the West 
(461-465) Libius Severus, senator Description: Ricimer deposed, divested, tortured, and beheaded Majorian in August 461. He eventually proclaimed 
Libius Severus as Augustus of the West in November, at Ravenna. 
Fate: He was recognised as emperor by the Roman senate, but never officially by Leo I (despite collaboration between 
their courts). 
Sources: Jordanes, Romana et Getica (Romana), ed. Mommsen 335; PLRE: II, 1004-1005 (Severus 18). 
Libius Severus [461-465] in the West, and Leo I [457-474] in the East 
Anthemius [467-472] in the West, with Leo I [457-474] in the East 
(470) Romanus, patricius, former magister 
officiorum 
Description: Discovered plotting to assassinate Anthemius in association with the Magister Militum Ricimer, and 
accused of aspiring to imperial power. 
Fate: Arrested, tried, and beheaded. 
Sources: PLRE: II, 947 (Romanus 4). 
(471) Aspar, Magister Militum Description: Discovered plotting to assassinate Leo I and proclaim a rival emperor. 
Fate: Executed with his son, Ardabur, inside the palace at Constantinople. 
Sources: Procopius, History of the Wars, III.6.22-27l; PLRE: II, 164-169 (Aspar). 
(472) Arvandus, praefectus praetorio per Galliarum Description: Accused of treason for conspiring against Anthemius with the Visigothic king Euric. Probably intended 
to be proclaimed. 
Fate: Arrested and tried in Rome. Sentenced to death, but this was commuted to exile during the legal thirty day delay.  
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(Apr-Jul 472) Olybrius, patricius, former consul Description: In 472 Olybrius was sent by Leo I to mediate between Anthemius and Ricimer, however, Ricimer 
proclaimed Olybrius as Augustus of the West in April, and Anthemius was murdered in July. 
Fate: He was recognised as emperor by the Roman senate, but not by Leo I. 
Sources: Jordanes, Romana et Getica (Romana), ed. Mommsen 338-339; Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 464; 
PLRE: II, 796-798 (Olybrius 6). 
Olybrius [472] in the West, and Leo I [457-474] in the East 
(Mar 473 – c. Jun 474) Glycerius, comes 
domesticorum 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by Gundobarus (Ricimer’s nephew), and the imperial guard, at Ravenna in 473. 
Fate: His authority appears to have been recognised only in Northern Italy. He abdicated to Leo I’s appointee Julius 
Nepos in 474, without resistance. He was divested, and consecrated as bishop of Selona, in Delmatia. 
Sources: Jordanes, Romana et Getica (Romana), ed. Mommsen 338; PLRE: II, 514 (Glycerius). 
Julius Nepos [473-475/480] in the West, with Leo I [457-474] in the East 
Leo II [474] 
Zeno [474-491] 
(Oct 475 – Sep 476) Romulus Augustulus, son of 
Orestes the Magister Militum 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by his father in 475 in Italy, after Julius Nepos had fled to Delmatia. 
Fate: Deposed by Odovacer at Ravenna after the murder of his father and uncle. On account of his youth, Romulus 
was permitted to live with family members on an estate in Campania and was granted an annual stipend. 
Sources: Jordanes, Romana et Getica (Romana), ed. Mommsen 344; PLRE: II, 811-812 (Orestes 2); PLRE: II, 949-
950 (Romulus 4). 
(Jan 475 – Aug 476) Basiliscus, brother-in-law of 
Leo I 
Description: He successfully assumed the throne in Constantinople (475-476) after winning the support of the 
Ostrogoth troops under Theodoric Strabo, and the Isaurians under Illus. Basiliscus and the empress-dowager 
Verina, with the support of the magister officiorum Patricius, and the magister militum per Thracias, convinced 
Zeno that he would be assassinated if he did not flee Constantinople. Zeno fled to Isauria and his supporters in 
Constantinople were slaughtered by Basiliscus’ allies. Basiliscus received a coronation and promoted his son 
Marcus as Caesar. He administered the government from Constantinople and sent Strabo and Illus against Zeno. 
Fate: Zeno rallied his Isaurian loyalists in effort to retake the throne and eventually bribed Strabo and Illus to join his 
cause. In 476, upon hearing that Zeno had entered Constantinople and the Great Palace, Basiliscus fled with his 
family to the Great Church. Zeno had them divested of their imperial insignia whilst inside the church and granted 
them an oath of assurance. They were exiled to Limnai in Cappadocia where they died of exposure. 
Sources: Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 100-108 (trans. Whitby 132-142); Malalas, 
Chronographia, ed. Thurn 301-303 (trans. Jeffreys 209-210); PLRE: II, 212-214 (Basiliscus 2). 
Fall of Western Roman Empire (476)  
(479) Marcianus, son-in-law of Leo I, and son of 
Western Emperor Anthemius 
Description: Instigated a popular revolt with the intention of proclaiming himself emperor. Had support from his 
brothers Romulus and Procopius, and from Theodoric Strabo. 
Fate: His supporters were bribed, and he was driven from the Great Palace. He sought asylum at the church of the 
Holy Apostles and was exiled to Caesarea. 
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Chronographia, ed. de Boor 126-127 (trans. Mango and Scott 195); PLRE: II, 717-718 (Marcianus 17). 
(c.483/484) Marcianus, son-in-law of Leo I, and son 
of Western Emperor Anthemius 
Description: Discovered attempting to escape his confinement in Caesarea during the Isaurian revolt of 483-484. He 
probably intended to renew his ambitions for the throne. 
Fate: He was ordained a presbyter and exiled to Papyrius in Cappadocia. 
Sources: Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 122-123 (trans. Whitby 161); PLRE: II, 717-
718 (Marcianus 17). 
(Jul 484 - 488) Leontius, Magister Militum per 
Thracias 
Description: Was despatched to suppress the Isaurian revolt of Illus in 484, but was subsequently persuaded to join the 
revolt and was proclaimed emperor (19 Jul 484). 
Fate: Finally defeated in 488, Leontius was beheaded at Seleucia-on-Calycadnus. His head was sent to Constantinople 
and displayed on a stake near St. Konan’s at Skylai. 
Sources: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 316-317 (trans. Jeffreys et al 214-218); Evagrius Scholasticus, 
Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 123-124 (trans. Whitby 162); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 
132 (trans. Mango and Scott 196-204); PLRE: II, 670-671 (Leontius 17). 
Anastasius I [491-518] 
(491-492) Flavius Longinus, brother of Zeno, 
Magister Militum 
Description: Entered into rebellion with the intention of establishing himself as Zeno’s successor. 
Fate: Exiled to Alexandria, and may have been ordained. 
Sources: Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 125 (trans. Whitby 164-166); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 137 (trans. Mango and Scott 210); PLRE: II, 689-690 (Longinus 6). 
(512) Areobindus, former Magister Militum per 
Orientem 
Description: Proclaimed by the Constantinopolitan crowds. 
Fate: Areobindus fled to the Perama to avoid his proclamation and does not appear to have been punished. Those 
citizens responsible for the unrest and proclamation were variously punished. 
Sources: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 333-334 (trans. Jeffreys 228); John of Nikiu, Chronicle, trans. Charles 
129; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 159 (trans. Mango and Scott 240); PLRE: II, 143-144 (Areobindus 
1). 
(513/514) Vitalianus, Magister Militum per 
Thracias 
Description: Proclaimed emperor after a military pay dispute involving the foederati, and marched against 
Constantinople. 
Fate: Reconciled with Anastasius after exchanging oaths. 
Sources: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 332-333 (trans. Jeffreys 226-227); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de 
Boor 157-158 (trans. Mango and Scott 238-239); PLRE: II, 1171-1176 (Vitalianus 2). 
Justin I [518-527] 
(518) Theocritus, comes domesticorum Description: Upon the death of Anastasius, Theocritus distributed largess in an effort to buy support for his 
proclamation in opposition to Justin. 
Fate: Executed by Justin’s loyalists inside the Great Palace. 
Sources: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 337 (trans. Jeffreys 230-231); Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 519; 
PLRE: II, 1065 (Theocritus). 
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(532) Nika Riot: Hypatius, nephew of Anastasius I Description: Proclaimed emperor by the Constantinopolitan crowds, initially prompting Justinian to flee. 
Fate: Hypatius was taken prisoner, executed, and his remains cast into the sea. The crowd supporting his proclamation 
were slaughtered. 
Sources: Procopius, History of the Wars, I.24.19-31; Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 163 
(trans. Whitby 213); Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 397-398 (trans. Jeffreys 278); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 181-186 (trans. Mango and Scott 276-280); PLRE: II, 577-581 (Hypatius 6). 
(536-537) Stotzas Description: Proclaimed emperor in a military rebellion in Africa. 
Fate: Suffered desertions and was defeated by Germanus at the Battle of Cellas (537). Fled to join the Vandals. 
Sources: Procopius, History of the Wars, II.11-17; III.39.12; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 203-205 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 297-299); PLRE: IIIb, 1199-1200 (Stotzas). 
(537) John Cottistis Description: Proclaims himself emperor at Dara. 
Fate: Assassinated by loyalist soldiers and local aristocrats after four days. 
Sources: Procopius, History of the Wars, I.26.5-12; PLRE: IIIa, 639-640 (Ioannes 24). 
(25 Nov 562) The banker Marcellus, Ablabius, the 
curator Aetherius, Sergius 
Description: Uncovered bearing swords, having planned to murder Justinian in the triclinium. Claim that Belisarius 
was involved in the conspiracy, but this is unlikely. 
Fate: Ablabius disclosed the details of the plot. Marcellus killed himself to prevent capture. Sergius sought sanctuary 
at the church of the Mother of God at Blachernai but was expelled, taken prisoner and interrogated. A silention 
was convened and the conspirators’ penalties read out. Belisarius was placed under house arrest. 
Sources: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 427-428 (trans. Jeffreys 301-303); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de 
Boor 237-238 (trans. Mango and Scott 349-350); PLRE: IIIb, 816 (Marcellus 4); PLRE: IIIa, 2-3 (Ablabius 1); 
PLRE: IIIb, 1128 (Sergius 6); PLRE: IIIa, 21-22 (Aetherius 2). 
Justin II [565-574] 
(566) Justin, augustalis (cousin of Justin II) Description: Uncovered plotting for the throne. 
Fate: Banished to Alexandria, later beheaded. Head sent to Constantinople. 
Sources: Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 196-197 (trans. Whitby 256-257); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 244 (trans. Mango and Scott 360); PLRE: IIIa, 750-754 (Iustinus 4). 
(Sep/Oct 566) Aetherius and Addaeus, (senators) Description: Discovered trying to poison Justin II. Probably intended to proclaim a rival emperor. Aetherius had been 
involved in the conspiracy of 562. 
Fate: Beheaded. 
Sources: Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Parmentier 197 (trans. Whitby 256-257); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 242 (trans. Mango and Scott 356); PLRE: IIIa, 14-15 (Addaeus); PLRE: IIIa, 21-22 
(Aetherius 2). 
Tiberius II [574-582] 
(Oct 578) Justinian, magister militum Description: Uncovered plotting for the throne. 
Fate: He was fined fifteen centenaria and pardoned. 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
(Oct 579/580/581) Justinian, magister militum Description: Uncovered plotting for the throne with Justin II’s widow Sophia. 
Fate: He received a reprimand from the emperor and was pardoned. 
Sources: Kaegi 1981: 62; PLRE: IIIa, 744-747 (Iustinianus 3). 
Maurice [582-602] 
(20 Apr 588) Germanus, dux per Phoenicia Description: Proclaimed emperor at Monokarton (Antioch), in a military pay dispute at Easter. 
Fate: When order had been restored Germanus was tried and found guilty of treason. Originally sentenced to death, 
this was commuted by Maurice who rewarded Germanus for preventing the troops from pillaging. 
Sources: Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 115-116 (trans. Whitby 74); Evagrius Scholasticus, 
Ecclesiastical History, ed. Bidez and Parmentier 224-225 (trans. Whitby 294-296); Theophanes, Chronographia, 
ed. de Boor 260 (trans. Mango and Scott 382); PLRE: IIIa, 529-530 (Germanus 6). 
(Oct-Nov 602) Phocas Description: Phocas was proclaimed emperor in a military revolt on the Danube frontier. He marched on 
Constantinople and the government collapsed within a month. 
Fate: Maurice abdicated and fled the Constantinople with his family. He was taken from the monastery in which they 
had sought asylum and publicly executed in November at the Harbour of Eutropius, together with his six sons. 
Their bodies were thrown into the sea. Phocas was acclaimed emperor by the Greens upon entering the city, and 
was crowned emperor by Patriarch Kyriakos on 25 Nov 602. 
Sources: Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 326-339 (trans. Whitby 219-229); Chronicon Paschale, 
ed. Dindorf I, 692-693; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 288-290, 291 (trans. Mango and Scott 412-414, 
418-419); PLRE: IIIb, 1030-1032 (Phocas 7). 
(Oct/Nov 602) Philippicus, comes excubitorum, 
brother-in-law of Maurice 
Description: Faced with Phocas’ revolt, a prophecy was circulated which indicated that Philippicus was plotting for 
the throne. 
Fate: Philippicus fell out of favour with Maurice (he may have been placed under house arrest), but was later reconciled 
with the emperor in private, after performing proskynesis and embracing. 
Sources: Theophylact Simocatta, Historiae, ed. de Boor 29 (trans. Whitby 196); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de 
Boor 283, 284-286 (trans. Mango and Scott 408, 409-411); PLRE: IIIb, 1022-1026 (Philippicus 3). 
(Nov 602) Germanus, father-in-law of Maurice’s 
son and heir Theodosius, patricius 
Description: Was offered the throne by elements of the soldiery inside Constantinople as Phocas approached the city, 
and sought proclamation by the Greens. 
Fate: His proclamation was not supported by the Greens, so he swore loyalty to Phocas. 
Sources: Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 333-334 (trans. Whitby 225); Theophanes, 
Chronographia, ed. de Boor 289 (trans. Mango and Scott 413); PLRE: IIIa, 531-532 (Germanus 11). 
Phocas [602-610] 
(Late 603) Germanus, father-in-law of Maurice’s 
son and heir Theodosius, patricius; and 
Constantina, former Augusta 
Description: Germanus sought to be proclaimed emperor with the support of Constantina and the Green faction.  
Fate: Germanus’ plan to buy the support of the Greens failed. Constantina and her daughters fled to Hagia Sophia 
where they were granted asylum by Patriarch Kyriakos. Phocas granted the women an oath of assurance and sent 
them into monastic confinement. Germanus was captured, tonsured, and kept under house arrest. 
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Scott 421-422); PLRE: IIIa, 531-532 (Germanus 11); PLRE: IIIa, 337-339 (Constantina 1). 
(605) Germanus, father-in-law of Maurice’s son 
and heir Theodosius, patricius; and Constantina, 
former Augusta; with elements of the army led by 
the praefectus Theodorus 
Description: Germanus and Constantina were discovered plotting for the throne after a rumour was spread that 
Theodosius, the son and heir of Maurice was still alive. Military figures were also implicated in the conspiracy 
including Theodorus the praefectus of the East. 
Fate: Constantina and her three daughters were executed at the Harbour of Eutropius. Germanus and his daughter were 
killed in their monastic confinement on Prote. Theodorus was flogged to death. Other figures were subjected to 
amputations, execution, and exile. 
Sources: Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 696; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 295, 297 (trans. Mango 
and Scott 423, 426); PLRE: IIIa, 531-532 (Germanus 11); PLRE: IIIb, 1275 (Theodorus 151). 
(608 - Oct 610) Herakleios, son of the exarch of 
Africa 
Description: In 608 Herakleios’ father renounced his oath to Phocas and entered into rebellion. Niketas, Herakleios’ 
younger cousin, marched through Egypt while Herakleios sailed on Constantinople, via Sicily and Cyprus. 
Herakleios was proclaimed emperor and crowned (for the first time) during his revolt, at Kyzikos in August or 
September 610. He gained entrance to Constantinople after the defenders deserted Phocas. The comes 
excubitorum Priscus, Phocas’ son-in-law and de facto heir, switched allegiance to Herakleios. 
Fate: Phocas was executed by Herakleios himself (5 Oct 610). The corpse was beheaded and mutilated, before being 
paraded through Constantinople to the Forum Bovis and burned. Herakleios was crowned emperor (for a second 
time) by Patriarch Sergios at the Church of St Stephen. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 297-299 (trans. Mango and Scott 426-428); Nikephoros, Historia 
Syntomos, ed. Mango 34-41; Chronicon Paschale, ed. Dindorf I, 699-701; PLRE: IIIa, 586-587 (Heraclius 4). 
Herakleios [610-641] 
(610-611) Komentiolos, brother of Phocas, 
patricius, commander of the eastern armies 
Description: Refused to acknowledge Herakleios’ authority and planned to claim the throne after the death of his 
brother. 
Fate: He was assassinated while wintering his troops at Ancyra. 
Sources: PLRE: III, 326 (Comentiolus 2). 
(617) John of Compsa, Magister Militum Description: Rebelled at Naples and intended to claim the imperial title. 
Fate: Defeated and killed by the Eleutherius, the exarch of Ravenna. 
Sources: Liber Pontificalis, ed. Vogel I, 106; PLRE: IIIa, 702-703 (Ioannes 240). 
(635/637) Ioannes Athalarichos, the illegitimate son 
of Herakleios, and Theodoros, magistros 
Description: Accused of plotting to depose Herakleios and proclaim Athalarichos emperor in a bloodless coup 
involving prominent Armenian nobles at court. 
Fate: Conspirators have their noses and hands maimed. Athalarichos was exiled to Prinkipos, and Theodoros to 
Gaudomelete (Malta). 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 58-59, 72-73; Sebeos, trans. Thomson 93, 107; PLRE: IIIa, 706 
(Ioannes 260). 
Constantine III (Herakleios Constantine) [641] 
Heraklonas [641] 
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III; through the intervention of Valentinos, 
commander of the troops in the east 
intended to secure their loyalty for the accession of Constantine’s son Konstans II in the face of dynastic infighting 
against Heraklonas and Martina. When Constantine died Valentinos marched on Constantinople in defence of 
Konstans’ rights. 
Fate: Valentinos was able to force Heraklonas and Martina to crown Konstans co-emperor. He was appointed comes 
excubitorum and then aided the popular rebellion that overthrew Heraklonas and Martina. Heraklonas and his 
brothers had their noses mutilated and were exiled to Rhodes (Marinos was additionally castrated); Martina had 
her tongue cut and was exiled. Konstans became sole emperor and was married to Valentinos’ daughter. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 78-85; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 341 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 475); John of Nikiu, Chronicle, trans. Charles 197; PLRE: IIIa, 333 (Constans 2); PLRE: IIIa, 
1354-1355 (Valentinus 5). 
Konstans II [641-668] 
(644) Valentinos, father-in-law of Konstans II, 
commander of the troops “of the East” 
Description: Marched on Constantinople with the intention of being proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: He was killed in the attempt. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 343 (trans. Mango and Scott 476); PLRE: IIIa, 1354-1355 
(Valentinus 5). 
(646-647) Gregorius, patrikios, and exarch of 
Carthage 
Description: Rebelled in North Africa and had himself proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: Was defeated in battle with the Arabs and went into exile. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 343 (trans. Mango and Scott 477-478); PLRE: IIIa, 554 (Gregorius 
19). 
(667-669) Saborios, strategos ton Armeniakon Description: Enters into revolt in Anatolia and was probably proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: Was killed at Hadrianople (in Asia Minor) when he lost control of his horse. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 348-349 (trans. Mango and Scott 488-489); PMBZ (Saborios 
6476). 
(668-669) Mizizios, strategos/comes (of the 
Opsikion?) 
Description: Was involved in the assassination of Konstans II in Sicily and was proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: Constantine sent a fleet which defeated the usurper. Mizizios was beheaded, and his head was sent to 
Constantinople. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 351-352 (trans. Mango and Scott 490-491); Liber Pontificalis, ed. 
Vogel I, 190; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 221-222; PMBZ (Mezezius 5163). 
Constantine IV [668-685] 
Justinian II [685-695] (1st) 
(695-698) Leontios, former strategos ton 
Helladikon 
Description: Proclaimed emperor at Constantinople in a popular revolt over Justinian II’s governance. 
Fate: Justinian II was deposed, had his nose and tongue mutilated, and was exiled to Kherson. Leontios was crowned 
emperor by Patriarch Kallinikos. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 94-99; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 368-369 (trans. 
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(698) Tiberios III (Apsimaros), droungarios of 
the Kibyrrhaeot theme 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by the Kibyrrhaeot theme after the failed expedition to retake Carthage. He sailed 
on Constantinople and besieged the city for several months. He eventually gained access when the ‘Greens’ and 
elements within the imperial guard joined his cause. 
Fate: Leontios was deposed, had his nose mutilated, and was tonsured at the monastery of Delmatos. Tiberios-
Apsimaros was crowned emperor by Patriarch Kallinikos. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 100-101; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 370-371 
(trans. Mango and Scott 517); PMBZ (Tiberios 8483). 
Tiberios III (Apsimaros) [698-705] 
(701) Philippikos-Bardanes,  Description: Suspected of plotting for the throne; an eagle omen (indicative of future rule) was attributed to him. 
Fate: He was exiled to Kephalonia. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 372 (trans. Mango and Scott 519); PMBZ (Philippikos 6150). 
(702/3-705) Justinian II Description: Justinian escaped his guards at Kherson and secured the assistance of Khan Tervel of Bulgaria. Supplied 
with troops to support his restoration, he marched on Constantinople and gained entrance to the city via an 
unguarded postern gate. 
Fate: Tiberios-Apsimaros was taken prisoner after fleeing the city. He was publicly paraded with Leontios during the 
Hippodrome games. The pair were subjected to a calcatio and beheaded. Justinian was restored and counted the 
period of his exile as part of his reign. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 100-105; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 375 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 523); PMBZ (Iustinianos 3556). 
Justinian II [705-711] (2nd) 
(710-711) Giorgios Description: Proclaimed emperor at Ravenna in opposition to Justinian, after the murder of the exarch John Rizocopo. 
Fate: He was probably executed: his father, who was imprisoned in Constantinople, was tortured to death. 
Sources: Liber Pontificalis, ed. Vogel I, 389. 
(711) Philippikos-Bardanes Description: Philippikos had been exiled under Tiberios but was restored by Justinian as part of the emperor’s 
expedition to retake Kherson. Philippikos’ troops revolted and proclaimed him emperor, and with support from 
the Khazars Philippikos marched on Constantinople. 
Fate: Justinian was captured trying to rally troops as he fled to Armenia. He was beheaded, and his head was sent to 
Constantinople and then to the West (Ravenna). Justinian’s body was thrown to the sea. Tiberios, Justinian’s six-
year-old son and co-emperor, was dragged from the sanctuary of the church of the Mother of God at Blachernai, 
divested of imperial attire, and had his throat slit. The boy was buried at church of the Holy Anargyroi. Philippikos 
was crowned emperor by Patriarch Kyros. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 110-113; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 379-381 
(trans. Mango and Scott 528-530); PMBZ (Philippikos 6150). 
Philippikos-Bardanes [711-713] 
(Jun 713) Artemios-Anastasios II, asekretis; with 
help from the strategos ton Thrakesion 
Description: Artemios-Anastasios was proclaimed emperor on 3 June after a conspiracy in Constantinople involving 
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Theodoros Myakios, and comes tou Opsikiou 
Georgios Bouraphos 
Fate: Philippikos was captured, blinded, and exiled as he returned from a feast at the Zeuxippus. Artemios-Anastasios 
was crowned emperor by Patriarch Ioannes VI. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 383 (trans. Mango and Scott 533); Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos 
ed. Mango 114-117; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 170; PMBZ (Anastasios 236); PMBZ 
(Theodoros 7519); PMBZ (Georgios 2107); PMBZ (Ruphos 6435). 
Anastasios II [713-715] 
(May 715) Theodosios III, tax official in Hellas Description: Proclaimed emperor in May by the troops of the Opsikion and marched on Constantinople. The army 
gained access via the Blachernai gate with assistance from some of the defenders. Artemios-Anastasios abdicated 
when an oath of assurance reached him at Nikaia (where he had been preparing to campaign in the east). 
Fate: Artemios-Anastasios was tonsured and exiled to Thessalonike; his supporters reportedly faced no punitive 
measures. Theodosios was crowned emperor by Patriarch Germanos. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 385 (trans. Mango and Scott 536); Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos 
ed. Mango 118-119; PMBZ (Theodosios 7793). 
Theodosios III [715–717] 
(717) Leon III, strategos ton Anatolikon Description: Leon refused to accept the authority of Theodosius III, proclaimed himself emperor in Anatolia, and 
entered into revolt with Artabasdos, the strategos ton Armeniakon. 
Fate: Theodosios was forced to abdicate after learning that Leon had captured his son at Nicomedia. Theodosios and 
his son were tonsured and exiled. Leon entered Constantinople as emperor on 25 March, and was crowned by 
Patriarch Germanos. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 389-390 (trans. Mango and Scott 539-540); PMBZ (Leon 4242). 
Leon III [717-741] 
(718) Basileios Onomagoulos; Sergios, 
protospatharios, strategos of Sicily 
Description: Basileios was proclaimed emperor on Sicily by the strategos Sergios during the siege of Constantinople 
by the Arabs. 
Fate: He was handed over to imperial forces and beheaded. His head was sent to Constantinople, and his supporters 
were variously subjected to nose-cutting, amputations, and other punitive measures. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 124-125; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 398-399 
(trans. Mango and Scott 549-550); PMBZ (Basileios 849); PMBZ (Sergios 6594). 
(719) Artemios-Anastasios II Description: Was proclaimed emperor at Thessalonike in a revolt involving the magistros Niketas Xylinites and the 
bishop of Thessalonike, which was supported by the Bulgarians under Khan Tervel. 
Fate: Artemios-Anastasias marched on Constantinople but was betrayed to the emperor by the Bulgarians when the 
city rejected his proclamation. Artemios-Anastasios, Xylinites, and the bishop, were all beheaded. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 126-127; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 400-401 
(trans. Mango and Scott 552); PMBZ (Anastasios 236). 
(c.Feb-April 727) Kosmas Description: Proclaimed emperor in a popular revolt amongst the population of Hellas and the Cyclades. 
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Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 405 (trans. Mango and Scott 560); PMBZ (Kosmas 4093). 
(729-730) Tiberios Petasius Description: Proclaimed emperor in Italy, supposedly in reaction to Iconoclasm. 
Fate: Captured and beheaded. His head sent to Constantinople. 
Sources: Liber Pontificalis, ed. Vogel I, 148; PMBZ (Tiberios 8492). 
(737) Biseros (Pseudo-Tiberios) Description: Claimed the throne as Tiberios, the son of Justinian II.  
Fate: Unkown. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 411 (trans. Mango and Scott 570); PMBZ (Tiberios 8491). 
Constantine V [741-775] 
(c.741/742-743) Artabasdos comes tou Opsikiou, 
and brother-in-law of Constantine V; with 
Nikephoros, his son  
Description: Artabasdos had supported Leon III against Theodosios III, and had married Leon’s daughter Anna. Soon 
after Constantine’s accession Artabasdos proclaimed himself emperor in Asia Minor and broke into revolt. 
Fate: Artabasdos defeated Constantine’s forces as the emperor marched east in preparation to campaign against the 
Arabs. Constantine fled to Amorian, while Artabasdos marched on Constantinople and was welcomed into the 
city. Artabasdos was crowned by Patriarch Anastasios. Nikephoros, Artabasdos’ younger son, was then crowned 
co-emperor. Constantine organised a counter-offensive c.742/743, defeated Artabasdos’ older son Niketas the 
monostrategos, and recaptured Constantinople when Artabasdos and Nikephoros fled to Pouzane (in Asia Minor). 
The pair were later captured and subjected to a degradation parade with Nikephoros and their supporters in the 
Hippodrome at Constantinople. All three were blinded and tonsured, and their supporters were variously subjected 
to execution, mutilations, and confiscations. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 136-137; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 415-421 
(trans. Mango and Scott 575-581); PMBZ (Artabasdos 632). 
(742/743) Sisinnios, strategos ton Thrakesion, 
cousin of Constantine V 
Description: Believed to be planning a usurpation, forty days after the parade of Artabasdos. 
Fate: Taken prisoner and blinded. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 136-137; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 420-421 
(trans. Mango and Scott 581); PMBZ (Sisinnios 6753). 
(July-Aug 765) Constantine, patrikios, logothetes 
tou dromou; and Strategios, spatharios, domestikos 
ton exkoubitoron; with seventeen other officials 
Description: A conspiracy to promote a rival to Constantine V was uncovered. 
Fate: Subjected to a degradation parade with co-conspirators on 25 Jul 765 in the Hippodrome. Constantine and 
Strategios were beheaded at the Kynegion. Their confederates were blinded and exiled. 
Sources: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 158-159; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 438 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 605); PMBZ (Konstantinos 3822); PMBZ (Strategios 7130). 
Leon IV [775-780] 
(May 776) Nikephoros, kaisar, brother of Leon IV Description: Uncovered plotting against Leon with spatharioi, stratores, and other officials. 
Fate: A silention was held and all those found to be involved were beaten, tonsured, and exiled to Kherson and its 
environs. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 450-451 (trans. Mango and Scott 621); PMBZ (Nikephoros 5267). 
Constantine VI [780-797] with Eirene [780-790] 
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other sons of Constantine V palace guard was uncovered that intended to proclaim Nikephoros emperor. 
Fate: Those officials involved in the conspiracy were beaten, tonsured, and exiled. Nikephoros and the other sons of 
Constantine V were tonsured and made to administer the holy communion on Christmas Day. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 454 (trans. Mango and Scott 627); PMBZ (Nikephoros 5267); 
PMBZ (Christophoros 1101); PMBZ (Niketas 5403); PMBZ (Anthimios 487); PMBZ (Eudokimos 1635). 
(782) Elpidios, strategos of Sicily Description: Proclaimed himself emperor at Sicily. 
Fate: He was defeated in battle against the patricius Theodoros and fled to Arabs in North Africa. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 455-456 (trans. Mango and Scott 628); PMBZ (Elpidios 1515). 
(Sept-Oct 790) Eirene Description: With the emperor well into his maturity, Eirene sought to maintain her grasp on power. She confined 
Constantine in the palace and tonsured his supporters. She then attempted to remove Constantine from authority 
by having the soldiery swear loyalty to her and acclaim her first. 
Fate: The soldiers of the Armeniakon rejected Eirene’s oath and demanded the release of Constantine. Eirene was 
forced to comply, was granted an apatheia by the emperor, and confined to a palace near the Harbour of 
Eleutherios. Many of her supporters, including the influential eunuch Staurakios, were exiled to the Armeniakon 
theme. Eirene was restored to prominence by her son in January 792.  
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 464-467 (trans. Mango and Scott 638-641); PMBZ (Eirene 1439). 
(Aug 792) Nikephoros, former kaisar, and the other 
sons of Constantine V 
Description: In response to Constantine’s failed expedition against the Bulgarians (July), elements of the military 
conspired to proclaim Nikephoros emperor in Constantinople. 
Fate: The plot was uncovered and Nikephoros was blinded. The other sons of Constantine V had their tongues cut. All 
were moved to St Mamas. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 468 (trans. Mango and Scott 643); PMBZ (Nikephoros 5267); 
PMBZ (Christophoros 1101); PMBZ (Niketas 5403); PMBZ (Anthimios 487); PMBZ (Eudokimos 1635). 
(Aug 792) Alexios Mousele, former strategos ton 
Armeniakon 
Description: Believed by Eirene to be plotting to proclaim himself with support from the rebellious Armeniakon units. 
Fate: Blinded with the sons of Constantine V. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 468 (trans. Mango and Scott 643); PMBZ (Alexios 193). 
(19 Aug 797) Eirene Description: Eirene instigated a conspiracy to oust Constantine as he returned from campaigning in Asia Minor. 
Fate: Constantine was taken captive by loyalists of Eirene and confined at the Great Palace, in the Porphyra. Eirene 
was restored to sole rule and had Constantine blinded. He is believed to have died within months. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 472 (trans. Mango and Scott 648-649); Leon Grammatikos, 
Chronographia, ed. Bekker 200-202; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Bekker III, 304; PMBZ (Eirene 1439). 
Eirene [797-802] 
(October 797) Nikephoros, former kaisar, and the 
other sons of Constantine V 
Description: Soon after Constantine’s deposition and blinding, the sons of Constantine went to Hagia Sophia in order 
to have one of them proclaimed emperor. They were joined by the Constantinopolitan crowds and may have been 
granted asylum. 
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Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 473 (trans. Mango and Scott 650-651); PMBZ (Nikephoros 5267); 
PMBZ (Christophoros 1101); PMBZ (Niketas 5403); PMBZ (Anthimios 487); PMBZ (Eudokimos 1635). 
(March 799) The sons of Constantine V – 
Christophoros, Niketas, Anthimos, and Eudokimos; 
possibly including Nikephoros 
Description: Discovered plotting to escape their confinement in Athens and proclaim one of the sons as emperor with 
help from the commanders of the Helladikon theme and the Slavs under Akameros. 
Fate: Christophoros, Niketas, Anthimos, and Eudokimos were blinded on Eirene’s orders. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 473-474 (trans. Mango and Scott 651); PMBZ (Nikephoros 5267); 
PMBZ (Christophoros 1101); PMBZ (Niketas 5403); PMBZ (Anthimios 487); PMBZ (Eudokimos 1635). 
(June 800) Staurakios, patrikios, logothetes tou 
dromou 
Description: Staurakios was accused by the domestikos ton scholon Niketas of plotting to usurp the throne. Eirene 
rebuked him and he retired to Cappadocia where he instigated a revolt in June. 
Fate: Staurakios died of natural causes (although this is dubious) only two days after the rebellion began. His supporters 
were exiled and suffered unspecified punishments. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 475 (trans. Mango and Scott 653); PMBZ (Staurakios 6880) 
(31 Oct 802) Nikephoros I, patrikios, logothetes 
tou genikou 
Description: A conspiracy was formed in 802 when Eirene considered marriage to Charlemagne. With Charlemagne’s 
ambassadors still in Constantinople, Nikephoros was proclaimed emperor on 31 October by influential patrikioi 
and senators. They gained access to the palace by subterfuge with the assistance of the guards at the Chalke gate. 
Nikephoros was proclaimed throughout the city. 
Fate: Eirene was deposed and remained under house arrest in the city. Nikephoros was crowned emperor on 1 
November by Patriarch Tarasios.  
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 476-477 (trans. Mango and Scott 655); PMBZ (Nikephoros 5252). 
Nikephoros I [802-811] 
(c. 802) Eirene, former empress; and Aetios, former 
strategos ton Anatolikon 
Description: Uncovered conspiring with a group of monks to restore Eirene to the throne. 
Fate: Aetios suffered no punishment, but Eirene was exiled to Athens. She was later moved to Lesbos where she 
reportedly died c.803. 
Sources: Michael the Syrian, ed. Chabot III, 12; Theophanes, Chronographia, trans. Mango and Scott 658, n.11; 
PMBZ (Eirene 1439). 
(Jul –Sep 803) Bardanes Tourkos, monostrategos Description: Proclaimed emperor by the Asiatic themata on the 19 July in a revolt prompted by Nikephoros’ fiscal 
reforms. 
Fate: Bardanes wrote to the emperor in order to put an end to the rebellion. He was granted an oath of assurance by 
Nikephoros and Patriarch Tarasios and was tonsured at Monastery of Herakleios in Bithynia. He was then sent 
into exile at his monastery on Prote, where he was later blinded. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 479-481 (trans. Mango and Scott 657-660); PMBZ (Bardanes 766). 
(Feb 808) Arsaber, patrikios, quaestor Description: Discovered planning a usurpation with support from unspecified military officials. 
Fate: Arsaber was beaten, tonsured, and exiled to Bithynia.  
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 483-484 (trans. Mango and Scott 664); PMBZ (Arsaber 600). 
Staurakios [811] 
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law of Staurakios proclaimed emperor by the people, senate, patriarch, and military in Constantinople against the wishes of the 
badly injured and dying Staurakios. 
Fate: Staurakios was compelled to take the tonsure and died of his injuries soon after. Michael was crowned by 
Patriarch Nikephoros on the same day (2 Jul). 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 492-494 (trans. Mango and Scott 674-677); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5 (trans. Wortley 4); PMBZ (Michael 4989). 
Michael I [811-813] 
(Early 812) Nikephoros, former kaisar, and the 
other sons of Constantine V 
Description: In light of Khan Krum’s victories in Thrace and the fall of Debeltos, certain soldiers of the western 
tagmata planned to proclaim one of the blinded sons of Constantine V in opposition to Michael. 
Fate: The brothers were exiled to Aphousia. 
Sources: Kazhdan et al 1991: II, 1476; Treadgold 1997: 430; PMBZ (Nikephoros 5267); PMBZ (Christophoros 1101); 
PMBZ (Niketas 5403); PMBZ (Anthimios 487); PMBZ (Eudokimos 1635). 
(22/23 Jun – 11 Jul 813) Leon V, strategos ton 
Anatolikon 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by the assembled military commanders after the defeat of the Byzantine forces sent 
against Khan Krum at Versinikia. 
Fate: Michael I abdicated upon hearing of Leon’s advance. He and his family claimed asylum at the palace church of 
the Pharos, divested themselves of their imperial attire (which they sent to Leon), and took the tonsure. Leon 
subsequently ordered that Michael’s sons be castrated, and had them exiled to Prote. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 502 (trans. Mango and Scott 685); Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-
Werner and Thurn 4 (trans. Kaldellis 6); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 19-20; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 
32-33; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5, 7 (trans. Wortley 4, 6-7); PMBZ (Leon 4244). 
Leon V [813-820] 
(25 Dec 820) Michael II, former domestikos ton 
exkoubitoron 
Description: Michael was discovered plotting to usurp the throne and imprisoned. He was sentenced to be executed; 
according to his propagandists Leon intended him to be burned alive in the furnaces of the palace baths on 
Christmas day, later commuted to 26 Dec (this is dubious). Michael was able to contact his supporters while in 
confinement and they arranged to depose Leon and proclaim Michael. 
Fate: Michael’s supporters disguised themselves as clerics and entered the church of St Stephen at Daphne. When 
Leon entered the church on Christmas Day for the morning services, they attacked and killed him. Leon’s corpse 
was beheaded and dragged through the streets to the Skyla. It was mutilated before a crowd in the Covered 
Hippodrome, hung from a harness, and paraded to the docks where it accompanied Leon’s wife and children to 
their exile on Prote. Leon’s four sons were castrated, and Theodosios died as a result. The corpses of Leon and 
Theodosios were buried on Prote. Michael was taken from his prison cell, seated upon the imperial throne, and 
proclaimed emperor. He was crowned by Patriarch Theodotos on the same day. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 34-41; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 54-65; Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-
Werner and Thurn 15-22 (trans. Kaldellis 18-27); PMBZ (Michael 4990). 
Michael II [820-829] 
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Anastasios, his adopted son emperor and crowned by Job the patriarch of Antioch. He marched against Constantinople, laying siege to the 
city in December 821 and from the spring of 822, but failed to gain access. His siege was broken after the 
intervention of the Bulgarians on Michael’s side. Michael then went on the offensive and defeated Thomas at 
Arkadiopolis. 
Fate: Thomas was captured at Arkadiopolis when his troops surrendered him to Michael in exchange for their being 
pardoned. Thomas was divested of his insignia and subjected to a degradation parade at Arkadiopolis. He was 
made to perform proskynesis and supplicatio in front of his troops, and then subjected to a calcatio. He was 
beheaded and his body mutilated. The head was sent to Byze where Thomas’ co-emperor, his second adopted 
son, Anastasios was resisting Michael’s troops. Anastasios was betrayed and executed in similar fashion soon 
after. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 50-71; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 76-105; Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 29-41 (trans. Wortley 32-44); Lemerle 1965; PMBZ (Thomas 8459). 
(826-827) Euphemios, tourmarches  Description: Proclaimed emperor by the fleet at Sicily after being slandered to Michael and killing the governor. He 
allied with the Arabs in North Africa, and captured Syracuse. 
Fate: He was defeated in by loyalist forces at Syracuse and executed. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 82-83; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 120-123; PMBZ (Euphemios 
1701). 
Theophilos [829-842] 
(829) Manuel, domestikos ton scholon, uncle of 
Empress Theodora 
Description: Accused of plotting to usurp the throne by the logothetes tou dromou Myron. 
Fate: Fled to the Arabs and was later formally reconciled with Theophilos before a ceremony at the church of the 
Mother of God. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 118-120, 148; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 170-173, ; Leon 
Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 219-221; Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 796-798; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 71 (trans. Wortley 72); PMBZ (Manuel 4707) 
(838-839) Theophobos, strategos Description: Proclaimed emperor by his Persian troops at Sinope. 
Fate: Theophobos corresponded with Theophilos in an attempt to excuse his usurpation. Theophilos granted him an 
amnesty and the two were reconciled in a ceremony at the Great Palace. 
Sources: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 40-41 (trans. Kaldellis 54); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
124-125; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 178-181; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 74, 80 (trans. Wortley 
75, 81); PMBZ (Theophobos 8237). 
(c.836/840) Alexios Mousele, kaisar, son-in-law of 
Theophilos 
Description: Slandered and suspected of conspiring to usurp the throne after the birth of Theophilos’ son and heir, 
Michael III. 
Fate: Tonsured at a monastery in Chrysopolis. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 64-65 (trans. Wortley 66-67); PMBZ (Alexios 195). 
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Sources: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 49 (trans. Kaldellis 65); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
121-122; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 174-175; PMBZ (Martenakios 4843). 
(c.841/842) Theophobos Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne. 
Fate: Arrested, confined in the Boukoleon prisons, beheaded in secret. 
Sources: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 42 (trans. Kaldellis 55-56); PMBZ (Theophobos 8237). 
Michael III [842-867] 
(Nov 855) Theoktistos, logothetes tou dromou Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne via a marriage into the dynasty. Intended to blind Michael. 
Fate: Dragged from the imperial palace and executed at the Skyla. The empress protested his execution. 
Sources: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 61-63 (trans. Kaldellis 78-79); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. 
Bekker 168-170; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 238-243; PMBZ (Theoktistos 8050). 
(c. May 866) Unspecified senators Description: Discovered plotting to overthrow Michael in order to promote a rival emperor. 
Fate: Prevented by the accession of Basileios I as co-emperor. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 207; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 294-295. 
(866 - 23/24 Sep 867) Basileios I, magistros, co-
emperor 
Description: Basileios was a favourite of Michael III. In 866 he was adopted by the emperor and granted the title of 
magistros. In April he was responsible for the death of the kaisar Bardas during the Cretan campaign, when his 
confederates slew Bardas in the presence of Michael III and paraded his corpse. Basileios was crowned co-
emperor at Hagia Sophia on 26 May 866.  
Fate: When Basileios’ position was threatened by the favour Michael III was showing to Basiliskianos, whom Michael 
also intended to promote to co-imperial status, Basileios had Michael murdered at the palace of St Mamas on 
23/24 Sep 867. Basileios received a second coronation by the Patriarch, associated his sons as co-emperors and 
assumed authority. 
Sources: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 75-81 (trans. Kaldellis 93-100); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. 
Bekker 205-211; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 292-299; Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 38-101; Georgios Monachos 
Continuatus, ed. Bekker 830-833; PMBZ (Basileios 832). 
(Summer-Winter 866) Symbatios, strategos; and 
Peganes, strategos ton Opsikion 
Description: Commenced a loyalist revolt in Asia Minor on behalf of Michael III after Basileios was proclaimed co-
emperor. 
Fate: They suffered desertions in the winter and attempted to flee to Plateia Petra and Kotyaeion. They were defeated 
by imperial forces and were sent to the palace in chains. Michael ordered them whipped and mutilated. Symbatios 
was blinded, had a hand amputated, and was exiled. Peganes was blinded, had his nose cut, and was exiled. They 
were reportedly recalled and restored after Basileios had assumed sole rule. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 307-308; Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 232-235; PMBZ (Symbatios 7169); 
PMBZ (Peganes 2263). 
Basileios I [867-886] 
(?) Leon Apostypes, strategos ton Thrakesion Description: Accused of conspiring to overthrow Basileios and proclaim himself emperor. 
Fate: His sons killed the individual responsible for the accusation against them and then attempted to flee to Syria with 
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Constantinople. He was found guilty and blinded. He also had a hand amputated and was later exiled to 
Mesembria. 
Sources: Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 74-77. 
(Autumn 883) Leon VI Description: Accused by Santabarenos of plotting to kill Basileios and claim basileia. 
Fate: Divested of imperial attire and confined in the Palace of Margarites. Basileios reportedly considered blinding 
Leon. A ritual reconciliation of Basileios and Leon was achieved on 21 July 886. 
Sources: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 81 (trans. Kaldellis 100); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 
348-350; Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 324-331; Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 846-847; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 168-169 (trans. Wortley 161-162); PMBZ (Leon 24311). 
(Mar 886) Ioannes Kourkouas, domestikos of the 
Hikanatoi; and 60+ senators 
Description: A conspiracy was uncovered to depose Basileios I and promote a rival (probably Kourkouas).  
Fate: The conspirators were tried and found guilty. They were variously subjected to confiscations beatings, and 
tonsure, and were paraded through the fora of the city before being sent into exile. 
Sources: Vita Basilii, ed. Ševčenko 160-161; Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 847; PMBZ (Ioannes 
22824). 
Leon VI [886-912] 
(c.897) Leon Zaoutzes, son of Stylianos Zaoutzes; 
Christophoros Zaoutzes; and others 
Description: Instigated an uprising against Leon while he is hunting outside the city. 
Fate: Leon sailed back to the Great Palace to secure it against the conspirators. He dismissed the droungarios Ioannes, 
and the Zaoutzes family were out of favour for a time. A reconciliation was arranged by the magistros Leon 
Theodotakes. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 360; Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 858-859; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 178-179 (trans. Wortley 173); PMBZ (Leon 24344); PMBZ (Christophoros 
21261). 
(899/900) Basileios the epeiktes, nephew of 
Stylianos Zaoutzes; with Nikolaos, the 
Hetaireiarches 
Description: Discovered conspiring with the droungarios of the watch, and Nikolaos the hetaireiarches, against Leon; 
probably intended to proclaim a rival. 
Fate: Basileios was summoned from Macedonia, tried, and found guilty. He was subjected to a degradation parade and 
exiled to Athens. The droungarios and hetaireiarches were arrested and exiled. 
Sources: Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 858-859; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 179-180 
(trans. Wortley 173-174); PMBZ (Basileios 20911); PMBZ (Nikolaos 25910). 
(c.899/900) Alexandros, co-emperor, brother of 
Leon VI 
Description: Accused of conspiring to overthrow Leon and assume sole rule. 
Fate: Alexandros was parted from his wife as punishment. 
Sources: Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.55, 73-75; PMBZ (Alexandros 20228).  
Alexandros [912-913] 
Constantine VII [913-959] 
(June 913) Constantine Doukas, domestikos ton 
scholon 
Description: Doukas was entreated by Patriarch Nikolaos to claim the throne after the death of Alexandros. He came 
to Constantinople and was proclaimed by his soldiers and the crowds in the Hippodrome before attempting to 
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Fate: He was killed trying to force entrance to the Great Palace via the Chalke gate. His corpse was decapitated and 
his head taken to Constantine VII. Some of his supporters claimed asylum at Hagia Sophia but were dragged from 
the altar and tonsured at the Stoudios monastery. Others were flogged, blinded, and exiled. Beheadings were 
performed in the Hippodrome and a degradation parade arranged, featuring Doukas’ decapitated head. Afterwards 
many of his supporters were impaled along the road to Chrysopolis. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 383; Vita Euthymii Patriarchae CP, ed. Karlin-Hayter p.131-133; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 197-199 (trans. Wortley 191-194); PMBZ (Konstantinos 23817). 
(Late 918 – early 919) Leon Phokas, domestikos ton 
scholon; Constantine, parakoimomenos, a relative of 
Leon 
Description: Leon was accused of conspiring with the parakoimomenos Constantine against Constantine VII; probably 
intended to marry Empress Zoe. 
Fate: He was forestalled by the conspiracy of the emperor’s tutor Theodoros on behalf of Patriarch Nikolaos, and 
dismissed by the new regency. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 379-400; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 292-300; 
PMBZ (Leon 24408); PMBZ (Konstantinos 23820). 
(919-920) Romanos I, droungarios, basileiopator, 
co-emperor 
Description: Romanos exploited the infighting of Constantine VII’s regency council to assume the throne. After the 
defeat of Leon Phokas’ expedition against the Bulgarians in 918 Zoe was reported to be considering a marriage 
to Leon in order to quell opposition to her regency. A coup was enacted early in 919 when Constantine VII’s tutor 
wrote to Romanos requesting his assistance in removing Zoe and Leon from power, on Constantine’s behalf. 
Patriarch Nikolaos was restored to the regency. However, soon after, Romanos was approached by Phokas to 
restore himself and Zoe to authority. Romanos betrayed the conspiracy and took control of the Great Palace with 
his naval forces in March, claiming that Constantine VII had authorised this. He assumed real power. 
Fate: Romanos was swiftly promoted megas hetaireiarches, basileiopator, and finally co-emperor; he was crowned 
by Constantine and assumed first place in the acclamations on account of his need to administer affairs. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 379-400; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 292-300; 
PMBZ (Romanos 26833). 
(Summer 919) Leon Phokas, former domestikos ton 
scholon; with loyalists of Empress Zoe 
Description: Commenced a revolt in Asia Minor on behalf of Constantine VII, after hearing of Romanos’ promotion 
as basileiopator. 
Fate: A chrysobull was issued declaring Leon a tyrant and apostate. His troops were bribed and deserted him. Leon 
fled to the fortress of Ateo but was denied entrance and soon captured by his former loyalists. He was sent to 
Constantinople and blinded en-route. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 395-397; Symeon Magister, ed. Wahlgren 310-311; Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 209 (trans. Wortley 203); PMBZ (Leon 24408). 
Romanos I [920-944] with Constantine VII [913-959] 
(Aug 920) Empress Zoe Description: Accused of planning to murder Romanos I with poison in order to ensure her restoration. 
Fate: Zoe was tonsured at the monastery of St Euphemia. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 397-398; Symeon Magister, ed. Wahlgren 313; Leon Grammatikos, 
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PMBZ (Zoe 28506). 
(920) Theophylaktos, patrikios; Theodoros, 
Constantine’s tutor; Symeon, Theodoros’ brother 
Description: Accused of conspiring to overthrow Romanos and appoint a rival. 
Fate: Exiled to the Opsikion theme. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 211-212 (trans. Wortley 204); PMBZ (Theophylaktos 28194); 
PMBZ (Theodoros 27684); PMBZ ((Symeon 27482). 
(920) Stephanos, magistros; Theophanes 
Teicheotes; Paulos, the Orphanotrophos 
Description: Discovered conspiring to proclaim Stephanos emperor. 
Fate: All were tonsured and exiled to Antigone. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 398; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 213 (trans. Wortley 
207); PMBZ (Stephanos 27224); PMBZ (Theophanes 28086); PMBZ (Paulos 26331). 
(920/922) Arsenios, patrikios; Paulos Manglabites, 
an imperial official 
Description: A conspiracy was uncovered during an imperial procession to the Tribunal. 
Fate: Romanos and Constantine returned to the Great Palace to secure it against the conspirators. Arsenios and Paulos 
were arrested blinded and exiled, their property was confiscated. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 410; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 213 (trans. Wortley 
207); PMBZ (Arsenios 20608); PMBZ (Paulos 26332). 
(Dec 921) Constantine VII, (co-)emperor; 
Anastasios, sakellarios and archon ton 
Chrysochoeion; Theodoretos, koitonites; Demetrios, 
basilikos notarios tou Eidikou 
Description: Uncovered plotting to restore Constantine to sole rule. 
Fate: Constantine’s co-conspirators were variously beaten, subjected to degradation parades in Constantinople, exiled, 
and tonsured. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 400; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 214 (trans. Wortley 
207-208); Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 892; PMBZ (Anastasios 20299); PMBZ (Theodoretos 
27607); PMBZ (Demetrios 21470). 
(c. 920s) Basileios ‘the Copperhand’ (Pseudo-
Constantine Doukas) 
Description: Instigated a rebellion while claiming to be the usurper Constantine Doukas. 
Fate: Defeated, captured, and suffered amputation of a hand. He commissioned a copper prosthesis to replace it. 
Sources: Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 912; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 421; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 228 (trans. Wortley 220); PMBZ (Basileios 20927). 
(Early 927) Kosmas, patrikios, logothetes tou 
dromou; Ioannes, secretary 
Description: Accused of plotting to proclaim Ioannes emperor. 
Fate: Kosmas was tortured and dismissed from office. Ioannes received the tonsure at the monastery of Monokastanos. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 221 (trans. Wortley 214); PMBZ (Kosmas 24112); PMBZ 
(Ioannes 22938). 
(932) Basileios ‘the Copperhand’ (Pseudo-
Constantine Doukas) 
Description: Revived his rebellion while claiming to be the usurper Constantine Doukas. 
Fate: Defeated, captured, and burned to death at the Kynegion. 
Sources: Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 912; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 421; Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 228 (trans. Wortley 220); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 228 (trans. 
Wortley 220); PMBZ (Basileios 20927). 
(20 Dec 944) Stephanos and Constantine 
Lekapenos, co-emperors, sons of Romanos I 
Description: Conspired to overthrow Romanos I’s reign in order to exercise greater authority after it appeared that 
Constantine VII was to be restored to precedence by their father. 
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Constantine VII. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 434-436; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 234-235 (trans. 
Wortley 226); PMBZ (Konstantinos 23831); PMBZ (Stephanos 27251). 
(25 Jan 945) Constantine VII, (co-)emperor Description: Constantine’s alliance with the Lekapenoi brothers lasted only forty days. The Augusta Helena reportedly 
convinced him to remove them from office and accused them of planning to poison Constantine. Constantine did 
so with the support of the Phokades, Tornikoi, and Bardas Peteinos. He finally assumed sole rule. 
Fate: Stephanos was exiled to Lesbos where he died on 18 April 963. His son Romanos was castrated and later became 
sebastophoros. Constantine Lekapenos was exiled to Samothrace where he was killed c.946-948 while attempting 
to escape his confinement. Michael Lekapenos, the son of Christophoros Lekapenos, was tonsured and later 
appointed magistros and Rhaiktor. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 434-437; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 234-237 (trans. 
Wortley 228); PMBZ (Konstantinos 23734). 
Constantine VII [913-959] 
(c.947) Romanos Lekapenos; Theophanes, 
parakoimomenos 
Description: Uncovered plotting to restore Romanos I to power. 
Fate: Theophanes was exiled. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 438-439; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 238-239 (trans. 
Wortley 230); PMBZ (Romanos 26833); PMBZ (Theophanes 28087). 
(c.947/948) Stephanos Lekapenos; Leon Kladon; 
Gregoras; Theodosios; Ioannes rhaiktor 
Description: Uncovered plotting to restore Stephanos to power. 
Fate: Beaten, subjected to nose cutting, and exiled. Their property was confiscated. 
Sources: Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 309; Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 438-439; 
Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 238-239 (trans. Wortley 230); PMBZ (Stephanos 27251); PMBZ 
(Leon 24422); PMBZ (Gregoras 22405); PMBZ (Theodosios 27909); PMBZ (Ioannes 22937). 
Romanos II [959-963] 
(960/961) Basileios Peteinos, magistros; with 
unspecified other magistroi 
Description: Discovered plotting to capture the emperor during the Hippodrome races and proclaim Basileios. 
Fate: The plot was revealed by Ioannikios, one of the conspirators. All involved were detained by Ioseph Bringas, the 
parakoimomenos. All except Basileios were tortured. They were paraded in the Hippodrome, exiled and tonsured. 
After a short time, all except Basileios were recalled by Romanos. Basileios had died in exile on Prokonnesos. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 250-251 (trans. Wortley 241-242); PMBZ (Basileios 20934). 
Theophano [963] with Basileios II and Constantine VIII [963–1025] 
(Jul-Aug 963) Nikephoros II Phokas, magistros, 
autokrator strategos in the East 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by the troops at Caesarea on 2 Jul and marched on Constantinople unchallenged. He 
claimed to be defending the rights of the basileis against the parakoimomenos Ioseph Bringas. 
Fate: He was crowned emperor with the basileis by Patriarch Polyeuktos, and married Empress Theophano. Ioseph 
took the tonsure. 
Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 38-48 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 89-99); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, 
ed. Thurn 256-260 (trans. Wortley 246-250); PMBZ (Nikephoros 25535); Cheynet 1990: 20-21, No. 1. 
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(966-971) Kalokyros, patrikios Description: Attempted to have himself proclaimed emperor and appealed to the Russian prince Sviatoslav for aid. 
Fate: Unknown. 
Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 77, 79, 134 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 128, 130, 180-181); Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 288-295 (trans. Wortley 275-281); PMBZ (Kalokyros 23631); Cheynet 1990: 
22, No. 4. 
(10/11 Dec 969) Ioannes I Tzimiskes, former 
domestikos ton scholon; with Empress Theodora 
Description: Ioannes and his comrades gained access to the Great Palace with the assistance of Empress Theodora. 
They located Nikephoros and proceeded to assassinate him before proclaiming Ioannes emperor. 
Fate: Nikephoros was beheaded. His body was left in a courtyard of the Great Palace while his head was shown to the 
palace guard in order to end their opposition to Ioannes’ proclamation. The body was buried at the Heroon of the 
Holy Apostles later that day. Ioannes was crowned emperor by Patriarch Polyeuktos a week later after performing 
a suitable penance for the murder of Nikephoros. Atzypotheodoros and Balantes, his co-conspirators, were exiled 
for their role in the murder. Theodora was expelled from the palace. 
Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 85-89 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 136-139); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 279-280 (trans. Wortley 267-269); PMBZ (Ioannes 22778); PMBZ (Theophano 28125); 
Cheynet 1990: 22-23, No.5. 
Ioannes I [969-976] with Basileios II and Constantine VIII [963–1025] 
(Spring-Summer 970/971) Bardas Phokas, patrikios, 
former doux of Chaldea and Koloneia 
Description: Proclaimed emperor at Caesarea and instigated a rebellion against Ioannes. 
Fate: Surrendered in exchange for imperial apatheia, and was exiled to Chios. Secondary figures were subjected to 
blindings and confiscations.  
Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 112-126 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 162-173); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 291-294 (trans. Wortley 278-280); PMBZ (Bardas 20784); Cheynet 1990: 24, No.6. 
(Spring 971) Leon Phokas the Younger, 
kouropalates, former domestikos ton scholon 
Description: Attempted to gain access to the Great Palace and proclaim himself while Ioannes I was on campaign. 
Fate: Sought refuge at Hagia Sophia, but was blinded with his son Nikephoros. Exiled to Kalonymos and subjected to 
confiscations. 
Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 145-147 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 189-191); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 303 (trans. Wortley 288); PMBZ (Leon 24423); Cheynet 1990: 25, No.7. 
Basileios II with Constantine VIII [976-1025] 
(Spring 976-March 979) Bardas Skleros, magistros, 
doux of Mesopotamian tagmata 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by his troops and planned to conquer Constantinople. 
Fate: Was defeated by Bardas Phokas in March 978 and fled to the Turks with family. He was imprisoned. 
Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 169-170 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 212-213); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 314-328 (trans. Wortley 298-311); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 12-19; ed. 
Renauld I, 4-7 (trans. Sewter 30-32); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 540-546; PMBZ (Bardas 20785); 
Cheynet 1990: 27-29, No.11. 
(Aug 987-13 Apr 989) Bardas Phokas, magistros, 
domestikos ton scholon 
Description: Proclaimed emperor at Caesarea in August 987 and instigated a rebellion against Basileios. 
Fate: Died in battle at Abydos. Supporters subjected to impalements, and imprisonment. Degradation parade staged in 
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Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 173-174 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 215-216); Skylitzes, Synopsis 
Historiarum, ed. Thurn 332-338 (trans. Wortley 314-321); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 12-19; ed. 
Renauld I, 7-11 (trans. Sewter 32-37); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 550-554; PMBZ (Bardas 20784); 
Cheynet 1990: 31-33, No.15. 
(Feb 987-Sep 987 & Apr-Oct 989) Bardas Skleros Description: After being released from his imprisonment he continued his revolt against Basileios. He was defeated 
by Bardas Phokas and imprisoned again. However, after the defeat of Phokas he was released and continued 
Phokas’ rebellion. 
Fate: Reconciled with Basileios II c.989 and was granted dignity of kouropalates. He was blinded and died soon after. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 338-339 (trans. Wortley 320-321); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri I, 34-39; ed. Renauld I, 15-16 (trans. Sewter 40-43); PMBZ (Bardas 20785); Cheynet 1990: 33-34, 
No.16. 
(Spring-Aug 1022) Nikephoros Phokas & 
Nikephoros Xiphias 
Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne after instigating a revolt in Cappadocia. 
Fate: Phokas was betrayed and executed by Xiphias after Basileios II promised him rewards. Xiphias was subsequently 
taken prisoner, tonsured on Antigone, and subjected to confiscations. Their supporters were imprisoned. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 366-367 (trans. Wortley 346-347); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-
Wobst III, 567; PMBZ (Phokas 25675); PMBZ (Xiphias 25661); Cheynet 1990: 36-37, No.21. 
(?) Theodosios Monomachos Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne. 
Fate: Executed. 
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 262-265; ed. Renauld I, 125 (trans. Sewter 162-163); Cheynet 
1990: 37-38, No.22. 
Constantine VIII [1025-1028] 
(Summer 1026) Nikephoros Komnenos, patrikios, 
protospatharios, strategos of Vaspurakan 
Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne, and of preparing a military revolt (he received an oath of loyalty from 
his troops). 
Fate: Blinded with co-conspirators. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 371-372 (trans. Wortley 350-351); PMBZ (Nikephoros 25676); 
Cheynet 1990: 38, No.24. 
(1026) Bardas Phokas  Description: Discovered plotting to overthrow Constantine. 
Fate: Blinded with co-conspirators. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 372 (trans. Wortley 351); PMBZ (Bardas 20806); Cheynet 1990: 
39, No.25. 
(c.1026-c.1028) Basileios Skleros, patrikios Description: Discovered plotting to overthrow Constantine. 
Fate: Exiled to the Prinkipos Isles and later blinded. Co-conspirator Prousanios exiled and then recalled. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 372 (trans. Wortley 351); PMBZ (Basileios 21113); Cheynet 
1990: 39-40, No.27. 
(c.1026-c.1028) Romanos Kourkouas, brother-in-
law of Bulgarian prince; Bogdan, Toparches; 
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Glabas; and Goudelios Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 372 (trans. Wortley 351); PMBZ (Romanos 26878); PMBZ 
(Bogdan 21186); PMBZ (Goudelios 22514); Cheynet 1990: 40, No.28. 
Romanos III [1028-1034] 
(c. Nov 1028-c. Nov 1029) Prousanios, magistros, 
former strategos ton Boukellarion; Theodora, 
basilissa 
Description: Accused of plotting for the throne with the basilissa Theodora. 
Fate: Imprisoned at the monastery of Manuel in Constantinople, blinded, and later tonsured. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 376, 384 (trans. Wortley 355, 362); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. 
Büttner-Wobst III, 574; PMBZ (Prousianos 26775); PMBZ (Theodora 27605); Cheynet 1990: 41-42, No.31. 
(c. Oct 1029) Constantine Diogenes, patrikios, doux 
of Thessalonike, strategos ton Thrakesion; 
Theodora, basilissa 
Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne, and of preparing a military revolt. 
Fate: Constantine was imprisoned in Constantinople. His co-conspirators were flogged, subjected to a degradation 
parade in Constantinople, and exiled. Theodora was confined at the Petrion monastery. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 376-377 (trans. Wortley 355-356); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-
Wobst III, 575; PMBZ (Konstantinos 24045); PMBZ (Theodora 27605); Cheynet 1990: 42-43, No.32. 
(1030) Military officers Description: Discovered plotting to overthrow Romanos. 
Fate: Unknown. 
Sources: Matthew of Edessa, Chronicle, trans. Dostourian 51; Cheynet 1990: 43, No.33. 
(c.1032-c.1033) Basileios Skleros, magistros Description:  Accused of aspiring for the throne. 
Fate: Already blind. Exiled from Constantinople. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 388 (trans. Wortley 366); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst 
III, 583; PMBZ (Basileios 21113); Cheynet 1990: 44, No.35. 
(11 Apr 1034) Michael IV and Zoe Description: Assassinated Romanos III in the palace baths. 
Fate: Michael was crowned emperor. 
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 106-113; ed. Renauld I, 49-52 (trans. Sewter 80-83); Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 389-391 (trans. Wortley 367-369); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 
584-585; PMBZ (Zoe 28508); Cheynet 1990: 44-45, No.36. 
Michael IV [1034-1041] 
(c.1035) Constantine Monomachos Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne. 
Fate: Exiled to Mytilene for seven years. 
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 262-263; ed. Renauld I, 125 (trans. Sewter 161); Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 423 (trans. Wortley 398); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 615; PMBZ 
(Konstantinos 23736); Cheynet 1990: 46, No.39. 
(Aug/Sept 1040) Gregoras Taronites, patrikios, 
tagma commander 
Description: Participated in a military revolt and probably aspired to be proclaimed. 
Fate: Taronites was bound in fresh Ox skin and sent to Constantinople for punishment. His co-conspirators were 
subjected to blindings. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 412 (trans. Wortley 387); PBW (Gregorios 102); Cheynet 1990: 
51, No.49. 
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Makrembolites Fate: Keroularios was tonsured. His co-conspirators suffered confiscations. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 412 (trans. Wortley 387); PBW (Michael 11); PBW (Ioannes 
112); Cheynet 1990: 51-52, No.50. 
Michael V [1041-1042] 
(20-21 Apr 1042) Theodora & Zoe; with the 
populace of Constantinople 
Description: Unrest developed in Constantinople after Michael V had Zoe tonsured and exiled to Prote. The people 
eventually turned to outright opposition and proclaimed Theodora at Hagia Sophia so that she might lead them 
against Michael. 
Fate: Michael fled the crowds and took the tonsure at the Stoudios monastery, where he claimed asylum. He was taken 
from the sanctuary of the monastery after being granted an oath of assurance by Theodora. He was subjected to a 
degradation parade through the city streets and then blinded at the Sigma. Michael was then confined to the 
Elegmoi monastery where he died soon after. Zoe and Theodora ruled jointly. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 418-420 (trans. Wortley 393-395); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri I, 212-243; ed. Renauld I, 101-115 (trans. Sewter 132-151); PBW (Theodora 1); PBW (Zoe 1); 
Cheynet 1990: 54-55, No.56. 
Zoe and Theodora [1042] 
(April-July 1042) Theophilos Erotikos, strategos of 
Cyprus 
Description: Rebelled on Cyprus and killed several imperial officials, probably intended to be proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: Defeated, captured, and sent to Constantinople. He was subjected to a degradation parade in the Hippodrome of 
Constantinople and then released. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 429 (trans. Wortley 403-404); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-
Wobst III, 624; PBW (Theophilos 102); Cheynet 1990: 56, No.59. 
Constantine IX [1042-1055] 
(Sept 1042 - Spring 1043) Georgios Maniakes, 
magistros, katepano of Italy, autokrator strategos 
Description: Proclaimed emperor in Italy he crossed the Adriatic and marched on Dyrrakhion. 
Fate: Defeated and killed in battle. His corpse was beheaded and mutilated. The head was sent to Constantine IX and 
displayed in the Hippodrome. A triumph was celebrated in which Maniakes’ supporters were processed through 
Constantinople preceded by Maniakes’ head atop a pike.  
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 427-428 (trans. Wortley 401-403); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri II, 8-21; ed. Renauld II, 2-6 (trans. Sewter 194-199); PBW (Georgios 62); Cheynet 1990: 57, No.61. 
(Jul 1043) Leon Lampros, patrikios, strategos of 
Melitene; with Stephanos, sebastophoros 
Description: The sebastophoros was discovered plotting to proclaim Lampros emperor. 
Fate: Lampros was tortured, blinded, and subjected to a degradation parade in Constantinople. He died soon after. 
Stephanos was tonsured and exiled; his property was confiscated. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 430 (trans. Wortley 404); PBW (Leon 109); PBW Stephanos 
102); Cheynet 1990: 58, No.62. 
(Sep-Dec 1047) Leon Tornikios, patrikios, former 
strategos of Iberia 
Description: Proclaimed emperor at Adrianople and marched on Constantinople, laying siege to the city. 
Fate: Leon’s proclamation was rejected by the Constantinopolitans and his forces failed to gain entrance despite having 
victory in their hands. Leon withdrew for the winter and suffered desertions. He sought asylum in a church to the 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
Constantinople where he was blinded at the city gates. His supporters were subjected to confiscations and a 
degradation parade in Constantinople before being exiled. 
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 34-67; ed. Renauld II, 14-30 (trans. Sewter 208-219); Skylitzes, 
Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 439-442 (trans. Wortley 413-416); PBW (Leon 61); Cheynet 1990: 59-60, 
No.65. 
(1050) The sons of Euthymios, Nikephoros and 
Michael 
Description: Discovered plotting to proclaim Nikephoros emperor with prominent officials in Constantinople. 
Fate: All were pardoned except Nikephoros, who was exiled without trial and had his property confiscated. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 471 (trans. Wortley 439); PBW (Nikephoros 109); PBW (Michael 
117); Cheynet 1990: 61, No.66. 
(c.1050/1051) An unnamed barbarian officer Description: Discovered plotting to assassinate Constantine IX and proclaim himself emperor. 
Fate: Tortured. 
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 80-83; ed. Renauld II, 35-37 (trans. Sewter 227); Cheynet 1990: 
61, No.67. 
(c.1051) Romanos Boilas, senator Description: Discovered plotting to proclaim himself emperor. He had won over and received oaths from numerous 
prominent individuals. 
Fate: Boilas avoided any permanent punishments. His supporters were exiled and had their property confiscated. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 473 (trans. Wortley 441); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri II, 84-105; ed. Renauld II, 38-47 (trans. Sewter 228-235); PBW (Romanos 62); Cheynet 1990: 62, 
No.69. 
(?) Constantine Barys Description: Discovered plotting to proclaim himself emperor; approached Lazaros Galesiotes for a prophecy to aid 
his cause. 
Fate: His tongue was cut. 
Sources: Vita S. Lazari auctore Gregorio Monacho §105; PBW (Konstantinos 202); Cheynet 1990: 64-65, No.74. 
(Jan 1055) Theodora Description: Upon learning that Constantine IX was dying, Theodora and her supporters Niketas Xylinites, Theodoros, 
Manuel, and elements of the palace guard rushed to bring her into the Great Palace to be proclaimed. Constantine 
IX had intended that Nikephoros proteuon be proclaimed his successor. 
Fate: Constantine’s plans for the succession were frustrated. He died on 7/8 January 1055 and Theodora was 
proclaimed empress. Nikephoros was tonsured at the monastery of Kouzenos in the Thrakesion theme. His 
supporters were subjected to confiscations and exile. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 477-478 (trans. Wortley 445-447); Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez 
Martin 51 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 90-91); PBW (Theodora 1). 
Theodora [1055-1056] 
(Jan/Feb 1055) An unnamed Bryennios, patrikios, 
commander of Macedonian tagmata 
Description: Upon hearing of Constantine IX’s death, Bryennios marched on Constantinople intending to proclaim 
himself emperor. 
Fate: He got as far as Chrysopolis before being captured, dismissed, and exiled. His property was confiscated. 
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Cheynet 1990: 66, No.76. 
Michael VI [1056-1057] 
(Aug 1056) Theodosios Monomachos, proedros, 
cousin of Constantine IX 
Description: Upon hearing of Theodora’s death, Theodosios marched to the Great Palace with the intention of being 
proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: He found no support from the populace of the city and those with him quickly deserted his cause. He attempted 
to claim asylum at Hagia Sophia but was denied entry 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 481-482 (trans. Wortley 449-450); PBW (Theodosios 103); 
Cheynet 1990: 67, No.78. 
(Spring 1057 – Sep 1057) Isaakios I Komnenos, 
magistros, former military commander 
Description: After being dismissed by Michael VI, Isaakios and several other eastern military commanders decided to 
plan a rebellion. Isaakios was proclaimed on 8 June and marched against Constantinople. He defeated Michael’s 
loyalist forces near Nikaia and was offered the title of kaisar by the emperor. A coup involving Patriarch 
Keroularios finally forced Michael’s abdication, and Isaakios entered Constantinople to be crowned on 1 
September. 
Fate: Michael abdicated the throne and received the tonsure. Isaakios was crowned by Keroularios and assumed 
authority. 
Sources: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 487-498 (trans. Wortley 450-465); Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez 
Martin 53-59 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 94-107); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 182-233; ed. 
Renauld II, 85-109 (trans. Sewter 277-299); PBW (Isaakios 1); Cheynet 1990: 68-70, No.80. 
Isaakios I [1057-1059] 
(21 Nov 1059) Constantine X Doukas, proedros, 
former strategos 
Description: When Isaakios I was injured in a hunting accident and believed to be dying: a successor needed to be 
appointed. Isaakios appears to have favoured his brother Ioannes. However, a conspiracy involving Michael 
Psellos managed to frustrate these plans and proclaimed Constantine X in the Great Palace instead. 
Fate: Isaakios accepted Constantine’s proclamation upon learning of it, he took the tonsure and retired. Constantine 
received a coronation and assumed authority. 
Sources: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 69 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 124-125); Psellos, Chronographia, ed. 
Impellizzeri II, 288-305; ed. Renauld II, 137-145 (trans. Sewter 321-330); Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 81-
83; Cheynet 1990: 70-71, No.82. 
Constantine X [1059-1067] 
(Apr 1060) Unknown. Description: An attempt was made to assassinate Constantine X while he was celebrating the feast of St George. 
(Cheynet 1990 speculates that it may have intended to restore Isaakios I.) 
Fate: Constantine returned to the Great Palace to secure it against the conspiracy. Those involved were exiled and their 
property was confiscated. 
Sources: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 72-75 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 130-135); Cheynet 1990: 71, No.83. 
(Summer 1066) Nikoulitzas Delphinas, 
protospatharios 
Description: Proclaimed emperor in Larissa during a tax revolt in Hellas. 
Fate: Exiled to Amaseia until his restoration to favour under Romanos IV. 
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(?) Romanos Diogenes, vestarches, doux of Serdica Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne and planning a military revolt. 
Fate: Initially sentenced to death, but that was commuted to exile to an unspecified island. 
Sources: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 97 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 176-179); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. 
Büttner-Wobst III, 684-685; PBW (Romanos 4); Cheynet 1990: 74-75, No, 90-91. 
Eudokia Makrembolitissa [1067], with Michael VII [1067] 
Romanos IV [1068-1071] 
(Summer-Autumn 1071 – Jun 1072) Michael VII 
Doukas, co-emperor; Ioannes Doukas, kaisar 
Description: After Romanos’ capture after his defeat at Manzikert (August 1071) Ioannes Doukas instigated a coup to 
restore Michael VII as autokrator. Eudokia was removed from power and Michael proclaimed. Romanos IV 
challenged the succession and a civil war ensued. 
Fate: Eudokia was tonsured. Romanos was defeated in June 1072, granted an oath of assurance, and then blinded. He 
was tonsured on Prote but died of his injuries on 4 August. Michael assumed authority. 
Sources: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 158-179 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 286-325); Psellos, 
Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 344-363; ed. Renauld II, 165-172 (trans. Sewter 354-366); Bryennios, 
Histoire, ed. Gautier 119-140; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 699-706; PBW (Michael 7); Cheynet 
1990: 75-76, No. 94. 
Michael VII [1071-1078] 
(1072-1075) Ioannes Doukas, kaisar; Roussel de 
Balliol 
Description: The rebellion began as a military revolt by Roussel and his free troops. Ioannes Doukas was dispatched 
by Michael VII to suppress the revolt c.1073/1074 but he was defeated and captured. Roussel proclaimed Ioannes 
emperor in order to sway influential figures to his cause and marched on Constantinople. 
Fate: The rebellion was defeated by the Turks in 1075. Roussel was captured sent to Michael and imprisoned until 
1077. Ioannes Doukas took the tonsure and returned to Constantinople. 
Sources: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 183-193 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 332-351); Bryennios, Histoire, 
ed. Gautier 167-195; Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 709-712; PBW (Ioannes 62); PBW (Roussel 61); 
Cheynet 1990: 78-79, 79-80, No.97, 99. 
(Nov 1077 – May 1078) Nikephoros Bryennios, 
proedros, doux of Dyrrakhion 
Description: Proclaimed emperor at Traianoupolis and marched on Constantinople. 
Fate: Defeated by Alexios Komnenos and sent as a prisoner to Nikephoros III. He was blinded en-route to 
Constantinople. Suffered confiscation of his property, but this was later restored to him. His supporters were 
granted an amnesty. 
Sources: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 214-236; Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 242-268, 284-294 (trans. 
Kaldellis and Krallis 440-489, 518-537); Skylitzes Continuatus, ed. Tsolakes 172-181; PBW (Nikephoros 62); 
Cheynet 1990: 83-84, No.104. 
(Oct 1077 – Apr 1078) Nikephoros III 
Botaneiates, kouropalates, doux of the Anatolikon 
Description: Proclaimed emperor near Lampa in October 1077 and marched on Nikaia. Then set out against an 
undefended Constantinople which he entered in March/April 1078 without bloodshed. 
Fate: Michael VII was prompted to abdicate when supporters of Nikephoros started proclaiming him in the city. He 
was tonsured at the Stoudios Monastery. Nikephoros III was crowned emperor and married Maria of Alania, 
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promised the succession. 
Sources: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 237-253; Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 238-243, 257-260 (trans. 
Kaldellis and Krallis 432-445, 468-475); Skylitzes Continuatus, ed. Tsolakes 172-179; PBW (Nikephoros 3); 
Cheynet 1990: 84-85, No.105. 
Nikephoros III [1078-1081] 
(Spring-Summer 1078) Nikephoros Basilakes, 
protoproedros, doux of Dyrrakhion 
Description: Proclaimed emperor after the defeat of Nikephoros Bryennios. Instigated a rebellion in the region of 
Thessalonike and Dyrrakhion. 
Fate: Defeated by Alexios Komnenos and captured. Sent to Constantinople and blinded en-route. 
Sources: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 217, 285-297; Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 298-300 (trans. 
Kaldellis and Krallis 540-549); Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 27-34 (trans. Frankopan 23-
29); PBW (Nikephoros 61); Cheynet 1990: 86-87, No.108. 
(Spring 1079) Konstantios Doukas, 
Porphyrogennetos, strategos 
Description: Rebelled against Nikephoros III with the intention of proclaiming himself emperor at Chrysopolis. 
Fate: Deserted by his troops and captured after a single day. Tonsured and exiled to Marmara. His supporters were 
granted amnesty. 
Sources: Attaleiates, Historia, ed. Perez Martin 307-309 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 560-563); PBW (Konstantinos 
61); Cheynet 1990: 87, No.110. 
(1081) Pseudo-Michael VII Doukas Description: Approached Robert Guiscard for assistance in claiming the throne as Michael VII. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 40-42 (trans. Frankopan 31-34); PBW (Raiktor 101); 
Cheynet 1990: 87, No.109. 
(Autumn 1080 – Apr 1081) Nikephoros Melissenos, 
former strategos, brother-in-law of Alexios 
Komnenos 
Description: Proclaimed emperor in Asia Minor and intended to depose Nikephoros III. 
Fate: Failed to secure substantial support. Was granted the title of kaisar by Alexios I in April 1081 in exchange for 
ending his revolt. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 75-81 (trans. Frankopan 68-72); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. 
Büttner-Wobst III, 732; PBW (Nikephoros 115); Cheynet 1990: 88-89, No.111. 
(Feb – Apr 1081) Alexios I Komnenos, sebastos, 
megas domestikos, adopted son of Empress Maria 
Description: Entered into a conspiracy with Maria of Alania when it was rumoured that Nikephoros intended to change 
the plans for Constantine Doukas’ succession. He rebelled against Nikephoros III after being accused of plotting 
a military revolt. Proclaimed emperor in Thrace and marched on Constantinople. Gained access to the city on 1 
April 1081 and ousted Nikephoros. 
Fate: Nikephoros abdicated and was tonsured at the Peribleptos. Alexios was crowned by Patriarch Kosmas. He 
considered a marriage to Maria of Alania but was persuaded against it. Maria and Constantine were removed 
from the Great Palace but retained their high status. Constantine was associated as co-emperor with Alexios and 
permitted to wear imperial insignia. 
Sources: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 63-67; Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 60-86 (trans. 
Frankopan 54-78); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Büttner-Wobst III, 727-730; PBW (Alexios 1); Cheynet 1990: 89-90, 
No.113. 
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(c. 1075-1098) Theodoros Gabras, sebastos, doux of 
Trebizond 
Description: Starts issues coinage in his name and declares himself independent of Alexios’ rule. 
Fate: Remains independent and issues coinage sporadically until his death in October 1098. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 255 (trans. Frankopan 232-233); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. 
Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 739; PBW (Theodoros 6003); Cheynet 1990: 92-93, No. 117. 
(c.1081-1097) Tzachas, former protonobelissimos Description: Proclaims himself emperor in Asia Minor and aspires to create a Byzantine-Turkish empire. 
Fate: His ambitions were dashed after he was dislodged from Smyrna in 1090 and faced serious territorial reverses, he 
continued to claim the imperial title until his death in 1097. 
Sources: Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 736-737; PBW (Tzachas 61); Cheynet 1990: 93, No.118. 
(1087) Anonymous Description: An individual claimed to be the relative of a former emperor and intended to be proclaimed in place of 
Alexios. 
Fate: Executed. 
Sources: Theophylaktos, Opera, ed. Gautier 229-231; Cheynet 1990: 95, No.122. 
(c. May 1091) Constantine Houmpertopoulos, 
commander of the Frankish tagmata; with Ariebes, 
an Armenian-born military officer 
Description: Uncovered conspiring to overthrow Alexios with a number of other prominent figures. 
Fate: Subjected to a degradation parade and exiled. Their property was confiscated. Houmpertopoulos may have been 
restored by Alexios, but Anna’s chronology is corrupt. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 252 (trans. Frankopan 229); Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder 
and Büttner-Wobst III, 741; PBW (Konstantinos 122); PBW (Ariebes 6001); Cheynet 1990: 96, No.124. 
(c. 1091-1093) Ioannes Komnenos, sebastos, doux 
of Dyrrakhion, nephew of Alexios I 
Description: Accused of plotting to rebel against Alexios and proclaim himself emperor. 
Fate: A family council was held but no overt action was taken against Ioannes. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 252-255 (trans. Frankopan 229-233); PBW (Ioannes 
128); Cheynet 1990: 96-97, No.125. 
(Spring/Summer 1094) Nikephoros Diogenes, doux 
of Crete, son of Romanos IV; Kekaumenos 
Katakalon 
Description: Discovered conspiring to overthrow Alexios with the support of the Doukai (Empress Maria and 
Constantine) and prominent aristocrats, senators, and commanders. Alexios’ brother, Adrianos, probably also had 
knowledge. 
Fate: Nikephoros Diogenes was blinded and his property confiscated. Kekaumenos Katakalon was treated likewise. 
Michael Taronites was exiled and his property confiscated. Alexios announced a general amnesty for the other 
conspirators, since he was unsure that the loyal troops he had at hand would be sufficient to detain all those 
involved. Adrianos and Constantine fell from favour soon after. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 267-279 (trans. Frankopan 246-257); Zonaras, Epitome, 
ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 742; PBW (Nikephoros 64); PBW (Kekaumenos 101); Cheynet 1990: 98-99, 
No. 128. 
(1095) Pseudo-Diogenes, aka Charakenos Description: Proclaimed himself emperor as the dead son of Romanos IV. 
Fate: Blinded. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 283-293 (trans. Frankopan 262-271); Zonaras, Epitome, 
ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 744; PBW (Anonymous 419); Cheynet 1990: 99-100, No. 129. 
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Ioannes Soloman, senator; and unspecified others and senators. 
Fate: Michael was sentenced to be blinded and subjected to a degradation parade in Constantinople. He was spared 
blinding when Alexios and Eirene intervened moments before he passed the point of no return. He was confined 
at a tower near the Blachernai Palace. His co-conspirators were subjected to confiscations and exile. Some were 
restored. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 372-375 (trans. Frankopan 346-349); Zonaras, Epitome, 
ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 745; PBW (Michael 194); PBW (Ioannes 15019); Cheynet 1990: 100-101, No. 
130. 
(Aug 1118) Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger, 
son-in-law of Alexios I, kaiser, panhypersebastos; 
Anna Komnene, daughter of Alexios I; Empress 
Eirene 
Description: After the death of Alexios Anna and Eirene conspired to promote Nikephoros as emperor in place of 
Ioannes I. 
Fate: Their ambitions were forestalled when Ioannes forced entrance to the Great Palace, using his father’s 
monogrammed ring as proof of his precedence. No action was taken against the conspirators although a rift existed 
between Ioannes and Anna thereafter. 
Sources: Zonaras, Epitome, ed. Pinder and Büttner-Wobst III, 761-764; Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 5-8 (trans. 
Magoulias 5-7); PBW (Nikephoros 117); PBW (Anna 62); PBW (Eirene 61); Cheynet 1990: 103, No.134. 
Ioannes II [1118-1143] 
(Spring 1119) Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger, 
son-in-law of Alexios I, panhypersebastos; Anna 
Komnene, daughter of Alexios I 
Description: Uncovered conspiring with other prominent figures to assassinate Ioannes while he was hunting at 
Philopation. They intended to promote Nikephoros in his place. 
Fate: Anna was divested of her imperial attire but was later reconciled with her brother. The other conspirators had 
their property confiscated and were later restored. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 10-11 (trans. Magoulias 8-9); PBW (Nikephoros 117); PBW (Anna 62); 
Cheynet 1990: 103, No.135. 
(Summer 1130 – Spring 1139) Isaakios Komnenos, 
sebastokrator, brother of Ioannes II; Ioannes 
Komnenos, his son 
Description: Conspired against Ioannes II in order to claim the throne for himself. 
Fate: Fled to the Turks with his son in 1130 and was reconciled with his brother in a formal ceremony in 1139. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 32, 36 (trans. Magoulias 19, 21); PBW (Isaakios 102); PBW (Ioannes 
250002); Cheynet 1990: 105, No.139. 
(c.1139-c.1143) Isaakios Komnenos, sebastokrator, 
brother of Ioannes II 
Description: After his reconciliation with Ioannes, Isaakios again plotted to overthrow him and proclaim himself 
emperor. 
Fate: His conspiracy was uncovered and he was exiled to Herakleia in Pontus. He was reconciled with Manuel I in 
May 1143. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 36 (trans. Magoulias 21); Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 32 (trans. 
Brand 34); PBW (Isaakios 102); Cheynet 1990: 106, No.140. 
Manuel I [1143-1180] 
(April-May 1143) Isaakios Komnenos, 
sebastokrator, oldest surviving brother of Manuel I 
Description: Attempted to claim the throne on the basis of primogeniture. 
Fate: Imprisoned at the Pantokrator Monastery until Manuel I had received his coronation. He was formally reconciled 
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Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 46-49 (trans. Magoulias 26-29); Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 29-31 
(trans. Brand 32-33); PBW (Isaakios 103); Cheynet 1990: 106, No.141. 
(Apr 1143) John Roger, kaisar, brother-in-law of 
Manuel I 
Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne. 
Fate: Sent away from Constantinople but not officially exiled. 
Sources: Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 37-38 (trans. Brand 37-38); PBW (Ioannes 306); Cheynet 1990: 107, 
No.143. 
(Feb 1147) Isaakios Komnenos, sebastokrator, 
oldest surviving brother of Manuel I 
Description: Suspected of plotting to overthrow Manuel, in collaboration with Patriarch Kosmas. 
Fate: No overt actions were taken against Manuel so Isaakios was not rebuked (at least not publicly), however, 
Patriarch Kosmas was deposed. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 80 (trans. Magoulias 47); PBW (Isaakios 103); Cheynet 1990: 106-107, 
No.142. 
(c.1154) Andronikos Komnenos, doux of Braničevo, 
cousin of Manuel I  
Description: Discovered plotting to assassinate Manuel and proclaim himself emperor with assistance from the 
Hungarians. 
Fate: Imprisoned at the Great Palace for nine years until he escaped to join the Russian Prince Yaroslav at Galitza. He 
was formally pardoned and reconciled with Manuel in 1165/1166. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 104-106 (trans. Magoulias 59-60); Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 126-
131 (trans. Brand 99-103); PBW (Andronikos 1); Cheynet 1990: 107-108, No.144. 
(1165/1166) Theodoros Stypeiotes, 
megalodoxotatos, protonotarios, epi tou kanikleiou 
Description: Accused of conspiring to overthrow Manuel and promote another emperor. The conspiracy may have 
been provoked by Manuel’s plan to instigate of an oath to his intended heir Bela-Alexios, the husband of Maria 
porphyrogenita. 
Fate: Blinded. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 111-115 (trans. Magoulias 63-66); PBW (Theodoros 186); Cheynet 1990: 
108, No.145. 
(1167-1180) Andronikos Komnenos, doux of 
Kilikia, cousin of Manuel I 
Description: Andronikos abandoned his military command in Kilikia and entered into rebellion against Manuel for a 
second time. He had been courting Philippa of Antioch in Jerusalem in 1166, but fled to the Sultan of Iconium 
with Eudokia Komnene. Probably he had been hoping to be proclaimed emperor with their help. 
Fate: Lived in exile until his formal reconciliation with Manuel in 1180 after which he was sent to govern Oinaion, on 
the Black Sea. During the period of his exile Manuel issued orders that if he were to be captured he should be 
blinded. 
Sources: Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 250 (trans. Brand 188); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 141-142 (trans. 
Magoulias 80-81); PBW (Andronikos 1); Varzos 1984: I, 493-638; Cheynet 1990: 109, No.147. 
(1167) Alexios Axouchos, sebastos, protostrator, 
relative by marriage of Manuel I 
Description: Accused of conspiring to overthrow Manuel. 
Fate: Taken prisoner at Serdica and tonsured at Mount Papykios in Thrace. 
Sources: Kinnamos, Epitome, ed. Meineke 265-269 (trans. Brand 198-199); Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 144-
145 (trans. Magoulias 82); PBW (Alexios 17004); Cheynet 1990: 109, No.148. 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
(Feb 1181) Maria, kaisarissa Description: Discovered plotting with other prominent figures and members of the Komnenian family to assassinate 
Alexios the protosebastos and overthrow the regency on behalf of Alexios II. 
Fate: Maria and her husband suffered no penalties, but their co-conspirators were tried, found guilty, and imprisoned. 
They may have been subjected to a degradation parade. 
Sources: Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 20-21; Choniates, Historia, ed. 
van Dieten 231-232 (trans. Magoulias 130-131); PBW (17002); Varzos 1984: II, 439-452; Cheynet 1990: 110-
111, No.150. 
(Apr-May 1181) Maria, kaisarissa; and the people 
of Constantinople 
Description: When the regency began to enquire into Maria’s role in the February conspiracy, indicating that they were 
going to imprison her, she fled to Hagia Sophia with her husband. They organised a resistance and were joined 
by the Constantinopolitan crowds who proclaimed Alexios II and denounced the regency. 
Fate: A one day battle ensued at Hagia Sophia in May. Many of the crowd were killed. Maria was subsequently 
reconciled with the regency through the mediation of Patriarch Theodosios. 
Sources: Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 22-23; Choniates, Historia, ed. 
van Dieten 236-240 (trans. Magoulias 133-135); PBW (17002); Varzos 1984: II, 439-452; Cheynet 1990: 111, 
No.151. 
(Early 1182 - Sept 1183) Andronikos Komnenos, 
doux of Paphlagonia, cousin of Manuel I 
Description: Andronikos had been contacted by the kaisarissa Maria about the state of the regency. He marched on 
Constantinople and gathered supporters along the way. He announced that he had been appointed by Manuel as 
Alexios’ regent and received oaths of loyalty to himself and Alexios. He arrived at Constantinople and the 
defenders defected to him. He entered the city and deposed the regency, before being appointed as Alexios II’s 
guardian. He was proclaimed co-emperor at Alexios’ behest and was crowned emperor at Hagia Sophia with 
Alexios in attendance in September 1182. He then proceeded to execute the young emperor and assumed sole 
rule. 
Fate: Alexios the protosebastos was blinded upon Andronikos’ entry to Constantinople, and then subjected to a 
degradation parade before being exiled. Alexios II was reportedly strangled a few days after Andronikos’ 
coronation. The boy’s body was beheaded and mutilated. The head was buried but the torso was cast into the sea. 
Empress Maria had been executed for treason earlier in the year and her body was thrown into the sea on a nearby 
shore. The kaisarissa Maria and her husband had died in 1182, and their deaths were later attributed to 
Andronikos. 
Sources: Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 22-45; Choniates, Historia, ed. 
van Dieten 236-273 (trans. Magoulias 133-151); Varzos 1984: I, 493-638; Cheynet 1990: 111-112, No.152. 
(Spring-Summer 1182) Ioannes Komnenos-
Vatatzes, sebastos, megas domestikos, doux of 
Thrace 
Description: Instigated a rebellion at Philadelphia in defence of Alexios II’s rights which he believed were being 
threatened by Andronikos Komnenos. He sent his sons Alexios and Manuel to campaign against Andronikos. 
Fate: When Ioannes died of an illness the populace of Philadelphia declared the city for Andronikos. Alexios and 
Manuel fled to the Turks and then tried to go to the West. They were captured and blinded. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 262-264 (trans. Magoulias 146-147); Varzos 1984: II, 382-389; Cheynet 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
(c. Spring-Summer 1183) Andronikos Angelos; 
Andronikos Kontostephanos, sebastos; sixteen sons; 
Basileios Kamateros, logothetes tou dromou; and 
others 
Description: Accused of conspiring to assassinate Andronikos Komnenos; probably intended that one of them be 
proclaimed emperor alongside Alexios II. 
Fate: Andronikos Angelos and his sons escaped Constantinople. Andronikos Kontostephanos and four of his sons were 
blinded with Kamateros. Kamateros was exiled to Scythia. Other conspirators suffered confiscations, 
imprisonment, and exiled. Some were executed. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 266-267 (trans. Magoulias 148); Varzos 1984: I, 656-662; Cheynet 1990: 
114, No.155. 
(Summer 1183) Maria of Antioch, Empress, and 
mother of Alexios II 
Description: Accused of conspiring with her sister’s husband, Bela III of Hungary to instigate a revolt and overthrow 
Andronikos. 
Fate: Tried and found guilty. Maria was executed by strangulation and her body thrown into the sea on a nearby shore. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 266-267 (trans. Magoulias 149); Cheynet 1990: 114-115, No.156. 
(Sep 1183 - Spring 1184) Theodoros Angelos; 
Theodoros Kantakouzenos 
Description: Enter into revolt at Nikaia, Prousa, and Lopadion shortly after the proclamation of Andronikos I. Probably 
intended to proclaim a rival emperor alongside Alexios II. 
Fate: The rebellions were suppressed by Andronikos in person. Theodoros Kantakouzenos was killed after falling from 
his horse in battle. Theodoros Angelos was blinded along with the bishop of Prousa. Numerous conspirators were 
hanged and impaled. The future Isaakios II Angelos was spared because he had surrendered to Andronikos. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 269-270, 281-289 (trans. Magoulias 149-150, 156-160); Nicol 1968: 7 
(Theodore Kantakouzenos); Cheynet 1990: 115, No.157. 
Andronikos I [1183-1185] 
(Autumn 1183) Andronikos Lapardas, sebastos, 
vestiarites, chartoularios 
Description: Planned a rebellion against Andronikos Komnenos while at Adrianople, and headed east toward Asia 
Minor. 
Fate: He was captured at Adramyttion and sent to Andronikos Komnenos in Constantinople. He was blinded and 
tonsured at the Pantepoptes. He died soon after. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 277-279 (trans. Magoulias 154); Stiernon 1966: 89-96; Cheynet 1990: 
116, No. 158. 
(1184-1191) Isaakios I Komnenos of Cyprus, former 
doux of Kilikia 
Description: Proclaimed himself emperor on Cyprus and intended to challenge Andronikos, quickly settled on 
establishing a break-away state. 
Fate: Remained independent until ousted from Cyprus by Richard the Lionheart in 1191. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 291-292, 369-370, 418 (trans. Magoulias 161, 204, 229-230); Varzos 
1984: II, 301, 884; Cheynet 1990: 116-117, No.159. 
(c. Jun/Jul 1185) Alexios Komnenos, sebastokrator, 
an illegitimate son of Manuel I, prospective son-in-
law of Andronikos I; Mamalos 
Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne and found with illicit books of prophecy (basileiographiai) owned by 
Mamalos. 
Fate: Alexios was blinded and imprisoned. Mamalos was burned in the Hippodrome with his books. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 296, 309-311 (trans. Magoulias 164, 172); Varzos 1984: II, 481-496; 
Cheynet 1990: 117, No.160. 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
Fate: Travelled to Sicily in an effort to raise support for his rebellion. 
Sources: Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 60-63; Varzos 1984: II, 471-
473; Cheynet 1990: 118, No.161. 
(c. Summer - Nov 1185) Alexios, pinkernes Description: Was proclaimed emperor in Sicily and aspired to claim the throne for himself with Western aid. 
Fate: Captured and blinded after the defeat of the Sicilians in Nov 1185. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 296, 319, 360 (trans. Magoulias 164, 175, 200); Eustathios of 
Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, ed. Melville Jones 60-63; Varzos 1984: II, 471-473; Cheynet 1990: 
118-119, No.162. 
(11-12 Sep 1185) Isaakios II Angelos, son of a 
cousin of Manuel I 
Description: A conspiracy involving Isaakios was uncovered and Andronikos I’s agent Hagiochristophorites was 
despatched to arrest him. Isaakios killed Hagiochristophorites and sought asylum at Hagia Sophia. He was joined 
by his family and the Constantinopolitan crowds, proclaimed emperor and invested. He marched against the Great 
Palace and deposed Andronikos. 
Fate: Andronikos was captured as he tried to flee the city. He was tortured while in confinement, had a hand amputated, 
and was blinded in one eye. He was subjected to a degradation parade and then executed in the Hippodrome. His 
remains were thrown into a vault of the Hippodrome before being taken to a nearby graveyard where they were 
not permitted a burial. Andronikos’ sons, Manuel and Ioannes were blinded, both died soon after. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 343-346 (trans. Magoulias 189-191); Varzos 1984: II, 807-840; Cheynet 
1990: 119, No.163. 
Isaakios II [1185-1195] 
(1186) Alexios Branas, sebastos, strategos Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne during the Sicilian campaign. 
Fate: Reconciled with Isaakios. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 376-377 (trans. Magoulias 207-208); Varzos 1984: II, 394-417, 540-543; 
Cheynet 1990: 121, No.166. 
(Spring 1186 – 1187) Alexios Branas, sebastos, 
strategos 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by the troops during his campaign against Peter and Asen and marches against 
Constantinople. 
Fate: Defeated and killed in battle. His corpse was beheaded and mutilated. The head was sent to Isaakios, and featured 
in a degradation parade through the streets of Constantinople. Some of his supporters were granted amnesties. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 377-388 (trans. Magoulias 207-213); Varzos 1984: II, 394-417, 540-543; 
Cheynet 1990: 122, No.167. 
(1191) Pseudo-Alexios II Description: Proclaimed emperor at Harmala (upper Maeander) under the name of Alexios II. 
Fate: Assassinated by a local priest. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 420-422 (trans. Magoulias 231-232); Varzos 1984: II, 473-476; Cheynet 
1990: 123-124, No.169. 
(1191) Pseudo-Alexios II Description: Proclaimed emperor in Paphlagonia under the name of Alexios II. 
Fate: Captured, whipped, and beheaded. The head was sent to Isaakios II. 
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124, No.170. 
(1191-1192) Basileios Chotzas Description: Entered into revolt at Tarsos and aspired to the throne. 
Fate: Captured, blinded, and imprisoned. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 423 (trans. Magoulias 233); Cheynet 1990: 125, No.171. 
(c.1191/1193) Isaakios Komnenos, nephew of 
Andronikos I 
Description: Escaped from prison and fled to Hagia Sophia where he sought to be proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: Killed in the attempt. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 423 (trans. Magoulias 233); Varzos 1984: II, 507-511; Cheynet 1990: 
125, No.172. 
(c.1191-1193) Constantine Tatikios  Description: Discovered plotting for the throne. 
Fate: Captured and blinded. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 423 (trans. Magoulias 233); Cheynet 1990: 126, No.174. 
(1193) Constantine Angelos, commander of the 
fleet, governor of Philippopolis 
Description: Proclaimed emperor at Philippopolis and marched on Adrianople. 
Fate: Betrayed by his supporters, captured, blinded, and handed over to Isaakios I. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 435 (trans. Magoulias 239); Varzos 1984: II, 847-850; Cheynet 1990: 
127, No.176. 
(c.1193-1194) Andronikos Komnenos, doux of 
Thessalonike 
Description: Accused of aspiring for the throne. 
Fate: Arrested and blinded without trial. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 424-425 (trans. Magoulias 234); Varzos 1984: II, 83-85; Cheynet 1990: 
128, No.178. 
(c. 1194-1195) The son of Andronikos Komnenos, 
doux of Thessalonike 
Description: Enters Hagia Sophia in secret in order to be proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: Captured and blinded. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 428 (trans. Magoulias 235); Cheynet 1990: 128, No.179. 
(8 Apr 1195) Alexios III Angelos, sebastokrator, 
brother of Isaakios I 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by the soldiery while on campaign with Isaakios II against the Vlachs and Bulgarians. 
Euphrosyne Doukaina Kamatera, Alexios’ wife, secured the Great Palace and Hagia Sophia for him.  
Fate: Alexios III was crowned emperor and assumed authority. Isaakios was captured, blinded, and tonsured at the 
Monastery of Vera. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 450-451 (trans. Magoulias 247-248); Varzos 1984: II, 726-801; Cheynet 
1990: 128-129, No.180. 
Alexios III [1195-1203] 
(1195) Alexios Kontostephanos, sebastos, 
chartoularios 
Description: Proclaimed himself emperor in the streets of Constantinople, in opposition to the acclamations for 
Isaakios. 
Fate: His supporters abandoned him and he was imprisoned. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 456 (trans. Magoulias 250) Varzos 1984: II, 249-293; Cheynet 1990: 
129-130, No.181. 








(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 461-463 (trans. Magoulias 253-254); Varzos 1984: II, 477-481; Cheynet 
1990: 130, No.182. 
(Autumn 1195) Isaakios I of Cyprus Description: After his release from imprisonment he sought to raise a rebellion in Asia Minor. 
Fate: He died before he was able to instigate a rebellion. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 463-4 (trans. Magoulias 254) Cheynet 1990: 130-131, No.183. 
(Jul 1200) The Constantinopolitan crowds Description: Attempt to proclaim a rival emperor at Hagia Sophia. 
Fate: After failing to gain access to the church, they marched on the Chalke prison and released many of the prisoners. 
They engaged the imperial guard but were defeated and dispersed. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 525-526 (trans. Magoulias 288-289); Cheynet 1990: 135-136, No.193-
194. 
(31 Jul 1200) Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos) Description: Proclaimed emperor at Hagia Sophia within days of the Constantinopolitan uprising. He marched on the 
Great Palace, gained access via the Hippodrome, and seated himself on the imperial throne. 
Fate: Alexios ordered a counter-attack from the Blachernai. The Varangians overwhelmed Ioannes’ supporters and 
killed him within the Great Palace. His corpse was beheaded and mutilated. The head was sent to Alexios III 
before being displayed in the agora. Ioannes remains were displayed outside the Blachernai Palace. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 527-528 (trans. Magoulias 289); Mesarites, Die Palastrevolution des 
Johannes Komnenos, ed. Heisenberg; Cheynet 1990: 136-137, No.195. 
(Jun-Jul 1203) Alexios IV, son of Isaakios II; with 
the Fourth Crusade 
Description: Alexios escaped imprisonment in Constantinople and fled to the West to find help in restoring his father 
to the throne. He made an agreement with the leaders of the Fourth Crusade that he would provide them with 
assistance if they were to install him at Constantinople. The crusade sailed to Constantinople and forced Alexios 
III to flee the city. Isaakios II was restored by the Varangians and senate in order to negotiate with the crusaders 
and Alexios was crowned co-emperor soon after. 
Fate: Alexios III fled to Debeltos in Thrace with one of his daughters. His wife and other daughters were removed 
from power and kept prisoner in Constantinople.  
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 536-541 (trans. Magoulias 294-297); Akropolites, Historia, ed. 
Heisenberg 6 (trans. Macrides 109-110); Cheynet 1990: 139-140, No.199. 
Alexios IV & Isaakios II [1203-1204] 
(25-28 Jan 1204) Nikolaos Kannavos, sebastos Description: Proclaimed emperor by the senate, people, and patriarch, at an assembly at Hagia Sophia. 
Fate: The will of the people was frustrated by the proclamation of Alexios V. Kannavos was arrested and executed. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 562-564 (trans. Magoulias 307-308); Akropolites, Historia, ed. 
Heisenberg 7 (trans. Macrides 110-111); Cheynet 1990: 142, No. 202. 
(28 Jan 1204) Alexios V Doukas, protovestiarios Description: Proclaimed himself emperor in the Great Palace with the support of the Varangians and the finance 
minister Constantine Philoxenites. He forced the abdication of Alexios IV and Isaakios II, before quashing the 
proclamation of Kannavos. 
Fate: Alexios IV and Isaakios II were taken prisoner and executed. Alexios V was crowned emperor and assumed the 
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Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 561-564 (trans. Magoulias 307-309); Polemis 1968: 145-147; Cheynet 
1990: 142-143, No.203. 
Alexios V Doukas [1204] 
(12/13 Apr 1204) Constantine Laskaris Description: Constantine was proclaimed emperor by the patriarch and remaining officials at Hagia Sophia, after 
Alexios V had fled Constantinople. He refused to accept the insignia offered to him by the patriarch. 
Fate: He led the resistance against the Latin entry into Constantinople and eventually fled the city to join his brother, 
Theodoros, in Asia Minor. He appears to have renounced all claim to the throne. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 571-572 (trans. Magoulias 314); Cheynet 1990: 145, No.206. 
Conquest of Constantinople by the forces of the Fourth Crusade (1204) 
(Apr 1204) Alexios Komnenos, grandson of 
Andronikos I; Queen Thamar of Georgia 
Description: Proclaimed emperor in Trebizond and had aspirations for the empire. 
Fate: Quickly settled for autonomy in Trebizond. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 571 (trans. Magoulias 313-314); Cheynet 1990: 144-145, No.204. 
(1205-1208) Theodoros I Laskaris, despotes, son-
in-law of Alexios III 
Description: After the capture of Alexios III by the Latins, Theodoros Laskaris was proclaimed emperor by the notables 
at Nikaia and sought his coronation. 
Fate: Theodoros was crowned emperor by the newly elected (20 March) Patriarch Autoreianos in April 1208. 
Sources: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 11-12 (trans. Macrides 119-120). 
Theodoros I Laskaris [1205-1221] 
(1211) Alexios III Angelos, emperor (still claiming 
the title), father-in-law of Theodoros I 
Description: After his ransom and release by Michael I Komnenos Doukas, Alexios III continued to claim the imperial 
title and appealed to the Seljuks for assistance against his son-in-law, Theodoros I Laskaris. 
Fate: He was defeated and captured at the battle of Antioch-on-the-Maeander, blinded, and tonsured at the monastery 
of St Hyakinthos in Nikaia. 
Sources: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 17 (trans. Macrides 131); Skoutariotes, Synopsis Chronike, ed. Sathas 
457. 
Ioannes III [1221-1254] 
(1224) Isaakios and Alexios Laskaris, brothers of 
Theodoros I Laskaris 
Description: Rebelled against Ioannes III and invaded Nikaian territory with the help of the Latins. They intended that 
one of them be proclaimed emperor in Ioannes’ place. 
Fate: The brothers were taken captive after the defeat of their forces at the Battle of Poimanenon, and were blinded. 
Other supporters were executed. 
Sources: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 34-36, 109-111 (trans. Macrides 166, 283); Gregoras, Historia, ed. 
Schopen I, 25. 
(1224/1225-1230) Theodoros Komnenos Doukas, 
despotes, cousin of Alexios III 
Description: After a string of successes against the Latins, including the recapture of Thessalonike (Autumn 1224) 
Theodoros Komnenos Doukas started exhibiting imperial ambitions. He had himself proclaimed emperor at 
Thessalonike in 1227, and was crowned by Archbishop Demetrios Chomatenos. 
Fate: In March 1230 he was defeated by the Bulgarian emperor Ivan Asen at the Battle of Klokotnitsa. He was 
imprisoned for seven years and blinded. 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
(1224) Andronikos Nestongos and Isaakios 
Nestongos, cousins of Ioannes III; and other 
prominent officials 
Description: Discovered plotting to proclaim Andronikos Nestongos emperor.  
Fate: Isaakios Nestongos and one other conspirator (a certain Makrenos) were both subjected to blinding and the 
amputation of a hand. Andronikos Nestongos was exiled to the fortress of Magnesia. The other conspirators were 
subjected to unspecified ‘minor’ penalties. 
Sources: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 36-38 (trans. Macrides 169). 
(c.1230-c.1237) Manuel Komnenos Doukas, 
despotes, brother of Theodoros Komnenos Doukas 
Description: Proclaimed emperor at Thessalonike at some point after the capture and blinding of his brother by Ivan 
Asen. 
Fate: Manuel was deposed by his brother Theodoros who had been released by Ivan Asen and provided with an army. 
He was exiled to Attaleia in Asia Minor. Theodoros proclaimed his son Ioannes Komnenos Doukas emperor at 
Thessalonike but exercised real power on his behalf. 
Sources: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 43-44, 60-62 (trans. Macrides 182, 206-207). 
(1237 - Winter 1241/1242) Ioannes Komnenos 
Doukas, son of Theodoros Komnenos Doukas 
Description: Proclaimed emperor by his father after capturing Thessalonike and deposing Manuel Komnenos Doukas, 
but was subject to his father’s authority. 
Fate: Was reconciled with Ioannes III after the latter’s expedition against Thessalonike in 1241. He renounced his 
imperial title in exchange for recognition as despotes. 
Sources: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 60-62, 65-67 (trans. Macrides 206-207, 215-216). 
Theodoros II [1254-1258] 
Ioannes IV [1258-1261] 
(Aug 1258 – Dec 1261) Michael VIII Palaiologos Description: During the funerary preparations for Theodoros II (Aug 1258) a group of disaffected Nikaian aristocrats 
and military officers led by Michael Palaiologos instigated the assassination of Georgios Mouzalon, the regent of 
the eight-year-old minority emperor Ioannes IV. Michael was promptly promoted as regent and granted the titles 
of megas doux and despotes (Sep-Dec). He was proclaimed co-emperor with Ioannes on 1 Jan 1259.  
Fate: Michael was granted seniority in the acclamations attending his first coronation (by Patriarch Arsenios) and 
Ioannes was not permitted to wear a crown. Michael received a second coronation, in Constantinople in 1261 
after the recapture of the city, Ioannes was not present. The young emperor was blinded on his eleventh birthday 
(25 Dec 1261), and exiled to a fortress in Bithynia.  
Sources: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 154-163 (trans. Macrides 339-352); Pachymeres, Relations 
Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 78-81, 94-97, 102-113, 129-147; PLP 21528. 
Michael VIII Palaiologos [1259-1282], with Ioannes IV [1258-1261] 
Recovery of Constantinople (1261) 
(Spring-Summer 1262) Pseudo-Ioannes IV Description: A blind child who resembled Ioannes was proclaimed emperor at Trikokkia in Bithynia. 
Fate: Following desertions Ioannes and his main supporters fled to the Turks. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 259-67. 
(1264) Makrenos, parakoimomenos Description: Suspected of plotting to usurp the throne after arranging a marriage alliance to a member of the Laskarid 
family. 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 275-276; PLP 16358/92605. 
(1265) Frangopoulos, oikeios Description: Discovered plotting to murder Michael VIII; probably intended to proclaim himself emperor. Patriarch 
Arsenios was implicated in the conspiracy. 
Fate: Tortured and subjected to unspecified penalties. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 371; PLP 30093. 
(1273) Pseudo-Ioannes IV Description: A Pseudo-Ioannes IV appeared at the court of Charles of Anjou and requested assistance in claiming the 
throne. 
Fate: N/A. 
Sources: Geanakoplos 1959: 217 and n.104. 
(1278) Georgios Komnenos, emperor of Trebizond Description: In light of Michael’s efforts towards church union, an anti-unionist faction at Constantinople called upon 
Georgios to assume the throne, and the Latin inhabitants of the city to help. 
Fate: The calls were suppressed, some of those involved were subjected to punishments. 
Sources: Loenertz 1965: 391; PLP 12094. 
(Late 1280) Ioannes Angelos, despotes Description: Was accused of planning to proclaim himself emperor after his successes against the Turks. 
Fate: He was blinded and imprisoned, and was later reported to have committed suicide. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent II, 613; PLP 205. 
Andronikos II [1282-1328] 
(Mar 1292) The Porphyrogennetos Constantine 
Palaiologos, despotes 
Description: Constantine was accused of plotting for the throne with support from prominent aristocrats and church 
officials. 
Fate: He was tried, found guilty, and imprisoned in the imperial palace. His supporters were subjected to confiscations. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 171-181; PLP 21492. 
(Late 1295) Alexios Philanthropenos, pinkernes Description: He was proclaimed emperor by the Cretan units of his army in Asia Minor. He was offered the title kaisar 
by Andronikos II if he were to end his rebellion but he refused. 
Fate: After suffering desertions he was betrayed by certain of his troops who had been bribed by the governor of 
Neokastra. He was blinded and confined to his estates. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 237-255; PLP 29752. 
(1297-1300) Ioannes Tarchaneiotes, an Arsenite 
loyalist 
Description: Discovered slandering the emperor and wearing insignia. 
Fate: Arrested and imprisoned. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 153-155; III, 285-299. 
(Jan-Mar 1304) Michael Angelos, despotes Description: After Michael had been discovered exchanging oaths and giving largess to military figures, he was 
accused of plotting for the throne. 
Fate: He was arrested, tried, and imprisoned at the Great Palace for the rest of his life. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent IV, 435-437; IV, 447-449; PLP 193. 
(1305) Ioannes Drimys, an Arsenite loyalist Description: Drimys was discovered claiming to be a member of the Laskaris family and organising a conspiracy 
against Andronikos from the monastery of Mosele. 







(Date) Principal Conspirator Details 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent IV, 652-653; PLP 5830. 
(c.1307) Kassianos, megas primmikerios, strategos Description: Accused by Nikephoros Choumnos of conspiring against Andronikos in collaboration with Osman after 
contracting a marriage alliance. 
Fate: He was seized by Andronikos’ agents at Chele and sentenced to imprisonment. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent IV, 681; PLP 11346. 
(1307) Charles of Valois Description: A conspiracy involving generals in Constantinople and Thessalonike, along with the metropolitan of 
Thessalonike, intended to proclaim Charles emperor. 
Fate: The plot was never implemented, nor was it discovered. 
Sources: Laiou 1972: 200-220; PLP 11234. 
(Apr 1321 - May 1328) Andronikos III Description: When Andronikos III caused the death of his brother Manuel (1320), his father the co-emperor 
Constantine died of grief. Andronikos II removed his grandson from precedence, although he had already been 
associated as co-emperor. The enraged grandson gained the support of prominent members of the military 
aristocracy including Ioannes Kantakouzenos and Syrgiannes Palaiologos, and instigated a period of recurring 
civil war with his grandfather.  
Fate: In Easter 1321 the grandson established a rival throne at Adrianople and forced his grandfather to accept his co-
emperorship in a peace treaty in June. In 1322, prompted by Syrgiannes (who had switched sides) Andronikos II 
renewed hostilities but was forced to agree peace terms in July; Andronikos III was crowned as co-emperor by 
his grandfather in February 1325. Finally, in February 1327, with assistance from the Bulgarians, Andronikos III 
renewed hostilities. His grandfather was supported by the Serbians, bringing an ‘international’ dimension to the 
conflict. After a string of victories in Macedonia, the grandson marched on Constantinople, besieged and entered 
the city, and deposed his grandfather on 23/24 May 1328. He was proclaimed sole emperor at the Blachernai. 
Andronikos II was tonsured but permitted to retain some of his imperial attire and to continue living in the palace. 
c.1330 he retired to the Lips monastery in Constantinople and died two years later. 
Sources: Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen esp. I, 419-442; Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen esp. I, 291-292, 
300-306; PLP 21437. 
Andronikos III [1328-1341] 
(late 1333 - 23 Aug 1334) Syrgiannes Palaiologos, 
megas doux; with Empress Maria 
Description: Suspected of plotting for the throne, he fled to Stephen Dušan and was given troops to support his 
campaign against the empire.  
Fate: Marched against Thessalonike in 1334 but was murdered by Sphrantzes Palaiologos in August. 
Sources: Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 442-443; PLP 27167. 
(1335/1341) John and Manuel Asan, brothers-in-law 
of Ioannes Kantakouzenos 
Description: Discovered conspiring to kill Empress Anna and Ioannes V and claim the throne with Genoese assistance. 
Fate: Both were arrested and imprisoned. They were eventually freed under Ioannes VI. 
Sources: Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen I, 530-533; Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 481-482, 484; PLP 
1499/91373 (Ioannes); PLP 1506 (Manuel). 
Ioannes V [1341-1391] (Sole 1st) 
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Sources: Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen II, 70-71; PLP 1180. 
(1345) Alexios Apokaukos, megas doux, regent Description: Again suspected of plotting to seize Ioannes V in order to use him to claim the throne for himself. 
Sources: Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 702; Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen II, 540-541; PLP 1180. 
(26 Oct 1341 – 2 Feb 1347) Ioannes VI 
Kantakouzenos 
Description: Kantakouzenos was proclaimed as junior emperor at Didymoteichon in 1341 instigating another period 
of protracted civil war. He was crowned for the first time by Lazaros of Jerusalem (21 May 1346) at Adrianople. 
His opposition to Ioannes V’s regency, to which he claimed Andronikos IV had appointed him, lasted for six 
years until, with the aid of the Turks, Ioannes besieged and entered Constantinople. Empress Anna of Savoy put 
up a brief show of resistance from the Blachernai Palace and entreated the Genoese at Pera to help. After 
overcoming the Genoese, Ioannes VI engaged in negotiations with the regency. When these proved fruitless his 
supporters stormed the Blachernai and forced Anna to submit. 
Fate: Ioannes V was relegated to second in precedence and married Ioannes VI’s daughter. Ioannes VI assumed 
authority and ruled with Ioannes V. He was crowned emperor (for a second time) by Patriarch Isidore in May 
1347, with Ioannes V and Anna in attendance. After a period of renewed civil war between Ioannes V and Ioannes 
VI, including peace treaties and power-sharing arrangements (1352-1357) Ioannes VI was forced to abdicate and 
enter monastic confinement at the monastery of Peribleptos when Ioannes V entered the city by subterfuge and 
besieged the Blachernai Palace. 
Sources: Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen esp. II, 167, 564, 600-615; III, 29, 255-256; Gregoras, Historia, 
ed. Schopen esp. II, 773-779; III, 186-187, 241-247; PLP 10973. 
Ioannes VI [1347-1354] with Ioannes V [1341-1391] 
(c. April 1353/4-1357) Matthew Kantakouzenos, son 
of Ioannes VI 
Description: In April 1353/4 he was proclaimed co-emperor with Ioannes VI and replaced Ioannes V in the 
acclamations. He was crowned co-emperor by Patriarch Philotheos. And continued to challenge Ioannes V’s 
authority from his appanage in Thrace, after his father was deposed. 
Fate: He was captured by the Serbs in 1357 after a failed expedition against Serres, and ransomed to Ioannes V. Ioannes 
exiled him to Tenedos, and then to Lesbos, before installing him in the Morea. His sons were made despotes by 
Ioannes V. 
Sources: Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen III, 188-189, 503-504; Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen III, 269-
270, 319-358; PLP 10983. 
Ioannes V [1341-1391] (Sole 2nd) 
(c.1357) Ziani, a supporter of Matthew 
Kantakouzenos 
Description: Planned to take Empress Helena and her children hostage in order to force the restoration of Matthew 
Kantakouzenos in Thrace. 
Fate: The plot was exposed by Matthew Kantakouzenos’ mother, Eirene, after Ziani wrote to her asking for support. 
He was arrested and imprisoned. 
Sources: Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen III, 341-345. 
(1373) Andronikos IV, oldest son and co-emperor of 
Ioannes V; with Ioannes VII, his son and co-
emperor; and Savci Bey, a son of Sultan Murad 
Description: Rebelled against his father, Ioannes V, with assistance from Savci Bey. Both men intended to claim their 
respective thrones by overthrowing their fathers. 
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his son and grandson. However, Andronikos IV and Ioannes VII were granted mercy and each blinded in one eye. 
They were removed from precedence, in favour of Manuel II, and were imprisoned. 
Sources: Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 73 (trans. Magoulias 79); Chalkokondyles, Historia, ed. Darkó 
I, 55-56 (trans. Kaldellis 94-97); PLP 21438 (Andronikos); PLP 21480 (Ioannes). 
(Jul-Aug 1376) Andronikos IV, oldest son and co-
emperor of Ioannes V; with Ioannes VII, his son 
and co-emperor 
Description: Andronikos fled his confinement and besieged Constantinople for thirty-two days, with assistance from 
a Genoese contingent and Turkish forces provided by Sultan Murad I. He entered the city on 12/13 Aug 1376 
with assistance from supporters inside.  
Fate: Ioannes V and Manuel II took refuge at the fortress of the Golden Gate where they continued to resist until 
October. They surrendered and were imprisoned. Andronikos IV and Ioannes VII assumed authority. 
Sources: Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Schreiner I, 67, 96 Chr. 7/17, 9/32; Wright 2017: 70. 
Andronikos IV [1376-1379] 
(May-Jul 1379) Ioannes V and Manuel II Description: Ioannes V and Manuel II escaped their captivity with assistance from the Genoese. They approached 
Sultan Murad I for support in being restored to authority. After a brief siege of Constantinople, they entered the 
city on 1/14 July with assistance from supporters inside. 
Fate: Andronikos’ Genoese supporters continued to resist Ioannes V from the fortress of the Golden Gate but were 
quashed when a Venetian fleet arrived later in the month. Andronikos himself fled to Pera upon hearing that his 
father had entered the city and continued to resist until 1381 when he was restored to precedence together with 
his son and granted an appanage to govern semi-independently.  
Sources: Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Schreiner I, 67, 182-183 Chr. 7/19, 22/20; Wright 2017: 70; PLP 
21485 (Ioannes); PLP 21513 (Manuel). 
Ioannes V [1341-1391] (Sole 3rd) 
(1385) Andronikos IV Description: Andronikos renewed hostilities against Ioannes V after requesting that Sultan Murad give him one of the 
fortresses then under Ioannes’ control. 
Fate: Andronikos was defeated and exiled to Selymbria, where he died later in the year. 
Sources: Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Schreiner I, 68 Chr. 7/20; PLP 21438. 
(Apr-Sep 1390) Ioannes VII Description: Ioannes VII besieged Constantinople with support from Sultan Bayezid I. He entered the city on 13/14 
April with assistance from the defenders, including the Genoese at Pera. Ioannes V retreated to the fortress at the 
Golden Gate and resisted for five months while Ioannes VII claimed authority. Manuel II escaped to Lemnos and 
Christoupolis to raise forces, including approaching the Knights of St John. 
Fate: Ioannes VII was ousted from Constantinople when Manuel II entered the city with his forces in September in 
order to restore Ioannes V. 
Sources: Ignatius of Smolensk, ed. Majeska 100-103; Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Schreiner I, 68-69 Chr. 
7/21-22; PLP 21480. 
Manuel II [1391-1425] 
(c.1394-1399) Supporters of Ioannes VII in 
Constantinople 
Description: Supporters of Ioannes VII exploited the Ottoman siege of Constantinople to proclaim Ioannes in the city 
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Sources: Doukas, Historia Turco-Byzantina, ed. Grecu 83 (trans. Magoulias 85-86). 
(c.1414) Theodosios Kyprios Description: One of ‘the leading men at court’ is mentioned in Mazaris’ Journey to Hades as having held aspirations 
for the imperial throne. 
Sources: PLP 13946. 
(1423) Demetrios Palaiologos, despotes Description: Suspected of plotting for the throne in collaboration with the Turks. 
Fate: Fled to the Perama. 
Sources: Sphrantzes, Memorii, 1401-1477, ed. Grecu 16; Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Schreiner I, Chr. 
13/8-9; II, 420-421; PLP 21454. 
Ioannes VIII [1425-1448] 
(Apr-Aug 1442) Demetrios Palaiologos, despotes Description: Besieged Constantinople for several months with aid from the Turks in an attempt to have Demetrios 
proclaimed emperor. 
Fate: Demetrios received no support from the citizenry of the city, and was not aided (as he believed he would be) by 
his brother-in-law Matthew Palaiologos Asan. He was eventually abandoned by his troops and exiled to 
Selymbria. 
Sources: Sphrantzes, Memorii, 1401-1477, ed. Grecu 64; Chalkokondyles, Historia, ed. Darkó II, 80 (trans. Kaldellis 
II, 42-45); PLP 21454. 
(Nov 1448) Demetrios Palaiologos, despotes Description: Marched on Constantinople from Selymbria shortly after the death of Ioannes VIII and before the 
proclamation of Constantine XI. He attempted to establish himself as the city’s defender in order to proclaim 
himself emperor. He appealed to the anti-unionist factions to support his proclamation. 
Fate: Demetrios’ proclamation was prevented by his mother, the empress Helena, who asserted her right to act as 
regent until Constantine XI could be proclaimed and return to the city. Constantine was proclaimed at Mistra on 
6 January 1448, and returned to Constantinople in March. He did not receive a coronation. Demetrios returned to 
Selymbria. 
Sources: Chalkokondyles, Historia, ed. Darkó II, 140-141 (trans. Kaldellis II, 156-157); Nicol 1993: 369-370; PLP 
21454. 









Table 2: A provisional case list of reluctant Byzantine emperors (c.306-1453) 
(Date) Reluctant Individual Description 
(306) Constantine I  Source: Panegyrici Latini VI(7).8.3-6 (trans. Nixon and Rodgers 229-231). 
Details: As Constantine was mourning the death of his father the soldiery unexpectedly clothed him in the imperial purple. He attempted 
to escape the proclamation by spurring his horse. The anonymous panegyrist calls this desire to flee an error because imperium was being 
offered to Constantine by Jupiter and he would have been unable to escape it anyway. Constantine was commended for his modesty and 
piety, but the good fortune of the state was said to have triumphed over him.  
(360) Julian  Source: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum 20.4, 20.5, 20.8. 
Details: (1) The emperor Constantius was jealous of Julian’s popularity with the army and plotted to remove him. After his troops had 
discovered the plot and broken into open revolt, Julian’s palace in Paris was surrounded (February 360). The soldiery proclaimed Julian 
Augustus and demanded that he appear before them. At daybreak Julian emerged, but rejected their acclamations; showing displeasure, 
extending his arms and entreating them to hold back from civil war. He called upon them to stand down and return to their quarters. The 
continued shouts of the troops eventually forced him to give way to their decision. Julian retreated into solitude out of fear of Constantius’ 
reaction. The troops then demanded to see him invested with imperial robes. Julian addressed them and claimed that he had been raised 
to supreme power by their ‘deliberate decision’. (2) Julian dispatched a missive to Constantius in order to explain why the troops had 
proclaimed him Augustus and to reaffirm his allegiance. After stressing his loyalty, Julian explained that he had been proclaimed without 
having sought it, that he had been afraid and had tried to hide within the palace, and that he had been persuaded to accept the promotion 
only after repeated entreaties by the soldiery. He believed that his agreement would restrain them from violent actions, and feared that 
they would have killed him had he continued to refuse.  
 
Source: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 3.9.2-3. 
Details: After Julian’s troops discovered Constantius’ plot against his life they broke into the palace and led Julian outside to proclaim 
him Augustus. They forced a crown onto his head, and Julian was distressed by what had happened, since he realised that it could not be 
undone. He sent an ambassador to Constantius to explain that the proclamation had been contrary to his own wishes, and to say that he 
would be content with the title of Caesar if Constantius were to pardon him.  
(363) Salutius  Source: Zosimus, Histoire Nouvelle 3.36. 
Details: The praetorian prefect Salutius was unanimously elected as the successor to Julian. He refused the promotion on account of his 
old age and inability to deal with the current crisis. The troops then proposed that his son should be promoted instead but Salutius again 
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(363) Jovian  Source: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum 25.9.4. 
Details: After Jovian’s selection as Julian’s replacement, the emperor reportedly refused to wear a crown, and finally accepted it only with 
great reluctance.  
 
Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 256-257 (trans. Jeffreys 181).  
Details: Before news of Julian’s death became known, Jovian was brought into the imperial tent under the pretext that the emperor wished 
to speak with him. As he entered the tent, he was seized by the military commanders and immediately proclaimed emperor.  
 
Source: John of Nikiu, Chronicle, trans. Charles p.79. 
Details: The troops assembled and decided upon Jovian as Julian’s successor. However, Jovian was unwilling to become emperor and had 
to be persuaded to accept the promotion. In exchange for his agreement, Jovian called upon all those present to convert to Christianity.  
(364) Valentinian I  Source: Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum 26.1.5, 26.2.1-6. 
Details: (1) After his unanimous selection as the successor to Jovian, Valentinian reportedly delayed his ‘election’ (proclamation) as he 
believed that it would otherwise fall on an unpropitious day. (2) After being proclaimed Augustus Valentinian addressed the troops and 
claimed that he had been raised because they had judged him to be the best candidate, that he had never desired nor sought the imperial 
position, and that he was troubled by his newfound responsibilities. (3) Before appointing his brother as co-emperor (Augustus), 
Valentinian supposedly considered himself ‘unequal to the pressure of the urgent business’ at hand. 
 
Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 260 (trans. Jeffreys 183-184). 
Details: After the death of Jovian, Valentinian was supposedly selected and crowned emperor by Salustius, the praetorian prefect, who 
had to ‘force’ him to accept this decision. 
(484) Leontius  Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 314 (trans. Jeffreys 216). 
Details: The magister militum per Orientem Illus rose in revolt against Zeno. He took the empress Verina with him to Tarsos in Kilikia, 
and there made her crown the patricius Leontius as emperor in the Church of St Peter. Malalas recounts that Leontius was ‘persuaded’ 
(πείσας) to accept the crown because he was a free-born man. Illus was the principal agent behind his elevation.  
(512) Areobindus  Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 333-334 (trans. Jeffreys 228); John of Nikiu, Chronicle, trans. Charles p.129. 
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rioting populace to assume the imperial title and replace Anastasius. Having gone to the home of Areobindus and Anicia Juliana, the 
rioters were disappointed to find that Areobindus had already fled and hidden in the Perama.  
 
 
(512) Anastasius  Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 333-334 (trans. Jeffreys 228). 
Details: Recusatio divestiture variant. During the popular unrest of 512 that saw an attempt to proclaim Areobindus as emperor, Anastasius 
ascended the kathisma of the Hippodrome, removed his crown, and made a ‘sacred pronouncement’ that indicated his intent to abdicate 
the throne. The people, upon witnessing this spectacle, called on him to once again wear the crown and resume his governance. 
 
Source: John of Nikiu, Chronicle, trans. Charles p.129. 
Details: Confirming Malalas on all other details, but omitting Anastasius’ performance of a recusatio. Instead the emperor calmed the 
rioters with his words. 
(588) Germanus  Source: Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 115-116 (trans. Whitby 74); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 260 
(trans. Mango and Scott 382). 
Details: In 588 Germanus was made general in a military revolt. Theophylaktos records that after removing their former leader, Priscus, 
the soldiery held an assembly and summoned Germanus in order to promote him. Germanus initially ‘rejected the camp’s demand’, but 
later agreed when the soldiery threatened to kill him if he continued to resist. 
 
Source: Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Bidez and Parmentier 224-225 (trans. Whitby 294-296). 
Details: Germanus was proclaimed as general and emperor, but refused to accept the promotion. He was threatened with physical violence 
and death if he did not acquiesce, and was then subjected to a range of tortures before eventually agreeing to the troops’ demands. 
(602) Phocas  Source: Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 333-334 (trans. Whitby 225); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 289 
(trans. Mango and Scott 413). 
Details: During his proclamation at the Hebdomon, Phocas purportedly feigned a wish that the patricius Germanus (the father-in-law of 
the deposed Maurice’s son and heir, Theodosius) be proclaimed instead. Germanus had already been offered the throne by the army if he 
were to replace Maurice, and before Phocas’ arrival at Constantinople had instigated an unsuccessful attempt to gain power through an 
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(610) Herakleios  Source: John of Nikiu, Chronicle, trans. Charles p.178. 
Details: Herakleios was conveyed against his will to the Church of St. Thomas the Apostle and crowned. 
 
Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 297 (trans. Mango and Scott 426). 
Details: Herakleios and his father had to be persuaded by members of the senate into rebelling against Phocas. 
 
Source: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos ed. Mango 36-37. 
Details: During Herakleios’ proclamation at Constantinople, he urged Priskos to assume the imperial office in his place. He claimed not 
to have come to take the empire for himself but to punish Phocas for the murder of Maurice and his children. However, Priskos refused 
the offer and Herakleios was subsequently acclaimed emperor. 
(715) Theodosios III  Source: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos ed. Mango 118-119. 
Details: (1) When the Opsikion thema revolted in 715 they marched on Constantinople. At Adramyttion they found a local tax collector 
named Theodosios and sought to proclaim him emperor. Theodosios ran away to hide on a mountain, but the troops found him again and 
proclaimed him by force. (2) When Theodosios’ lack of experience became clear, the military and civil dignitaries called upon him to 
abdicate the throne. He swiftly did so, and Leon was elected as his successor. 
 
Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 385 (trans. Mango and Scott 536). 
Details: Confirming Nikephoros’ account of Theodosios’ proclamation, but omitting the circumstances of his abdication. 
(802) Nikephoros I  Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 477 (trans. Mango and Scott 656). 
Details: After Nikephoros’ proclamation he met with Eirene to apologise for his usurpation. He claimed to have been promoted against 
his will and that he had no desire for the throne. He cursed those who had raised him and condemned them as akin to Judas. He showed 
Eirene the black buskins that he chose to wear in place of the red buskins of an emperor. This account contrasts with Nikephoros’ 
willingness to go along with his proclamation as described earlier by Theophanes. 
(803) Bardanes Tourkos  Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 479 (trans. Mango and Scott 657). 
Details: (1) Bardanes, patrikios and strategos ton Anatolikon, was proclaimed emperor by the troops. He ‘strenuously declined the office, 
but was unable to frustrate his men.’ (2) After eight days spent fruitlessly trying to gain entry to Chrysopolis, he feared to commit a 
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(811) Michael I  Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 492 (trans. Mango and Scott 674). 
Details: Soon after the magistros Theoktistos had proclaimed the badly injured Staurakios emperor at Adrianople, Staurakios’ brother-in-
law, the kouropalates Michael Rhangabe, was entreated by friends to lay claim to the title himself. Even Theoktistos was in agreement. 
However, Michael initially refused the promotion and cited the oaths he had taken to Nikephoros and Staurakios as his excuse. 
 
Source: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5 (trans. Wortley 4). 
Details: Michael, was selected to succeed Staurakios after the latter was severely wounded in battle, however, he supposedly believed 
himself to be unworthy of the imperial office. He therefore initially refused his promotion and proposed that the future Leon V be promoted 
instead. Leon refused the offer and was subsequently able to persuade Michael to accept the dignity. 
(813) Leon V  Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 502 (trans. Mango and Scott 685). 
Details: After the defeat of the Byzantine forces by the Bulgars at the Battle of Versinikia (June 813), Michael ‘escaped’ to Constantinople. 
He informed the military commanders of his intent to abdicate the throne, and indicated that the patrikios, and strategos of the Anatolikon 
thema, the future Leon V, should replace him on account of his piety and courage. Leon refused this invitation. When the strategoi heard 
of Michael’s flight they called upon Leon to help the ‘common cause’ and ‘the oikoumene’. Leon continually refused their exhortations, 
wishing to remain untouched by treachery toward the emperor. He was persuaded to accept the promotion when the Bulgars continued 
their advance against Constantinople.  He had already written to the patriarch in order to assure him of his Orthodoxy and to ask for 
prayers and consent for the assumption of power. 
 
Source: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 4 (trans. Kaldellis 6).  
Details: The army defamed Michael I and then called upon Leon to assume the throne. Leon was seized with foreboding at the thought of 
the elevation, but Michael II threatened to kill him if he did not comply. 
 
Source: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 16-17; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 26-29. 
Details: After Michael’s defeat and flight back to Constantinople, Leon exhorted the troops to abuse the emperor and acclaim him as 
emperor. Michael II threatened him with death if he would not accept the proclamation. Once this had been done, Leon displayed signs 
of nervousness and terror at the elevation. Continuatus questions whether these expressions were feigned so that Leon could cite them 
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Source: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 5, 7 (trans. Wortley 4, 6-7). 
Details: (1) Leon was offered the throne by Michael I who considered himself unworthy of the dignity. However, Leon also protested his 
unworthiness to rule and persuaded Michael to accept the imperial office. (2) After the defeat of the Byzantine forces by the Bulgars, Leon 
and his supporters contemplated rebelling against Michael I. The soldiery surrounded Leon’s command tent, defamed Michael, and 
acclaimed Leon. Leon apparently sought to avoid the promotion by making light of what had happened. He accepted the decision when 
the future Michael II (the Amorion) drew his sword and invited his comrades to do likewise. Leon was invested with a diadem and 
proclaimed emperor. 
(838) Theophobos  Source: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 40-41 (trans. Kaldellis 54); Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 124-125; ed. 
Featherstone and Codoñer 178-181; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 74, 80 (trans. Wortley 75, 81). 
Details: Theophobos was proclaimed by his Persian troops either at Sinope or Amastris. He repeatedly entreated them to cease their 
rebellion but was ignored. He secretly contacted the emperor to ensure him of his continued loyalty, and to explain that the revolution had 
not been his doing. Theophilos accepted this version of events and granted Theophobos an apatheia. 
(963) Nikephoros II  Source: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 40-44 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 91-93).  
Details: At Kaisareia, Ioannes Tzimiskes and the other military commanders surrounded Nikephoros’ command tent and drew their swords 
before proclaiming Nikephoros emperor. Nikephoros refused the promotion, citing the difficulty of attaining power and his grief over the 
deaths of his wife and son as reasons. He then proposed that Ioannes should accept the honour instead, but nobody present would allow 
it; instead, they declared him emperor on the spot and threatened to kill him if he refused. 
 
Source: Psellos, Historia Syntomos, ed. Aerts 99. 
Details: Ioannes Tzimiskes proposed to Empress Theophano that Nikephoros should be made emperor on account of his many 
achievements. Nikephoros was incredibly hesitant to acquiesce but finally agreed when Tzimiskes threatened him with a sword. 
 
Source: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 256-257 (trans. Wortley 247). 
Details: The parakoimomenos Ioseph Bringas reportedly dispatched letters to the magistroi Ioannes Tzimiskes and Romanos Kourkouas, 
offering rewards in exchange for the deposition, tonsure, or murder of Nikephoros. Tzimiskes and Kourkouas revealed this to Nikephoros 
and called upon him to act. They supposedly threatened to kill him with their own hands if he should continue to delay. Fearing for his 
life, Nikephoros permitted them to proclaim him emperor. 
(969) Ioannes I  Source: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 41-44 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 92-93). 
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Ioannes Tzimiskes, strategos of the Anatolikon thema. He offered to elevate Tzimiskes to the ‘summit of empire’ in exchange for the 
capture of Nikephoros. Tzimiskes revealed the letter’s contents to Nikephoros and exhorted him to action. (2) When the troops sought to 
elevate Nikephoros II to the imperial dignity he initially refused and offered the insignia to Ioannes instead. Ioannes also promptly refused 
the offer and joined the calls for Nikephoros’ elevation. 
 
Source: Psellos, Historia Syntomos ed. Aerts 99. 
Details: The Historia Syntomos records that Theophano had wanted to appoint Ioannes as the successor to Romanos even before her 
marriage to Nikephoros. However, Ioannes had declined the empress’ requests and entreated her to take Nikephoros as her husband.  
(1028) Romanos III Argyros  Source: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 374 (trans. Wortley 353). 
Details: Romanos III, the eparchos of Constantinople, was brought into the palace shortly before the death of Constantine VIII. He was 
then given two choices: divorce his wife, marry Zoe, and be proclaimed emperor; or be blinded. Skylitzes records that Romanos was 
undecided and speechless when presented with these choices. It was his wife’s decision to willingly accept tonsure that spared him from 
having to make a choice. 
(1042) Theodora  Source: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 226-229; ed. Renauld I, 108 (trans. Sewter 144). 
Details: During the rebellion against Michael V, the Constantinopolitan crowd sought to proclaim Theodora. She initially refused their 
calls. Certain members of the crowd reportedly grew tired of trying to persuade her and forced entry to the Petrion monastery. They 
brought Theodora out by force, and drew knives to coerce her. A ‘radiant robe’ was then placed upon her, and the crowd escorted her to 
Hagia Sophia for her proclamation. 
(1057) Katakalon Kekaumenos  Source: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 487 (trans. Wortley 454). 
Details: During the planning phase of Isaakios I’s rebellion against Michael VI, the conspirators considered who should be appointed as 
their leader. Katakalon Kekaumenos was reportedly considered the superior choice on account of his bravery and experience. However, 
Kekaumenos refused the promotion and immediately declared Isaakios to be the emperor. He encouraged his compatriots to do likewise.  
(1057) Isaakios I Komnenos  Source: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. ed. Impellizzeri II, 180-183, 216-219, 286-287; Renauld  II, 85, 102, 136 (trans. Sewter 278, 294, 
328). 
Details: (1) Isaakios was persistently reluctant to press his own claims to the throne. (2) He was selected to act as leader of the rebellion 
against Michael VI by the other commanders, however, he was reluctant and offered to hand authority to the future Constantine X even 
after the will of the army had been made known. Constantine X refused to accept and supposedly signed a document renouncing all 
aspirations to basileia. (3) During Psellos’ embassy to Isaakios, the usurper-emperor revealed to him that he had not donned the imperial 
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power, and he had been ‘persuaded’ to this course of action by them. 
 
Source: Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 489-491 (trans. Wortley 456-457). 
Details: At the outset of the conspiracy against Michael VI, the conspirators reportedly convinced Isaakios to join them, mobilise his 
forces, and accept the proclamation (8 June 1057) only with great reluctance. 
(1059) Ioannes Komnenos  Source: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 80-83. 
Details: Since Isaakios I was presumed to be on his deathbed he called upon his brother, Ioannes, to accept the imperial office and succeed 
him. Ioannes was reluctant to consent to his proclamation. His wife, upon hearing his refusals, entreated him to think of the consequences 
that would be suffered by the Komnenoi if another family were to take the throne. Despite being warned that his family would likely be 
killed, Ioannes continued to refuse basileia and fled to a hiding place within the palace. Constantine X was crowned before Ioannes could 
be found. 
(1059) Constantine X Doukas  Source: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 274-303; ed. Renauld II, 129-136 (trans. Sewter 322-329).  
Details: (1) During the revolt of Isaakios I against Michael VI, Constantine X was invited by Isaakios to accept the imperial position and 
lead the revolt himself. However, Constantine refused (in writing) and allowed Isaakios to accede in his place. This was supposedly the 
will of God, who would later guide Constantine to the throne in a peaceful manner. (2) When Isaakios was presumed to be on his deathbed, 
he took Psellos’ advice and called upon Constantine to assume the throne. When Isaakios had recovered somewhat, he regretted having 
promised power to Constantine, and the latter was fearful that he would be opposed. When Isaakios relapsed, Psellos claims to have taken 
charge and seated Constantine on the throne before investing him with the red buskins. 
(1066/7) Nikoulitzas Delphinas  Source: Kekaumenos, Strategikon, ed. Vasilevskij pp.66-71. 
Details: Delphinas, a relative of Kekaumenos, was reportedly caught up in the Larissaean revolt of 1066/7 after having warned Constantine 
X of its impending outbreak. He had secretly been approached by its leaders and feigned agreement with their aims. When the conspiracy 
became public the Larisseans seized him and sought to appoint him as their commander. Despite his repeated protests, he was eventually 
convinced to accept and proclaimed emperor when they threatened his life. Kekaumenos makes clear that Delphinas did not rebel out of 
a desire for his own acclamation, but in order to save himself from the violence of the people. 
(1071) Michael VII Doukas  Source: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 342-345; ed. Renauld II, 163-164 (trans. Sewter 356-357). 
Details: Michael VII was reluctant to challenge the rule of his mother and Romanos IV. Michael asked others, including the kaisar Ioannes 
Doukas and his mother, to help him lead the state. Psellos even reports that the emperor was so deferential to his mother that he had 
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Source: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 246-251. 
Details: In his account of Botaneiates’ accession, Bryennios describes how Michael VII willingly took the tonsure and admitted to the 
future Alexios I that he had been considering abdicating the throne for a long time.  
(1073/4) Ioannes Doukas  Source: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 176-181. 
Details: Bryennios notes that the Kaisar Ioannes Doukas, on account of his impeccable qualities, earlier could have claimed the imperial 
title for himself had he so wished. Roussel, after capturing Ioannes in 1073/4, sought to use him to garner the support of the local cities 
and the elite of Constantinople. Ioannes was initially reluctant to be proclaimed by Roussel, but later became an active participant in the 
rebellion. 
(1077) Nikephoros Bryennios 
the Elder  
Source: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 226-231. 
Details: Shortly before the capture of Traianoupolis, after Nikephoros Bryennios had been joined by his brother Ioannes, and the Thracian 
and Macedonian troops, he was offered basileia by them. Ioannes Bryennios, had supposedly brought imperial insignia with him and 
intended to invest his brother. Ioannes called upon the other notables present to persuade Nikephoros to accept, but Nikephoros refused. 
After the capture of Traianoupolis and the acclamation of Nikephoros as emperor by the inhabitants of the city, the assembled generals 
and troops approached the Nikephoros’ tent and forced him to accept the imperial purple and put on the red shoes. 
(1078) Konstantios Doukas  Source: Bryennios, Histoire, ed. Gautier 246-251. 
Details: Before Michael VII abdicated and received the tonsure, Alexios Komnenos entreated him to appoint a successor other than 
Nikephoros III. Alexios proposed that Konstantios Doukas, Michael’s brother, should be named as his successor and invested with 
basileia. Alexios had the emperor’s words hastily recorded and sealed in an official document, and entreated Konstantios to follow him 
to the Great Palace in order to see him invested as senior emperor. Konstantios, due to his youthful naiveté, believed that he would be 
well treated under Botaneiates and therefore refused basileia. Instead, he went with Alexios to welcome Botaneiates and swear fidelity. 
(1081) Alexios I Komnenos  Source: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 74-75 (trans. Frankopan 67-68). 
Details: Alexios was reluctant to engage in rebellion at all and gave his brother, Isaakios, precedence at all times. Although Alexios 
enjoyed the support of the army he reportedly flattered his brother by encouraging him to seek power. Knowing that Isaakios would not 
carry enough support to be proclaimed anyway, Alexios made a pretence of deferring to his authority. The troops assembled around the 
command tent to deliberate the choice of emperor, and Isaakios then attempted to put the red sandals onto Alexios’ feet. Alexios repeatedly 
objected, and Isaakios reminded him of a prophetic vision foretelling Alexios’ rule (a vision that Alexios had been similarly reluctant to 
tell his brother about and was unsure was valid). Recognising the truth of the prophecy, and the army’s desire for Alexios’ rule, Isaakios 
forced the sandals onto Alexios’ feet, and the proclamation ensued. 
(1118) Nikephoros Bryennios 
the Younger  
Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 6-7, 10 (trans. Magoulias 6, 8). 







(Date) Reluctant Individual Description 
unwilling to act against Ioannes II’s claims by capturing the Great Palace and taking the throne as his own. (2) When a second plot focused 
around Bryennios and Anna was discovered early in Ioannes II’s reign, Bryennios was again described as disinclined to pursue basileia.  
(1183) Andronikos I 
Komnenos  
Source: Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of Thessaloniki, Melville-Jones 44-51. 
Details: Andronikos initially feigned a desire to leave the political realm, but the people forced him to remain. They decided that he should 
be invited to rule alongside Alexios II, and declared that if he should prove reluctant he should be persuaded or forced: “Better that he 
should suffer something that he did not want, than that the world should be ruined.” Andronikos became depressed by the suggestions that 
he should be promoted as he disliked the idea of being accused of infidelity to his oaths to Manuel I and Alexios II. He said that he would 
return to exile instead, and then began striking himself and tearing at his hair before seeking a means of escaping those proclaiming him 
in the Polytimos chamber of the Blachernai Palace. Eustathios suggests that this attempt at escape was feigned so that Andronikos could 
express his joy at his proclamation and laugh at his supporters, unseen by anyone else. The Palace Guard prevented his escape, and the 
Patriarch bound him with a metaphorical stock and chain. Andronikos was restrained by his supporters and the red buskins were forced 
onto his kicking feet. 
 
Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 270-271, 346 (trans. Magoulias 150-151, 191). 
Details: (1) Andronikos was bade to accept his proclamation and, following his acclamation in the Polytimos Chamber, was held firmly 
in place by his supporters as they invested him with the insignia of office and seated him upon the imperial golden couch. (2) Andronikos 
was also involved in a failed recusatio: as Isaakios II and his supporters surrounded Andronikos at the Great Palace, the emperor, after a 
brief attempt at resistance, dispatched a messenger to calm the crowd and offered to cede his crown to his younger son, Manuel. 
(1185) Isaakios II Angelos  Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 284, 345 (trans. Magoulias 157, 190). 
Details: (1) During the Nikaian revolt of 1184, after the death of the Nikaian leader Theodoros Kantakouzenos, Isaakios was reportedly 
enjoined to replace him. Isaakios stepped aside from the leadership contest, but looked to the future and believed the imperial office to be 
reserved for his family. (2) When Isaakios was proclaimed by the assembled masses in Hagia Sophia he was confused by the coronation 
and, although desiring basileia, was concerned at how difficult it would be to overthrow Andronikos. Ioannes Doukas, removed his own 
hat and proffered his head to receive the crown in place of Isaakios. However, the crowd made it clear that they would only be satisfied 
with Isaakios, who permitted himself to be invested soon after. 
(1204) Nikolaos Kannavos  Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 562 (trans. Magoulias 308). 
Details: Choniates records that, in January 1204, the senate and Constantinopolitan crowds sought to replace Alexios IV and Isaakios II. 
They assembled at Hagia Sophia and chose Nikolaos Kannavos on the third day of deliberations (27 January), when they ‘anointed him 
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(1204) Constantine Laskaris  Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 571-572 (trans. Magoulias 314). 
Details: Constantine Doukas and Constantine Laskaris were considered candidates to succeed Alexios V at an assembly in Hagia Sophia. 
Laskaris eventually received basileia ‘by lot’ but refused to accept the insignia of office when they were offered to him by the patriarch. 
(1259) Michael VIII 
Palaiologos  
Source: Imperatoris Michaeli Palaeologi de vita sua, ed. Grégoire 453-455 (trans. Dennis 1243-1244). 
Details: Michael VIII provides a brief autobiographical account of his life and accession to the throne. He claims to have been raised to 
authority by the force of God’s will: ‘I did not persuade anyone, but was myself persuaded. I did not bring force to bear on anyone, but 
was myself forced.’ 
 
Source: Akropolites, Historia, ed. Heisenberg 158-159, 161 (trans. Macrides 344, 346, 351). 
Details: (1) Michael refused to assume the regency and become guardian to Ioannes IV because of the oaths he had sworn to Theodoros 
II and Ioannes. The clergy subsequently provided him with their ‘unwritten consent’ and then produced a signed document that would 
excuse him from any wrongdoing implied by his former oath. (2) Akropolites comments that he was then raised ‘willingly or unwillingly, 
to imperial eminence, constrained greatly by the prominent men and those for whom public affairs were a concern.’ 
 
Source: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 96, 104, 130. 
Details: (1) Following the murder of Mouzalon, Michael was chosen to be guardian to the young emperor Ioannes. Michael was selected 
on account of his impeccable qualities and agreed to take on the role of the emperor’s tutor. His elevation to the rank of despotes was 
granted by others and Michael had remained silent during the deliberations, neither actively seeking nor rejecting the promotion. (2) When 
subsequently called upon by the nobility to assume the imperial office, Michael questioned his worthiness and offered to abdicate if either 
he or his son were found undeserving. 
(1295) Alexios Philanthropenos  Source: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 243-247. 
Details: Alexios was persuaded by a Cretan military unit to enter into rebellion. After giving a speech invoking his affection for his men 
and the difficulty of the endeavour, he was said to have been convinced to acquiesce to their demand that he assume the supreme office. 
He refused to accept the insignia even though he was urged to do so by senior figures. 
(1341) Ioannes VI 
Kantakouzenos  
Source: Kantakouzenos, Historiarum, ed. Schopen I, 365-370. 
Details: (1) When Andronikos III fell ill at Didymoteichon in 1330 he reportedly called upon Ioannes Kantakouzenos to act as regent to 
his yet unborn son. Andronikos had repeatedly entreated Ioannes to accept the insignia and title of co-emperor - a promotion that Ioannes 
continually rejected. Ioannes asserted that he was content with his position as megas domestikos, in which he shared almost equal status 
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October) co-emperor with Ioannes V. His claims to legitimacy then owed much to Andronikos’ offers to elevate him and share imperial 
power. 
 
Source: Gregoras, Historia, ed. Schopen II, 580, 585-586, 593-594, 604, 611-612. 
Details: (1) The Emperor Andronikos III had often asked Kantakouzenos to accept the imperial insignia and reign alongside him. (2) 
Andronikos later asked Ioannes to reign with Ioannes V in order to ensure the boy’s security. However, Kantakouzenos continually 
rejected the insignia and imperial attire that were offered to him, claiming that he did not need nor desire basileia. (3) When Apokaukos 
and the regency acted against Ioannes VI in 1341, Gregoras reports that Kantakouzenos was still reticent to pursue imperial power and 








Table 3: Cases of usurpation-related imperial repentance 
(Earliest Expression) Emperor Description 
(Jun 713) Artemios-Anastasios II Within a fortnight of assuming the throne, Artemios-Anastasios had blinded and exiled Theodoros Myakios and Georgios Bouraphos, 
commanders of the Thrakesion and Opsikion themata, who had helped him to overthrow Philippikos. Rouphos, the individual 
responsible for the physical blinding of Philippikos, appears to have remained unpunished. The sequence may have been an attempt 
by Artemios-Anastasios to be seen to atone for the circumstances of his accession, or at least to distance him from wrongdoing by 
bringing justice to those responsible for the conspiracy. 
Sources: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 383 (trans. Mango and Scott 533); Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos ed. Mango 
114-117; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. Bekker 170. 
(Oct 829) Michael II On his deathbed, Michael allegedly asked Theophilos to punish his co-conspirators, those responsible for the murder of Leon V. We 
may question whether this story was intended as part of a campaign by Theophilos to revive Michael’s reputation and be seen to 
atone for the wrongdoing of his accession. 
Sources: Symeon Magister, Chronicon, ed. Wahlgren 217; Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 36 (trans. Kaldellis 49); 
Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 85-86; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 124-127; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. 
Bekker 214-215; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 49-50 (trans. Wortley 51-52). 
(Oct/Nov 829) Theophilos Theophilos complied with his father’s request to punish those responsible for the murder of Leon V by arresting (and subsequently 
executing) certain of the co-conspirators after a silention. This was reportedly his first official act as emperor, although there are 
chronological discrepancies in the narratives. 
Sources: Symeon Magister, Chronicon, ed. Wahlgren 217; Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 36 (trans. Kaldellis 49);  
Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 85-86; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 124-127; Leon Grammatikos, Chronographia, ed. 
Bekker 214-215; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 49-50 (trans. Wortley 51-52). 
(Aug 886) Basileios I Basileios was alleged to have had visions of Michael III prior to his own death which prompted him to feel remorse for the murder 
that had permitted his accession to sole rule. According to The Life of Saint Basil the Younger, and stories told to Liudprand of 
Cremona during his embassy to Constantinople, the construction of several churches in the city was believed to be associated with 
Basileios’ atonement. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Davidic persona that Basileios adopted in imperial ideology throughout 
his reign, would naturally have suggested his association with penitential activities. 
Sources: The Life of Saint Basil the Younger, ed. Talbot, Sullivan, and McGrath 68-69; Liudprand of Cremona, Antapodosis, ed. 
Chiesa §10 (trans. Squatriti 49). 
(Aug-Sep 886) Leon VI Leon, who later made recourse to the Davidic/Theodosian ceremony of repentance for the sin of tetragamy, also sought to redeem 
his father’s image. As one of the first acts of his reign, he arranged the translation and reburial of Michael III’s remains in the 
Macedonian imperial mausoleum.  
Sources: Georgios Monachos Continuatus, ed. Bekker 848-849; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 172 (trans. Wortley 
166). 
(c.946-948) Romanos I Romanos allegedly had a dream in which he saw his son thrown into the fires of Hell, but was himself saved thanks to the last-minute 
intervention of the Virgin. He interpreted this dream as a sign that he was doomed to share his son’s fate if he did not atone for the 
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ceremony of repentance in which he was whipped and his sins read aloud. He received intercessory prayers, was granted an 
absolution, and the record of his sins was buried with him. The story is not recorded by Skylitzes, who instead assigns penitential 
motives to Romanos’ building works and acts of philanthropia. 
Sources: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 438-439; Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 237 (trans. Wortley 228). 
(Dec 969) Ioannes I  Ioannes was made to perform the Davidic/Theodosian ritual of repentance, outside Hagia Sophia, before Patriarch Polyeuktos would 
agree to perform his coronation. As part of the conditions for Polyeuktos’ assistance, the Empress Theophano, who was believed to 
have helped Ioannes murder Nikephoros II, was exiled from the Great Palace. Balantes and Atzypotheodoros, who were responsible 
for the actual murder and mutilation of Nikephoros, were also exiled. Ioannes later performed acts of philanthropia that were said 
to be attempts to expiate his sin. The iconography on several issues of his coinage (anonymous issues bearing an image of the Mother 
of God) may also have been intended to help expiate his wrongdoing. Leon Diakonos reports that, on his deathbed, Ioannes finally 
admitted to the sin of murdering Nikephoros, and implies that this admission saved Ioannes from Hell. 
Sources: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 98-99 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 147-148); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. 
Thurn 285 (trans. Wortley 272). 
(c.1034-1041) Michael IV Michael is said to have performed numerous private acts of repentance as a result of his guilt over his involvement in the murder of 
Romanos III. Alongside acts of philanthropia, he associated with monks and adopted their lifestyle as a means of penitence. He 
subsequently refrained from intercourse with Empress Zoe as a result of their advice. 
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 132-135, 152-155, 156-163, 176-181; ed. Renauld I, 62, 71, 73-76, 83-85 
(trans. Sewter 96,  105-109, 116-118); Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Thurn 397-398 (trans. Wortley 375). 
(20/21 Apr 1042) Michael V In the hours before his blinding, Michael tearfully espoused remorse for his actions in exiling and tonsuring Zoe. 
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 234-235; ed. Renauld I, 111-112 (trans. Sewter 147). 
(Aug 1057) Isaakios I In Psellos’ account of his embassy to Isaakios he records that Isaakios and his supporters tearfully espoused their remorse for having 
shed the blood of their countrymen in a civil war. Attaleiates, reports numerous rumours in circulation about ‘moisture’ that was 
found in Isaakios’ sarcophagus. This moisture was variously attributed as evidence of Isaakios repentance or damnation.  
Sources: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 200-203; ed. Renauld II, 94-95 (trans. Sewter 286-287); Attaleiates, Historia, 
ed. Pérez Martin 69-70 (trans. Kaldellis and Krallis 124-127). 
(c. Apr/May 1081) Alexios I Alexios reportedly called upon the Church to establish a suitable penance for him to perform in propitiation of the violence committed 
by his army upon its entry into Constantinople (1081). He performed penance for forty days, in emulation of Christ. Other members 
of the Komnenian family were reported to have joined him in performing acts of atonement. 
Sources: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 99 (trans. Frankopan 90-91). 
(Apr 1182) Andronikos I Andronikos is reported to have expressed remorse for the death of Manuel at his cousin’s tomb, facilitating a form of repentance for 
his earlier conspiracies against him. Later, he is reported have cited the biblical figure of King David as an allegorical explanation 
of his periods of exile and life spent among the Turks. A image of David and Goliath visible near Andronikos’ planned mausoleum 
was reinterpreted (by Choniates) as a reference to Andronikos’ murder of Alexios II. It is highly probable that Andronikos (like 
Michael VIII) made recourse to Davidic ideology in an attempt to atone for the murder of Alexios. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 256-257, (trans. Magoulias 143, 184); Eustathios of Thessalonike, The Capture of 
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(Sep 1185) Isaakios II Just hours before his proclamation by the assembled crowds, Isaakios begged forgiveness for the crime of killing 
Hagiochristophorites, at the anastathmos of Hagia Sophia where murderers and wrongdoers traditionally confessed and sought 
forgiveness. The murder won him the throne and the story was undoubtedly promoted by the Angeloi to exonerate Isaakios of guilt 
even before his assumption of the imperial title. 
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 342-343 (trans. Magoulias 188-189).  
(c.1195-1203) Alexios III Choniates gives two contrasting accounts of Alexios’ thoughts regarding his usurpation: in the first, Alexios showed no remorse for 
the overthrow or blinding of his brother, not even acknowledging what had taken place; in the second, Alexios was said to be 
‘conscience-stricken’ by what he had done and feared that ‘Justice’ would later catch up with him. Although no penitential acts were 
connected with this guilt, his contrition was said to be ‘heartfelt’,  
Sources: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 457, 547-548 (trans. Magoulias 251, 299). 
(1262-1267) Michael VIII Michael performed the Davidic/Theodosian ritual of repentance on several occasions before receiving an official absolution from 
the Church for his treatment of Ioannes IV. His propagandists employed the David story as a means of rhetorically absolving him of 
guilt, and to provide a precedent for his atonement. Michael’s coinage also employed the iconography of an imperial penitent before 
the heavenly intercessor St Michael. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent I, 280-283; II, 330-331, 396-399; IV, 516-517; Gregoras, 
Historia, Schopen I, 107-108; Arsenios, Testamentum, ed. Migne 956-957; Manuelis Holoboli Orationes ed. Treu p.23-27. 
(1295-1310) Andronikos II Andronikos made numerous efforts to redeem his father’s memory: c.1295 he met with Ioannes IV to apologise for what his father 
had done and claimed to have gained Ioannes’ favour in return. He later undertook to translate the relics of Patriarch Arsenios and 
Ioannes IV to Constantinople where they were interred. Ioannes’ remains were associated with a Palaiologan foundation, thus 
honouring him and associating him with the dynasty. A final ceremony of absolution involving the relics of Arsenios was performed 
(1310), during which the deceased Patriarch posthumously forgave Michael’s transgressions, bringing the Arsenite Schism (1265-
1310) to an end. Andronikos’ coinage retained the penitential iconography of his father’s but replaced Saint Michael with the figure 
of Christ, enhancing the entreaty. 
Sources: Pachymeres, Relations Historiques, ed. Failler and Laurent III, 94-99, 118-119; Gregoras, Historia, Schopen I, 173-174, 









Table 4: A list of emperors, usurpers, and conspirators reported to have sought church asylum 
(Date) Name Details 
(355) Claudius Silvanus Sanctuary: An unspecified church. (Cologne) 
Outcome: Dragged from sanctuary inside the church and executed. 
Source: Ammianus, Rerum Gestarum, 15.5.31. 
(472) Anthemius [Western Emperor] Sanctuary: St. Peters, or Santa Maria in Trastevere. (Rome) 
Outcome: Captured and beheaded by Ricimer’s supporters while taking refuge in the church. 
Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 296-297 (trans. Jeffreys 206-207). 
(476) Basiliscus  Sanctuary: An unspecified church. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Granted assurance by Zeno and exiled to Cappadocia with his family (where they were left to die of exposure). 
Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 303 (trans. Jeffreys 210); Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 124-125 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 192). 
(479) Marcian Sanctuary: Church of the Holy Apostles. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Removed from the Church, tonsured, and exiled to the Fortress of Papyrios in Cappadocia. 
Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 127 (trans. Mango and Scott 195). 
(490) Arcadius [praetorian 
praefectus] 
Sanctuary: The Great Church. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Escaped execution, but had his properties confiscated by Zeno. 
Source: John of Nikiu, Chronicle trans. Charles 88; Malalas, Chronicle, ed. Thurn 318 (trans. Jeffreys 219). 
(562) Abblabius Sanctuary: Church of the Theotokos at Blachernai. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Denied access to the church because of the accusations of treason arising from his involvement in a plot with Marcellus 
to assassinate Justinian. Captured by the imperial guard and tortured for information. 
Source: Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Thurn 426-427 (trans. Jeffreys 301-303) 
(545) John ‘the Tyrant’ [Successor to 
the mutineer Stotzas, and loyalist of 
Gontharis] 
Sanctuary: An unspecified church. (Carthage) 
Outcome: Left the Church after receiving assurance but was subsequently executed for rebellion. 
Source: Procopius, History of the Wars, ed. Dewing II, 420-421, 454-455; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 215 (trans. 
Mango and Scott 305-306). 
(602) Germanus [patricius, and 
father-in-law of Maurice’s co-
emperor, Theodosios] 
Sanctuary: First to the Church of the Theotokos founded by Cyrus Panopolis, and then to Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Maurice sent the imperial tutor, Stephen, to persuade Germanus to leave the Church of the Theotokos, but was 
unsuccessful. Germanus then fled to Hagia Sophia where Maurice attempted to remove him by force but was prevented by a crowd 
favourable to Germanus.  
Source: Theophylaktos Simokattes, Historiae, ed. de Boor 329-331 (trans. Whitby 222-223). 
(603) Constantina, Germanus, and 
Philippicus.  
Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Germanus persuaded Constantina and her daughters to seek sanctuary in Hagia Sophia while he attempted to have 
himself proclaimed by the Greens. Phocas attempted to remove Constantina and her daughters by force. Patriarch Kyriakos 
opposed these attempts and Phocas was made to swear an oath of assurance concerning their safety. 







(Date) Name Details 
(711) Tiberios [son and co-emperor 
of Justinian II] 
Sanctuary: Church of the Theotokos at Blachernai. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Tiberios was taken to the sanctuary by his grandmother when Philippikos’ troops entered the city. He was dragged from 
the altar, stripped of his cross and phylacteries, denuded of attire, and had his throat slit. 
Source: Nikephoros, Historia Syntomos, ed. Mango 112-113; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 380 (trans. Mango and 
Scott 529). 
(797) Sons of Constantine V Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: After giving them an oath of assurance the eunuch Aetios escorted them from the Church, where a crowd had gathered, 
and they were exiled to Athens. 
Source: Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. de Boor 473 (trans. Mango and Scott 650). 
(803) Bardanes Tourkos Sanctuary: The Monastery of Heraklius at Kios. (Kios or Prousa on the Bithynian coast) 
Outcome: Received the tonsure at the monastery before being escorted to his own monastic foundation on Prote. Subsequently 
blinded. 
Source: Theophanes Continuatus, ed. Bekker 9; ed. Featherstone and Codoñer 18-19. 
(813) Michael I Sanctuary: The Palace Church of the Pharos. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Sought sanctuary when Leon IV entered Constantinople. Leon accepted Michael’s abdication, had the family tonsured, 
and ordered the castration of Michael’s sons. 
Source: Genesios, ed. Lesmueller-Werner and Thurn 6 (trans. Kaldellis 8). 
(971) Leon the kouropalates and 
Nikephoros Phokas [the brother, and 
nephew, of Nikephoros II] 
Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Sought asylum after being discovered trying to seize the Great Palace from Ioannes I by subterfuge. They were 
subsequently dragged from the church by the droungarios Leon’s troops and exiled to Kalonymos in Bithynia. Ioannes then 
ordered their blinding. 
Source: Leon Diakonos, Historia, ed. Hase 147 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan 191). 
(1042) Michael V Sanctuary: The Stoudios Monastery. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Fled the Constantinopolitan crowds attacking the Great Palace. He was forced from the sanctuary of the monastery and 
paraded through streets of Constantinople by the crowds, before being blinded and exiled to the Elegmoi Monastery in Bithynia. 
Source: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri I, 228-243; ed. Renauld I, 109-116 (trans. Sewter 144-151). 
(1047) Leon Tornikios and his 
supporter Ioannes Vatatzes 
Sanctuary: Fortress of Bulgarophygon. (South-West of Adrianople) 
Outcome: After the collapse of his army, Leon sought asylum near Adrianople. He allegedly threatened to kill himself if anyone 
tried to drag him from the altar. An oath of assurance was offered by an unspecified commander of the imperial forces and the 
Leon surrendered with Vatatzes. They were transported to Constantinople where Constantine IX ordered them blinded outside the 
city gates. 
Source: Psellos, Chronographia, ed. Impellizzeri II, 64-67; ed. Renauld II, 28-29 (trans. Sewter 219). 
(1056) Theodosios Monomachos the 
proedros 
Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Denied asylum after attempting to foment a populist uprising that would have installed him as successor to Theodora. 
He was captured by the imperial guard and exiled to Pergamon. 







(Date) Name Details 
(1081) The Komnenian Women Sanctuary: First at St Nicholas’, and then at Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople)  
Outcome: The women sought asylum at St Nicholas’ (near Hagia Sophia) when Alexios left to commence his rebellion. Anna 
Dalassena was then permitted to pray at Hagia Sophia where she subsequently sought asylum and received assurance of safety 
from Nikephoros III. The women were then kept in comfortable confinement at the Petrion Monastery for duration of Alexios’ 
revolt. 
Source: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 66-67 (trans. Frankopan 60). 
(1081) Nikephoros III Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Nikephoros fled the Great Palace to Hagia Sophia when Alexios’ troops entered the city. He had sought asylum, but was 
persuaded to take the tonsure the next day and was sent into confinement at the Peribleptos. 
Source: Anna Komnene, Alexias, ed. Reinsch and Kambylis 86 (trans. Frankopan 78). 
(1181) Maria Porphyrogenita and 
Renier of Montferrat  
Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: After a thwarted attempt to assassinate the protosebastos Alexios, the pair were accused of treason (although no action 
had been taken against them). They sought sanctuary in Hagia Sophia before Easter 1181, were received by Patriarch Boradiotes, 
and rejected an offer of amnesty from the regency council of Alexios II. The populace flocked to support them and open conflict 
between the two sides erupted on 2 May. The next day an amnesty was negotiated. Maria and Renier were granted assurances, 
reconciled with the regency council, and permitted to return to the Palace. 
Source: Niketas Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 233-241 (trans. Magoulias 131-136). 
(1185) Isaakios II Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Isaakios sought sanctuary at Hagia Sophia after killing Hagiochristophorites. During the night Isaakios’ supporters 
among the elite, and the Constantinopolitan crowd mobilised at Hagia Sophia. A popular revolt ensued, prompting Andronikos’ 
flight from the city and Isaakios’ elevation. 
Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 342-343 (trans. Magoulias 188-189). 
(1191/1193) Isaakios Komnenos 
[Nephew of Andronikos I] 
Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Isaakios escaped imprisonment and fled to Hagia Sophia where he allegedly proceeded to incite the Constantinopolitan 
crowds. He was captured and tortured, eventually dying of his wounds. 
Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 423 (trans. Magoulias 233). 
(1193/1194) Unnamed son of 
Andronikos Komnenos, Governor of 
Thessalonike  
Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Prompted by the blinding of his father, Andronikos Komnenos, the unnamed Komnenos sought sanctuary in Hagia 
Sophia and attempted to have himself proclaimed. The crowds remained unaware of his ambitions because he had entered the 
Church in secrecy. He was dragged out and blinded. 
Source: Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 428 (trans. Magoulias 235). 
(1200) Ioannes Komnenos(-
Axouchos) 
Sanctuary: Hagia Sophia. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Following the suppression of a public revolt focused on Hagia Sophia, and the withdrawal of the Varangians from the 
area, on 31 July Ioannes Komnenos(-Axouchos) marched into Hagia Sophia and sought asylum. Patriarch Kamateros withdrew 
and refused to meet Ioannes. Ioannes supporters flocked to the Church and a popular revolt ensued. Ioannes left the Church to 







(Date) Name Details 
Source: Mesarites, Palastrevolution, ed. Heisenberg 20; Choniates, Historia, ed. van Dieten 526 (trans. Magoulias 289). 
(1305) Ioannes Drimys Sanctuary: Mosele monastery. (Constantinople) 
Outcome: Discovered preparing a revolt against Andronikos II using the monastery for shelter. He was captured and imprisoned. 
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